Do interest groups strategically select lobbying tactics in response to the legislative context of policies they wish to influence? As rational actors, interest groups should be keen to spend their resources wisely by responding strategically to legislative contexts. This research suggests a theoretical and empirical framework and attempts to explain variations in interest group behavior at the policy level. The empirical design associates direct and indirect interest group lobbying activities with specific policies and tests the hypothesis that interest groups use legislative context as a part of their decision calculus when considering how to lobby Congress. I find that measures of legislative context are important components of models of direct and indirect lobbying. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2007.]
Abstract Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.
A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the reporting of lobbying activities by organizations that have employees who lobby on the organizations' behalf and have the option to report their lobbying expenses under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 or applicable Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provisions that they use for tax purposes, focusing on: (1) the differences between the LDA and IRC section 4911 and 162(e) definitions of lobbying; (2) the impact that differences in the definitions may have on registration and reporting under LDA, including information on the number of organizations using each definition and the expenses they have reported; and (3) identifying and analyzing options, including harmonizing the three definitions, that may better ensure that the public disclosure purposes of LDA are realized."
This report discusses the constitutional issues that may arise with respect to a federal law that would require disclosures of efforts to stimulate so-called "grassroots" lobbying activities by those entities and persons who are compensated to engage in such activities.
This report is intended to provide a brief overview of the various potential restrictions upon or regulation of the lobbying activities of non-profit organizations.
This report is intended to provide a brief overview of the various potential restrictions, rules or regulations upon lobbying activities of non-profit organizations.
Do interest groups strategically select lobbying tactics in response to the legislative context of policies they wish to influence? As rational actors, interest groups should be keen to spend their resources wisely by responding strategically to legislative contexts. This research suggests a theoretical and empirical framework and attempts to explain variations in interest group behavior at the policy level. The empirical design associates direct and indirect interest group lobbying activities with specific policies and tests the hypothesis that interest groups use legislative context as a part of their decision calculus when considering how to lobby Congress. I find that measures of legislative context are important components of models of direct and indirect lobbying.
Abstract This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to take part in lobbying activities or not. They are assumed to be group rule-utilitarian such that they follow the rule that, if followed by everyone else in their special interest group, would maximize their group's aggregate welfare. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the incumbent government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency model. I show the existence of equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to join lobbying activities. Therefore, the lobbyists are rather extremists than moderates. However, the competition between those extreme lobbies results in a more moderate policy outcome relative to that initially preferred by the biased government. Lobbies therefore guard against extremism, while acting as moderators of the government's preferences.
This report is intended to provide a brief overview of the various potential restrictions or regulations on lobbying activities of non-profit organizations. Public charities, social welfare organizations, religious groups, and other non-profit, tax-exempt organizations are not generally prohibited from engaging in all lobbying or public policy advocacy merely because of their tax-exempt status.
This report is intended to provide a brief overview of the various potential restrictions or regulations on lobbying activities of non-profit organizations. Public charities, social welfare organizations, religious groups, and other non-profit, tax-exempt organizations are not generally prohibited from engaging in all lobbying or public policy advocacy merely because of their tax-exempt status.
The article examines the phenomenon of lobbying as actual practice in a pluralistic society, as a complex, modern institution of the political system, which provides a mechanism and tools for the influence of interested groups on decision-making by power structures. Competition between groups in lobbying interests is represented by a condition that ensures freedom and justice without recourse to the concepts of "social interest", "public interest" or "common good". With the help of theoretical and conceptual studies focused on the mechanisms of collective actions of interested groups and interest groups, it is shown that political decisions in modern public systems are no longer the prerogative of official institutions of power, but are the result of a compromise of groups. Lobbying has acquired indicators that are characteristic of institutions that are involved in the decision-making process, and the structures of the organization of lobbying activities reflect the current structure of political interest. It is shown that the historical development of lobbying activities and forms of interpretation of lobbying practices in various socio-political systems developed in the context of the logic of the formation of the socio-political system. The analysis of current regional models of lobbying activity, formed in different socio-political conditions, reflects the nature of the interaction between interest groups in society and demonstrates dependence on the structures of political interest, providing information about who and how transforms it into political decisions and actions. The British-American model of individualized lobbying, formed as a result of the symbiosis of political activity and business, is presented; the continental European model of corporate representation, formed as a result of changes in the rules of the game between business and the state; the Eastern European model of institutionally controlled lobbying with elements of "clientelism". The center of gravity in matters of regulation of lobbying practices has certain options. If in the British model the regulatory process concerns, first of all, politicians (the object of lobbying), then in the American model the lobbyists themselves and the market for lobbying services are subject to state regulation. It is emphasized that the normative indicator of the intensity and effectiveness of lobbying activity is the ability of the political system to solve systemic challenges, which is understood as the number and quality of access points available in it, using which interest groups can join the decision-making process of state authorities
AbstractAside from anecdotal evidence, lobbying activities and the role of vested interests in the EU have not been scrutinized. This article attempts to cast focus on the relationship between lobbying and aspects of innovation in the EU. The modest performance of the EU compared to the innovation frontier has been attributed to an array of factors, one of which is the adverse effect of vested interests. The lack of new, innovative enterprises has been identified as a decisive factor behind the productivity stagnation and lobbying by incumbents poses as a credible culprit. In this article, I create a novel firm‐level database through the cross‐fertilization of data from the growing Transparency Register (EC and EP), AMADEUS (BvD), the OECD, Eurostat, and the European Commission in order to address the complex relationship between vested interests, innovation, and competition. The preliminary findings indicate that more R&D intensive firms tend to spend significantly larger amount of funds on lobbying, primarily competing for EU grants and government procurement. Using data for country‐sector concentration, I find that the relationship is stronger in the presence of low competition. Despite the improvements required in the documentation of lobbying activities, these results provide preliminary tangible evidence on the effect of vested interests on innovation performance.
