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Abstract. In this article I attempt to do two things. First I consider in what sense it could be reasonable to talk of a 'Balkan mentality', shared across national divisions by all peoples in Southeastern Europe. I argue among other things that nationalism and its impact on culture and scholarship has been a major stumbling block for the conceptualisation of a shared 'Balkan mentality'. Secondly, I go on to examine one possible context in which a shared mentality could be said to have existed among the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. I suggest that such a context could be located in the pre‐nationalist Balkan society of the eighteenth century, a period in which the region was politically united by Ottoman rule. To illustrate the content of the mental outlook shared by the Balkan Orthodox in the eighteenth century I examine the autobiographical writings of three major authors, one writing in Greek (Caisarios Depontes), one in Bulgarian (Sofroni Vračanski) and one in Serbian (Matija Nenadović). I identify the shared mental elements reflected in their texts and point out how the transition to a national self‐conception taking place at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the Balkans, marked the end of this shared 'Balkan mentality'. The study is thus an exploration in the 'prehistory', as it were, of nationalism in the Balkans, an exploration which also looks at the symbolic origins nationalism in the region as reflected in the texts of two of the three authors.

The difficulties of defining the essence of populism and of circumscribing the range of application of this concept have determined a long-lasting controversy in the academic field. Among the main subjects under discussion, one question has arisen most frequently: can populism be considered as an ideology (a 'thin' ideology, in Freeden's sense) or must it be reduced to a political style which can be attached to any ideological background? Referring to the notion elaborated by Juan Linz in order to distinguish authoritarianism from totalitarianism, and on the basis of the empirical evidence, we suggest that populism must be seen neither as an ideology nor only as a style, but as a mentality, connected to a vision of the social order that is based on a belief in the innate virtues of the people, whose primacy is claimed as the source of legitimacy for the government.

This article explores the political, economic and ecological context within which environmental insecurity emerges and feeds back into a fortress mentality. Shortages of food, water and energy sources are the trigger for nefarious activities involving organized criminal networks, transnational corporations and governments at varying political levels. The consequences of such activities contribute to even more ruthless exploitation of rapidly vanishing natural resources, as well as the further diminishment of air, soil and water quality. These developments, in turn, exacerbate the competitive scramble by individuals, groups and nations for what is left. The accompanying insecurities and vulnerabilities ensure elite and popular support for self-interested 'security'. Accordingly, the 'fortress' is being constructed and reconstructed at individual, local, national and regional levels-as both an attitude of mind and a material reality. Fundamentally, the basis for this fortress mentality is linked to decades of neo-liberal policy and practice that have embedded an individualizing and competitive self-interest that, collectively, is overriding prudent and precautionary policy construction around climate change and environmental degradation. The net result is that security is being built on a platform of state, corporate and organized group wrongdoing and injustice, in many instances with the implied and/or overt consent of relevant publics. Yet, as long as the fortification continues apace, it will contribute to and further exacerbate varying levels of insecurity for all. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)