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The vital importance of the Indian Army as the guardian of the imperial order in India was never more evident than during the interwar years. The period from 1919 to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 was a testing time for the Raj; state authority was being challenged by a mounting nationalist movement, and public order was frequently disrupted by civil disobedience campaigns, as well as recurrent outbreaks of communal violence. In maintaining public order the colonial state had always been prepared to rely on that ultimate guarantee of its authority and power–the Indian Army. However, in frequent discussions of the deployment of the military in 'aid of civil power', the continued loyalty of the bulk of the army the Indian soldiers and officers, was never questioned, and seemed to be taken for granted.2 Yet, both the Government of India and the to be taken for granted.2 Yet, both the Government of India and the Army Headquarters were well awar that the 'loyalty' of the Army could never be guaranteed, and that it was conditional upon a stable and pacified recruiting base; if that base were to be 'subverted', then the Indian Army, or portions of it, would not only cease to be of use as an instrument of state power, but could ultimately pose a threat to the Raj itself

The development of the process of military-civilian integration (VGI) in the PRC, which in recent years has adopted the scale of a national strategy and aimed at creating an effective innovative system of science, technology and production in the country, combining military and civilian resources, in order to increase the capabilities of the military-industrial complex for the production of weapons and military equipment of a new generation for modernization of the PLA and at the same time — facilitating the transition of China's economic system to world-class high-tech production to ensure the country's international competitiveness in a new era. The goal of civil-military integration is to create a unified civil-military system and a unified strategic potential of China, in order to plan the development of the military and civil spheres on this basis with the rational use of resources. The estimates of Chinese analysts are given, who believe that the VGI should cover China's top-level national strategies (the "Going Out" strategy, the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, innovation-based development, strategies for achieving the status of a world power in critical areas: advanced high-tech manufacturing, space, the world ocean, artificial intelligence) and at the regional level (development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei zone, the Yangtze River Economic Belt, the West, the Northeast renewal strategy). The article analyzes the successes in the implementation of the VGI at the present stage, the problems on the way to its deepening and measures to resolve them. In the author's field of view is the efforts made in recent years in China to extend the strategy of the VGI to foreign economic activity and international scientific and technical cooperation.

Preventing the recurrence of civil war has become a critical problem for both scholarship and policy. Conventional wisdom urges the creation of capable, legitimate, and inclusive postwar states to reduce the risk of relapse into civil war, and international peacebuilders have often encouraged the formation of a new national army that would include members of the war's opposing sides. However, both the theoretical logics and the empirical record identifying military integration as a significant contributor to durable post–civil war peace are weak. An analysis of eleven cases finds little evidence that military integration played a substantial causal role in preventing the return to civil war. Military integration does not usually send a costly signal of the parties' commitment to peace, provide communal security, employ many possible spoilers, or act as a powerful symbol of a unified nation. It is therefore both unwise and unethical for the international community to press military integration on reluctant local forces.