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Analyse der Auswirkungen des Zusammenbruchs der Ölpreise Mitte der achtziger Jahre auf soziale Lage und Aktivitäten der betroffenen Ölarbeiter. In einem ersten Teil wird die Preisentwicklung im Ölsektor nachgezeichnet und auf gesamtgesellschaftliche Probleme bezogen. Der zweite Teil diskutiert die Lage der Ölindustrie mi den Auswirkungen auf Formen des Klassenkampfes: Schwächung der Gewerkschaften; selbstorganisierte Aktionen der Arbeiter; Tendenz zur klassenübergreifenden Einheit; Mobilisierung der Bauern; ethnische Spannungen; neue Allianzen und Spaltungen bei den Funktionären; Entwicklung eines harten Kerns von Arbeitern, die die Industrie selbst kontrollieren wollen. (DÜI-Wsl)

This article analyses oil elite formation in light of the wider transformation that is taking place in the global oil order due to the rise of powers from the Global South, including Russia: in particular, the expansion and integration of the state-owned oil companies into the global oil market. This is done by analysing the networks that the directors of the world's largest oil companies create through their affiliations with a) other corporations, b) policy planning bodies and c) with the state. The most important finding is that the increased cooperation between the Western private oil companies and the non-Western state-owned oil companies has not yet translated into increased integration between their respective elite networks. It is argued that this indicates we are witnessing a transition towards a more multi-polar global oil order that increasingly needs to take into account the rising powers of the Global South. © The Author(s) 2012.

Following the transfer of oil extraction and exploitation concessions to William Knox Darcy, and after five years of exploration, our country and, of course, the Middle East, on May 26, 1901, witnessed the eruption of the first well. The black substance that took the title of black gold, after many years and passing through the stages of historical transition and developments that took place in Iran and the Middle East, never lost any of its value and its impact on the developments of the societies involved has not diminished. On the other hand, it moved the train of development and progress of Iran, which had been in a deep sleep for several years, quickly, and it was once again proved to everyone that Iran, especially in the south, was the birthplace and fertility of the first in The world and the Middle East. The exploration of oil in Masjed-e-Soliman made this city the first oil city of Iran and the capital of oil in the ancient land of Iran and the Middle East, so that this important, new and brilliant season in the south and in line with Iran's progress.

In 1991, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) commenced the first Chinese national oil company equity oil investment overseas when it invested in a UN-sponsored oil sands project in Canada. Since then, the CNPC and the other Chinese national oil companies (Sinopec and the CNOOC) have steadily increased their equity oil investments in developing nations, sometimes with the assistance of various Chinese party and government organs. Viewed in the context of China's burgeoning oil consumption and plateauing oil production, these investments have led to accusations by Western analysts and policy makers that China is engaging in "mercantilism" by "locking up" oil supplies from vulnerable developing nations to assuage their mounting energy-security woes. Through examining Chinese oil engagement in Kazakhstan, this paper will analyze whether accusations of "mercantilism" can adequately capture the complexities and dynamics that drive Chinese oil company investment in developing nations. This will be achieved by first surveying contemporary debates regarding Chinese oil engagement abroad and then linking these debates to historical and contemporary conceptualizations of mercantilism. This will allow for a new multi-faceted definition of "oil mercantilist" behaviour, which will shift the label from a statement of ethical value to a statement of empirical fact that can be tested. This definition will then be used to examine the institutional contexts in China that support and counter contemporary accusations of oil mercantilism, and then to explore Chinese oil engagement in Kazakhstan from 1996 to the present day. This paper will contribute to emerging literature that suggests Chinese oil investment and diplomacy cannot be simply understood through mercantilist perspectives. Analyses of Chinese oil engagement need to recognize the important influence that China's institutional reforms have had on Chinese national oil companies' increasingly commercial approach to foreign investment, in addition to the unique host-country contexts China encounters through its oil investments.

In 1991, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) commenced the first Chinese National Oil Company (NOC) equity oil investment overseas when they invested in a UN-sponsored oil sands project in Canada. Since then, CNPC and the other Chinese NOCs (Sinopec & CNOOC) have steadily increased their equity oil investments in developing nations, sometimes with the assistance of various Chinese party and government organs. Viewed in the context of China's burgeoning oil consumption and plateauing oil production, these investments have led to accusations by Western analysts and policymakers that China is engaging in "mercantilism" by "locking up" oil supplies from vulnerable developing nations to assuage their mounting energy-security woes. Through examining Chinese oil-engagement in Kazakhstan, this paper will analyse whether accusations of "mercantilism" can adequately capture the complexities and dynamics that drive Chinese NOC investment in developing nations. This will be achieved by first surveying contemporary debates regarding Chinese oil-engagement abroad and then linking these debates to historical and contemporary conceptualisations of mercantilism. This will allow for a new multi-faceted definition of "oil mercantilist" behaviour, which will shift the label from a statement of ethical value to a statement of empirical fact that can be tested. This definition will then be used to examine the institutional contexts in China that support and counter contemporary accusations of oil mercantilism, and then to explore Chinese oil-engagement in Kazakhstan from 1996 to the present day. This paper will contribute to emerging literature that suggests Chinese oil investment and diplomacy cannot be simply understood through mercantilist perspectives. Analyses of Chinese oil engagement need to recognise the important influence that China's institutional reforms have had on Chinese NOCs' increasingly commercial approach to foreign investment, in addition to the unique host-country contexts China encounters through its oil investments. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

Not all barrels of oil are created equal: their extraction varies in both private cost and carbon intensity. Using a rich micro-dataset on World oil fields and estimates of their carbon intensities and private extraction costs, this paper quantifies the additional emissions and costs from having extracted the 'wrong' deposits. We do so by comparing historic deposit-level supplies to counterfactuals that factor in pollution costs, while keeping annual global consumption unchanged. Between 1992 and 2018, carbon misallocation amounted to at least 10.02 GtCO 2 with an environmental cost evaluated at 2 trillion US dollars (2018 US dollars). This translates into a significant supply-side ecological debt for major producers of dirty oil. Looking towards the future, we estimate the gains from making deposit-level extraction socially-optimal, and document the very unequal distribution of the subsequent stranded oil reserves across countries.

Not all barrels of oil are created equal: their extraction varies in both private cost and carbon intensity. Using a rich micro-dataset on World oil fields and estimates of their carbon intensities and private extraction costs, this paper quantifies the additional emissions and costs from having extracted the 'wrong' deposits. We do so by comparing historic deposit-level supplies to counterfactuals that factor in pollution costs, while keeping annual global consumption unchanged. Between 1992 and 2018, carbon misallocation amounted to at least 10.02 GtCO 2 with an environmental cost evaluated at 2 trillion US dollars (2018 US dollars). This translates into a significant supply-side ecological debt for major producers of dirty oil. Looking towards the future, we estimate the gains from making deposit-level extraction socially-optimal, and document the very unequal distribution of the subsequent stranded oil reserves across countries.

Not all barrels of oil are created equal: their extraction varies in both private cost and carbon intensity. Using a rich micro-dataset on World oil fields and estimates of their carbon intensities and private extraction costs, this paper quantifies the additional emissions and costs from having extracted the 'wrong' deposits. We do so by comparing historic deposit-level supplies to counterfactuals that factor in pollution costs, while keeping annual global consumption unchanged. Between 1992 and 2018, carbon misallocation amounted to at least 10.02 GtCO 2 with an environmental cost evaluated at 2 trillion US dollars (2018 US dollars). This translates into a significant supply-side ecological debt for major producers of dirty oil. Looking towards the future, we estimate the gains from making deposit-level extraction socially-optimal, and document the very unequal distribution of the subsequent stranded oil reserves across countries.

Not all barrels of oil are created equal: their extraction varies in both private cost and carbon intensity. Using a rich micro-dataset on World oil fields and estimates of their carbon intensities and private extraction costs, this paper quantifies the additional emissions and costs from having extracted the 'wrong' deposits. We do so by comparing historic deposit-level supplies to counterfactuals that factor in pollution costs, while keeping annual global consumption unchanged. Between 1992 and 2018, carbon misallocation amounted to at least 10.02 GtCO 2 with an environmental cost evaluated at 2 trillion US dollars (2018 US dollars). This translates into a significant supply-side ecological debt for major producers of dirty oil. Looking towards the future, we estimate the gains from making deposit-level extraction socially-optimal, and document the very unequal distribution of the subsequent stranded oil reserves across countries.

Not all barrels of oil are created equal: their extraction varies in both private cost and carbon intensity. Using a rich micro-dataset on World oil fields and estimates of their carbon intensities and private extraction costs, this paper quantifies the additional emissions and costs from having extracted the 'wrong' deposits. We do so by comparing historic deposit-level supplies to counterfactuals that factor in pollution costs, while keeping annual global consumption unchanged. Between 1992 and 2018, carbon misallocation amounted to at least 10.02 GtCO 2 with an environmental cost evaluated at 2 trillion US dollars (2018 US dollars). This translates into a significant supply-side ecological debt for major producers of dirty oil. Looking towards the future, we estimate the gains from making deposit-level extraction socially-optimal, and document the very unequal distribution of the subsequent stranded oil reserves across countries.