Armed conflict and peace agreements
In: Journal of peace research, Band 43, S. 617-631
ISSN: 0022-3433
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In: Journal of peace research, Band 43, S. 617-631
ISSN: 0022-3433
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of peace research, Band 43, Heft 5, S. 617-632
ISSN: 0022-3433
In: African security review, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 300-316
ISSN: 2154-0128
World Affairs Online
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 26, Heft 4, S. 367-387
ISSN: 1549-9219
The focus of this article is civil war peace agreement duration from 1989 to 2005. Recent work by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 2007) has argued that power-sharing provisions have a cumulative impact. In other words, the more power-sharing provisions there are built into an agreement, the greater the prospects for peace. Our basic theoretical premise is that power-sharing provisions that are costlier to government and more difficult to implement will decrease the life span of the peace agreement because of government motivations to renegotiate and rebel incentive to strike preemptively before the government does or out of frustration because of delays in implementing costly provisions. In other words, governments will abandon the agreement because it concedes too much or rebels will abandon the agreement because of delays in implementation and/or to move preemptively. We look at three forms of power-sharing provisions: military (integration of rebels into army), territorial (autonomy), and political (shared government). Civil war peace agreements can expire after being replaced by a new agreement or if at least one party abandons the agreement. Hazard models are specified controlling for democracy score at time of signing, intensity of war, GDP per capita, and type of agreement. The results indicate that the less costly concessions by government of military integration and autonomy increase the duration of peace agreements, while political power-sharing provisions have a negative though insignificant impact on duration. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd.]
In: On the Law of Peace, S. 175-196
In: On the Law of Peace, S. 77-104
In: RUSI journal, Band 141, Heft 1, S. 27-30
ISSN: 0307-1847
In: Windows of Opportunity, S. 31-56
In: The Slippery Slope to GenocideReducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder, S. 248-269
In: International affairs, Band 77, Heft 3, S. 689
ISSN: 0020-5850
In: The RUSI journal, Band 141, Heft 1, S. 27-30
ISSN: 1744-0378
In: Conflict management and peace science: the official journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 31, Heft 2, S. 193-217
ISSN: 1549-9219
The article debunks the conception that peace agreements are all equal. Distinct from the conventional monocausal assessment, I view the peace agreement as a cohesive whole and evaluate its strength in terms of its structural and procedural provisions. I use data on the length of intrastate peace episodes during the period from 1946 to 2010. My key finding is that the design quality of the peace agreement has a significant impact on the durability of peace. Agreements that are carefully designed to deal with all obstacles to cooperation have the strongest pacifying effect among armed conflict outcomes. The article sets forth ways to sharpen the performance of conflict management operations in war-torn countries. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd.]
In: in J. Mitchell, S. R. Millar, F. Po and P. Martyn (eds.) The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Religion and Peace, Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, Forthcoming 2022
SSRN
In: APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper