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This article offers a detailed analysis of the recent history of pensions policy in the United Kingdom, culminating in two apparent 'revolutions' in policy now underway: the introduction of 'automatic enrolment' into private pensions, and proposals for a new 'single-tier' state pension. These reforms are considered exemplary of the 'financialisation' of UK welfare provision – typified in pensions policy by the notion that individuals must take personal responsibility for their own long-term financial security, and engage intimately with the financial services industry to do so. As such, the reforms represent the continuation of pensions policy between the Labour and coalition governments, despite the coalition government's novel rhetorical commitment to austerity. In fact, the pensions revolutions will actually cost the state significantly more than current arrangements, yet the importance of fears about population ageing means that the government is both able to marshal the imagery of austerity to justify financialisation, but is also required to partly conceal the increased expenditure this requires. The article shows therefore how the financialisation agenda in pensions policy was evident before the financial crisis, but has evolved to both take advantage, and mitigate the constraints, of a post-crisis political climate.

Why do governments backtrack on major policy reforms? Reversals of pension privatization provide insight into why governments abandon potentially path-departing policy changes. Academics and policymakers will find this work relevant in understanding market-oriented reform, authoritarian and post-communist politics, and the politics of aging populations. The clear presentation and multi-method approach make the findings broadly accessible in understanding social security reform, an issue of increasing importance around the world. Survival analysis using global data is complemented by detailed case studies of reversal in Russia, Hungary, and Poland including original survey data. The findings support an innovative argument countering the conventional wisdom that more extensive reforms are more likely to survive. Indeed, governments pursuing moderate reform - neither the least nor most extensive reformers - were the most likely to retract. This lends insight into the stickiness of many social and economic reforms, calling for more attention to which reforms are reversible and which, as a result, may ultimately be detrimental.

AbstractThe likelihood that longevity will continue to increase has generated a search for regulation that make people work longer as they live longer, and thus not just containing pension expenditure but also enlarging labor supply, economic growth, and tax revenue. In public pension policy, Nordic countries have led the world with three types of approaches aimed at making people retire later. The first came when Sweden, followed by Finland and Norway, installed life expectancy coefficients in benefit calculation formulas. The second followed as Finland introduced age‐related accrual rates and the third when Denmark indexed the pensionable age to developments in life expectancy. Since economic incentive‐based regulations failed to raise exit ages sufficiently, Finland and Sweden subsequently linked pensionable ages to life expectancy like Denmark. While this policy brings out inequalities in health and workability, the fact that countries found it necessary to index the pensionable age to longevity instead of just relying on economic incentives in regulating retirement behavior may hold lessons for other countries.