Presidential influence in the House: Presidential prestige as a source of presidential power
In: American political science review, Volume 70, Issue 1, p. 101-113
ISSN: 0003-0554
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In: American political science review, Volume 70, Issue 1, p. 101-113
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online
In: American politics quarterly, Volume 5, Issue 4, p. 481-500
ISSN: 1532-673X
In: American politics quarterly, Volume 5, p. 481-500
ISSN: 0044-7803
In: 110 Virginia Law Review ___ (forthcoming 2024)
SSRN
In: Presidential studies quarterly, Volume 10, Issue 2, p. 224-233
ISSN: 0360-4918
USING CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 'PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT SCORES', 1953-78, THE ESSAY EXAMINES THE STRENGTH OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PRESIDENT'S POPULARITY AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR HIS POSITIONS ON LEGISLATION. ANALYZING THE PRESIDENTS OF THAT PERIOD, TWO FACTORS SUSPECTED OF AFFECTING THE LINK BETWEEN POPULARITY & SUPPORT ARE EXAMINED, ONE BEING A PRESIDENT OF THE MAJORITY CONGRESSIONAL PARTY.
In: Russian analytical digest: (RAD), Issue 110, p. 2-29
ISSN: 1863-0421
White, S.: The Russian presidential election: what next? - S. 2-4
World Affairs Online
The Vietnam "war" has convinced many persons that the president of the United States claims apparently unlimited power to commit this country to war. Not surprisingly, therefore, considerable interest has focused on the powers that inhere in the presidency. And many critics of the war – those who in other times and in other contexts might have been sympathetic to a spacious conception of presidential power – have concluded that the Vietnam conflict is not only a tragic error, but is the direct result of unconstitutional conduct by the president. I cannot accept this view; at bottom, it seems to me yet another example of the American propensity to substitute "for the question of the beneficial use of the powers of government . the question of their existence." In view of what has already been written, I shall confine myself to the considerations that impress me as controlling. Since my concern is with the constitutional relationship between the president and congress, I shall give no consideration to the consistency of the president's action with American treaty obligations or with international law generally.
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In: American political science review, Volume 9, p. 467-487
ISSN: 0003-0554
References to state presidential primary laws, p 487.
In: Presidential studies quarterly, Volume 36, Issue 1, p. 1-4
ISSN: 0360-4918
Introduces a special issue of Presidential Studies Quarterly examining several presidential doctrines, starting with the Monroe Doctrine and ending with the Reagan Doctrine. Notes the difficulty in identifying presidential doctrines, and attributing their philosophies appropriately. The author further notes that most presidential doctrines can be summarized on bumper stickers, but that there is also a down side to over-simplification. Adapted from the source document.
In: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/7949
Although a large body of research has been produced both on semi-presidential regimes and patterns of electoral change from general elections to midterm or other non-general elections, the study of presidential elections in semi-presidential regimes remains, to quote one of the few exceptions in this regard, "uncharted territory" in the political science literature. Using a dataset on election results and turnout levels in all semi-presidential democracies since 1945, we test several hypotheses about changes in turnout levels and government parties and coalitions' gains and losses in presidential elections. We show that while semi-presidential democracies with weaker presidencies do approximate the patterns predicted by the "second-order" model, that is clearly not the case where presidents hold more considerable powers, where government losses are explained by "negative voting" and "balancing" theories. The implications of these findings for the very definition of "semi-presidentialism" and the consequences of these regimes are also discussed.
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Even before the framing of the Constitution, the Framers feared an executive power that would grow too strong. This fear was reflected throughout debates held before, during, and after the American Revolution. Even today, debate still continues as to what the executive power entails when it comes to acts of war and treaties. The United States Constitution was framed with the purpose of dividing power between the branches of government in order to avoid abuse and tyranny. "The Constitution bestows enormous power and responsibility on the President to protect the nation's security and safeguard the people's liberty" (Matheson 1). Throughout the history of the United States, the President has had to find the delicate and important balance between liberty and security. That balance is most fully manifested through the President's interpretation and carrying out of the executive power during national security crises. This thesis will examine in-depth the Framer's giving the President the power of prerogative during national security crises as outlined in Article I Section 8 and Article II Section II of the Constitution. It will focus on the works of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, as well as on the British system of government and the Framers' decision to give prerogative to the President of the United States. The British model had a tremendous influence on the framing of the 18th century Anglo-American Constitution and what the Framers understood as the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone argued in favor of separation of powers, a federative power, and the executive having absolute power on issues of war. These three men in particular would have a tremendous influence on the Framers and their view on executive war powers. My thesis will also examine the important change in the Constitution's Declare War Clause, specifically the change in the wording from "make" to "declare war." I contend that although Congress was given the power in Article I, section 8(11) to declare war, by changing the language from "make" to "declare" in that provision, the Framers of the Constitution intended to give the President the power to engage the country in war without the consent of Congress. I will provide evidence for this argument by reviewing three significant episodes in the exercise of national security power by the President: President George Washington's Neutrality Proclamation, as discussed in the Pacificus-Helvidius debates, Abraham Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and use of military tribunals during the Civil War, and President George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq with the approval of Congress through the Authorized Use of Military Force, as well as surveillance and detainee programs. These three case studies are important examples of the President using his executive power to protect the nation from threats both at home and abroad. They were crucial moments in American history which have been criticized by many as an abuse of Presidential power. However, when examined, these critical events demonstrate the Framers' intent to give the President the power of prerogative and the Presidents' correct use of that power. I will argue that from The Federalist Papers to the actions of President Bush, there has been support for giving the President the power of prerogative to go to war without Congress's consent.
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In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Volume 51, Issue 10, p. 20304A-20304B
ISSN: 1467-825X
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Volume 44, Issue 8
ISSN: 1467-825X
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Volume 44, Issue 8, p. 17180A
ISSN: 0001-9844
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Volume 43, Issue 3
ISSN: 1467-825X