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The debate on whether democracy and inequality increase the level of redistribution in a country is still ongoing. We construct a model that predicts a higher probability of redistribution in democracies than in autocracies. Further, with higher initial inequality, there should be more redistribution in democracies but not necessarily in autocracies. We test these predictions using data on social transfers in developing countries for the period 1960-2010. We confirm that democracy increases redistribution and, to some extent, that there is more redistribution with rising inequality. Hence, on the basis of a direct measure of redistribution, we present evidence to confirm the median voter theorem.

The debate on whether democracy and inequality increase the level of redistribution is ongoing. We construct a model that predicts higher probability of redistribution in democracies than autocracies through social transfers. Higher inequality leads to more redistribution in democracies but not necessarily in autocracies. Using the new data on Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programmes for 1990-2015, we find democracies are more likely to have a transfer programme. This is consistent with previous conclusions that democracy enhances redistribution measured by tax revenues and government expenditures. We also present less robust evidence that countries with a transfer programme experience higher inequality.

Study after study has found that regime type has little or no effect on states' decisions to pursue nuclear weapons. We argue, however, that conventional approaches comparing the behavior of democracies to that of nondemocracies have resulted in incorrect inferences. We disaggregate types of nondemocracies and argue that leaders of highly centralized, 'personalistic' dictatorships are particularly likely to view nuclear weapons as an attractive solution to their concerns about regime security and face fewer constraints in pursuing nuclear weapons than leaders of other types of regimes. Combining our more nuanced classification of regime type with a more theoretically appropriate empirical approach, we find that personalist regimes are substantially more likely to pursue nuclear weapons than other regime types. This finding is robust to different codings of proliferation dates and a range of modeling approaches and specifications and has significant implications for both theory and policy. Adapted from the source document.

To understand the limitations of discrete regime type data for studying authoritarianism, I scrutinize three regime type data sets provided by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, Hadenius and Teorell, and Geddes. The political narratives of Nicaragua, Colombia, and Brazil show that the different data sets on regime type lend themselves to concept stretching and misuse, which threatens measurement validity. In an extension of Fjelde's analysis of civil conflict onset, I demonstrate that interchangeably using the data sets leads to divergent predictions, it is sensitive to outliers, and the data ignore certain institutions. The critique expounds on special issues with discrete data on regime type so that scholars make more informed choices and are better able to compare results. The mixed-methods assessment of discrete data on regime type demonstrates the importance of proper concept formation in theory testing. Maximizing the impact of such data requires the scholar to make more theoretically informed choices.

To understand the limitations of discrete regime type data for studying authoritarianism, I scrutinize three regime type data sets provided by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, Hadenius and Teorell, and Geddes. The political narratives of Nicaragua, Colombia, and Brazil show that the different data sets on regime type lend themselves to concept stretching and misuse, which threatens measurement validity. In an extension of Fjelde's analysis of civil conflict onset, I demonstrate that interchangeably using the data sets leads to divergent predictions, it is sensitive to outliers, and the data ignore certain institutions. The critique expounds on special issues with discrete data on regime type so that scholars make more informed choices and are better able to compare results. The mixed-methods assessment of discrete data on regime type demonstrates the importance of proper concept formation in theory testing. Maximizing the impact of such data requires the scholar to make more theoretically informed choices. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Why do some diaspora groups, but not others, play a prominent role in the formalization of cooperative political ties between their country of origin and their country of residence? This article adopts a novel dyadic approach to the study of diaspora politics by arguing that diaspora politics are simultaneously structured by regime type in the country of origin and in the country of residence. Diaspora groups can play a prominent role in the formalization of cooperative foreign policy ties between their country of origin and their country of residence in democracy–democracy dyads (i.e., when the country of origin and the country of residence are both democratic). In all other dyads (including authoritarian–authoritarian), diaspora groups' political impact on the formalization of cooperative foreign policy ties tends to be limited. The democracy–democracy dyad approximates a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition; nationalism and international economic strategies adopted by the country of origin help shape diaspora politics. This article examines all four regime type dyads by focusing on diaspora politics in authoritarian Malaysia and democratic United States, which have notable populations of Chinese and of Indian origin.

This article conducts quantitative tests on the relationship between regime type and suicide terrorism for 1980 to 2003. We present the recently popularized argument that democracies are more likely to experience suicide terrorism and a new hypothesis that mixed regimes are especially likely to experience suicide terrorism. We offer several improvements in research design, including using more controls, the nation-year as the unit of analysis, and more appropriate statistical techniques. Using both Freedom House and Polity data, we find that in general, regime type is uncorrelated with suicide terrorism. We do find that there is a statistically significant interaction between regime type and the number of religiously distinct minorities at risk (MARs) with suicide terrorism, but the statistical significance of this finding is limited, and its substantive impact is marginal. We also find that national size, Islam, national experience with suicide terrorism, and global experience with suicide terrorism affect the likelihood of suicide terrorism.

This is an accepted version of the manuscript published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Global Information Technology Management in 2017, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1097198X.2017.1354597. ; The current study examines the relationship between regime type and country access to the Internet at both domestic and global levels by conducting longitudinal analyses of economic and social indicators and Internet data between 2002 and 2014. In particular, the authors investigate how a country's position in the global Internet network is associated with the country's type of political institution while taking into account its economic growth, population, and education level. The current analysis shows that democracies dominated the global Internet network both in 2002 and in 2014. Finally, the panel regression and network analyses suggest that it is important to consider network characteristics in investigating whether and how a country's regime type influences the country's Internet adoption.

We present a theory that addresses the question of why autocracies with a regime legitimation which ties the destiny of the members of the ruling elite, namely the nobility or ideocratic elite, to the survival of the autocracy, namely (ruling) monarchies and communist ideocracies, are more durable than other kinds of autocracies. Using logistic regression analysis and event history analysis on a dataset on autocratic regimes in the period 1946 to 2009, we are able to show that ruling monarchies and communist ideocracies are indeed the most durable autocratic regime types.

This paper examines the implications of political factors for social policy choices. Specifically, we explore the link between regime type and adoption of unconditional transfers versus transfers conditioned on beneficiaries' investments in human capital. Due to the direct nature of benefits, unconditional transfers are more likely to be used to buy off opposition and prevent social unrest. As transfers that are conditioned on education and health pay off only in a relatively distant future, they are rarely initiated for political motives and rather defined by interests of long-term development and human capital accumulation. Using the new dataset on Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programs (NSTP) in developing countries, we find that transfers are indeed chosen so as to be unconditional under less democratic regimes. There is some evidence that conditional transfers are more likely to be adopted in democracies. In particular, democracies tend to increase the number of conditional schemes once any social transfer program is introduced.

In this article, the authors investigate the relationship between states'political leaders'ages, their regime type, and the likelihood of militarized dispute initiation and escalation. They examine more than 100,000 interstate dyads between 1875 and 2002 to systematically test the relationship between leader age and militarized disputes. The results show that, in general, as the age of leaders increases, they become more likely to both initiate and escalate militarized disputes. In addition, the interaction of age and regime type is significant. In personalist regimes, the general effect reverses; as age increases, the relative risk of conflict declines in comparison to other types of regimes. Increasing leader age in democracies increases the relative risk propensity for conflict initiation at a higher level than for personalist regimes, while the impact of increasing leader age is most substantial in intermediate regimes.