Suchergebnisse

Einleitung; Die Rechtmäßigkeit der Resolution 1973 (2011) des UN-Sicherheitsrates; Die Intervention der NATO in Libyen: Völkerrechtliche und rechts-philosophische Anmerkungen zu den Grenzen legitimer militärischer Gewalt; Normen, Interessen, Projektionen: Deutschland und die militärische Intervention in Libyen 2011; Die Libyen-Intervention: Warum Deutschlands Enthaltung im Sicherheitsrat falsch war; Autorenverzeichnis

Anfang Mai sprach sich der französische Außenminister Bernard Kouchner unter Berufung auf die »Responsibility to Protect« für eine militärisch gestützte Hilfsoperation in Myanmar aus, um die Opfer der Zyklonkatastrophe notfalls gegen den Widerstand ihrer eigenen Regierung mit humanitären Gütern zu versorgen. Dieser Vorstoß entfachte eine Debatte über den Inhalt und die völkerrechtliche Verankerung der Schutzverantwortung. Schon vor ihrer Aufnahme in das Abschlussdokument des Weltgipfels der Vereinten Nationen von 2005 wurde die »Responsibility to Protect« als »sich herausbildende Norm« charakterisiert. Eine solche Beschreibung greift jedoch insofern zu kurz, als einzelne Elemente bereits fester Bestandteil des Völkerrechts sind. Andererseits geht sie dort zu weit, wo der Wunsch nach Schaffung weitergehender völkerrechtlicher Rechte und Pflichten im Sinne der Schutzverantwortung nicht oder noch nicht die nötige Unterstützung der Staatengemeinschaft findet

AbstractThe concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P) holds that not only do sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their populations, but so too does the international community. The international community is said to be responsible for encouraging and assisting states to protect and also for taking collective action to enforce the protection of populations in instances where states fail to carry out their obligations. This idea that the international community itself bears not merely a right but a responsibility to protect, through military intervention if necessary, is perhaps the most novel aspect of the R2P concept, and it would seem to have extraordinary implications. Yet it remains largely under-examined. In this article, I consider how the notion that the international community bears a responsibility to protect might be fruitfully understood and conceptualised. After briefly outlining from where this idea has emerged, I consider two interrelated questions: What kind of responsibility is it – moral, legal, or political, or some combination of the three? And who in particular bears the responsibility – the international community broadly speaking, particular international institutions such as the Security Council, regional organisations, or individual states?

A Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is desirable in a perfect world but problematic in a world rife with aggression, occupation, & exploitation. Although the R2P should ideally be implemented by the UN, it is contended that the UN Security Council has become corrupted & would have to be reformed to achieve a North-South balance. Both the UN Charter & international law must be applied equally to large & small states before a shared R2P can become a reality. Adapted from the source document.

One of the most recent innovations of institutional liberalism in international politics is the so-called Responsibility to Protect. Defined in 2001 by an international commission established in Canada, it argues that sovereignty is a privilege that States may earn by protecting their people. In case of refusal to protect its people, the international community has the responsibility to violate that state's sovereignty to protect the at-risk population. Based on recent experience, the Responsibility to Protect not only often fails to achieve its goal of protecting at-risk civilians, but it may also unintentionally put others in danger. Even though the doctrine is quite new, it already requires a major rethinking if it is to promote its intended purpose of maximizing protection for innocent civilians. By the example of Bosnia, Darfur, Rwanda and other sites of violence, the article explains that the political will to halt violence often is lacking until many civilians have already been victimized. Furthermore, logistical obstacles often leave more and more rapid mobility to perpetrators than to interveners. The article proposes alternatives enabling rapid intervention, such as the pre-positioning of equipment to be shipped when necessary in smaller aircraft that is often more suited for local airfields than inter-continental planes. Furthermore, the article discusses the training of local civilians for peacekeeping operations, and a rapid response capability within the UN. O. van Zijl

Die ?Responsibility to Protect? ist ein neues Prinzip im Völkerrecht, das sich nach den schweren Menschenrechtsverbrechen in den 1990er Jahren entwickelt hat. Den Vereinten Nationen wurde damals von vielen Seiten ein Versagen attestiert. Als Reaktion darauf bildete sich die R2P-Doktrin, welche die Verantwortung der Staaten betont, ihre Völker vor Kriegsverbrechen, Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit, ethnischen Säuberungen und Völkermord zu schützen. Kann oder will ein Staat seiner Schutzverantwortung nicht nachkommen, so überträgt sich die Pflicht gemäß der Richtlinie auf die internationale Gemeinschaft. Als allerletzte Möglichkeit kann die R2P eine militärische Intervention, unter Zustimmung des Weltsicherheitsrates, legitimieren. Bis dato wurde diese Option 2011 in Libyen angewandt. In dem zurzeit andauernden syrischen Bürgerkrieg konnte sich der UN-Sicherheitsrat noch nicht auf den Gebrauch der R2P zu einer militärischen Interaktion einigen, da dies von den Vetomächten blockiert wird. Das Konzept der R2P stellt bislang keine Rechtsnorm dar, weswegen der Umgang mit dem Prinzip Fragen aufwirft. Diese Masterarbeit soll klären, inwieweit Menschen einander zur gegenseitigen Hilfe verpflichtet sind und ob die R2P in ihrer momentanen Form dafür als legitime Grundlage dienen kann. Das Argument lautet, dass eine solche Verpflichtung zur Hilfeleistung besteht, nach dem Prinzip des Kategorischen Imperativs. Infolge müsste diese Pflicht auch auf Staaten zu übertragen sein, weswegen eine rechtliche Normierung der R2P zweckmäßig erscheint. Dazu wird zunächst der Begriff der staatlichen Souveränität definiert, welche durch einen externen Eingriff beschränkt wird. Die anschließende philosophische Auseinandersetzung, welche mit Praxisbeispielen sowie einer Aussicht für das Konzept der Weltstaatlichkeit abschließt, soll zeigen, welche Richtung die R2P einnimmt ? Schutzpflicht oder reine Interventionserlaubnis? ; The ?Responsibility to Protect? is one of the newer principles applied to International Law, which was initiated after the incidents of severe violations against human rights in the 1990s. The United Nations were accused of having failed to protect these rights. As a consequence, the R2P doctrine evolved. It stresses the responsibility of all of the states to protect their people from war crimes, crimes againt humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide. If a state is not able or willing to take on its responsibility to protect, the duty is assigned to the international community. With the consent of the World Security Council a military intervention can be authorised as last resort, due to the principle of the R2P. So far, this option has been carried out in Libya in 2011. The UN Security Council has not yet agreed upon interfering in the current persisting Syrian Civil War by using this final option, due to the blocking by the veto powers. Up to now the concept of R2P does not constitute a legal norm. This is why the approach to the principle raises questions. To begin with, this paper investigates to which extent we as people are obliged to help one another and whether the consisting principle of R2P can be used as legitmiate basis in its present form. First and foremost the argument states that there is a duty to help each other, according to the idea of the Categorical Imperative. Hence this duty also ought to be assigned to states. Therefore it seems appropriate for the R2P to become a legal norm. Fur this purpose the notion of state sovereignty, which is being restricted by an external interference, will be determined at first. The following philosophical discussion, which is concluded by giving practical examples and an outlook for the concept of Global Governance, will show which direction the R2P is going to take ? an obligation to protect or purely a permission to intervene? ; vorgelegt von Verena Schaupp ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfasserin/des Verfassers ; Zsfassungen in dt. und engl. Sprache ; Text teilw. dt., teilw. eng. ; Graz, Univ., Masterarb., 2014 ; (VLID)251991

The Declaration on 'the responsibility to protect' (R2P), unanimously endorsed by the Security Council in April 2006, identified both national and international responsibilities in relation to genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This was highly significant in appearing to accept that the prevention of mass atrocities was a legitimate international concern. Subsequently, there has been some disappointment about the limited practical impact of R2P, and also anxiety that its progress may be impeded by the fear that it is designed to legitimise military intervention. However, this article concentrates on a different concern. Arguing that an earlier version of R2P (in the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty of 2001) linked the issues with those of human security and development, it suggests that the contemporary focus is far narrower, undermining its critical potential with regard to the policies of the global North and reducing its appeal to developing countries.