Suchergebnisse

When elections are free and fair, why do some political parties rule for prolonged periods of time? Most explanations for single-party dominance focus on the dominant party's origins, resources, or strategies. In this article, we show how opposition parties can undermine or sustain single-party dominance. Specifically, opposition parties should be central in explaining single-party dominance in countries with highly disproportional electoral systems and a dominant party whose vote share falls short of a popular majority. Employing a quantitative analysis of Indian legislative elections as well as a paired case study, we show that opposition coordination plays a crucial part in undermining single-party dominance.

AbstractLobbying, and its role in the policy process, has been extensively studied in democratic states, but much less is known about similar practices in authoritarian political systems. Although a few studies have identified lobbying in China, most have focused on big businesses and national policy making, and some have argued that it is unaffected by differences in political institutions. Our paper challenges this portrayal of business lobbying in autocracies. Through a study of the lobbying activities of business associations based on documentary research and fieldwork in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin between 2011 and 2013, we show that although business associations have similar lobbying motivations to their counterparts in democracies, their specific practices are often shaped by authoritarian political institutions. While they are similar in seeking to build informal relationships with public officials, provide expertise to shape policies, and raise their profile through public relations activities and media engagement, they differ in focusing their relationship‐building efforts on helping officials with routine work, helping Communist Party organizations establish cells in businesses, and brokering between businesses and government. Rather than donating to political campaigns like their counterparts in democracies, they become legislators themselves, hire retired officials, and seek positions on advisory bodies. Rigged elections, an unreliable legal system, and restrictions on media and freedom of movement are key authoritarian institutions that shape these distinctive lobbying practices.

Sarawak, formerly a British colony prior to the formation of Malaysia, has been ruled by the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition for over four decades. Although the BN's political domination has been robust, it has never been smooth sailing, particularly in the 1960s and mid-1980s. The crises in the 1960s were resolved partly by the timely and swift interventions of the British and the core BN parties based in Peninsular Malaysia, albeit with resistance from local political parties. When a leadership crisis in the Sarawak BN erupted in mid-1980s, the coalition gained firm control over the state apparatus. This enabled the embattled Chief Minister to utilize the state's resources to fend off opponents, rally the support of the electorate and subsequently retain control of the state. After more than two decades of relatively unchallenged rule, recent events such as the revolt of urban voters, the emergence of a strong opposition coalition and the impending resignation of Taib Mahmud - the most powerful figure in Sarawak and the longest serving Chief Minister in the country - have indicated that a change in political hegemony could be in the making. However, the most important factor that would bring about such a change, a revolt of rural voters, does not seem likely to happen in the near future. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)

AbstractWhile numerous studies consider the roles that media consolidation, court‐packing, and economic crises have played in Hungary's democratic decline since 2010, none have considered the subnational mechanisms driving illiberalism. This study examines the types of subnational procedural tinkering that propel illiberalism by reducing local capacity for institutional resilience. Specifically, we trace how the right‐wing Fidesz‐KDNP government implemented subnational constraints to prevent the reemergence of a viable political opposition by (a) limiting opportunities for political contestation and (b) reducing oversight of the governing coalition. We employ a multimethod approach, pairing systematic document analysis of city council rules and regulations in Hungary's 27 largest municipalities with 26 in‐depth elite interviews across five Hungarian regional cities with mayors, councilmembers, and local leaders of each major political party. In contrast to a large literature on subnational democratic resilience, we examine how subnational maneuvers can enable single‐party consolidation and exacerbate authoritarian tendencies in declining democracies.

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