Suchergebnisse

The dynamics of social status and prestige in Pliny, Juvenal and Martial / Annika B. Kuhn -- Status dissonance and status dissidents in the equestrian order / John Bodel -- Die Genese der Rangtitel in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten / Matthäus Heil -- Titres officiels, titres officieux / Ségolène Demougin -- Status and social hierarchies : The case of Pompeii / Henrik Mouritsen -- The Album of Herculaneum : Problems of status and identity / Andrew Wallace-Hadrill -- Fischteiche und Fischesser : Aufstieg und Niedergang eines Luxusguts / Werner Tietz -- Grabmonumente in Rom und im Rheinland : Reflex von sozialem Status und Prestige? / Werner Eck -- Die Darstellung des kaiserlichen Status und seines Prestiges / Martin Zimmermann -- Prestige und Statussymbolik als machtpolitische Ressourcen im Prinzipat des Claudius / Annika B. Kuhn -- Civic mirrors : Honorific inscriptions and the politics of prestige / Onno van Nijf -- Membership of the boule and the inscriptions of Asia Minor : A mark of elevated social status? / Anna Heller -- Inscribing senatorial status and identity, A.D. 200-350 / Caillan Davenport -- Status and rank in the Theodosian Code / Boudewijn Sirks -- Servus dei und verwandte Formulierungen in lateinischen Inschriften / Ulrike Ehmig -- Bescheidenheit ist eine Zier : Der Gebrauch der Demutsformel doulos theou in den Kirchenbauinschriften der spätantiken Patriarchate Antiochia und Jerusalem / Rudolf Haensch

Is the political value of equality a distributive ideal, governing the allocation of goods, or an idealdemanding egalitarian social and political relationships? Theories of social justice that argue for thelatter understanding of equality have gained currency in the last decade or so. Yet their focus on socialand political relationships should not be taken to imply that they neglect questions of distributivejustice, and settle for a minimalist, sufficiency view regarding the distribution of goods. This paperargues that relational egalitarianism, properly understood, requires a demandingly egalitariandistribution of goods such as income, wealth, and opportunities for desirable social positions, for bothintrinsic and instrumental reasons: egalitarian distributions of socially produced goods expresspeople's standing as equals in societal cooperation, and are instrumentally necessary to avoid unjustrelationships, such as domination, and the emergence of objectionably inegalitarian status norms.

This study examines the effects of social status on opioid drugged driving fatalities in the context of the ongoing opioid mortality crisis. Broad criminological insights are leveraged to understand how position in the age, race, and sex status hierarchies impacts opioid use by drivers. Analysis of data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System shows that fatally injured drivers who used opioids prior to the crash were more often male, White, non-Hispanic, and older compared to other statuses. Moreover, the social statuses of opioid drugged drivers are dissimilar to those who used opioids in drug overdose deaths. Results suggest that social status-informed and driver-focused initiatives may be particularly effective in reducing opioid use by drivers.

This thesis is concerned with social stratification of psychosocial factors and social position measurement in population samples collected in mid-Sweden 2000-2006. Traditional resource-based measures of social position (occupation, education) and so far less explored prestige-based measures (subjective status, status incongruence) are tested with respect to their associations with psychosocial factors, emotions, and selfrated health. Three papers in this thesis are based on data from the Life Conditions, Stress, and Health (LSH) study, using a randomly selected population sample. Data for the fourth paper is a regional sample drawn from the health-related survey "Liv och Hälsa 2000". Statistical methods range from correlation analysis to logistic regression and repeated measures analyses. Results from studies I and IV show that psychosocial factors are unequally distributed within the population in a linear manner, so that the lower the socioeconomic position (SEP), the more unfavourable levels. This is independent of whether we study this in a highly unequal setting such as Russia, or in a more egalitarian society such as Sweden. The stability of psychometric instruments over two years tend to be lower for all instruments among low SEP groups, and differ significantly for self-esteem and perceived control among groups with high and low education, and for cynicism among groups with high and low occupational status. Results from studies II and III point to the relevance of individuals' own thoughts about themselves, and the potential impact on the self by normative judgements of social position in a certain hierarchical setting. In paper II, the prestige-based measure of subjective status was influenced by resource-based measures, such as self-rated economy and education, but also by life satisfaction and psychosocial factors. The importance of self-evaluation was especially obvious from the study on status incongruence (study III) where the traditionally protective effecs of a high education seem to disappear when combined with a lowstatus occupation. Shaming experiences may play an important role here for our understanding of self-perception.

Prior to July 15, 1961, when the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance
[5] came into effect, formal registration of marriages was not required,
although a record of marriages was usually kept by the person performing
the ceremony (Qazis, Mosque Imams, etc.). However, no centralized system
of registration of marriages existed, with the result that no reliable
statistics concerning marriages in Pakistan were available. For all
practical purposes, all Muslim and Hindu marriages in Pakistan are
arranged by the two families. But since 1961 the registration of
marriages has been required, and, as the law applies only to Muslims,
the followers of Islam are expected to adhere to it. At a later date,
perhaps, members of other religious communities may also be required to
register their marriages. Karachi, the major commercial and industrial
city of the nation, as well as its most populous city, is 96.9 per cent
Muslim [7, Vol. 1, Part II, p. 60]. The administration of the Family
Laws Ordinance is left in the hands of the Basic Democrats Union
Committees, and the registration of marriages, as well as other official
business is conducted in the Basic Democrats' Union offices. The city is
divided into a number of registration areas, and, although it is
possible to register marriages elsewhere, residents normally record
their intentions at the local union office in the registration area
where the bride resides.