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AbstractSome historical sociologists have, with some justification, described the development of the sub‐discipline in the language of three successive "waves." This framing implies that each wave supercedes the other across time. Given that second and third waves map onto generational distinctions, the whole idea of waves has been met with consternation from second wavers who are not ready to be superseded. In addition, there is some debate, if not confusion, over the criteria that define the waves. In this paper I suggest that the language of successive waves frustrates the potential to articulate different approaches with the aim of a more comprehensive understanding of historical societies. This is particularly the case with our understanding of states and state formation, which is the focus here. Instead of the waves framing, I suggest a strategy for articulating research agendas on state formation by conceiving of such in terms of their "centers of gravity" (or COGs)1 rather than their boundaries. I pay particular attention to the body of work that can be said to have a concern with culture as its center of gravity, a body of work that while overlapping considerably is not co‐extensive with that identified as third wave. In this context I elaborate a broad conceptual architecture of culture, at the foundation of which is the distinction between meaning, practice, and materiality. This triangulated conceptualization of culture can, I argue, clarify some ambiguities in the literature and aid articulation of three COGs in state theory. In addition, I suggest that many questions taken to be theoretical are actually empirical. I conclude by briefly illustrating the approach in the case of science and modern state formation in Ireland.

Intro -- National Identity and State Formation in Africa -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Contributors -- Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction: Identity, Networks and State Formation in Africa -- 2 Mobility, Globalization and the Policing of Citizenship and Belonging in the Twenty-first Century -- 3 Federalism in Africa -- 4 National Identity and State Formation: The Case of the Former UN Trust Territory of the British So -- 5 The Secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia: A Historical Profile -- 6 National Identity of Sudan and the Emergence of South Sudan -- 7 A New Kind of State for the Nation? Civil Society Mobilization and White Minority Identity Politic -- 8 Reimagining the Sporting Nation: Negotiating Identity and Globalization Amongst 'Coloured' Support -- 9 The Persistence of Ethnic Identities in KwaZulu-Natal -- 10 Identity-based Conflict in KwaZulu-Natal: Current State and Future Prospects -- 11 Rethinking Mobility, States, Borders and Identity -- References -- Index.

chapter 1 Old legacies, new protests: Welfare and left rule in democratic India -- chapter 2 The social bases of rule and rebellion: Colonial Kerala and Bengal, 1792-1930 -- chapter 3 State formation and social movements: Colonial Kerala and Bengal compared, 1865-1930 -- chapter 4 Political practices and left ascendancy in Kerala, 1920-47 -- chapter 5 Structure, practices and weak left hegemony in Bengal, 1925-47 -- chapter 6 Insurgent and electoral logics in policy regimes: Kerala and Bengal compared, 1947 to the present.

State Formation and Radical Democracy in India analyzes one of the most important cases of developmental change in the twentieth century, namely, Kerala in southern India and begs the question of whether insurgency among the marginalized poor can use formal representative democracy to create better life chances. Going back to pre-independence, colonial India, Manali Desai takes a long historical view of Kerala and compares it with the state of West Bengal, which like Kerala has been ruled by leftists but has not had the same degree of success in raising equal access to welfare, literacy, and basic subsistence. This comparison brings the role of left party formation and its mode of insertion in civil society to the fore, raising the question of what kinds of parties can effect the most substantive anti-poverty reforms within a vibrant democracy. This book offers a new, historically based explanation for Kerala's post-independence political and economic direction.

State Formation and Radical Democracy in India analyzes one of the most important cases of developmental change in the twentieth century, namely, Kerala in southern India and begs the question of whether insurgency among the marginalized poor can use formal representative democracy to create better life chances. Going back to pre-independence, colonial India, Manali Desai takes a long historical view of Kerala and compares it with the state of West Bengal, which like Kerala has been ruled by leftists but has not had the same degree of success in raising equal access to welfare, literacy, and basic subsistence. This comparison brings the role of left party formation and its mode of insertion in civil society to the fore, raising the question of what kinds of parties can effect the most substantive anti-poverty reforms within a vibrant democracy. This book offers a new, historically based explanation for Kerala's post-independence political and economic direction.

Abstract
This paper presents a set of theoretical models that links a two-phase sequence of cooperative political integration and conflict to explore the reciprocal relationship between war and state formation. It compares equilibria rates of state formation and conflict using a Monte Carlo that generates comparative statics by altering the systemic distribution of ideology, population, tax rates, and war costs across polities. This approach supports three core findings. First, war-induced political integration is at least 2.5 times as likely to occur as integration to realize economic gains. Second, we identify mechanisms linking endogenous organizations to the likelihood of conflict in the system. For example, a greater domestic willingness to support public goods production facilitates the creation of buffer states that reduce the likelihood of a unique class of trilateral wars. These results suggest that the development of the modern administrative state has helped to foster peace. Third, we explore how modelling assumptions setting the number of actors in a strategic context can shape conclusions about war and state formation. We find that dyadic modelling restrictions tend to underestimate the likelihood of cooperative political integration and overestimate the likelihood of war relative to a triadic modelling context.