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Humanitarian catastrophes as a consequence of progressive climate change are one of the greatest challenges of the 21st century. Franziska Kring underlines the important role of the international community of states in combating and mitigating climate change. In her innovative approach, the author applies the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which was originally intended to prevent human rights violations, to climate change-related humanitarian catastrophes. To this effect, she argues that state responses to such events correspond perfectly with the R2P framework. In particular, the understanding of state sovereignty as responsibility can be used as a theoretical basis for such commitments. The author concludes: Although a general obligation of states to take measures to mitigate climate change cannot be based on R2P, its application in the case of climate change-related humanitarian catastrophes is politically and morally justified.

1. Introduction / Charles Sampford -- 2. Falls the shadow : the responsibility to protect from theory to practice / Spencer Zifcak -- 3. R2P + POC (+ IHRL) = R2PC : the United nation's Security Council and the hybridisation of international protection principles / Hugh Breakey -- 4. R2P and the East Timor intervention / Clinton Fernandes -- 5. When is there sufficient information to decide if there is an R2P situation or not? From the intervention in Timor-Leste to the crisis in Sri Lanka / Paul Harpur -- 6. The responsibility to prevent : could the UN have prevented the atrocities in East Timor and Kosovo? / Hitoshi Nasu -- 7. Sovereignty and R2P ten years after East Timor and Kosovo : a failure to protect, the UN Human Rights Council and Darfur / Kevin Boreham -- 8. Legality and legitimacy : a dozen years after Goldstone / Charles Sampford -- 9. Refugees and military intervention in the name of the responsibility to protect / Angus Francis -- 10. The responsibility to protect : retrospect and prospect / Ramesh Thakur.

The Responsibility to Protect (r2p), as enshrined in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, aims to protect populations from the commission of mass atrocities. Yet both Sri Lankan government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte) forces killed thousands of civilians during the conclusion of Eelam War Four in Sri Lanka, in spite of the adoption of r2p by the Sri Lankan government. In this article, I argue that these atrocities occurred with little involvement on the part of the international community to stop them, in large part due to existing international political dynamics, which the framing efforts of the Sri Lankan government played upon. The government was able to determine the dominant discourse on the conflict and portrayed it as part of the War on Terror. This facilitated states in supporting the government in the conflict, while diminishing criticism from actors that may otherwise have been more supportive of the invocation of r2p.

Fifteen years on, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine is still facing questions over its content, scope and attendant obligations. Recent conflicts in Syria, Ukraine and Iraq show, how, when and if states intervene is a matter of political will and calculation. Yet the question of political will remains largely unaddressed, and many ignore the conceptual and practical distance between stating that the international community should encourage and assist states to fulfill R2P obligations and requiring third parties to use diplomatic, humanitarian or 'other' means to protect populations when states fail to do so. I propose we acknowledge this distance and minimize it through covert action. Embracing the reality that some states cannot intervene due to political constraints entails that we can theorize about other ways to uphold R2P. Moreover, covert action involves a range of means and types of targets and is a flexible option for R2P.

AbstractThis essay considers the R2P principle as expressed by the African Union's (AU) Constitutive Act of 2000, the United Nations (UN) World Summit's outcome document of 2005, and recent civilian protection mandates issued for peacekeeping operations by the UN Security Council. Examining how these three international mechanisms have sought to establish and operationalise the norm, the author argues that the AU should make greater efforts to bring R2P implementation into line with the UN Charter in order to secure the legitimacy of regional interventions in Africa. Reflecting on the experience of the AU Mission in Sudan between 2004 and 2007, the importance of clear mandates and sufficient capacity to the success of R2P interventions is emphasised. The use of force by peacekeepers—its feasibility and potential extent—is analysed and placed within the context of peacebuilding in the R2P continuum. The essay also argues for better coordination between the UN Security Council and the world body's Economic and Social Council, as well as with the AU's Peace and Security Council, to ensure a reliable supply of adequate peacebuilding resources to Africa and proper consideration of security and reconstruction matters.

(A) Extraterritorial extension of environmental human rights jurisprudence -- (b) Obligations under the international duty of cooperation -- (c) Obligations under international refugee law -- b) Mitigation of climate change -- aa) States' obligations towards their own populations -- bb) States' obligations towards populations of other states -- (1) Potential obligations -- cc) Erga omnes obligations -- 2. Remarks -- III. Conclusion -- C. The responsibility to protect -- I. History -- 1. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

Dürfen die Vereinten Nationen zum Schutz der Bevölkerung in einen innerstaatlichen Bürgerkrieg eingreifen und oppositionelle Kräfte im Kampf gegen eine amtierende Regierung unterstützen? Diese Frage stellt sich nicht erst seit dem Einsatz der Nato in Libyen. Der Fall ist deswegen besonders, weil erstmals eine Ermächtigung des Sicherheitsrats zum Schutz von Zivilisten genutzt wurde, um eine funktionsfähige Regierung in einem Mitgliedstaat zu beseitigen und auf diese Weise den Weg für eine politische Neuordnung zu ebnen. Sobald ein repressives Regime Massengewalttaten an der eigenen Bevölkerung verübt, ist es kaum mehr möglich, neutral und unparteilich auf die Konfliktparteien einzuwirken. Zwar hat sich die Staatengemeinschaft auf dem Weltgipfel der Vereinten Nationen im September 2005 zur Responsibility to Protect (R2P) bekannt. Die Kritik am Libyeneinsatz ist aber ein Indiz dafür, wie schwer sich die Staaten weiterhin mit der Übernahme kollektiver Verantwortung tun. Gestritten wird vor allem darüber, ob es zulässig und legitim ist, zu humanitären Zwecken einen Regimewechsel zu erzwingen.

Die Studie befasst sich zum einen mit den völkerrechtlichen Spielräumen und Grenzen militärischer Interventionen in R2P-relevanten Bürgerkriegssituationen. Zum anderen werden die Entwicklungsperspektiven der R2P aus politischer Sicht beleuchtet. (Autorenreferat)

Durch den jüngsten politischen Konflikt in Libyen stehen die Völkerrechtler ein weiteres Mal vor dem ungelösten Problem, inwieweit Menschenrechte in legitimer Weise mit militärischen Mitteln von außen in einem Staat gegen den Willen des Hoheitsinhabers erzwungen werden können. Seit dem Kosovo-Krieg von 1999 hält die intensive Debatte über die humanitäre Intervention an, die durch sehr kontroverse Positionen gekennzeichnet ist und mit der "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) eine neue Dimension erlangte. Brisant ist nach Meinung des Autors vor allem die Tatsache, dass eine solche Intervention im Widerspruch zu der bislang auch durch das moderne Völkerrecht garantierten Souveränität der Staaten steht. Der Autor nimmt zunächst eine rechtsdogmatische Einordnung der Problematik vor und skizziert die Stellung der Menschenrechte im Völkerrecht. Er geht anschließend der Frage nach, ob eine Pflicht zur humanitären Intervention besteht und welche rechtlichen Probleme die NATO-Intervention in Jugoslawien aufgeworfen hat. Das Beispiel des Kosovo, wo auch zwei Jahre nach der einseitigen Unabhängigkeitserklärung immer noch kein Konsens über den Status herbeigeführt wurde, ist seines Erachtens symbolisch für die Zerbröselung der Völkerrechtsordnung durch die Unfähigkeit der Großmächte zur Akzeptanz eines Kompromisses. Daher ist es zu begrüßen, dass die R2P immer deutlichere völkerrechtliche Gestalt annimmt, obwohl es sich nach wie vor um ein politisches Konzept handelt. Zu dieser Fortentwicklung kommt es vor allem durch den Umstand, dass der UN-Generalsekretär regelmäßige Berichte über die "Umsetzung der Schutzverantwortung" vorlegt. (ICI2)

Though Russia has approved the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) in the UN platforms it has often been placed rightly in the 'sceptics group' of states that are not at ease with the premises and practices of R2P. What is the basis of the Russian discontent? This article suggests the relevance of strategic culture in explaining the Russian position on R2P. It is based on the assertion that, in addition to humanitarian and moral aspects, responding to mass atrocities within the doctrine of R2P takes place in a context of security considerations since, in severe cases, it involves, among others, a military component under a UN Security Council mandate. As such the use of force, approving or disapproving, it is all related to the realm of security even if the motive and objective may be humanitarian. In the security domain, this article argues that Russian strategic culture, in interaction with its national identity, historical experiences and prevailing narratives, forms a loose code of conduct and a context within which strategic decisions concerning the use of force in responding to a humanitarian crisis are made. It is, thus, concluded that Russian strategic culture by constraining decision-makers, defining appropriate behaviour and reflecting insecurities and aspirations explains Russia's approach to R2P's normative propositions, legal standing and implementation in practice.

Most empirical contributions to the normative power Europe (NPE) debate concentrate on whether and when the EU promotes its core internal norms abroad. In contrast, we investigate how norms emerging from international fora come to be accepted and internalised by the EU in the first place. We examine the case of the emerging responsibility to protect norm (R2P) and argue that the EU's implementation has been more limited and slower than one would expect from the NPE procedural ethics of 'living by example'. We examine the potential reasons for this failure to 'live by example': the role of persuasion by norm entrepreneurs; the role of inducements and costs; the goodness of fit between R2P and existing EU norms; and the clarity of the norm. We find that the lack of goodness of fit and clarity of the norm are important factors, but argue that low levels of bureaucratic receptivity were the greatest obstacle.