Suchergebnisse

This article analyses the admissibility of evidence gathered by the Polish procedural authorities as a result of issuing an European Investigation Order, on the basis of provisions implemented due to the adoption on the 3th of April 2014 of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters. This Directive created a mechanism that allows for transfer of evidence between EU Member States. In this text the question will be answered how to deal with results of investigative measures that have been legally obtained in the executing state but despite acting in accordance with the legality principle by both states, happen to be illegal in the issuing Member State. Another discussed problem is how the rules of admissibility of evidence obtained from the result of issuing an EIO work in Poland – or at least how they should operate. The second discussed issue thus will refer to the current provisions in force in Poland regulating the method of dealing with evidence obtained abroad – that is also with evidence transferred from other Member States. It will be shown that they are unclear and may lead to undesirable results. In addition, suggested changes in Polish law will be proposed. ; This article analyses the admissibility of evidence gathered by the Polish procedural authorities as a result of issuing an European Investigation Order, on the basis of provisions implemented due to the adoption on the 3th of April 2014 of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters. This Directive created a mechanism that allows for transfer of evidence between EU Member States. In this text the question will be answered how to deal with results of investigative measures that have been legally obtained in the executing state but despite acting in accordance with the legality principle by both states, happen to be illegal in the issuing Member State. Another discussed problem is how the rules of admissibility of evidence obtained from the result of issuing an EIO work in Poland – or at least how they should operate. The second discussed issue thus will refer to the current provisions in force in Poland regulating the method of dealing with evidence obtained abroad – that is also with evidence transferred from other Member States. It will be shown that they are unclear and may lead to undesirable results. In addition, suggested changes in Polish law will be proposed.

This article analyses the admissibility of evidence gathered by the Polish procedural authorities as a result of issuing an European Investigation Order, on the basis of provisions implemented due to the adoption on the 3rd of April 2014 of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters. This Directive created a mechanism that allows for transfer of evidence between EU Member States. In this text, the question will be answered how to deal with results of investigative measures that have been legally obtained in the executing state but, despite acting in accordance with the legality principle by both states, happen to be illegal in the issuing Member State. Another discussed problem is how the rules of admissibility of evidence obtained from the result of issuing an EIO work in Poland – or at least how they should operate. The second discussed issue thus will refer to the current provisions in force in Poland regulating the method of dealing with evidence obtained abroad – that is also with evidence transferred from other Member States. It will be shown that they are unclear and may lead to undesirable results. In addition, suggested changes in Polish law will be proposed.

From Parents Defending Education v. Linn Mar Community School Dist., decided Sept. 29 by the Eighth Circuit (Judge Steven Colloton, joined by Judges Duane Benton and Jane Kelly): The disputed policy is entitled "Administrative Regulations Regarding Transgender and Students Nonconforming to Gender Role Stereotypes." The policy was adopted in April 2022 as Board Policy 504.13-R.…

Surgeon General Vivek Murthy

The doctrine of parens patriae allows state attorneys general to represent state citizens in aggregate litigation suits that are, in many ways, similar to class actions and mass-tort actions. Its origins, however, reflect a more modest scope. Parens patriae began as a doctrine allowing the British king to protect those without the ability to protect themselves, including wards and mentally disabled individuals. The rapid expansion of parens patriae standing in the United States may be partly to blame for the relative absence of limiting requirements or even well-developed case law governing parens patriae suits. On the one hand, class actions are subject to myriad stringent procedural rules that help protect class members, members who "opt out," and even defendants who find themselves liable for often sky-high damages. On the other hand, parens patriae suits are largely unregulated and free from requirements that plaintiffs seeking class certification must meet. Part of this distinction seems to stem from an assumption that attorneys general are adequate representatives of their citizens' interests. The relative ease of bringing a parens patriae suit, compared to the increasingly onerous requirements of private class actions, has led state attorneys general to bring claims under parens patriae standing more frequently in the twenty-first century. But the lack of procedural protections in parens patriae suits means that state citizens affected by a parens patriae suit may potentially be precluded via res judicata from bringing valid, individual or class claims that have already been brought by the state on their behalf. Furthermore, it is not clear that parens patriae suits are an adequate, let alone superior, method of litigating citizens' claims. Settlements reached between states and defendants pose additional adequacy problems due to being unregulated and determined by a political representative, who may have interests distinct and separate from the interests of individual citizens. First, this Comment traces ...

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19681 attempts to regulate the use of electronic surveillance and wiretap within fourth amendment guidelines developed by the judiciary. If evidence has been obtained in violation of the Act, the Act prohibits its introduction into judicial, legislative, and administrative proceedings. As recent courts of appeals cases indicate, however, one primary question has arisen concerning the operation of this exclusionary rule in the specific context of a grand jury proceeding: May a grand jury witness challenge the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Crime Control Act?