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Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Editors and Contributors -- 1 Introduction and Overview -- 1.1 Sri Lanka in the Global Context -- 1.2 State Reforms and Centre-Periphery Relation in Sri Lanka -- 1.3 Current Issues and Objectives -- 1.4 Structure of the Book and Chapter Summaries -- References -- Decentralisation and Financing of Sub-National Units of Government -- 2 Local Government System in Sri Lanka: A Historical Overview -- 2.1 The Concept of Local Government -- 2.2 Devolution and Local Government -- 2.3 Historical Overview: Pre-independence Period -- 2.3.1 Local Authorities as Managers of Local Utility Services -- 2.4 Historical Overview: The Post Independent Period -- 2.4.1 The Failed Attempt on "Statutory" Devolution -- 2.4.2 The Introduction of Constitutional Devolution -- 2.4.3 Local Authority System After the Establishment of Provincial Councils -- 2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 3 Developmental Role and Financing of Sub-National Units of Government: The Case of Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Run Up to the Establishment of Provincial Councils -- 3.3 The Provincial Councils System -- 3.4 Fiscal Devolution and Financing of Provincial Councils -- 3.5 Regional/Provincial Disparities -- 3.6 Improving Fiscal Autonomy of PCs -- Acknowledgements -- Annexure -- Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution -- Subject Areas PCs are Constitutionally Permitted to Tax -- Bibliography -- 4 Intergovernmental Fiscal Framework for Local Government and Centre-Local Revenue and Expenditure Sharing: A Comparative Analysis -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Local Autonomy and Sharing Revenue and Expenditure Responsibilities for Development: Review of Issues -- 4.2.1 Development and Local Autonomy: Issues of Expenditure and Revenue Responsibilities -- 4.2.2 Fiscal Arrangements for Local Autonomy: Issues of Efficiency and Equity

The regional level has traditionally had a weak position in the administrative system in all the Nordic countries. New developments in territorial governance throughout Europe characterized by a stronger regional role have found their way to the Nordic countries. The view of actors in peripheral Nordic regions can be labelled 'redistributive regionalism' which implies that the actors' claims for a stronger role for the regional level must be understood in the context of the unitary state. The idea of a stronger regional level is embraced but has to be adapted to national characteristics, the unitary state and the traditionally strong role of local government, and to the various conditions of each region. Adapted from the source document.

Studies of policy-making and management in health and related fields have generally been confined to England. The assumption of a unitary state in which the policy lead is given by Westminster /Whitehall is shown to be grossly misleading in the case of community care policy. Demonstrates the limitations of studying health and personal social services adopting a unitary state perspective. Argues for more intra-Britain comparative work aimed at evaluating the costs and benefits of service variations in different policy fields. (Abstract amended)

Studies of policy‐making and management in health and related fields have generally been confined to England even when professing to embrace Britain or the United Kingdom. The assumption of a unitary state in which the policy lead is given by Westminster/Whitehall is shown to be grossly misleading in the case of community care policy. Considerable variations exist not only in policy means but also in policy ends. The paper demonstrates the limitations of studying health and personal social services adopting a unitary state perspective. It argues for more intra‐Britain comparative work aimed at evaluating the costs and benefits of service variations in different policy fields.

Despite variety, plurality and complexity, analysis of (inter) organisational arrangements in the mixed economy of unitary states is still dominated by the centralistic frame of reference suggested by the formal-legal characteristics of these systems. Despite a growing sense of discomfort with this situation, and a growing critique of the unwarrantability of assumptions of uniformity and centralised control, an alternative theoretical approach does not yet seem to have been developed. This article explores the field of public administration in order to see what perspectives can be offered to the analysis of plural public structures. It distinguishes between a policy-instrumental and a political perspective. Differences are outlined in confronting these perspectives with respect to some analytical and normative issues to be resolved.

"Intergovernmental Relations in the UK provides a timely and up-to-date analysis of a turbulent decade in British politics and presents a fascinating case study of intergovernmental relations and territorial power in a devolved unitary state. As over time a widening range of powers has been transferred from the Westminster Parliament to the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, intergovernmental relations have become increasingly important to deal with the corresponding overlaps of legislative and fiscal authority. However, leaving the European Union has exposed the weakness of the intergovernmental architecture and challenged the functionality of the UK's multilevel polity. Until now, the question of how powerful the devolved administrations really are has not been satisfactorily answered. The author uses insights from comparative studies of federations to develop a systematic account of shared rule and intergovernmental relations. This book examines how informal institutions and practices can provide political influence beyond formal structures, with reference to an extensive range of institutions, practices, policies and political decisions. Unlike other studies focused predominantly on the state of the Union, this volume points to the interplay between conflict and cooperation, and demonstrates that the proclaimed 'break-up of the Union' is accompanied by efforts to integrate the different jurisdictions. This book will be of interest to scholars and postgraduate students of comparative politics, political systems, multilevel governance, regional and federal studies, British politics and public administration. It will also appeal to politicians, government advisers, civil servants and other practitioners who seek a better, more nuanced understanding of the UK's multilevel constitution and politics, and the nature of intergovernmental relations in the UK"--

The paper is concerned with what Albert Breton, in his theory of competitive federalism has called vertical competition, that is, competition between governments situated at different levels. However its setting is government systems that are unitary rather than federal and structured around three or four levels of government rather than the two often implicitly assumed. The paper tries to show that these characteristics may offer a partial solution to what is perhaps the major problem raised by vertical competition, that is, how winners in a vertical contest get protected against retaliation by the losers when the latter can change the rules (which are not constitutionally entrenched). In federations, the problem typically arises in the context of the relationship between the intermediate (provincial or state) level and the local one. In unitary systems, the relationship affected is the one between the central government and the intermediate level, whereas the competitive relationship between the intermediate and the local levels may find some protection as an effect of the central government playing the role of a monitor. As is illustrated by the decentralization experience in France, a lively vertical competition at the bottom, between several subcentral tiers of government, may ensue.

The paper is concerned with what Albert Breton, in his theory of competitive federalism has called vertical competition, that is, competition between governments situated at different levels. However its setting is government systems that are unitary rather than federal and structured around three or four levels of government rather than the two often implicitly assumed. The paper tries to show that these characteristics may offer a partial solution to what is perhaps the major problem raised by vertical competition, that is, how winners in a vertical contest get protected against retaliation by the losers when the latter can change the rules (which are not constitutionally entrenched). In federations, the problem typically arises in the context of the relationship between the intermediate (provincial or state) level and the local one. In unitary systems, the relationship affected is the one between the central government and the intermediate level, whereas the competitive relationship between the intermediate and the local levels may find some protection as an effect of the central government playing the role of a monitor. As is illustrated by the decentralization experience in France, a lively vertical competition at the bottom, between several subcentral tiers of government, may ensue.