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International humanitarian law is increasingly perceived as part of human rights law applicable in armed conflict. This trend can be traced back to the United Nations Human Rights Conference held in Tehran in 1968 which not only encouraged the development of humanitarian law itself, but also marked the beginning of a growing use by the United Nations of humanitarian law during its examination of the human rights situation in certain countries or during its thematic studies. The greater awareness of the relevance of humanitarian law to the protection of people in armed conflict, coupled with the increasing use of human rights law in international affairs, means that both these areas of law now have a much greater international profile and are regularly being used together in the work of both international and non-governmental organizations.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Note on the text -- Dedication -- 1 Theoretical variables - an overview -- Introduction -- New legal imaginaries -- Aesthetics -- Crisis of subjectivity -- Materiality -- Plurality -- Conceptual dynamism -- Prefigurative law and theory -- 2 Limited and unlimited law -- Introduction -- Restricted and unrestricted legal theory -- Brighton rock law -- Historical and cultural exclusions -- Beyond law as reified subject -- Lawspace -- Vertical and horizontal -- Is and ought -- The norm -- Defining 'law' -- 3 Legal materialism and social existence -- Introduction -- Law's abstractions -- The real, the material, and the socio-legal -- Postmodernism and materialism -- 4 A new legal materialism -- Introduction -- Thinking and things -- Creating subjects and objects -- Intra-actions -- Humans as beings -- Materialism and law -- Legal bodies in spacetime -- 5 Inner and outer space -- Introduction -- Headscape -- Lawspace -- Beyond inside and out -- Being-in not being-and -- 6 Scales of law -- Introduction -- Satellite and street views -- The geographical notion of scale -- Law defined through space -- Jurisdiction and scale in positive law -- 7 Subjects and perspective -- Introduction -- The legal theorist as an expert knower -- Subjective knowers in legal philosophy -- Fractured subjects and plural laws -- Differently situated law construction -- Posthuman agents -- 8 Imagining law -- Introduction -- Metaphors and meaning -- 'A moderate amount of cacophany' -- Boundaries -- Mapping legal landscapes -- 9 Pathfinding -- Introduction -- The way of the law -- Beaten tracks -- Performing law -- 10 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.

In the year 1274, Sir Hugh LaPape, knight, vassal, and retainer of his liege lord, Edward the First of England, stood on a hill outside the city of Florence, Italy, and wept. Four years before, Sir Hugh had set off for the Holy Land at the call of his king, leaving behind him a beautiful palace with tall towers, shining in the morning sun. Now he surveyed the remains of that palace, a pile of rubble, in growing anger. Although a vassal of the English king, Sir Hugh had some years before removed himself from England to Florence, Italy, where he became attached to the Guelphs, a party that was disputing control of the city with the rival Ghibbelines. The Guelphs were grateful for Sir Hugh's assistance and, after the Ghibbelines were driven away, ceded him land outside the city walls on which he constructed his palace. While Sir Hugh was at the Crusades, the Ghibbilines threatened to retake Florence and the Guelphs razed the palace to the ground to prevent its tall towers from being used as vantage points to guide the fire of bombards against the city. Not happy with this course of events but accepting the unpleasant reality before him, Sir Hugh returned to London where in 1275 he filed suit against certain Florentine merchants living there on the then--prevalent theory that citizens of a city or state could be sued for injuries caused by their municipal government. The merchants defended by arguing that they could not be called to account in England for acts done in Florence because that was wholly a matter for Florentine law. In 1281, the King's Council ruled for the merchants, stating:. "it is not the custom of England that anyone answer in the Kingdom of England for any trespass made in a region outside . [Therefore,] the aforesaid merchants do go without a day. And the aforesaid Hugh to take nothing by his complaint and to be in mercy." Thus, the court concluded that it had neither judicial nor prescriptive jurisdiction to try in England any case that arose abroad.