Suchergebnisse

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security.The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once.







1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.







3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.







In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.







A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.







And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "transitioning away from" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.







Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.







CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security. The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once. 1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "leave behind" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers.DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

In October 2023, the G7 countries published the Hiroshima Process International Guiding Principles for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems, in which they suggest the implementation of measures to "identify, evaluate, and mitigate risks across the AI lifecycle".[1] As artificial intelligence (AI) technology becomes increasingly powerful and integrated into society, safety measures and protocols that ensure these systems function safely and predictably become increasingly important. Many current AI governance efforts, such as the UK's AI Safety Institute,[2] chiefly address the deployment and post-deployment stages of the AI lifecycle through model evaluations, leaving out the pre-development and development phases. But these safeguards are not enough; current AI safety evaluation regimes lack rigorous methodologies to predict and mitigate risks due to persisting gaps in expert's understanding of the inner workings of AI models, making it difficult to generalise experimental results.[3]
Nonetheless, ever-more powerful advanced AI systems are released every few months, while AI experts and developers are sounding the alarm bells about very advanced AI systems posing extreme risks on a global scale. Their concerns range from the large-scale deployment of lethal autonomous weapons or malicious actors destabilising governments through advanced AI-driven misinformation campaigns, to smarter-than-human, out-of-control AI accidentally causing human extinction in the future.[4] Considering these high stakes, we need transparent, robust governance mechanisms that address the pre-development stage of the AI lifecycle to safeguard against the development of high-risk advanced AI systems.
Developing advanced AI systems requires three key components: algorithms, massive high-quality datasets and access to compute resources (powerful microchips). Of the three, managing access to and use of compute resources is the most convenient lever for pre-development AI governance. Empirical data suggests that the larger and more powerful an AI model is, the more compute was used to train it,[5] with the most powerful models requiring tens of millions of dollars worth of cutting-edge microchips to train.[6] Conveniently, compute is also detectable, quantifiable, is produced via a highly concentrated supply chain, and access can be granted or limited physically.[7]
Therefore, we propose that the G7 countries back an international institution that designs international standards for the responsible management of compute resources. Such standards would help expand AI governance to cover the entire AI lifecycle, as appropriate for such a high-risk technology, and as proposed in the 2023 Hiroshima Guiding Principles.The International Compute Governance Consortium (ICGC)
We suggest that the G7 countries support the establishment of an International Compute Governance Consortium (ICGC) tasked with developing standards for the responsible use and distribution of compute resources in AI research and development.
To design well-informed standards, this new institution would initially focus on gathering information on present compute ownership and use by the public and private sectors within the jurisdiction of its member states, tracking compute use and assessing its impact. By collecting such data, the ICGC would create transparency on the questions of who controls the compute, and who has access to it, fostering accountability and informed policymaking. This process would also lay the groundwork for a potential future multilateral organisation that manages the access to compute to ensure malicious actors or those following unsafe practices do not have access to enough compute to cause significant damage.
While the G7 countries would support and aid with the founding of the ICGC, it would be an international institution open to all countries and co-governed by its member states. The internationalisation of compute governance is necessary because advanced AI systems pose extreme risks on a global scale, making AI safety a global challenge. Thus, internationally cohesive action will be impossible without the participation of some major non-G7 stakeholders like China.
However, national AI governance interests and priorities vary. France for example plans to massively invest in domestic AI innovation to unlock economic growth, and to become a global leader in AI.[8] Other countries, like the US and China,[9] are introducing laws and policies requiring developers to disclose information about the training of their advanced AI models to mitigate risks. The challenge in building an international compute governance framework will be finding a solution that respects national interests while remaining effective.Creating transparency: The Global Compute Registry
To fulfil its mission, the ICGC would create a Global Compute Registry, which would track the ownership and use of compute resources. Any entity possessing large-scale computing clusters located or operating in the member states would be required to report such possessions, including its location and compute capacity. Changes of possession should also be reported, especially if some part of the cluster is transferred to a non-member state. This idea is not without precedent; the 2023 US Executive Order on AI already introduced some reporting requirements on location and total capacity for owners of large compute clusters in the US.[10]
Furthermore, owners would be required to report provisions of access to these clusters to any domestic or foreign entity, including the type of use (for instance, training specific or general AI models, foreseen use cases and risks, etc.) and verification of the user's identity. This approach mirrors Know Your Customer policies in the financial sector, which require companies to verify the identity of their clients to prevent illegal activities. The Global Compute Registry should also publish an annual report presenting data on the amount of compute resources globally available and project its growth.
This would allow the ICGC to record and make transparent large concentrations of computing power and gather information about their use for the development of safety-first compute use standards. The vast majority of AI models and their applications would remain untouched by such standards since they do not require high compute concentrations for training,[11] nor pose extreme risks.Evaluating the impact: The Compute Resource Impact Assessment
A second important function of the ICGC would be assessing the impacts of compute use by establishing a Compute Resource Impact Assessment protocol. This protocol would evaluate the economic, environmental and societal impacts and risks of compute resource allocation, providing crucial context for the ICGC's development of compute use standards.
The protocol would define compute thresholds above which training a powerful AI system would be considered high-risk as the EU did in its AI Act,[12] and re-adjust them regularly. Since skewed compute distribution can limit beneficial, low-risk AI innovation and research in under-resourced regions, exacerbating disparities in economic growth, education, and employment, the protocol would also assess the societal impact of compute distribution, access and use by analysing the allocation of compute resources across various sectors, populations and geographical regions. Finally, under this protocol, the ICGC would examine environmental effects, such as the carbon footprint of compute clusters and chip manufacturing.Integrating existing compute governance frameworks
The proposed International Compute Governance Consortium would not only help expand AI governance to cover the entire AI lifecycle, as proposed in the 2023 Hiroshima Guiding Principles. It would also build upon and integrate other existing efforts to establish information disclosure regimes for high-risk AI systems, such as those in the US and the EU, as well as international cooperation efforts like the Bletchley Declaration.[13] The 2023 US Executive Order on the safe development and use of AI requires reporting ownership of large-scale computing clusters and provisions of access to any foreign entities. Similarly, the EU AI Act considers models trained on compute resources above a given threshold to potentially pose systemic risk. Developers of such models must notify the Commission and comply with several safety precautions. Furthermore, the ICGC would complement the OECD's AI Principles on Robustness, Security and Safety,[14] promoting international cooperation on AI governance.
To increase participation in the ICGC, the G7 countries could cooperate with other international forums, such as the AI Safety Summit series started by the UK in 2023 and the G20. The G20 could be a fitting partner; the G20 AI Principles state that "AI systems should be robust, secure and safe throughout their entire lifecycle",[15] which matches the G7's Hiroshima Principles, and its membership includes some major countries not represented in the G7, such as China and India.
By supporting ongoing efforts of international cooperation on AI governance, the ICGC would enhance existing national AI governance frameworks, standardising compute data collection and impact assessments. As such, it would increase the transparency of compute use and lay the groundwork for the design of international compute resource management standards that ensure the development of safe, beneficial AI.Eva Behrens and David Janků are Advanced AI Researchers at the International Center for Future Generations (ICFG). Bengüsu Özcan is an Advanced AI Research Assistant at ICFG. Max Reddel is the Advanced AI Program Lead at ICFG.[1] G7, Hiroshima Process International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems, 30 October 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100573473.pdf.[2] UK Government, Introducing the AI Safety Institute, updated on 17 January 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-institute-overview/introducing-the-ai-safety-institute.[3] Will Henshall, "Nobody Knows How to Safety-Test AI", in Time, 21 March 2024, https://time.com/6958868.[4] Center for AI Safety, Statement on AI Risk, May 2023, https://www.safe.ai/work/statement-on-ai-risk.[5] Jared Kaplan et al., "Scaling Laws for Neural Language Models", in arXiv, 23 January 2020, https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2001.08361.[6] Will Knight, "OpenAI's CEO Says the Age of Giant AI Models Is Already Over", in Wired, 17 April 2023, https://www.wired.com/story/openai-ceo-sam-altman-the-age-of-giant-ai-models-is-already-over.[7] Girish Sastry et al., "Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence", in arXiv, 13 February 2024, https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2402.08797.[8] France Artificial Intelligence Commission, Our AI: Our Ambition for France, March 2024, https://www.info.gouv.fr/actualite/25-recommandations-pour-lia-en-france.[9] Matt Sheehan, "China's AI Regulations and How They Get Made", in CSIS Working Papers, July 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/publi90117.[10] See Section 4.2(b) of the Executive Order No. 14110 on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, 30 October 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/10/30/executive-order-on-the-safe-secure-and-trustworthy-development-and-use-of-artificial-intelligence.[11] Nicolas Moës and Frank Ryan, Heavy is the Head that Wears the Crown. A Risk-based Tiered Approach to Governing General-Purpose AI, The Future Society, September 2023, https://thefuturesociety.org/heavy-is-the-head-that-wears-the-crown.[12] Council of the EU, Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act: Council Gives Final Green Light to the First Worldwide Rules on AI, 21 May 2024, https://europa.eu/!3Gf3QN.[13] UK Government, The Bletchley Declaration by Countries Attending the AI Safety Summit, 1 November 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration.[14] OECD.AI Policy Observatory, OECD AI Principles: Principle on Robustness, Security and Safety (Principle 1.4), https://oecd.ai/en/dashboards/ai-principles/P8.[15] G20, G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy, 9 June 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000486596.pdf.

The sorption of volatile organic compounds which are components of the wine flavor has been studied on thin films of sorbents - modifiers of piezoelectric resonators electrodes forming an sensors array of gas analyzer "electronic nose". The resulting sensor array is trained on the main marker substance (ethanol, 1-butanol, 2-butanol, pentanol-2, ethanoic acid, ethyl acetate, water) and adapted to the flavor of wine. It has been established the correlation between sugar content in wine and integral quantitative indicator quartz crystal microbalance - area of "visual imprint" of the sensors array responses, reflecting the content of volatile substances in the equilibrium gas phase of wine. The parameters of the speed and efficiency of sorption of volatile compounds have been calculated which are indicators of analytical information about the condition of wine samples. The model that describes the connection of empirical physicochemical characteristics and parameters of the piezoelectric quartz crystal microbalance with the properties of the analyzed wine samples is developed by principal component analysis. The possibility of expert evaluation of quality, individual physicochemical parameters (content of sugar, alcohol), belonging assortment of wines as the results of detection of the individual compounds in the equilibrium gas phase over samples by array of 7 piezosensors with different films. The way of express evaluation of wine quality on standard indicators and aroma has been developed, which can be an alternative to preliminary examination in routine analysis of detecting falsification.Keywords: chemical piezosensors, detection of organic vapors (gases), wine quality, expert evaluation (Russian)DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/analitika.2014.18.4.002 Т.А. Kuchmenko *, R.P. Lisickaja **, А.А. Shuba * *Federal State Budget Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education «Voronezh state university of engineering technology» (VSUET), Voronezh, Russian Federation**Federal State Official Military Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education Military Educational – Research Center of Air Force «Air Force Academy named after professor N. E. Zhukovsky and Yu. A. Gagarin» of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (MERC AF «AFA»), Voronezh, Russian Federation REFERENCES1. Vino i alkogol'nye napitki. Direktivy i Reglamenty Evropeiskogo soiuza [Wine and alcoholic beverages. Directives and Regulations of the European Union]. Moscow, Standartinform Publ., 2000. 616 p. (in Russian).2. Eliseev M. N., Pozdniakovskii V. M. Tovarovedenie i ekspertiza vkusovykh tovarov [Commodity and examination of flavoring products]. Moscow, Akademiia Publ., 2006. 239 p. (in Russian).3. Iakuba Iu.F. [Improving the analytical control of wine production]. Analitika i kontrol' [Analytics and control], 2011, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 309-312 (in Russian).4. Therkashina Y. [Qality assessment of cognas]. [Proc. EHEDG «1st Hygienic Engineering and Design Conference for Food Factories»]. St. Petersburg, 2010, p. 103.5. GOST R 52813-2007. Produktsiia vinodel'cheskaia. Metody organolepticheskogo analiza [State Standard 52813-2007. Production of wine. Methods for sensory analysis]. Moscow, Standartinform Publ., 2008. 13 p. (in Russian).6. Markosov V. A., Guguchkina T. I., Ageeva N. M., Ageeva Iu.F. Primenenie kapilliarnogo elektroforeza dlia analiza vinodel'cheskoi produktsii [Application of capillary electrophoresis for the analysis of wine products]. Vinogradstvo i vinodelie [Viticulture and winemaking], 2007, no. 2, pp. 23-24 (in Russian).7. Kaunova A. A., Petrov V. I., Tsiupko T. G., Temerdashev Z. A., Perekotii V. V., Luk'ianov A. A. [Identification of Wine Provenance by ICP-AES Multielement Analysis]. Russian Iournal of Analytical Chemistry, 2013, vol. 68, no. 9, pp. 831-836. doi:10.1134/S1061934813090050 (in Russian).8. I. A. Ragazzo-Sanchez, P. Chalier, D. Chevalier, C. Ghommidh [Electronic nose discrimination of aroma compounds in alcoholised solutions]. Sens. and Actuators. B, 2006, vol. 114, no. 2, pp. 665-673. doi:10.1016/i.snb.2005.05.032.9. Kuchmenko T.A., Lisitskaia R.P., Skrypnikova M.I., Tkacheva E.B. Sorbtsiia legkoletuchikh kislorodsoderzhashchikh soedinenii tonkimi plenkami modifitsirovannykh p'ezokvartsevykh mikrovesov [Sorption of volatile oxygenated compounds by thin films modified piezoelectric quartz microbalance]. Materialy III Vserossiiskogo simpoziuma «Razdelenie i kontsentrirovanie v analiticheskoi khimii i radiokhimii» [Proc. of the III All-Russian Symposium "The separation and concentration in analytical chemistry and radiochemistry"]. Krasnodar, 2011, p. 258 (in Russian).10. Lang H.P., Ramseyer I. P., Grange W., Braun T., Schmid D., Hunziker P., Iung C., Hegner M., Gerber C. [An artificial nose based on microcantilever array sensors]. I. Phys. Conf. Ser., 2007, pp. 663-667. doi:10.1088/1742-6596/61/1/13311. Gutierrez M., Capdevila F., Vila-Planas I., Domingo C., Büttgenbach S., Llobera A., Puig-Puiol A., Iiménez-Iorquera C. [Hybrid electronic tongue based on optical and electrochemical microsensors for quality control of wine]. I. of Sensors, 2011, no. 11, pp. 4840-4857. doi:10.1155/2014/59831712. I. Blackman, D. N. Rutledge, D. Tesic, A. Saliba, G. R. Scollary [Examination of the potential for using chemical analysis as a surrogate for sensory analysis]. Anal. chim. Acta, 2010, vol. 660, no. 1, pp. 2-7. doi:10.1016/i.aca.2009.10.062.13. Kuchmenko T. A., Lisitskaia R. P., Bobrova O. S., Akst N. N. [Analysis of grape and grape-apple iuice using a gas analyzer "static pezoelektronny nose"] Analitika i kontrol' [Analytics and control], 2006, vol. 10, no. 3-4, pp. 267-275 (in Russian).14. Korenman Ia. I., Kuchmenko T. A., Lisitskaia R. P., Stegantseva Iu. A. [Application of pezosensors for analysis of orange iuice]. Sensor [Sensor], 2004, no. 1, pp. 46-53 (in Russian).15. Kuchmenko T.A. Innovatsionnye resheniia v analiticheskom kontrole [Innovative solutions in analytical control]. Voronezh, Voronezh. gos. tekhnol. akad., OOO «SenTekh» Publ., 2009. 252 p. (in Russian).16. Petsev N., Kotsev N. Spravochnik po gazovoi khromatografii [Handbook on Gas Chromatography]. Moscow, Mir Publ., 1987. 264 p. (in Russian).17. Rodopulo A. [Aromaforming substances of grapes and grape iuice]. Vinogradstvo i vinodelie SSSR [Viticulture and winemaking USSR], 1987, no. 4, pp. 53-55 (in Russian).18. Kishkovskii Z. K., Skurikhin I. M. Khimiia vina [Chemistry of wine]. Moscow, Agropromizdat Publ., 1988. 250 p. (in Russian).19. Tekhnologicheskoe i fiziologicheskoe znachenie veshchestv aromata vina [Technological and physiological significance of wine aroma substances]. Available at: http://vinograd-vino.ru/sostav-vinograda-i-vina/194-tekhnologicheskoe-i-fiziologicheskoe-znachenie-fenolnykh-veshchestv.html (accessed 15 June 2014) (in Russian).20. Kuchmenko T.A., Lisitskaia R.P. [Microbalance aniline vapor on films alkyloxides under static conditions] Sensor [Sensor], 2002, no. 3, pp. 35-40 (in Russian).21. GOST 7208–93. Vina vinogradnye i vinomaterialy vinogradnye obrabotannye. Obshchie tekhnicheskie usloviia [State Standard 7208–93. Grape wines and grape wine materials processed. General specifications]. Moscow, Standartinform Publ., 2000. 8 p. (in Russian).22. Kuchmenko T. A., e.a. Sposob formirovaniia matritsy sensorov «staticheskogo elektronnogo nosa» dlia identifikatsii muskatnogo aromata vinograda, vinogradnogo syr'ia i soka [A method of forming a sensors matrix of "static electronic nose" to identify muscat aroma of grapes, grape iuice and raw materials]. Patent RF, no. 2442158, 2012 (in Russian).23. Korenman Ia. I. Ekstraktsiia fenolov [Phenols extraction]. Gor'kii, Volgo-Viatsk. Publ., 1973. 216 p. (in Russian). ; Изучена сорбция легколетучих органических соединений, составляющих аромат вина, на тонких пленках сорбентов – модификаторов электродов пьезокварцевых резонаторов, формирующих массив сенсоров анализатора газов «электронный нос». Полученный массив сенсоров обучен по основным веществам-маркерам (этанол, бутанол-1, бутанол-2, пентанол-2, этановая кислота, этилацетат, вода) и адаптирован к аромату виноградного вина. Установлена корреляция между содержанием сахара в вине и интегральным количественным показателем пьезокварцевого микровзвешивания – площадью «визуального отпечатка»откликов массива сенсоров, отражающим содержание легколетучих веществ в равновесной газовой фазе вина. Рассчитаны параметры скорости и эффективности сорбции легколетучих соединений – носители аналитической информации о состоянии проб вина. Методом главных компонент разработана модель, описывающая связь эмпирических физико-химических стандартных характеристик и параметров пьезокварцевого микровзвешивания со свойствами анализируемых образцов вина. Показана возможность экспертной оценки качества, отдельных физико-химических показателей (содержание сахара, алкоголя), ассортиментной принадлежности виноградных вин по результатам детектирования веществ-маркеров в равновесной газовой фазе над образцами массивом 7 разнохарактерных пьезосенсоров. Разработан способ экспрессной оценки качества вина по стандартным показателям и аромату, который может составить альтернативу предварительной экспертизе в рутинном анализе при выявлении фактов фальсификации.Ключевые слова: химические пьезосенсоры, детектирование органических паров (газов), качество вина, экспертная оценка DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/analitika.2014.18.4.002 ЛИТЕРАТУРАВино и алкогольные напитки. Директивы и Регламенты Европейского союза. М.: ИПК Изд-во стандартов, 2000. 616 с.Елисеев М. Н., Поздняковский В. М. Товароведение и экспертиза вкусовых товаров. М.: Академия, 2006. 239 c.Якуба Ю.Ф. Совершенствование аналитического контроля винодельческой продукции // Аналитика и контроль. 2011. Т.15, № 3. С. 309-312. Therkashina Y. Qality assessment of cognas // EHEDG «1st Hygienic Engineering and Design Conference for Food Factories», СПб. 2010. С. 103. ГОСТ Р 52813-2007. Продукция винодельческая. Методы органолептического анализа. М.: Изд-во стандартов, 2008. 13 с.Применение капиллярного электрофореза для анализа винодельческой продукции / В.А. Маркосов и [др.] // Виноградство и виноделие. 2007. № 2. С. 23-24.Идентификация вин по региональной принадлежности на основе мультиэлементного анализа методом АЭС-ИСП /А.А. Каунова и [др.] // Ж. аналит. химии. 2013. Т. 68, № 9. С. 831-836.Electronic nose discrimination of aroma compounds in alcoholised solutions/ J.A. Ragazzo-Sanchez [et al.] // Sens. and Actuators. B. 2006. № 2. Р. 665-673.Сорбция легколетучих кислородсодержащих соединений тонкими пленками модифицированных пьезокварцевых микровесов Т.А. Кучменко и [др.] // Материалы III Всероссийского симпозиума «Разделение и концентрирование в аналитической химии и радиохимии». Краснодар, 2011. С. 258.An artificial nose based on microcantilever array sensors / H.P. Lang [et al.] // J. Phys. Conf. Ser. 2007. Р. 663.Hybrid electronic tongue based on optical and electrochemical microsensors for quality control of wine / M. Gutierrez [et al.] // Sensors. 2011. № 11. Р. 4840-4857.Examination of the potential for using chemical analysis as a surrogate for sensory analysis / J. Blackman [et al.] // Anal. chim. acta. 2010. № 1. Р. 2-7.Анализ виноградного и виноградно-яблочного сока с применением газоанализатора «статический пьезоэлектронный нос» / Т.А. Кучменко и [др.] // Аналитика и контроль. 2006. Т. 10, № 3-4. С. 267-275.Применение пьезосенсоров для анализа апельсинового сока / Т.А. Кучменко и [др.] // Сенсор. 2004. № 1. С. 46-53.Кучменко Т.А. Инновационные решения в аналитическом контроле. Воронеж: Воронеж. гос. технол. акад., ООО «СенТех», 2009. 252 с.Пецев Н., Коцев Н. Справочник по газовой хроматографии. М.: Мир, 1987. 264 с.Родопуло А. Ароматобразующие вещества винограда и виноградного сока // Виноделие и виноградарство СССР. 1987. № 4. С. 53-55.Кишковский З.К., Скурихин И.М. Химия вина. 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[spa] En los últimos años el mapa asegurador del mercado español se ha visto modificado como consecuencia de la crisis financiera. Derivado del entorno de inestabilidad del mercado, el regulador europeo ha aprobado un nuevo marco legislativo que pretende garantizar la estabilidad financiera y la solvencia de las compañías aseguradoras a través del control de los riesgos a los que se exponen. En los distintos capítulos de esta tesis se analiza la forma en que el regulador pretende que las entidades garanticen su estabilidad, esto es, a través del proceso de fijación de los requerimientos de capital, y las herramientas con las cuales el regulador permite su obtención, es decir, el Modelo Estándar o un Modelo Interno. Se aborda la problemática de la estimación de los requerimientos de capital, las implicaciones de la utilización tanto del Modelo Estándar como de un Modelo Interno, así como el proceso de estimación de los parámetros necesarios para su implementación, con especial énfasis en la matriz de correlaciones. En esta tesis se analiza la problemática en la estimación delos requerimientos de capital que el regulador exige a las entidades. Por una parte se analiza exhaustivamente el Modelo Estándar para el riesgo de primas y reservas no vida. Se derivan las hipótesis estadísticas implícitas en la fórmula estándar con la finalidad de mejorar la comprensión sobre el modelo y poder realizar estimaciones de los parámetros de los que depende, y poder de este modo, adaptar la fórmula estándar al perfil de riesgo de las entidades. Mediante la determinación de la variable aleatoria implícita en la fórmula estándar se está en disposición, en particular, de realizar estimaciones de los coeficientes de correlación necesarios para realizar la agregación de requerimientos de distintas líneas de negocio. Esta cuestión resuelve el vacío que deja la Directiva a este respecto, es decir, la propuesta de un método para la estimación de los coeficientes de correlación y su actualización. Posteriormente, se propone un Modelo Interno comparable con el Modelo Estándar para el riesgo de primas y reservas no vida. El Modelo Interno está basado en la estimación de los requerimientos de capital mediante una medida de riesgo procedente de una simulación Monte Carlo de un vector de variables aleatorias que representan las distintas líneas de negocio. Para modelizar el comportamiento conjunto de las distintas líneas de negocio, es introducido la modelización a través de cópulas, en particular, la cópula Gaussiana y la cópula t-Student. Finalmente, se propone la estimación de la matriz de correlaciones, necesaria para realizar las estimaciones de capital tanto en el Modelo Estándar como en el Modelo Interno propuesto, mediante el uso de un Modelo de Credibilidad. Es introducido el uso de un modelo bayesiano como caso particular de Modelo de Credibilidad, que permite fusionar el criterio del regulador en referencia a la matriz de correlaciones que propone, con el criterio de la entidad basado en las estimaciones procedentes de la experiencia histórica. ; [eng] The publication in the Official Journal of the European Union of the European Parliament and Council of 25 November 2009 Directive on the taking up and pursuit of the business of insurance and reinsurance, also known as Solvency II, 2009/138/EC, marks the official starting point in the implementation of legislative measures of risk management in insurance. While, prior, and there was another regulation, Solvency II has been a legislative change on the approach that insurers must hold in relation to the risks they face as a result of their activity. Solvency II establishes a common legal framework to apply over those insurers based in any of the member states of the European Union to access and exercise the insurance and reinsurance business. The Directive is structured on the three pillars principle. These pillars set the criteria and standards of quantitative and qualitative requirements that entities must undertake to ensure their solvency and financial stability. Pillar I set rules that determine the criteria for obtaining capital requirements that an entity must maintain over an annual time horizon, commensurate to the risk assumed by the entity, to ensure an acceptable level of solvency through the market consistent economic valuation of the balance sheet of an entity. Pillar I is aimed to determine the minimum financial requirements to ensure that the assets are sufficient in quantity and quality, to meet the liabilities under a certain time horizon. To do this, the assessment under Pillar I balance must be performed according to market criteria, i.e. both the valuation of assets and liabilities of the entity must be consistent with that which would result from the interaction of free market agents. On the one hand, the balance sheet is determined by the market value of the investments made by the entity. For those assets that by their illiquid nature, or for any other reason, there is no market value, the Directive introduces valuation standards. The valuation of the liabilities presents difficulties inherent in the insurance business as for example to determine the economic value of the contract obligations insured by entities. These have usually an uncertain amount as well as uncertain in the time of liquidation. Also, Pillar I determines the composition of the entities' own funds, i.e., the asset structure that supports that part of the balance, in addition to the financial amounts (capital requirements) of legal character Directive establishes. Pillar I consider separately different levels of protection. The first level would be constituted by the market valuation of technical provisions, which should reflect an estimate consistent with the level of liabilities and risk margin. The second level would be determined by Pillar I solvency requirements. These requirements should reflect the risk and ensure the solvency of institutions. The Directive sets a minimum threshold of economic requirements under which the entity could not continue their business. Financial requirements of the first level of protection should reflect the obligations of the entity through insurance contracts undersigned. This capital is reflected in the valuation of technical provisions. The valuation of technical provisions for solvency II, must represent, on the one hand, the present value of the best estimate of future economic flows arising from contractual obligations (best estimate) and secondly, a risk margin (risk margin) to reflect the amount that an entity would have to pay to transfer the obligations arising from insurance contracts, net of the present value of the best estimate of future economic flows arising from obligations. Moreover, the objective of the economic requirements of the second level of protection is to cover any unexpected losses that an entity may suffer as a result of adverse unexpected fluctuations in claims. This part of the capital requirements directive is known as the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR). As mentioned, the SCR has a lower bound determined by a threshold called Minimum Capital Solvency Requirement (MSCR), below which an entity could not continue operating. The Directive states that the SCR should be obtained by a model that reflects the risk profile of the entity, and that is appropriate based on the nature, scale and complexity of the risks assumed by the company. The model proposed by the regulator is called in the Directive as General Formula to calculate the Solvency Capital Requirement. Under Article 110 of the Directive, the Standard Model can be used by institutions using the parameters set in the Directive as market proxy, or can be adapted to the risk profile of each institution itself by estimating new parameters based on specific historical experience of the entity. There may be several reasons to make an insurer decides to estimate new parameters. One possible reason may arise from the overestimation of the proxys, which would lead to an SCR greater than that obtained with the use of specific parameters. Moreover, another reason for the estimation of the parameters could be determined by the fact that the structure of business of an insurance company does not adapt to that proposed by the regulator. The Directive also provides that under the competent authority's previous approval, the SCR can be obtained using an internal model. This model cannot account for all or part of the risks facing the entity. In the latter case, the model is referred to in Directive as partial internal model. The requirements to be met by an internal model are related to implementation and monitoring standards, so those entities that choose to use an internal model, total or partial, for the calculation of the solvency capital requirements must justify their use. The Standard Model is a set of formulas and methodologies proposed by the regulator with which the insurer can get the amount corresponding to the SCR. An internal model is a procedure offered by the insurer that has the same objective and purposes than the Standard Model, i.e., obtaining capital requirements using a model that reflects the risk profile of the entity. The SCR, obtained with any of the models permitted by the regulator, must be calibrated in such a way that corresponds to the value at risk (VaR) of the entity's own funds, at a one year horizon, calculated at a 99,5% confidence level. Pillar II describes the qualitative requirements that entities must comply and which result in those formal procedures and communication to the regulator. Pillar II of the Directive concerns those aspects relating the procedures of supervision and control by the regulator. Solvency II is defined as a policy of harmonization for entities operating in the states member of the European Union, so it is necessary that the quantitative aspects are accompanied by other qualitative aspects that achieve homogeneity of appropriate methods and monitoring and control tools to be used by local regulators of different States Member. These requirements also include the obligation for any entity to control risk management model, both quantifiable and non-quantifiable. This management model is known as Own Risk Solvency Assessment (ORSA). The ORSA is a communication tool that should serve two purposes. The first one should be used as an aid in the process of strategic decision making, therefore must be reviewed continuously when the risk profile of the entity changes significantly, incorporating strategic decisions. The second purpose must serve as a regulator tool of communication. The ORSA must project requirements in future years and justify deviations between projected and present requirements, whatever the model used for this aim. Thus, the model ORSA should be a calibration tool whatever the model chosen to estimate the SCR. Finally, Pillar III represents those measures intended to ensure the transparency and discipline in the insurance market, through a set of rules for communication of information on the financial position and solvency of financial institutions facing the local regulator, and the rules of communication and transparency of local regulators facing the European regulator. Pillar III sets the action to be taken by the regulator and the entities in the case of misalignments in fulfilling the requirements of the valuation rules of Pillar I and / or the requirements of Pillar II. Thus, the European regulator empowers local regulators to take action to ensure the standards imposed under Pillar I and II, and is authorized to take action on states that fail to comply with the requirements of Directive Communication and transparency.

The recovery of global growth that started in 2010 began to weaken in 2011. During the first half the falloff was linked to the Tohoku nuclear disaster in Japan and high oil prices, but by the end of July, temporary effects from Tohoku were starting to fade and global industrial production was rising. However, since August the global economy has come under increasing stress from the sovereign debt problems in Europe, anemic growth in the US, and a slowdown in China and other main emerging markets. The latest leading indicators and forecasts point to a further slowdown in growth in Europe. Meanwhile, risks remain of a double-dip recession in the US and sharper slowdown in the large emerging economies. Near term developments depend critically on factors that are largely beyond the control of governments. As this is being written, leaders of the major European Union (EU) countries are still seeking to implement a set of credible policies to establish an orderly process for managing sovereign debt in Greece, to prevent risks from spreading to other economies in the euro zone, to recapitalize banks affected by likely sovereign debt write downs, and to establish a more unified and effective fiscal framework for euro zone (EZ) states. Uncertainty over their ability to successfully conclude this process, as well a series of ratings downgrades, stock market volatility and uncertainty over US deficit policies have shaken investor and business confidence and kept consumers wary. Most forecasters have already reduced their projections for global growth in the US and the EU by a percent or more.

Over the past five years, the microcredit sector has experienced unprecedented growth. The number of borrowers served by microfinance institutions (MFIs) has increased threefold to reach 120 million clients, according to MIX estimates as of December 2009 and by other estimates the number may be as high 190 million (Microcredit Summit Campaign 2011). In large markets, such as Mexico and South Africa, commercial banks and consumer lending companies have expanded their activities to include microfinance for low-income households. Unfortunately, the growth of microcredit is not always sustainable. Some iconic markets, such as India and Bosnia Herzegovina, are experiencing large-scale credit crises, and they are not alone. The deterioration in the quality of MFI loan portfolios can be attributed to several factors. Some fast growing MFIs have outgrown their risk management systems and controls. These weaknesses have often been exacerbated by high staff turnover, leading to a further erosion of credit discipline. Rapid growth has also been focused in narrow geographies, which in turn affected borrower repayment incentives and behaviors. This report takes a fresh look at the state of credit reporting at the base of the pyramid. The data and analysis for this paper are drawn from International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) market intelligence on credit reporting systems. the lessons learned for effective credit reporting at the base of the pyramid and identifies key success factors as well as common challenges.

Peter Stella joined me on the podcast this week. He was back by popular demand and we touched on two important and related questions: how should the government finance its relief efforts and who should ultimately manage the public debt? The U.S. Treasury may seem like the obvious answer to both questions, but it is not the whole story. The Federal Reserve can also finance the relief efforts and, in so doing, affect the structure of public debt. But is this a good thing? Peter Stella says no, at least in the longrun. He makes the case that it is economically and politically cheaper to return the financing and management of the public debt back to the U.S. Treasury once the COVID-19 recession is over. In other words, the Fed's expansion of its balance sheet, an understandable response to the crisis, needs to be unwound as the economy improves. Otherwise, we might end up with two government agencies with very different objectives trying to manage the public debt. This is an interesting argument and one I want to flesh out in this post by taking a closer look at the two questions of financing the budget deficits and managing the public debt.Financing the Budget DeficitsThe first issue is financing the budget deficit. The question here is whether the government should fund the deficit through (1) overnight debt with a variable interest rate or (2) long-term debt with a fixed interest rate. The former option is what happens when Federal Reserve liabilities--the monetary base--finance the deficit, while the latter option arises when it is funded by treasury securities. The Fed financing of deficits, in other words, is not risk free. It could lead to higher financing costs as the economy recovers. In such a scenario, financing with long-term treasury securities with fixed interest rates would be ultimately cheaper. But is this even possible in the current crisis with the Fed buying up so much public debt? That is, even if Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin issued more long-term treasury bonds, the Fed's asset purchases have been so large they would effectively convert most of the long-term bonds into overnight reserves. That, in fact, is what has happened over the past three months. The chart above shows that for  March, April, and May, the Fed purchased about $1.67 trillion of treasury securities compared to $2.31 in new issuance. The Fed, in other words, bought up about 72 percent of the treasury securities supplied during this time.Not only was the Fed buying up most of the new issuance, but it was buying up treasury securities with a maturity far longer than overnight reserves. This can be seen in the chart below. The Fed, then, has been acting as the final financier for most of the deficit during the COVID-19 crisis and, in so doing, has transformed the structure of $1.67 trillion of U.S. public debt into overnight government liabilities.  Managing the Public DebtSo are we stuck with these short-term government liabilities forever? As Peter Stella explained in the show, the answer is no. The U.S. government could convert those overnight reserves back into longer-term treasury securities once the crisis is over.  To illustrate how, imagine that by the end of 2020 the Fed has bought up $2 trillion in treasury securities. The purchase of these treasuries were used to indirectly fund the cash transfers to households, the PPP program, extended unemployment benefits, and other economic relief efforts. The figure below shows this development in terms of the respective balance sheets of the Treasury and Fed. The treasury securities are liabilities for the U.S. Treasury and assets for the Fed and vice-versa for Fed-issued reserves. The Treasury takes the reserves on its balance sheet and sends them to the private sector as part of the economic relief efforts.If we now combine the Treasury and Fed balance sheets into a consolidated government account and also look at the private sector balance sheet, we see the following two t-accounts: The net government liabilities are now $2 trillion in overnight reserves which are assets on the private sector's balance sheet. Again, during a crisis this is not a surprising outcome as the Fed rapidly expands its balance sheet. But left unchanged, it would imply rising interest rate costs once the economy starts recovering and the Fed is forced to raised the IOER to keep inflation in check.To avoid this problem, Peter Stella recommends that after the crisis the Treasury issues additional long-term treasury bonds that lock in low interest rates. Selling these treasuries to the private sector means taking reserves off their balance sheets. The Treasury, in other words, is swapping long-term treasury securities for the overnight Fed liabilities. This is what the consolidated balance sheet would like after this activity: Peter Stella outlines this process more thoroughly in his paper titled "Exiting Well". Again, this would not happen right away, but after the crisis has ended. Historically, the Fed has financed about 20 percent of the consolidated public debt (CPD) based on data back through 1945. I define CPD as the sum of marketable treasury securities not held by the Fed and the monetary base. Using data from the Financial Accounts of the United States, I constructed the chart below that shows the share of CPD attributable to the Fed and the U.S. Treasury. Unsurprisingly, the Fed's share of CPD during the Great Inflation rose to an average of almost 30 percent and hit almost 40 percent in 1974. During the Great Moderation it fell to about 14 percent. As of May, the Fed's share of CPD is approximately 24 percent, just above the historical average. The reason it is not higher is because of large budget deficits coming into the crisis. If 'exiting well' means returning to the historical average, it might occur naturally with regular budget deficits after the crisis. If 'exiting well' means returning to something closer to the Great Moderation levels, then this will be a more ambitious project and require a vast reduction in the stock of reserves.Other ConsiderationsThe argument so far for reducing the Fed's management of the public debt is that it is likely to be economically cheaper. As noted by folks like George Selgin, Charles Plosser, Paul Tucker, and others, a second argument is that it is also politically cheaper for the Fed to avoid playing the role of public debt manager. The management of U.S. public debt is normally under the purview of the U.S. Treasury because this process is inherently politically and therefore overseen by representatives of the taxpayers. The Fed can avoid these political entanglements by minimizing its influence on public debt management. This, of course, requires a smaller Fed balance sheet.

A post-crisis journey to a smaller balance sheet, however, faces two big roadblocks. First, the Fed has chosen an 'ample reserve' or floor operating system. This keeps the stock of excess reserves large in normal times and therefore keeps elevated the Fed's influence over public debt management. A number of post-2008 bank regulations also has increased the demand for bank reserves. Some of these regulations have been tweaked in the crisis, but both they and the Fed's floor system would have to be reconsidered if we wanted to return to a world of scarce reserves and less political entanglement for the Fed. Finally, it is worth noting that maintaining large central bank balance sheets do not guarantee robust growth. The charts below show the 2009-2019 averages of central bank balance sheets sizes against several measures of nominal economic activity. They, ironically, show bigger balance sheets are tied to slower nominal growth. Now, it could be the case that the countries with the weakest nominal growth responded with the most aggressive use of the LSAP programs. This is probably true, but the data span an entire decade so one would expect to see inflation, domestic demand, and credit growth respond to the use of LSAPs over this long of a period if QE worked as advertised. If nothing else, these figures should give us pause in considering the benefits of maintaining large central bank balance sheets over long periods. Further analysis of this data supports this interpretation. So between the higher financing cost for the public debt, the greater political entanglement for the Fed, and the unclear benefits from maintaining a large central bank balance sheet over a long period, we should take seriously Peter Stella's suggestions for 'exiting well' once the crisis is over. Here's hoping we do.

La presente tesis tiene por objetivo realizar una minuciosa investigación sobre las ventajas e inconvenientes de la dación en pago, equilibrando las dos partes del procedimiento de ejecución hipotecaria (acreedor y deudor hipotecario). En primer lugar, se ha hecho un análisis exhaustivo de todas aquellas normas legales, doctrina y jurisprudencia que regulan la protección de los deudores hipotecarios, así como la normativa que suspende los lanzamientos hasta el año 2020. En segundo lugar, se ha utilizado el tipo de preguntas y respuestas a fin de solventar todas aquellas cuestiones que en la vida cotidiana suelen ocurrir y se ha explicado el iter procesal que se sigue en un procedimiento de ejecución hipotecaria, señalando los motivos de oposición que el deudor podrá alegar en tal caso, así como la estructura que tiene tanto una demanda de ejecución hipotecaria como la oposición a la misma. En tercer lugar, se ha aludido a los sistemas de ordenación de la propiedad inmueble en otros países, haciendo especial hincapié al derecho inglés por las particularidades que ostenta en comparación con el derecho español y que resultan totalmente ilustrativas y de gran ejemplo para España al proteger a ambas partes y conseguir ayudas gubernamentales para solventar las situaciones de aquellas personas que en un momento dado de su vida no pueden hacer frente a la deuda que contrajeron. Por ello, el objetivo de la presente no es otro que la investigación dirigida a evitar la desgracia económica que han sufrido muchas familias con ocasión de la crisis inmobiliaria, realizando al efecto una serie de conclusiones y propuestas, ambas basadas en un estudio de investigación legal, doctrinal y jurisprudencial profundo. No hay que olvidar que todo tiene su origen en un préstamo hipotecario concedido por la entidad acreedora, (en España bancos o cajas de ahorro y en Inglaterra, además de bancos, entidades locales y building societies, sociedades industriales y económicas, sociedades de previsión social y fiduciarios, entre otros) que debió ser explicado de forma previa a la contratación, en concreto, debió informarse de los escenarios positivos y negativos que se podían producir en caso de incumplimiento, así como no incluir cláusulas declaradas absolutamente abusivas, tanto por el Tribunal Supremo como por el Tribunal de Unión Europea, entre otros. Dichas cláusulas son las relativas a la cláusula suelo, gastos hipotecarios o vencimiento anticipado, por nombrar algunas, en las que el Banco, en una posición dominante hizo que el consumidor se adhiriera a ellas, sin posibilidad de negociación. La nulidad de las mismas no implicará la nulidad del contrato por completo, sino que se tendrán por no puestas. Por ello, a la entidad bancaria se le exige un grado de diligencia superior que al hombre medio, muy cercana a la responsabilidad por riesgo del profesional dada su experiencia profesional en la actividad financiera. A consecuencia de ello, serán muchos los supuestos en los que la oposición a la ejecución hipotecaria acabará en éxito para la parte deudora, sin perjuicio de la suspensión acordada en estos procedimientos por los Tribunales a día de hoy. De ahí, que resulte más equitativo para un Estado de Derecho como el que vivimos que en caso de incumplimiento, la entidad acreedora solo pueda reclamar judicialmente el impago cuando el mismo represente un porcentaje de la totalidad y en ningún caso tres cuotas como indica en la actualidad la propia Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil. Interesa destacar propuestas tales como la unificación de normativa en transparencia bancaria a nivel europeo, debiendo ser facilitada por el Banco Central Europeo a fin de lograr que las medidas se apliquen por igual a todos los ciudadanos de la Unión, de modo eficiente y equitativo. Otra propuesta que sería de gran interés para la economía española y sobre todo para aquellos consumidores que soliciten préstamos hipotecarios en el futuro es la regulación de modelos escritos con las cláusulas contractuales adecuadas para evitar aquellas abusivas que imponen obligaciones y gastos al prestatario pero no a la parte prestamista. Otras propuestas de lege ferenda que se encuentra en la tesis aluden a la necesidad de que se produzca la inversión de la regla del artículo 140 de la Ley Hipotecaria, así como impedir que sea el Banco el que se adjudique la vivienda por un precio inferior al valor de tasación, debiendo cubrirse correctamente las lagunas que siguen patentes y que son gravemente perjudiciales para el ciudadano de a pie". This thesis aims to carry out a thorough investigation of the advantages and disadvantages of the dation in payment, balancing the two parts of the foreclosure procedure (creditor and mortgage debtor). Firstly, an exhaustive analysis has been made about all those legal norms, doctrine and jurisprudence that regulate the protection of mortgage debtors, as well as the regulations that suspend launches until the year 2020. Secondly, it has been used the type of questions and answers in order to solve all those issues that in the everyday life usually happen. In addition to that it has also been explained the procedure in a mortgage execution, pointing out the reasons that the debtor may argue in such a case, as well as the structure that has both a demand of mortgage execution and the opposition to it. Thirdly, reference has been made to real estate management systems in other countries, with special emphasis on English law because of the peculiarities it has in comparison with Spanish law, which are totally illustrative and a great example for Spain. That's because such a law protects both parties and gets government aid to solve the situations of those people who at a certain moment of their lives could not cope with the debt they incurred in. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is a research aimed at avoiding the economic misfortune suffered by many families during the real estate crisis. Moreover, within the thesis are proposed several concluding and different ideas and proposals, both based on a legal research study, with doctrinal and jurisprudential fundamentals. It should not be forgotten that everything has its origin in a mortgage loan granted by the creditor entity, (in Spain, Banks or local savings Banks (cajas), and in England, in addition to banks, local entities and building societies, industrial and economic societies, social welfare societies and fiduciaries, among others). That's why it should have been explained the risk prior to the hiring, in particular, it should have had to be informed of the positive and negative scenarios that could occur in case of non-compliance, as well as not include clauses declared absolutely abusive, both by the Court Supreme as by the European Union Court, among others. Those clauses are the so-called "interest rate floors", mortgage expenses or advanced maturity, to name a few, in which the Bank, in a dominant position, caused the consumer to adhere to them, without possibility of negotiation. The nullity of those clauses will not imply the contract nullity in full, but the consideration of "not set". Therefore, banks are required a higher degree of diligence than regular people, very close to the risk liability of the professional given their professional experience in financial activity. Hence, the aforementioned scenario is more equitable for the Spanish State that in case of default, in which the creditor can only claim the default if it represents a percentage of the total amount, and in no case three quotas as indicated in the Civil Procedure Law. It is important to highlight proposals such as rules unification in bank transparency at European level, which also must be provided by the European Central Bank in order to ensure that the measures are applied equally to all Union citizens, in an efficient and Equitable way. Another proposal that that would be very interesting to Spanish economy and especially for consumers who apply for mortgage loans in the future is the regulation of "written models" with the appropriate contractual clauses to avoid those abusive clauses because these clauses impose obligations and expenses on the borrower but not on the lender party. Other "lege ferenda" proposals explained in this thesis allude to the need of reversing the 140th Article of the Mortgage Law, as well as the need of preventing the Bank from self-adjudicating housing in a lower price than its appraised value. The ideas and proposals within this thesis could help to bridge the gap in matters that are seriously and negatively affecting ordinary citizens."

Programa Oficial de Doutoramento en Química Ambiental e Fundamental. 5031P01. ; [Resumen] Las triazinas son uno de los grupos de herbicidas más utilizados para eliminar las malas hierbas. Actualmente están considerados medioambientalmente peligrosos debido a su persistencia, toxicidad, capacidad de bioacumulación y por ser disruptores endocrinos. Su empleo indiscriminado se manifiesta en suelos, frutas y verduras, pero también en el agua cuando estos contaminantes son arrastrados por las lluvias y los arroyos. Después de su aplicación una gran proporción permanece en el medio ambiente y, debido a su persistencia y movilidad, alcanzan el medio marino. A pesar de que para la mayoría de las triazinas no se han regulado límites máximos en aguas, sedimentos o biota, la Directiva 2013/39/UE advierte sobre la importancia de monitorizar contaminantes emergentes que, aunque no están considerados en los programas de control, pueden tener efectos tóxicos. La Unión Europea ha incluido Simazina y Atrazina en la lista de las 33 sustancias prioritarias en la Directiva Marco del Agua (2000/60/CE), por medio de la Decisión 2455/2001/CE. Además, la Directiva 2008/105/CE establece las normas de calidad ambiental (NCA) para estos compuestos en las aguas superficiales, e insta a los Estados Miembros a establecer parámetros de calidad para estos compuestos en sedimentos y biota a nivel nacional. Por último, la Directiva 2013/39/UE incluye la Terbutrina en la lista de sustancias prioritarias. Por otra parte, la Directiva Marco de Estrategia Marina 2008/56/CE establece entre los descriptores de buena salud ambiental que "los contaminantes presentes en el pescado y otros productos de la pesca destinados al consumo humano no superen los niveles establecidos por la normativa comunitaria". Por otro lado, el Reglamento 396/2005/CE, relativo a los límites máximos de residuos de plaguicidas en alimentos y piensos de origen vegetal y animal, establece límites para Simazina y Terbutilazina en algas, aunque todavía no ha establecido límites máximos para pesticidas en animales acuáticos. A este respecto, la Agencia Americana Food and Drug Administration sí ha establecido niveles de tolerancia para pesticidas, entre los que se encuentra la Simazina, en pescados y productos de la pesca. Los herbicidas triazínicos pueden ser transformados por procesos químicos y biológicos. Debido a su movilidad, los productos de degradación pueden llegar a los cuerpos de agua más fácilmente que las triazinas; por lo tanto, el impacto debido a los herbicidas tiende a subestimarse cuando sólo las triazinas son analizadas, siendo por ello necesario incluir sus principales productos de degradación para obtener un mejor conocimiento en relación con la contaminación por herbicidas. Por todo esto, es necesario disponer de métodos de análisis precisos, eficaces, sencillos y rápidos para estos compuestos. Así, a lo largo de esta Tesis Doctoral, se ha desarrollado metodología analítica para la determinación de estos compuestos a niveles traza tanto en agua de mar como en sedimento y biota. Estos métodos mejoran los propuestos en la bibliografía, son sensibles, selectivos y simples, cumpliendo además con los principios de la Química Verde. Una vez validados los métodos de análisis, se realizó un muestreo de aguas de mar, sedimentos y biota acuática (algas, peces y moluscos). ; [Resumo] As triazinas constitúen un dos grupos de herbicidas máis amplamente utilizados para eliminar as malas herbas. Actualmente son considerados medioambientalmente perigosos por mor da súa persistencia, toxicidade, capacidade de bioacumulación e por seren disruptores endócrinos. O seu emprego indiscriminado ponse de manifesto nos solos, froitas e verduras, pero tamén nas augas, cando estes contaminantes son arrastrados polas choivas e os regatos. Tras a súa aplicación, unha grande proporción permanece no medio ambiente e, debido á súa persistencia e mobilidade, acadan o medio mariño. A pesar de que para a meirande parte das triazinas non se teñen regulado límites máximos nas augas, sedimentos ou biota, a Directiva 2013/39/UE advirte sobre a importancia de monitorizar contaminantes emerxentes que aínda que non estean considerados nos programas de control, poidan ter efectos tóxicos. A Unión Europea incluiu Simazina e Atrazina no listado das 33 sustancias prioritarias na Directiva Marco da Auga (2000/60/CE), mediante a Decisión 2455/2001/CE. Ademais, a Directiva 2008/105/CE estabelece as normas de calidade ambiental (NCA) para estes compostos nas augas superficiais, e insta aos Estados Membros a estabelecer parámetros de calidade para estes compostos en sedimentos e biota a nivel nacional. Por último, a Directiva 2013/39/UE inclúe a Terbutrina no listado de sustancias prioritarias. Por outra banda, a Directiva Marco de Estratexia Mariña 2008/56/CE estabelece entre os descritores de boa saúde ambiental que "os contaminantes presentes nos peixes e produtos da pesca destinados ao consumo humano non superen os niveis estabelecidos pola normativa comunitaria". Neste senso, o Regulamento 396/2005/CE, relativo aos límites máximos de residuos de praguicidas en alimentos e pensos de orixe vexetal e animal, estabelece límites para Simazina e Terbutilazina en algas, emporiso aínda non ten estabelecido límites máximos para pesticidas en animais acuáticos. A este respecto, a Axencia Americana Food and Drug Administration ten estabelecido niveis de tolerancia para pesticidas, entre os que se atopa a Simazina, en peixes e produtos da pesca. Os herbicidas triazínicos poden ser transformados por procesos químicos e biolóxicos. Debido á súa mobilidade, os produtos de degradación poden chegar aos corpos de auga máis doadamente cás triazinas; como consecuencia, o impacto debido aos herbicidas tende a subestimarse cando só as triazinas son analizadas, resultando necesario incluír os seus principais produtos de degradación para obter un mellor coñecemento en relación á contaminación por herbicidas. Por todo o exposto, cómpre dispoñer de métodos de análise precisos, eficaces, sinxelos e rápidos para estes compostos. Así, ao longo desta Tese Doutoral, desenvolveuse metodoloxía analítica para a determinación destes compostos a niveis traza tanto en auga de mar como en sedimento e biota. Estes métodos melloran os propostos na bibliografía, son sensíbeis, selectivos e sinxelos, cumprindo ademais cos principios da Química Verde. Unha vez validados os métodos de análise, realizouse unha mostraxe de augas de mar, sedimentos e biota acuática (algas, peixes e moluscos). ; [Abstract] Triazines are one of herbicides groups most widely used for the control of weeds. Currently, they are considered environmentally dangerous because of their persistence, toxicity, bioaccumulation and being endocrine disruptors. Their indiscriminate use can be observed not only in soils, fruits and vegetables, but also in water when these pollutants are washed away by rain. After their application, a large amount remains in the environment and, because of their persistence and mobility, can reach the marine environment. Although there are no maximum limits regulated for most of the triazines in water, sediment or biota, the Directive 2013/39/EU calls the attention on the importance of monitoring emerging pollutants which are not considered in the control programs, but can have toxic effects. The European Union has included Simazine and Atrazine in the list of 33 priority substances in the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), by way of Decision 2455/2001/EC. Moreover, the Directive 2008/105/EC sets the Environmental Quality Standards (EQS) for these compounds in surface waters and committees the Member States to set EQS for these compounds in sediments and biota at national level. Finally, the Directive 2013/39/EU adds Terbutryn to the list of priority substances. On the other hand, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive 2008/56/EC establishes, between descriptors of good environmental health, "contaminants in fish and other fishery products destined to human consumption should not exceed the levels established by Community legislation". In this way, the Regulation 396/2005/EC, relative to the maximum residue levels of pesticides in food and feed of plant and animal origin, sets limits for Simazine and Terbuthylazine in algae; however this Regulation has not established yet maximum levels for pesticides in aquatic animals. Regarding to it, the U.S Food and Drug Administration has set tolerance levels for pesticides, including Simazine, in fish and fishery products. Triazinic herbicides may be transformed by chemical and biological processes. Because of their mobility, the degradation products can reach water bodies more easily than triazines; therefore, the impact due to herbicides tends to be underestimated when only the triazines are analyzed, being necessary to include their main degradation products to obtain a better knowledge regarding herbicides pollution. Therefore, it is necessary to provide precise, effective, simple and quick analytical methods for these compounds. Thus, throughout this Thesis, analytical methodology for the determination of these compounds in seawater, sediment and biota at trace levels was developed. The proposed methods have improved the previous methodologies found in the literature, are sensitive, selective and simple, besides complying with Green Chemistry principles. Once analytical methods were validated, a sampling of seawater, sediment and aquatic biota (algae, fish, and mollusks) was held.

Recientemente Redalyc compartió la primera edición en español del libro de Peter Suber editado inicialmente por el Instituto Tecnológico de Massachusetts traducido por Remedios Melero del comité científico de Redalyc y editado por la Universidad Autónoma del estado de México UAEM . Este libro permite aclarar más de una confusión y decantar en forma precisa lo que es y lo que no es el acceso abierto, muy relevante para aquellos que hemos apostado a esta opción de divulgación científica. Para este caso centraré mi editorial en lo que no es el acceso abierto (OA). Suber (2015) afirma: 1. No es un intento por eludir la revisión por pares; es frecuente que una parte de nuestras comunidades en especial en ciencias humanas y sociales igualen desafortunadamente el OA con evadir la evaluación de pares y que confundan la práctica común de no pago a evaluadores con la no revisión de pares. Es claro que las declaraciones diversas de OA promueven la revisión por pares. 2. El OA no trata de cambiar o eliminar los derechos de explotación (copyright); el acceso abierto usa los trabajos que son de dominio público y con el consentimiento del o de los titulares de los derechos. 3. El OA no es un intento de suprimir los beneficios que pueden generar las regalías derivadas de la publicación lo que trata de es de evidenciar que seguramente los beneficios del acceso abierto son superiores a los de no percibir regalía alguna. 4. El OA no niega que este tiene un conjunto de costos de producción lo que afirma es que deben pensarse formas alternativas a trasladar los costos a otros actores que no sean los lectores. 5. El OA no busca eliminar los derechos de autor; por el contrario busca que estos conozcan todo el control de los trabajos que publica. 6. El OA es un intento de acabar la libertad de la libertad de catedra los académicos son libres de enviar sus productos donde quieran. 7. El OA no trata de evadir las acciones contra el plagio o promoverlo; todas las políticas del acceso abierto promueven los reconocimientos a la autoría, es más, las acciones por identificar, regular y sancionar las acciones de plagio han llevado a la creación de entidades como COPE (Committee on Publication Ethics ) (López-López, 2014; Yong, Ledford, & Van Noorden, 2013). 8. El OA no pretende atacar las editoriales convencionales todo lo contrario el acceso abierto promueve los investigadores y las instituciones para las que firman. 9. El OA no promueve el ataque a otros tipos de estrategias editoriales o de editores que no comparta el acceso abierto. 10. El OA no tiene como objetivo el acceso obligatorio a otras audiencias no académicas; el acceso abierto busca en primer lugar facilitar la conexión entre académicos e investigadores. Para esto trata de que cualquier persona con conexión a internet pueda acceder a los contenidos. 11. El OA no implica el acceso universal, pues el mismo no puede controlar por ejemplo los filtros de contenidos que ejercen entidades y gobiernos; no puede controlar las barreras idiomáticas, tampoco puede resolver las barreras que impone la discapacidad y menos las de conectividad. Finalmente agregaría otros 12. El OA no promueve el uso de métricas de la producción publicada incluidas las métricas de citación como las de Scielo que incluye análisis de citación, Redalyc que enfatiza en descargas y colaboraciones e incluso sistemas de indexación en sistemas comerciales como el Web of Science (WOS) de Thompson-Reuters o Scopus de Elsevier que enfatizan en prácticas de citación y desarrollan sistemas como el Journal Citation Reports (JCR) o el Scimago Journal Rank y por ultimo 13. El OA no ataca o promueve la exclusión de las publicaciones en sistemas de indexación. El libro de Suber es una obra muy relevante, de consulta obligada para editores, investigadores y administradores de la gestión de conocimiento por cuanto aclara y precisa los alcances y limitaciones del acceso abierto. Vale la pena mencionar la desafortunada y poco real afirmación de Jeffrey Beall al OA y los sistemas de Scielo y Redalyc al compararlo con favelas. Compartimos las declaraciones de rechazo iniciadas en los diferentes niveles y consideramos que nuestros sistemas han sido una alternativa viable, rigurosa y sostenible ante prácticas inadecuadas y centradas en la comercialización de los contenidos. Hemos aprendido a convivir con las casas editoriales privadas, sus métricas y reglas pero estamos de acuerdo en que su modelo tiene fallas y no representa ni la situación ni abarca la divulgación científica de los países de América Latina y en desarrollo (Alperin et al., 2015). ; Recently, Redalyc shared the first edition of Peter Sauber's book, which was first edited by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and translated by Remedios Melero, of the Redalyc Scientific Committee. This book clears more than a few confusing aspects regarding what Open Access is and is not, which is very relevant for those who, like us, have chosen to use it for scientific communication. I will focus this editorial on what Open Access (OA) is not. Suber (2015) states the following: 1) It is not an attempt to avoid peer review; a part of our communities, especially in the human and social sciences, often equate OA with avoidance of peer-review and confound the common practice of not paying reviewers to review with lack of peer-review. Statements in OA publications certainly promote peer-reviewing processes. 2) OA does not try to change or refuse exploitation rights; open access uses works in the public domain with the consent of the holder of their rights. 3) OA is not an attempt to suppress the benefits from publication royalties; what it does is to point out that benefits from open access are probably higher than those of not earning royalties at all. 4) OA does not deny that there are associated costs, but it does suggest that alternatives to charging readers need to be found. 5) OA does not seek to end copyright; quite the contrary, it aims to acknowledge them. 6) OA is an attempt to end academic freedom; no, researchers are free to submit their products anywhere. 7) OA is not promoting plagiarism or disrupting anti-plagiarism; every OA policy promotes acknowledgment of authorship and in fact actions oriented towards the identification, regulation and punishment of plagiarism have led to the creation of entities such as COPE (Committee on Publication Ethics ) (López-López, 2014; Yong, Ledford, & Van Noorden, 2013). 8) OA is not an attack on traditional publishing houses; in fact, OA is a vehicle for promoting the work of researchers and institutions. 9) OA does not go against other editorial strategies or editors who do not share OA policies. 10) OA's goal is not to force catering to non-academic audiences; open access seeks to facilitate a connection between researchers and the rest of academia, by trying to make knowledge available to anyone with Internet access. 11) OA does not imply universal access, since it cannot, by itself, control content filters put in place by entities and governments; it cannot avoid barriers imposed by language, disability or connectivity. I would also add a couple of additional misunderstandings. 12) OA does not promote the use of published output metrics such as citation analysis (SciELO), downloads and collaborations (Redalyc), or proprietary citation algorithms (Web of Science or Scopus). And finally, 13) OA does not promote the exclusion of publications from indexing systems. Suber's book is very relevant, and needs to be consulted by editors, researchers and knowledge managers, since it clarifies the scope and limitations of open access. It is worth mentioning that this piece is a response to Jeffrey Beall's unfortunate characterization of OA, SciELO and Redalyc as "favelas", poorly grounded in reality. We share the views of many actors and entities who voiced their criticisms to those opinions. We believe that our systems have been a rigorous, viable, and sustainable alternative to inadequate practices centered in the commercialization of content. We have learned to live alongside private publishing houses, their metrics and regulations, but we agree that their model has certain flaws and that it does not represent the situation of scientific dissemination in Latin America and in other developing countries (Alperin et al., 2015).

Strategien politischer Akteure, die dazu führen, dass der Akteur für den Rezipienten vertrauenswürdig beziehungsweise faszinierend erscheint, sind bisher unerforscht. Um diese Forschungslücke zu schließen, wird die bisher gängige Forschungsperspektive gedreht und der Akteur in das Zentrum der Analyse gestellt. Das Forschungsdesign verschränkt individuelle Kommunikationskonzepte, situative Bedingungen und Verhaltensdispositionen diametraler Kommunikationstypen mit der verbalen Analyse der Phänomene "Vertrauen" und "Faszination". Mit Helmut Kohl und Gerhard Schröder wurden diametrale Kommunikationstypen ausgewählt und mit den Bulletins, den Neujahrsansprachen und den ZDF-Sommerinterviews ein angemessener Querschnitt ihrer Regierungskommunikation untersucht. Die verbale Analyse der Quellen legt ein strukturelles Gerüst spezifischer Faktoren beider Kommunikationsphänomene frei. Konfidenzkommunikation besteht aus Aktions-, Personen- und Funktionsvertrauen. Aktionsvertrauen korrespondiert mit der entsprechenden Regulierungserwartung der Rezipienten. Über Personenvertrauen versucht der Akteur, eine gemeinsame emotionale Basis mit dem Rezipienten herzustellen. Funktionsvertrauen ist Vertrauen in das politische Funktionssystem und löst in verschiedenen Zeitdimensionen das Problem der riskanten Vorleistung des Rezipienten. Der Akteur reduziert die soziale Kontingenz und versucht, die Zukunftsoffenheit gesellschaftlicher Situationen in Sicherheit umzuwandeln. Ferner veranlasst er den Rezipienten zur Abwägung von kritischen Alternativen. Die Befunde zeigen bei beiden Kommunikationstypen in der Grundstruktur einen kongruenten Aufbau. Die Detailstruktur des Funktionsvertrauens weist allerdings gravierende Unterschiede auf. Kohl generiert in den Neujahrsansprachen, konstituiert durch Werteofferten und Anerkennungsreferenzen, stärker idealisierende Vertrauensfaktoren. Schröder hingegen setzt auf Optimierung und rekurriert entsprechend häufiger auf Erfolgsparadigmen und Zuversichtsofferten. Kohl entwickelt im Modus der Sommerinterviews noch weniger Optimismus als in seinen Neujahrsansprachen. Er räumt der Kontrastierung Priorität ein. Die Verwendung idealisierender insbesondere auch optimierender Konfidenzfaktoren nimmt ab. Dem Problem der doppelten Kontingenz begegnet Kohl, indem er eine vertraute Welt kommuniziert. In stereotypen Inszenierungen präsentiert er sich als berechenbarer Faktor. Mit Hinweisen auf ein konsistentes Wertesystem versucht er, die soziale Kontingenz seiner Regulierungsofferten zu reduzieren. Idealisiert und als replizierbar angesehen schwingt das Gestern in Zukunftsentwürfe über. Der Darstellung konkreter Regulierungsofferten räumt Kohl gegenüber der retrospektiven und perspektivischen Erfolgspräsentation Vorrang ein. Schröder sichert seine Regulierungsmaßnahmen durch die Aktivierung von Optimismus und Zuversicht ab. Mit Zuversichtsofferten und Erfolgsparadigmen favorisiert er Erfolgsdarstellungen vor der Auflistung konkreter staatlicher Maßnahmen. Das Problem der doppelten Kontingenz löst er auf, indem er erstens in seiner Selbstdarstellung ein hohes Maß an Bereitschaft signalisiert, Vertrauen übertragen zu bekommen. Der Zustand der Zukunftsunsicherheit wird zweitens aufgelöst durch eine Metaphorik, die an alltagspraktische Vertrautheit anknüpft. Drittens wird die Gegenwart substituiert durch massive Aktivierung von Zukunftsoptimismus. Zuversichtsofferten leiten Zukunftsinhalte in Gegenwart über. Die Gegenwart selbst füllt Schröder mit kongruenten interaktiven Botschaften aus. Faszinationskommunikation setzt sich zusammen aus Faszination "Persönlichkeit", Faszination "Identität" und Faszination "Visionen". Mit Hilfe von Faszination Persönlichkeit weist der Akteur auf seine außeralltäglichen Fähigkeiten hin, vermittelt Leidenschaft und demonstriert dem Rezipienten sein energetisches Potenzial zur Regulierung der Unsicherheiten der Zukunft. Faszination Identität hebt kollektive Stärken hervor und benennt außeralltägliche Fähigkeiten des Rezipienten, die ihn dafür prädestinieren, an einer idealisierten Zukunft teilzunehmen. Die Suggestion von Gemeinschaft verbindet disparate gesellschaftliche Gruppen. Ferner wird der Rezipient dazu aufgefordert, Dispositionen für seine eigene Zukunft zu treffen. Faszination Visionen beinhaltet sinnstiftendes Potenzial durch visionäre Einzelziele sowie langfristige Kollektivaufgaben. Die soziale Komplexität wird auf positives Erleben reduziert, die Risikowahrnehmung minimiert. Der Rezipient erhält die Chance, durch sein Engagement selbst Teil einer erfüllten Zukunft zu werden. Die Befunde zeigen bei beiden Kommunikationstypen in den Neujahrsansprachen einen kongruenten Aufbau. Kohl und Schröder stimulieren Faszination aus gleich starken Anteilen an "Faszination Visionen" sowie "Faszination Identität". Verbale Selbstaufwertungen der Akteure spielen nur eine untergeordnete Rolle. In den Sommerinterviews kommt es je nach Kommunikationstyp zu signifikanten Umschichtungen. Kohl aktiviert insbesondere Selbstaufwertungen. Parallel dazu lassen seine in den Neujahrsansprachen gezeigten Stärken deutlich nach. Er reduziert die Impulse, die Identität der Rezipienten zu stärken sowie Gemeinschaft zu simulieren und schöpft sein Potenzial an Orientierungen nicht aus. Schröder gelingt es dagegen, seine Potenziale weitgehend konstant hoch zu halten. Dominierend bleibt der Datenbestand "Faszination Visionen". "Faszination Identität" behält ebenfalls einen hohen Aktivierungsgrad durch stabil hohe Aktivierungen von Fremdaufwertungen. Diese Arbeit argumentiert, dass es zu den im medialen Politikprozess praktizierten symbolischen Handlungen und Inszenierungen sprachliche Äquivalente gibt. Mit dem Erklärungsmodell einer Konfidenz- und Faszinationskommunikation wird dem Rezipienten ein Instrumentarium zur Dekodierung komplexer Vertrauens- und Faszinationskonstruktionen angeboten. Der politische Akteur erhält gleichzeitig eine systematische Grundlage, die eigenen Vertrauens- und Faszinationspotenziale gezielt zu optimieren. ; Politicians' strategies which let them appear more trustworthy or more fascinating in the audience's eyes are hitherto unexplored. To close this gap of research this thesis turns the established perspective and moves the policy maker centre stage. The research design applied combines the examination of different communication concepts, situative conditions and the personal demeanor of diametrical communicators with the analysis of the phenomena trust und fascination. Chancellors Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder are such diametrical communicators and the Bulletins of the federal government, the New Year's speeches and the ZDF-Summer-Interviews form a representative textual source. The close analysis of the material reveals specific structural patterns for both phenomena. The communication of trust is composed of trust in action, trust in the person and trust in the functional capability of the system. Trust in action answers an assumed underlying expectation of regulation the part of the audience. By generating trust in the person the politician tries to create a common emotional basis with his audience. Trust in the functional capability solves the audience's problem of the risky input with regard of the future. The politician reduces the social contingency and attempts to convert the uncertainty of the future into security. In addition he provokes the audience to consider critical alternatives. Although the results show a comparable, almost congruent basic structure for both communication types, the ascetic as well as the hedonist, the details of how both types try to create trust in the functional capability are significantly different. Whereas Kohl, especially in his New Year's speeches, by referring to value systems and making use of acknowledgments, puts a strong emphasis on so called idealizing trust factors, Schröder stresses optimization and points to political achievements and offers of confidence. In the summer-interviews Kohl shows even less optimism than in the New Year's speeches. He prefers the method of contrasting his policy with that of his political opponents. The use of idealizing and optimizing trust factors is reduced. Kohl responds to the problem of double contingency by communicating a familiar world. In presenting himself in an almost stereotypical manner he wishes to convey reliability and predictability. By trying to convey a consistent value system he aims to reduce the social contingency of his regulation offers. An idealized and repeatable past continues to inspire the present and is carried over into the future. Kohl prefers offering clear regulatory measures to presenting past achievements or promising future achievements. Schröder safeguards his regulatory measures by displaying optimism and confidence. He clearly prioritizes past achievements over regulatory measures. Schröder tackles the problem of double contingency by signaling his willingness and ability to make good use of the trust conferred onto him. Secondly, he resolves the state of uncertainty with regard to the future by using images and metaphors taken from familiar every day life. Thirdly, he substitutes the presence with a massive activation of optimism in regard of the future. Offers of confidence are being transferred into concrete future concepts. The presence itself is filled with congruent interactive messages. The communication of fascination consists of three main elements: fascination with regard to the politician's personality, fascination with regard to a collective identity and fascination with regard to visions. When seeking to fascinate the audience by way of his personality the politician stresses his exceptional capabilities, communicates passion and demonstrates his energetic potential to regulate the uncertainties of the future; when trying to arouse fascination with regard to a collective identity the speaker calls upon individual and collective strengths and highlights the audience's exceptional capabilities which predestine them to be part of a glorious future. He creates a sense of community among different social groups. The audience is encouraged to make decisions for their own future. When stimulating fascination with regard to visions the politician evokes visionary goals as well as longterm collective tasks. Social complexity is reduced to common positive experience and risk awareness is at an absolute minimum. Moreover the audience is given the opportunity through their own engagement and efforts to participate in a promising fulfilling future. Concerning the New Year's speeches the results reveal a congruent configuration of the principal components for stimulating fascination with both types of communicators, the ascetic as well as he hedonist. Kohl and Schröder both stimulate fascination by resorting in equal parts to arousing fascination with regard to a collective identity as well as to visions. Verbal self appraisals of the politicians are only playing a minor role. Within the genre of the summer interviews significant differences between the two types of political communicators become evident. Kohl particularly uses self appraisal. He reduces his impulses to strengthen the audience' s identity as well as to simulate community. Kohl is not able to make full use of his potential to provide orientation. Schröder on the other hand succeeds in keeping his potentials to stimulate fascination at a constant high. At the same time he seeks to fascinate his audience by creating a collective identity and presenting visions while constantly referring to the audience's collective excellence. This thesis argues that there is a verbal equivalent to symbolic actions in the political media process. With the proposed interpretative model the audience is given a method to decode and understand how politicians generate trust and try to elicit fascination on the part of the audience; the politician on the other hand is given a systematic base to optimize well directed his own potentials of generating trust and stimulating fascination.

Critics derisively call him "King" – or "Queen,"
given his penchant for drama during Bossier City Council meetings – but disclosure
data demonstrate that among Bossier Parish officials Republican Councilor David
Montgomery truly is the monarch when it comes to grifting taxpayer dollars, something
about which the city's Charter Review Commission should take notice and repair,
along with a couple of other potential conflicts.

Financial disclosure forms for Louisiana elected
and appointed officials, except judges who don't have to file, were due May 15,
detailing 2023 activities. Of the 52 such Bossier officials from government
bodies or executive offices that have taxing authority and whose jurisdictions
are almost exclusively within the parish and are sufficiently large – the
Police Jury, School Board, Bossier City, the Levee Board, the Cypress Black
Bayou Commissioners, sheriff, assessor, clerk of court, and coroner – of the 50
required to file (because two appointees only assumed their posts earlier this
year), 40 did so by the end of last week.

In all but two cases, in their reporting about
compensation they or their spouses received from other governments they listed
items such as salary (including if a spouse worked for a government), money
received for serving on a board connected to their positions, or pension
payments, with two exceptions. One
was recently-elected Republican Coroner Mike Williams, who received in 2023 over
$37,000 as he serves, and has for 23 years, as medical director for city fire,
police, and emergency medical services.

The other was Montgomery. He reported from his
position with the family
insurance firm (a half-owner) or in one instance on his own raking in $202,313
for insurance sales to seven different local governments with a Bossier
presence. This means since 2008, the first year state law had changed to
require this disclosure, Montgomery has gotten $3,172,612 from Bossier-based
governments (although none from the city, as it is illegal for an entity's
elected officials to do business with it).

That figure is likely a few hundred thousand
dollars greater for Montgomery's time in office, since he was elected first in
2001. He reported about
$60,000 in the first year of required disclosure, so an estimate of his
total earnings from local taxpayers during his entire time in office could be
over $3.5 million. Possibly he has one of the highest totals of any elected
official in Louisiana since the institution of disclosure.

Some of his buyers he has authority over with his
position as councilor, along with other councilors. For example, the Council
selects a member of the Cypress
Black Bayou Recreation and Water Conservation District Commission, and it occasionally
doles out funds to Visit
Shreveport-Bossier, formerly called the Shreveport-Bossier Convention and
Tourist Bureau, most recently
this spring.

This raises serious ethical issues about whether Montgomery
ever has used his position to entice business from these taxpayer-funded entities,
although it is not illegal for him to have a business relationship with any
government entity except for Bossier City. Nor is there any evidence that he
has pressured, by whatever means through his position, any local government
into doing business with him.

But even the appearance of possible impropriety should
not be encouraged by him and these entities in their dealings. Unknown is how
these agencies go about awarding insurance contracts and whether they use an
open and competitive bidding process; some have been Montgomery clients for 15
years. Possibly Montgomery is an incredible insurance agent who underbids
everybody and provides great service, but public records requests of this
various agency clients likely would reveal he annually racks up a series of
no-bid contracts, with a likely unspoken and unwritten motive of the buyers
being a desire to keep on his good side lest he and his political allies make
trouble for them, something that doesn't require an explicit or even indirectly
acknowledged quid quo pro relationship or any communications between he
and they other than those strictly business in nature, nor does it require that
he have any motive to leverage his elected position into drumming up business
as the perception that he could is what matters.

This possibility of unethical behavior by a city
elected official in his business dealings, or the perception of other governments
over which one can exert some kind of authority that they have to shape their
business dealings to please such an official whether that official makes such
demands, should be addressed by the city's ongoing Charter Review Commission. A
revised charter could have inserted a passage dictating that any of its elected
officials cannot do business with any governmental entity with any jurisdiction
in Bossier Parish or with any other entity established by ordinance or state
law that receives appropriations from the city the year after that
appropriation, and that no such business can be conducted until four years have
passed after leaving city office.

While the example of Montgomery points to a major
deficiency in city ethics regulation, a couple of other lesser cases also
deserve attention in any charter revisions. Republican Santi Parks was elected city
judge in 2020, yet as in the case of all past city judges is not prohibited by statute
to run a law practice on the side. Judges don't have to file disclosure
statements, but because his wife GOP Police Juror Julianna
Parks must, information is present on his activities. In 2023,
besides his salary (over $110,000, paid in part by the city court and the rest
by the city) he earned over $55,000 from what she described as "Judicial Branch
of Louisiana," but, more relevantly, earned over $100,000 from his private law
practice in its entirety.

Problematically, potential lenient treatment of
individuals in court could be leveraged to drive business a judge's way, even
as there is no evidence Parks ever has engaged in this, solicited this, or been
motivated to act this way. The state's Civil Code of Procedure
provides for recusal by a judge, which in this instance likely lands the case
in a district court or requires appointment of an ad hoc judge, but it's
not automatic and it's best to avoid all the involved procedures in the first
place. Here again, a charter change could prohibit the city judge from earning
any outside income, who takes home a nice chunk of change from his salary in
any event, as a means of avoiding these situations.

Finally, the city recently appointed Jerry Wilhite
to serve on the Cypress Black Bayou Commission. Wilhite disclosed
his more than 10 percent ownership in Wilhite Electric, which occasionally lands
city contracts (the latest such being last
year). The charter revision could prohibit a firm of which any of its
appointees to other local governments that own at least a tenth stake in it
from competing for any city contracts.

As long as a charter review is underway, best
practices demand any end product include tightening existing ethics loopholes that
decrease citizen confidence that city elected officials and their appointees don't
use their positions or relationships to feather their own nests.

This survey examines the framework conditions of civil society in Austria. It was conducted at the Institute for Sociology and Empirical Social Research at WU. It builds on two previous surveys on the same topic, a Civil Society Index Rapid Assessment (More-Hollerweger et al., 2014) and an update of this Assessment (Simsa et al., 2019). In 2014, the development of public and private funding, democratic rights and performance of civil society organisations (CSOs) were particularly important; in 2019, the focus was on the impact on civil society of authoritarian policies. The current survey initially focused on an analysis of the impact of the change to a more civil-society friendly government at the beginning of 2020. In the course of the year, the effects of the Covid-19 crisis came to the fore. By civil society we refer to the sphere between the state, the economy and the private sphere, in which people collectively represent and try to shape their own concerns (Simsa, 2013). Civil society and its organisations have high benefits for society. In addition to producing services for the common good, they also strengthen diversity, participation and integration. The importance of a pluralistic civil society for democracy is undisputed. Democracy thus needs civil society, but civil society is not necessarily democratic. In the last year in particular, illiberal civil-society endeavours have also gained in importance, especially based on conspiracy-theories. Nevertheless, these were only a marginal topic in the present survey. Rather, in the tradition of previous surveys, the report focuses on those areas of civil society that meet Habermas´ requirements of plurality, tolerance and discursivity (Habermas, 1992). Political framework conditions are decisive for the functioning of civil society in many respects. Apart from general human rights such as freedom of association or freedom of expression, opportunities for participation in legislative procedures, the government's information policy, and the quality of the welfare state and the financial support of civil society organisations by the public sector play an important role. Following on from the 2019 study, the following topics will therefore be analysed: The social climate in relation to civil society; Participation, i.e. political involvement of civil society; Funding of civil society organisations; The human rights situation. While in 2019 a very homogeneous picture was drawn by respondents, currently the impressions and findings are highly diverse. Some respondents complain about the lack of dialogue with politicians, while others see it as much better and more intense than in 2019. The situation is similar with participation as well as with regard to the financial situation. It is a clear result that the general climate with regard to civil society has improved. There is hardly any devaluation or defamation on the part of politicians. The pan-demy has also made clear the high importance of services provided by civil society organisations, which are therefore increasingly appreciated. Currently, many respondents also perceive a better discourse with politicians, although there are major differences in the perception of the two governing parties in this respect. However, the improved climate and the communication that is now partly possible again has shown little effect on the possibilities of political participation. In the health and social sectors as well as in climate policy, the expertise of CSOs is explicitly requested by politicians and partly taken into account, but according to the respondents there is little participation in other areas. It is interesting that the situation in this regard has changed only slightly since 2019, but that civil society currently seems to accept this more than before. Firstly, this can be attributed to the pandemic. Especially in the first months of the crisis, there was more acceptance of quick, less inclusive and less transparent decisions due to the high level of uncertainty. Furthermore, during this time, organisations in the health or care sector were stretched to the limit in coping with the greatly increased work demands, leaving less time for advocacy or criticism. Secondly, the participation of the Green Party in government also has an impact on the critical potential. On the one hand, there is a certain "inhibition to bite" on the part of some CSOs due to political or personal proximity, and there is also increased participation in the Green-led ministries. On the other hand, however, the criticism of politics, for example of asylum policy, is more severe because expectations have been disappointed. As the pandemic progressed, however, deficits in participation became clearer and more strongly criticised. The shortening of review periods, for example, which limited the possibility of comments, transparency and trust, could no longer be argued with the urgency of the decisions. The Covid-19 pandemic is associated with severe restrictions on both fundamental and human rights and civil liberties. Exit restrictions and stand-off rules also affect freedom of assembly. In this respect, there was a difficult situation in 2021. On the one hand, events were restricted at the beginning of the pandemic with reference to the health situation, which was criticised by civil society. On the other hand, however, a series of large demonstrations against the pandemic measures, some of which were banned, took place towards the end of 2020 and in 2021 with the participation of radical right-wing groups, which showed a high degree of willingness to use violence and whose participants in some cases did not comply with the pandemic regulations. Regarding the financial situation of CSOs the previously seen politically motivated cuts in public funding for critical CSOs were no longer seen. However, the cuts made in 2018/2019 had hardly been reversed. A decisive factor regarding the public funding of CSOs was the Nonprofit-emergency fund of 700 million euros decided in June, which had contributed significantly to providing financial security for many of the CSOs. In terms of policy content, hopes of civil society were disappointed, especially for improvements in asylum, ecological and social welfare legislation. The last year was dominated by COVID-19 and the handling of the pandemic, leading to the postponement of other agendas important for the future. The COVID-19 pandemic and the actions of the federal government posed many challenges to civil society and CSOs and caused considerable strain on their actors. It is to be hoped that the projects planned by the government (e.g. initiatives for voluntary work in 2021) will be taken up and that expenditures for absorbing the side effects of the pandemic will not be sacrificed to a new austerity course at the expense of the CSOs. Also, a new awareness of the importance of freedom and assembly rights has grown in many sectors of society. This can lead to an increase in the importance of CSOs in the post-pandemic period, if more people can be mobilised for their causes. The methodological basis of this survey was firstly a literature and document analysis. Secondly, a total of 27 interviews with representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs) were conducted between December 2020 and February 2021.

This research addresses utility models (UMs) as a synonym of industrial property right (IPR) that aims to provide protection for «minor» inventions. «Minor» inventions are those which, although providing improvements or technical advances, do not reach the level of inventiveness that is required for patent protection. It is often considered that a UM system could be a means to foster local innovation in technology stemming from small and medium-sized enterprises and independent inventors. Likewise, it is often said that UMs is a IPR particularly useful for fairly or less industrialized countries or for countries that are net importers of technologies. Due to the fact that the TRIPS Agreement does not enshrine UMs, there is no obligation for WTO Member States to include this IPR in their national legislation and there is no internationally specific parameter or prototype which has to be followed for the regulation of a UM regime. In contrast to patents – which have economic theorizations and justifications that are largely standardized – there is no consensus regarding the economic relevance or the necessity of protecting minor inventions by an exclusive right. However, despite the lack of consensus, more than a half of the WTO Member States enshrines UM regimes with diverse features. Within the varied panorama of existing regimes of UM, this dissertation focuses on the Portuguese UM. The UM was introduced in Portugal in 1940, under the influence of the German UM. Since then, several of its key aspects have been thoroughly modified, e.g., the delimitation of its protected subject matter, requirements, the granting system, and procedural mechanisms for interconnecting patent and UM applications. The Portuguese case also stands out because the UM regime established in the Industrial Property Code of 2003 was inspired by the European Community's initiative for a community-level UM. Furthermore, the Portuguese regime is notable because its granting system was sui generis when compared with the UM regimes in Germany, Spain, Brazil and the Andean Community. This dissertation studies and analyzes the peculiar legislative development of the UM regime in Portugal. It furthermore inquires to what extent the shifts in the UM legal regime could have had a correlation in the usage trends of the UM as a protection of inventions by local users. With this approach, this dissertation also aims to offer readings from which to draw considerations regarding the key aspects of the UM as an IPR that seeks to provide protection for minor inventions. ; A base da presente dissertação é o modelo de utilidade (MU) como sinónimo de modalidade de propriedade industrial (PI) que visa a protecção de invenções «menores» que, apesar de apresentarem melhorias ou avanços técnicos, não atingem o nível de inventividade exigido para a sua protecção mediante patente. Habitualmente, o MU é associado a um possível mecanismo de estímulo da inovação tecnológica local proveniente de pequenas e médias empresas e de inventores independentes. Para além disso, é geralmente sugerido que o MU é uma modalidade de propriedade industrial especialmente conveniente para países pouco ou medianamente industrializados ou importadores de tecnologia. Devido ao facto de o MU não estar previsto no ADPIC, os Países membros da OMC não estão obrigados a consagrar a figura, nem existe um parâmetro ou protótipo internacional ao qual a legislação dos países que a prevêem se tenha de se submeter. Ao contrário da patente - que goza de teorizações e de justificações económicas em grande medida estandardizadas - não há consenso relativamente à importância económica ou à necessidade de conceder protecção a invenções menores mediante um direito de exclusiva; contudo, mais de metade dos membros da OMC contam com regimes de MU com diversas características. No variado panorama de regimes, o MU português é o objecto do presente estudo. Sob influência da lei alemã, o MU foi introduzido em 1940 e ao longo dos anos tem experienciado modificações radicais em vários elementos fundamentais; e.g., a delimitação do seu objecto de protecção, os requisitos, o sistema de concessão e os mecanismos de conexão procedimental com a patente. O caso português destaca-se ainda porque, para o MU do Código da PI de 2003, invocou-se como inspiração a iniciativa da Comissão Europeia de um MU com alcance comunitário e porque contemplou um sistema de concessão que fez dele um regime sui generis comparado com os existentes na Alemanha, em Espanha, no Brasil e na Comunidade Andina. O objectivo da presente tese é então o estudo e a análise da peculiar evolução legislativa do MU em Portugal, pretendendo ainda indagar em que medida as alterações operadas no seu regime jurídico tiveram correlação nas tendências dos usuários locais em acudir à figura. Com isto, este trabalho ambiciona ainda arriscar leituras das quais se possam extrair considerações em torno dos aspectos fundamentais do MU como modalidade de PI para a protecção de invenções menores. ; El eje de la presente investigación es el modelo de utilidad (MU) como sinónimo de modalidad de propiedad industrial (PI) que tiene por finalidad la protección de invenciones «menores», aquellas que, a pesar de que aportan mejoramientos o avances técnicos, no alcanzan el nivel de inventiva exigido para su protección mediante patente. El MU es asociado usualmente a un posible mecanismo de estímulo a la innovación tecnológica local proveniente de las PYME y de inventores independientes; también, se suele sugerir que el MU es una modalidad especialmente conveniente para países poco o medianamente industrializados o importadores netos de tecnología. Al no estar recogido en el ADPIC, los Miembros de la OMC no están obligados a contemplar al MU ni existe un parámetro o prototipo internacional al que se tenga que someter la legislación de los países que lo contemplan. A diferencia de la patente - que goza de teorizaciones y justificaciones económicas en gran medida estandarizadas - no hay consenso respecto de la importancia económica o la necesidad de otorgar protección a invenciones menores mediante un derecho de exclusiva; no obstante, más de la mitad de los Miembros de la OMC cuentan con regímenes de MU, con características diversas. Dentro del variado panorama de regímenes, el MU portugués es el objeto del presente trabajo. Bajo influencia de la ley alemana el MU fue introducido en 1940 y desde entonces ha experimentado radicales modificaciones en varios de sus aspectos fundamentales; e.g., delimitación de su objeto de protección, requisitos, sistema de concesión y mecanismos de conexión procedimental con la patente. El caso portugués destaca también porque para el MU del Código de PI de 2003 se invocó como inspiración la iniciativa de la Comisión Europea para un MU de espectro comunitario y porque contempló un sistema de concesión que hizo de él un régimen sui generis comparado con los existentes en Alemania, España, Brasil y la Comunidad Andina. El objetivo de la presente tesis es el estudio y análisis de la peculiar evolución legislativa del MU en Portugal; asimismo, persigue indagar en qué medida los cambios operados en su régimen jurídico pudieron haber tenido correlato en las tendencias de los usuarios locales en acudir a la figura. Con esto, se ambiciona también arriesgar lecturas de las que se puedan extraer consideraciones en torno a los aspectos fundamentales del MU como modalidad de PI para la protección de invenciones menores.