Suchergebnisse

International audience ; Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We exhibit two necessary conditions that a theory of rational decision must satisfy in order to solve the paradox. We then show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve it because each theory meets either one or the other necessary condition, but not both. However, the paradox of not voting is consistent with an amended version of third-generation prospect theory in which the reference is merely to vote or abstain. We are grateful to an anonymous referee and Ashley Piggins for the valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Citation: Serge Blondel and Louis Lévy-garboua, (2011) ''Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 31 No. 4 pp. 3158-3168. Contact: Serge Blondel-serge.blondel@univ-angers.fr, Louis Lévy-garboua-llg@univ-paris1.fr.

International audience ; Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We exhibit two necessary conditions that a theory of rational decision must satisfy in order to solve the paradox. We then show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve it because each theory meets either one or the other necessary condition, but not both. However, the paradox of not voting is consistent with an amended version of third-generation prospect theory in which the reference is merely to vote or abstain. We are grateful to an anonymous referee and Ashley Piggins for the valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Citation: Serge Blondel and Louis Lévy-garboua, (2011) ''Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 31 No. 4 pp. 3158-3168. Contact: Serge Blondel-serge.blondel@univ-angers.fr, Louis Lévy-garboua-llg@univ-paris1.fr.

International audience ; Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We exhibit two necessary conditions that a theory of rational decision must satisfy in order to solve the paradox. We then show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve it because each theory meets either one or the other necessary condition, but not both. However, the paradox of not voting is consistent with an amended version of third-generation prospect theory in which the reference is merely to vote or abstain. We are grateful to an anonymous referee and Ashley Piggins for the valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Citation: Serge Blondel and Louis Lévy-garboua, (2011) ''Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 31 No. 4 pp. 3158-3168. Contact: Serge Blondel-serge.blondel@univ-angers.fr, Louis Lévy-garboua-llg@univ-paris1.fr.

International audience ; Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We exhibit two necessary conditions that a theory of rational decision must satisfy in order to solve the paradox. We then show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve it because each theory meets either one or the other necessary condition, but not both. However, the paradox of not voting is consistent with an amended version of third-generation prospect theory in which the reference is merely to vote or abstain. We are grateful to an anonymous referee and Ashley Piggins for the valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Citation: Serge Blondel and Louis Lévy-garboua, (2011) ''Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 31 No. 4 pp. 3158-3168. Contact: Serge Blondel-serge.blondel@univ-angers.fr, Louis Lévy-garboua-llg@univ-paris1.fr.

International audience ; Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We exhibit two necessary conditions that a theory of rational decision must satisfy in order to solve the paradox. We then show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve it because each theory meets either one or the other necessary condition, but not both. However, the paradox of not voting is consistent with an amended version of third-generation prospect theory in which the reference is merely to vote or abstain. We are grateful to an anonymous referee and Ashley Piggins for the valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Citation: Serge Blondel and Louis Lévy-garboua, (2011) ''Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 31 No. 4 pp. 3158-3168. Contact: Serge Blondel-serge.blondel@univ-angers.fr, Louis Lévy-garboua-llg@univ-paris1.fr.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Introduction: the Theory of Games and Economic Theory -- 1.1 The scope of the theory of games -- 1.2 Economics without game theory -- 1.3 The so-called failure of game theory -- 1.4 The structure of game theory -- 1.5 Game theory and competition -- Chapter 2 Utility -- 2.1 Risk and uncertainty -- 2.2 Utility -- 2.3 Axioms for risky choice -- 2.4 The expected utility proposition -- 2.5 The utility of money and risk aversion -- Chapter 3 Two-person Zero-sum Games -- 3.1 The definition of a game -- 3.2 Moves and strategies -- 3.3 Payoffs -- 3.4 Uncertainty and security -- 3.5 Saddle points -- 3.6 Wage determination I -- 3.7 Mixed strategies -- 3.8 The minimax theorem -- 3.9 Interpretations of mixed strategies -- Chapter 4 Two-person Nonzero-sum Non-cooperative Games -- 4.1 Nonzero-sum games -- 4.2 The prisoner's dilemma -- 4.3 Repeated dilemmas -- 4.4 Oligopoly I -- 4.5 Oligopoly I, continued: non-cooperative equilibrium and Cournot's solution -- 4.6 Externalities -- 4.7 Externalities I: the separable case -- 4.8 Externalities II: the non-separable case -- 4.9 Oligopoly II: the limit solution -- Chapter 5 Two-person Cooperative Games -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The attainable set -- 5.3 The negotiation set -- 5.4 Bargains -- 5.5 Zeuthen's bargaining theory -- 5.6 Moral considerations -- 5.7 Wage determination II -- 5.8 Nash's solution for the general two-person cooperative game -- Chapter 6 n-person Cooperative Games With Transferable Utility -- 6.1 Coalitions -- 6.2 Transferable utility -- 6.3 The characteristic function -- 6.4 The core -- 6.5 An empty core -- 6.6 The trading game -- 6.7 Trading game I: one seller, two buyers, transferable utility -- 6.8 Trading game II: m sellers, n buyers, transferable utility.

The aim of the article is to demonstrate on a familiar example of
Cobb-Douglas utility function principles of intertemporal resource
allocation under general market conditions. The enormous increase of data
availability and progress in data analysis in recent decades caused that
empirical inequality research has created a robust base of results. On the
other hand, researchers face serious interpretation difficulties. Empirical
results do not speak for themselves but only through interpretative theory.
Hence, the article provides a theoretical scheme which clarifies fundamental
inequality-driving forces and which reveals economic inequalities as the
intrinsic feature of market economies.

A research stream known as prospect theory describes how decision biases lead to results that differ from those predicted by classical utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory hypothesizes that individuals will experience potential losses more intensely than potential gains, and will be more risk‐seeking in loss situations, while more risk‐avoiding in gain situations. This study includes 948 participants from the PRC and 318 students from the USA. All of our attempts to replicate these findings in the Peoples' Republic of China have revealed a different pattern. Chinese subjects consistently demonstrated risk‐seeking preferences, both in gain and loss situations.

This essay argues that beneath the superficial linearity of the history of neoclassical price index theory lie important conceptual ruptures that are linked to the ordinal revolution, including a radical transformation in the core objective for cost-of-living indexes. Revealing these ruptures produces a more accurate history of both the development of neoclassical price index theory and its reception. Furthermore, we can recognize how transformations in this theory have made cost-of-living indexes more coherent with existing traditions of empirical macroeconomics even as they may have reduced the indexes' suitability for other functions, notably adjusting income payments.

While focusing on particular countries or regions is indispensable for accumulating substantive knowledge, there are also costs to not stretching beyond a given geographic region when taking on "big" questions in the study of politics. The recent volume, Comparative Area Studies: Methodological Rationales and Cross-Regional Applications (Ahram, Köllner, and Sil 2018) identifies comparative area studies (CAS) as a distinct research strategy occupying unique intellectual spaces within the social sciences. As the contributions to the volume demonstrate, CAS has distinct advantages for developing mid-range theory, offering novel empirical findings and a different mode of triangulation. Such works can also serve an important disciplinary function by bringing into dialogue scholars that may be siloed off into various research communities. Moreover, they advance an important intellectual agenda in offering a mode of research that problematizes and denaturalizes our conceptions of geographical areas, and indeed, our understanding of what it means to compare.

ABSTRACTThe main focus of this article is to compare utility functions derived by the Von Neumann‐Morgenstern conceptual apparatus with those imputed through actual pricing behavior. The study is cast in a competitive bidding setting in the oil drilling industry. A version of the Friedman bidding model is used to generate separate bidding models for two drilling contractors. From the actual bids submitted by the contractors and those generated by the model, one can construct each contractor's imputed utility function. An examination of a contractor's derived and imputed utility functions over a common range of outcomes then provides a diagnostic check on the veracity of the Von Neumann‐Morgenstern theory as a prescriptive model of executive behavior.

The concept of 'marginal value' is critical to the emergence of neo-classical economics. This volume is divided into sections on:Book I: Utility (Disutility of labour, Utility and Wants, Direct and Indirect Utility, Utility Equations, Subjective Price)Book II: Value and Market (Objective Price, Markets, Value)Book III: Relations of Subjective Prices (The Distribution of Income and Prices, The Elasticity of Consumption, Differential Rent)Book IV: The Normal Market (Constant, Decreasing and Increasing Return)