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p. 242 ; column 1 ; 6 ¼ col. in. ; A summary of a Utah emigrant's "scriptural and rational" arguments in favor of polygamy.

This thesis is comprised of three chapters. In the first chapter, I examine a voting model where two political parties have fixed positions on a unidimensional policy space but where the implemented policy is the convex combination of the two positions and study the effects of opinion polls on election results and social welfare. Voters are completely agnostic about the distribution of preferences and gain sequential and partial information through series of opinion polls. Voters' behavior is driven in part by regret minimization. The mass of undecided voters decreases monotonically with the number of polls, but may not necessarily disappear. Voters who remain undecided have centrist ideologies. Finally, social welfare is not necessarily increasing in the number of polls: having more polls is not always better. Features of the model are con firmed by empirical evidence. In the second chapter, which is a joint work with Agustin Casas and Guillermo Diaz, we evaluate the effect of an institutional provision designed to increase accountability of local officials, and we show that its implementation can lead to a distribution of power within the legislature which is not consistent with voters' true preferences. The cause of this inconsistency is the ballot design which asymmetrically affects the officials listed on it. We analyze the case of the Lima's 2013 city legislature recall referendum and show that the design of the referendum ballot had adverse and signifficant effects on the composition of the Lima's city legislature. We also show that the election results with more \neutral" ballot designs would have been signifficantly different, and the composition of the legislature would have been more representative of voters' true preferences. More specifically, we use our results to simulate the outcome of the election with a random order of candidates. Even though the voters' fatigue is still present, it affects all parties equally, obtaining a more faithful representation of the voters' preferences. Finally, the third chapter is a joint work with Marco Serena. For small electorates, the probability of casting the pivotal vote drives one's willingness to vote, however the existence of costs of voting incentivizes ones abstention. In two-alternative pivotal-voter models, this trade-off has been extensively studied under private information on the cost of voting. We complement the literature by providing an analysis under complete information, extending the analysis of Palfrey and Rosenthal [1983. A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice. 41, 7-53]. If the cost of voting is sufficiently high at least for supporters of one of the two alternatives, the equilibrium is unique, and fully characterized. If instead the cost of voting is sufficiently low for everyone, we characterize three classes of equilibria and we find that all equilibria must belong to one of these three classes, regardless of the number of individuals. Furthermore we focus on equilibria which are continuous in the cost of voting. We show that this equilibrium refinement pins down a unique equilibrium. We conclude by discussing an application of our findings to redistribution of wealth. ; Polling in a Proportional Representation System / Christos Mavridis. -- The last shall be the first: failed accountability due to voters fatigue and ballot design / Christos Mavridis, Agustin Casas and Guillermo Diaz. -- Costly voting under complete information / Christos Mavridis, Marco Serena ; Programa Oficial de Doctorado en Economía ; Presidente: Pablo Amorós González; Secretario: Fracisco Marhuenda Hurtado; Vocal: Orestis Troumpounis

"Some books on Ohio history": p. 9-10. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Suhrawardi is a renowned philosopher famous for his thoughts on the philosophy of Illumination. His thoughts are contained in his mangnum opus, The Wisdom of Al-Isryq (Hikmat Al-Isryq). This study aims to reveal the prominent aspect of various political dimensions in his work, whose primordial focus was on the aspects of the political system and the concept of power. The political system and the concept of power were then characterized as a political philosophy of Illumination. For this reason, this study not only uses a qualitative method with factual historical study techniques regarding figures but also uses an analytical approach to the theory of sociology of knowledge by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Lucmann and the theory of socio-political philosophy of al-Farabi's emanation. The sociology of knowledge is used to analyze the social dimensions involved in the formation of Suhrawardi's thoughts. Meanwhile, the socio-political philosophy of emanation is used to characterize the system and the concept of political power contained in the Wisdom of al-Isryq. The study concludes that the political system contained in the Illumination philosophy is divine, theocratic, and based on the concept of power in the form of self-control. Keywords: Hikmat al-Isryq, Illumination Political Philosophy, Suhrawardi, Reality, Sociology of Knowledge

Reply to the article: Buzgalin A. Heuristic Potential of Political Economy of Socialism in the 21st Century (Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2003, No 3).