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In this paper entrepreneurs are defined as agents who bring about economic change by combining their own effort with other factors of production in search of economic rents. The institutional setup is argued to determine both the supply and direction of entrepreneurial activity. Four key institutions are explored more closely: property rights protection, savings policies, taxation and the regulation of labor markets. Institutions have far-reaching effects on entrepreneurship, and they largely determine whether or not entrepreneurial activity will be socially productive. Due to the responsiveness of entrepreneurship to the institutional setup it is maintained that in-depth analyses of specific institutions are required in order to further our understanding of the determinants of entrepreneurial behavior and the economic effects of entrepreneurship. The paper also demonstrates that it is problematic to use self-employment as an empirical proxy for productive entrepreneurship.

This article revisits the concept of the total institution (TI), critically assessing the extent to which it has changed from being repressively coercive to relatively voluntaristic. I propose two new concepts, the 'Reinventive Institution' (RI) and 'performative regulation', to take the debate forward. The model of the TI outlined in Goffman's Asylums has been (mis-)interpreted as rendering its inmates powerless, but they also demonstrated agency through gestures of resistance. Conversely, RIs, which members elect to join for purposes of self-improvement, appear to celebrate the subject's autonomy but suggest a unique form of social control based on mutual surveillance. This performative regulation is enacted through the interaction order, as members actively produce, negotiate and legitimate the exercise of power.

Einleitung: Politische Ideengeschichte — institutionentheoretisch gelesen -- 1. Krise der griechischen Polis -- Einführung -- Kritik und Legitimation politischer Institutionen in der Sophistik -- Thukydides: Machtkampf als Institutionenkritik -- Zur Theorie der Institutionen in der praktisch-politischen Philosophie bei Platon und Aristoteles -- Zur Theorie der Institutionen in der praktisch-politischen Philosophie bei Platon und Aristoteles. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag -- 2. Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit -- Einführung -- Wilhelm von Ockham und die Institutionen des späten Mittelalters -- Die Gegner Ockhams: Zur Korporationslehre der mittelalterlichen Legisten -- Institutionen — Recht — Politik im Denken Martin Luthers -- Politische Weiterungen der reformatorischen Theologie. Die Antwort des Gemeinen Mannes -- Zum Institutionenverständnis in der Zeit der Reformation -- Staatsraison. Die Verstaatlichung der Politik im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit -- Johannes Althusius: Eine "alternative" Institutionentheorie der Frühen Neuzeit? -- Korporatistische und kontraktualistische Institutionenbegründung. Zu Thomas O. Hueglin "Johannes Althusius" -- 3. Die Herausbildung der modernen bürgerlichen Gesellschaft -- Einführung -- Institution, Imagination und Freiheit bei Spinoza. Eine kritische Theorie politischer Institutionen -- Institutionen als ideologische Apparate bei Spinoza -- Adam Smith: Der Zusammenhang von Moralphilosophie, Ökonomie und Institutionentheorie -- Selbstregulierung und republikanische Ordnung in der politischen Wissenschaft der Federalist Papers -- Die politische Institution bei Kant -- Zur Theorie der Institutionalisierung bei Kant -- 4. Institutionen und Utopien -- Einführung -- Utopie und Institution. Propädeutische Überlegungen zu ihrem Verhältnis -- Utopien, Utopiekritik und Systemtheorie -- Namenregister -- Die Autoren des Bandes.

Better legal institutions favor economic development, but only in States withsufficiently constrained executive power. We document this novel pattern acrossdeveloping countries, and build a simple model that illustrates how power, and theinstitutions that constrain or complement it, may affect development. We show that thereis a tradeoff between the two facets of power—enforcement and expropriation. As aruler's power grows, his temptation not to enforce diminishes while the temptation toexpropriate grows. As a consequence, private enforcement optimally evolves into Stateenforcement, and legal institutions, which relax the ruler's incentive constraint onenforcement, lose economic importance vis-à-vis political institutions, which limit theexecutive's ability to expropriate. Our results are consistent with the observed crosscountrypatterns, as well as with historical evidence on the transition from the "LawMerchant" private enforcement system to the State. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

In this volume, we examine how the institutional environment affects entrepreneurial organizations, and vice-versa. This includes not only how the institutional environment constrains both founding processes and the type of organizations founded, but also how institutional dynamics construct new entrepreneurial opportunities, empower and facilitate action, and how entrepreneurs manipulate the institutional environment to serve their own ends. This institutional approach to entrepreneurship shifts attention away from the personal traits and backgrounds of individual entrepreneurs, and towards how institutions shape entrepreneurial opportunities and actions; how entrepreneurs navigate their cognitive, normative, and regulatory environments; and how actors modify and build institutions to support new types of organizations.