Reinhold Niebuhr is widely acknowledged as the father of Christian realism and a staunch critic of pacifism. In a famous exchange with his brother H. Richard in The Christian Century, Niebuhr defended the necessity of entering the fray of battle to combat evil as opposed to opting for non-violent detachment that ultimately usurps God's authority to decide on final matters. Niebuhr, however, never endorsed an aggressive Just War doctrine. Striving to reconcile the Christian command of love with the harsh realities of power resulting from universal sinfulness, Niebuhr emphasised the necessity of negotiating the distance between the two extremes of a pendulum swinging from Christian pacifism to the endorsement of interventionist policies. Rather than this being an expression of the ambiguity of his moral convictions, this paper argues that it is a product of his sensitivity to applying contextual moral and political judgement as an exercise of theological responsibility.
This article considers the role that might be played by the political thought of Reinhold Niebuhr in contemporary debates over pacifism. It begins with an overview of Niebuhr's changing position on pacifism, showing how his early commitment to anti-war principles gradually faded over time and was replaced with a pragmatic approach to just war thinking in his later life. The article then considers whether this drift away from pacifism necessarily means that there is nothing in Niebuhrian Christian realism for contemporary pacifist thought. Drawing on Niebuhr's critique of perfectionist liberalism, it argues that an imperfect and non-absolute pacifism that accepts the permanent possibility of political violence but refuses to offer moral endorsement to such violence can offer a viable political position in current debates on war and peace, particularly in opposition to just war approaches.
This paper reconstructs the political thought of the Scottish legal philosopher, and eventually MEP, Sir Neil MacCormick (1941–2009), the founder of "constitutional pluralism," one of the most influential legal theories of the European union today. It argues that his legal theory is underpinned by a coherent and original political theory of post-sovereignty. But, contrary to many current interpretations, this article argues that normatively, constitutional pluralism is not a purely liberal theory. Neither is it inherently illiberal, as has been contended. Instead, this article spells out the hybrid institutional design imagined by N. MacCormick and inspired by the thought of D. Hume, as well as the lineaments of an ethical theory of post-sovereignty he developed. So doing, while I will argue that it ultimately leads to a kind of republican cosmopolitanism, the political theory of constitutional pluralism is shown to open up an important, if not fully developed, avenue to escape some shortcoming commonly associated with post-sovereignty.
The article discusses the political eff ects of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic in the framework of Terror Management Theory. Growing fears caused by the pandemic provoke mortality salience across the globe. Political and psychological eff ects of mortality salience are manifested in the strengthening of conservative orientations and support for status quo. Awareness of mortality provides support to power structures, incumbent political leaders, strengthening patriotic attitudes and rejection of external groups. The pandemic strengthens the eff ect of rallying around the fl ag and results in an increase in the ratings of ruling political leaders. The growing support for political leaders confi rms the orientation towards maintaining the status quo and conservative attitudes. In a pandemic, patriotic feeling, the demand for order, the growth of distrust of fellow citizens, and the rejection of freedoms in favor of security come to the fore. In the context of mortality salience orientation to support specifi c types of political leadership is intensifying. It seems that in the near future, electorally successful types of leaders will include two major types. Firstly, politicians inclined to charismatic control of the trust of their supporters based on a confi dent and uncompromising orientation to their own ego, most often on the basis of previously gained fame. Secondly, those politicians who are capable of expressing simple human closeness to ordinary people and are focused on creating and maintaining social ties with a constituency. Charismatic leadership is oriented towards personal decision-making at leader's own peril and risk. The second type is associated with horizontal dialogue with citizens. and creating the maximum numberof personal connections. In the current situation, the role of personal qualities of leaders will only grow, both as objects of attitudes and aspirations on the part of the masses, and as subjects of the political process, making political decisions that are crucial for society.
Georgia's turn to the West signifi cantly aff ected its geopolitical and foreign policies. The author shares the view expressed by Georgian scholars that the country's continued commitment to the Western vector is a direct consequence of ideas expressed by political elites (constructivist theory) and their self-identifi cation as "European," coupled with Western-style liberal democracy as a social order preference (liberal theory). Georgia's political elites are driven by the concept of "Europeanness" and thus focus primarily on the state's aspirations to be integrated into the "Western world," which is pushing the state towards European and North-Atlantic integration. Georgian elites believe that institutional reunifi cation with "European family" under the NATO defence shield will not only deter Moscow but will fi nally put an end to Moscow's attempts to bring the post-soviet state under its control. Moreover, due to the tensions between the generalized West and Russian Federation, the Kremlin's aspirations to stop what it perceives as a geopolitical expansion of the West to the east, Georgia's approach has become even more radical. The paper argues that the concept of "Europeanness" has been transformed into "radical Europeanness," meaning that the political elites maintain economic cooperation with non-Western countries, but there is no proactive foreign policy beyond that, even with its most important strategic partners, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. In spite Tbilisi enjoys trade relations with these countries, the existing level of political and military cooperation between them conceals signifi cant bilateral challenges. Additionally, this approach is perfectly refl ected in Georgia's relations with China, when the country's political elites pushed for free trade, without attention to the political and geopolitical aspects of economic cooperation. Thus, Georgia – China relations are also the part of research interest in this paper, as the free trade regime between the two countries is subject to serious scrutiny after the Donald Trump administration made it clear that Washington would not welcome Chinese economic and geopolitical expansion in Georgia.
The Northeast Asian (NEA) power structure demonstrates a weakening unipolarity of the United States (U.S.), which will evolve into a power structure with "multilateral co-opetition of two superpowers (China and the U.S.) and three regional great powers (Russia, Japan, and South Korea)" during the 2020s. In the context of this shifting power structure, the other fi ve NEA states will adjust their diplomatic policies. Japan, Russia, and South Korea, which occupy the second tier of the NEA power structure, will pursue regional great power diplomacy and regional interests. Russia will maintain a careful balance with China and the U.S., and will use investments from the other NEA states pragmatically to develop its Far East region. Japan will seek to maximize its security guarantees from the U.S. while actively obtaining economic benefi ts from China, and will try to remain fl exible in terms of its NEA strategic choice. South Korea will implement the so-called "two superpowers diplomacy" in relation to the U.S. and China in order to enhance its strategic autonomy. With relatively weak national power, North Korea and Mongolia occupy the third tier of the NEA power structure, and they will try to ensure the survival of their respective regimes and promote national security. China's strategic choices for NEA in the next decade are likely to include fi ve aspects: 1) to avoid a "new Cold War" and achieve a strategic balance with the U.S.; 2) to maintain friendly and close strategic ties with Russia; 3) to actively promote economic cooperation with the other NEA countries; 4) to promote the establishment of a regional security mechanism in the future that includes all the NEA states, for example, a "Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Organization" (NEAPCO); and 5) to construct a collective NEA identity.
Most economic forecasts made after the trans-Atlantic fi nancial crisis of 2008 – 2009 have suggested that by 2030 China and India will overtake the United States to become the world's largest and second-largest economies, respectively. This is why India is viewed as a global power, graduating from its regional role. The COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing "Cold War" between the United States and China could present new challenges and open up new opportunities for India. While dealing with short-term economic and geopolitical challenges, India will continue to carve out its path in its relations with the world that is defi ned by its civilizational inheritance, its core national interests and its economic performance and capabilities. This article discusses why, given India's focus on its economic development and growth, the country seeks a regional and global economic and security environment that would be conducive to attaining these objectives. The author suggests fi rst, that as a rising power, India has remained committed to multilateralism in both the economic and security fi elds. It has adhered to the discipline of existing multilateral regimes, including in trade, fi nance and nuclear non-proliferation. India has also actively supported a global solution to the challenge of global warming and climate change. Second, that even as India pursues a policy of multi-alignment in a world marked by a multipolar balance of power, the viability of its policy will hinge upon how China responds to India's rise and its core national security concerns. Finally, that as Big Power rivalries return and a new Cold War may be in the offi ng, India will have to reassess its options given its developmental aspirations. An assertive China seeking hegemonic dominance in Asia could reduce India's options and encourage it to build new alliances that are aimed at enhancing national security and ensuring a more balanced distribution of power.
