Suchergebnisse

This article provides a conclusion to the EJSS Special Issue 'Discussing strategies for Social Europe: The potential role of EU law in contributing to the Union's policy objective of fighting poverty and social exclusion'. The contributions to this Special Issue raise a fundamental question: why did European governments fail to deliver on their promise, proclaimed with so much emphasis twenty years ago, to reduce poverty in Europe? It is too easy to say that the one and only problem was the non-binding nature of the social objectives of Lisbon and the antipoverty targets of Europe 2020. There is a broader challenge at the EU level, which goes beyond minimum income protection and directly involves crucial nuts and bolts of the whole welfare edifice: when confronted with severe economic and social shocks, welfare states need an adequate stabilization capacity. This implies that the European Monetary Union becomes a true 'insurance union'. I argue that one should understand the relevance of the European Pillar of Social Rights from this perspective, and I relate that argument to the contributions to the Special Issue.

In the aftermath of a decade of crisis, the 2019 European Parliament elections confirmed the results of the 2014 elections as voters turned away from the traditional political families to vote for parties with a strong message on Europe, including Eurosceptic parties. It further evidenced the normalization of Euroscepticism, which has become a stable component of European politics. But should one talk of Euroscepticism or rather of Euroscepticisms? This contribution focuses on 19 radical right and radical left parties, more specifically the parties from Western Europe belonging to the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) and the Identity and Democracy (I/D) groups. Through an analysis of the electoral manifestos, it analyses how the European Union has been framed by the parties and whether we can speak of a 'unified Eurosceptic narrative'. More specifically, this article concentrates on three issues that have been at the heart of the recent crises: the European Union's reform and how the regime itself is framed in a post-crisis context, the Economic and Monetary Union well as migration and free movement.

In 2010 the European Semester was created to better coordinate fiscal and economic policies within Europe's Economic and Monetary Union. The Semester aims to tackle economic imbalances by giving European Union (EU) member states country-specific recommendations (CSRs) regarding their public budgets as well as their wider economic and social policies with a view to enabling better policy coordination among Euro Area member states. In this article we develop a method to assess the way in which the CSRs have been addressing coordination and offer a systematic analysis of the way they have been formulated. We offer a way to code CSRs as well as one to analyse progress evaluations. Furthermore, we seek to use our results to address one of the reoccurring questions in the literature: whether the EU is pursuing a 'one size fits all' approach to economic policy making in the Euro Area? The findings indicate that different types of market economies and welfare states – different 'varieties of capitalism' – among the Euro Area members obtain different recommendations regarding different policy areas

An argument commonplace in narratives concerning the difficult recovery after the 2008 crisis, the relative backslide of 2011, and the European peripheral debt crisis is that difficulties occurred because European economic integration has been privileged over any form of political solidarity. Consequently, Europe should develop the institutions of solidarity to provide relief of instability and inequality. Maastricht had to lead to political Union and to some form of solidarity, but this aspect always remained vague and was not implemented. What has been implemented after the crisis is an even tougher set of control-oriented institutions that introduce further rigidities in European economies, reducing the degrees of freedom of national economic policy. The aim of this contribution is to argue that the implementation of solidarity schemes in the EU should not be conceived of as a compensatory measure for the costs and damages directly or indirectly caused by the European Monetary Union (EMU) and its rigidities and passiveness, including the inability to curb financial instability. Solidarity schemes should instead be the product of unified programs framed by a genuine constitutional federalism.

On 6 December 2017, the European Commission presented its policy package on 'Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union'. Some of the proposals it entails aim at improving the democratic accountability of the governance of the Eurozone. This paper examines how exactly this objective is supposed to be achieved, i.e. how national and European Parliaments are meant to be involved in this field. In doing so, it first considers the mechanisms that currently exist to this end and recalls some of the proposals previously made with the same goal, e.g. creation of a Eurozone sub-committee within the European Parliament or of a Eurozone parliament. Then, the proposals made by the Commission to enhance democratic accountability in the EMU are analysed, and it is contended that, overall, they are coherent with the content of the whole package, with previous statements, and with the interests of the EP. Yet, they appear insufficient, in particular because the involvement of national parliaments remains very limited. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

The paper aims at assessing the changes in flows of selected forms of capital under deepening financial integration in the European Union. EU Member States are divided into two groups: members of the euro area and those outside of it. The analysis coincides with the establishing of the EU monetary union and covers the turn and early 21st century. We have reviewed major theoretical concepts providing grounds for further considerations. Together with the progressing financial integration of the EU Member States there is an increase in the overall value of financial flows measured with net IIP. Research method applied in this particular study includes the overview of theoretical concepts, literature review and a comparative analysis based on statistical data. Analyses of selected data revealed significant differences between developed and developing countries when it comes to various forms of net capital and its relation to the GDP based on the International Investment Position. The analysis of the degree of financial and trade integration of the Eurozone countries compared to the Member States outside of the euro area demonstrated that the two groups are at two opposite extremes.

While there are many methods to measure the competitiveness of an economy, most of these concepts ignore the fact that competitiveness can change because of market processes like wage negotiation but also because of political decision-making. Governments that compete with others for factors of production face the incentive to adjust key policy variables to improve their competitive position. Disentangling market-induced and politics-induced changes in competitiveness is not easy, but strongly warranted given current discussions that some EMU Member States should improve their competitive position within the euro area by adjusting policy variables. Increasing country competitiveness is one of the key objectives currently discussed by policy makers in the context of creating an economic union in the euro area, to complement monetary union. We propose a new competitiveness index that captures the dimensions in which politics can influence competitiveness beyond factor price adjustments. Our index shows that the individual components of institutional competitiveness have developed heterogeneously among EMU Member States. To explain these divergent developments, the uneven integration within the EU Single Market may play a role.

The crisis that emerged following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers which is the fourth largest investment bank in the United States quickly spread to the entire world and has globally become a financial and real sector crisis. Today, the global financial crisis has influenced many countries in the world, and caused various economic, political and social problems in the European Union countries especially in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (PIIGS). The global financial crisis became the European Union's economic crisis at first, and later turned into to be the debt crisis of the Euro area. The decline observed in recent years in the economic performance of the countries of the Euro Area has become more apparent along with the economic crisis, and this situation increased the concern about the future of the Economic and Monetary Union. In this context, in this study within the framework of global capitalism, the economic, social and political problems that the global financial crisis caused in many countries are examined, observations were made on the Euro area public debt crisis and analyses were carried out on the PIIGS economies.

This paper explores how European integration impacts the national identities of Member States. Identity is an amorphous concept, and so this paper focuses on one dimension of it: the perception of the relative status of the nation that nationalized individuals possess. Perceptions of relative national status flow from the fact that the international system is characterized by hierarchy, competition, and concerns for relative gains and losses. A key motivation for the foreign policies of lower status nations is equality with higher status ones, and for the former, European integration is often perceived in equalizing terms. But, this perception of Europe as equalizer often does not correspond with objectively unequal power relations in Europe. This paper focuses on why, among nationalized individuals, perceptions of power differentials change, even though objectively the unequal inter-state power relations may remain unchanged. The case study is Italy entering the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union in 1999, which was perceived by many Italians in equalizing terms, even though the unequal power relations between Italy and Europe's elite countries remained objectively the same. Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v7i2.219

This paper explores how European integration impacts the national identities of Member States. Identity is an amorphous concept, and so this paper focuses on one dimension of it: the perception of the relative status of the nation that nationalized individuals possess. Perceptions of relative national status flow from the fact that the international system is characterized by hierarchy, competition, and concerns for relative gains and losses. A key motivation for the foreign policies of lower status nations is equality with higher status ones, and for the former, European integration is often perceived in equalizing terms. But, this perception of Europe as equalizer often does not correspond with objectively unequal power relations in Europe. This paper focuses on why, among nationalized individuals, perceptions of power differentials change, even though objectively the unequal inter-state power relations may remain unchanged. The case study is Italy entering the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union in 1999, which was perceived by many Italians in equalizing terms, even though the unequal power relations between Italy and Europe's elite countries remained objectively the same.

Each enlargement of the European Communities (EC) and later the European Union (EU) has had an indisputable in! uence on inner cohesion of the organization itself. The participants of the integration processes have included the countries deviating from the previous Member States by the level of the economic development, the structures of their economies, macroeconomic conditions, etc. This differentiation has taken its toll especially on the functioning and the expenses of common policies (mainly transfer ones) as well as the execution of the integration reinforcement plans such as the European Economic and Monetary Union. In this aspect the most serious consequences were caused by the admission of countries that were much weaker economically, especially Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. These countries had to go through a long way of reforms in order to become rightful members of the organization and for their integration with the Communities to become a mutual success. A big part of the expenses connected with these reforms was financed by the common budget thanks to the structural funds and the Common Agricultural Policy.

The creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe challenges much of what we have come to take for granted about states and the components of sovereignty. What does the willingness of twelve European Union (EU) members to abandon their own currencies mean for the nation-states of Europe? Does the Euro automatically imply further political development at the EU level? To address these questions, this paper parses out the role that national currencies play in statebuilding with reference to the nineteenth century American experience. Just as US federal authorities engaged in a political project to wrest control over money from subnational authorities to the center and unify the currency, so have the dynamics of currency unification in the EU involved important conflicts over the location of the legitimate exercise of control and rule. In particular, I highlight the role of war and market integration in prompting currency consolidation, and the importance of linkages between money and fiscal capacity for statebuilding, and apply the analytical lessons learned from the US experience to the case of the Euro.

With the creation of European monetary union (EMU), European welfare states have entered a new phase of development. The margins for manoeuvring public budgets have substantially decreased, while the unfolding of the four freedoms of movement within the European union (EU) have seriously weakened the traditional coercive monopoly of the state on actors and resources that are crucial for the stability of redistributive institutions. The article explores these issues adopting a Rokkanian perspective, i.e. building on Rokkan's pioneering insights on the nexus between boundary building and internal structuring. The first part of the paper briefly presents the theoretical perspective. The second part sketches the development of national welfare institutions from their origin up to the early 1970. The third part describes the challenges that have emerged to the ≪ social sovereignty ≫ of the nation state, largely linked to the process of European integration. The final part offers some more speculative remarks of the potential de-structuring of the traditional architecture of social protection, with some hints at cross-national variations and possible developments at the EU level.

Since the 1997 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference a sea-change in the formulation and implementation of European Union Social Law and Policy has taken place in response to the demands made by economic, political and monetary union. The evolution of EU social law is an area which has developed within a process or framework of "differentiated integration",1 not only between the Member States, but also the regions of the EU. Since its emergence in the EU Council's Conclusions of 22 June 19842 the concept of a "European Social Area" has slowly been created by the processes of "Europeanisation"3 of social policy whereby through EU-led processes a "re-nationalisation"4 of domestic policies has taken place. The process is similar to the ideas of "re-regulation" of national law in relation to the basic economic freedoms of the EC Treaty whereby a measure of national autonomy can only be retained through European Community law standards. It is striking how the Amsterdam IGC has led to a definite shift in the paradigm of EU social policy law with distinctive aims, values, processes, new legal tools and new political actors.

Given Italy's reputation for fiscal profligacy, the zeal with which Italians strove to meet the strict budgetary and other criteria to qualify for full participation in European Monetary Union might be in need of explanation. On a wider front, Italy has displayed an enthusiasm for European integration which has been largely free of the reservations occasionally shown by member‐states of comparable size and importance. This paper considers explanations which have been advanced for Italians' pro‐European attitude, such as Catholic universalism and Roman imperial traditions, but rejects them as insufficient, in order to argue that the modern experience of the nation‐state in Italy has failed to produce a strong sense of allegiance to a national identity, encouraging Italians to look to the European level of supranational institutions. Furthermore, it is argued that this lack of strong national allegiance in Italy is not simply a negative characteristic, but has allowed for the preservation of traditions of localism, federalism and social partnership in Italy which are potentially valuable contributions to a future configuration of the European Union.