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Public international law, through its rules regulating the dealings between independent nations, purports to impose limits on the actions of all governments, including those of the United States. In this context American lawyers interested in foreign relations may reasonably wonder whether American courts would enforce rules of public international law purporting to bind the United States against the United States government, particularly the executive branch. A fair number of Supreme Court cases have dealt with the enforce ability of treaties in American courts.' Treaties, however, are only one source of international law. The other important source, customary international law, is neither expressly mentioned in the Constitution nor much discussed in Supreme Court cases. Customary international law also differs in important respects from treaties. Treaties are by necessity purely consensual arrangements between the parties. Rules of customary law, as the definition implies, are matters of general practice that can come into existence if a practice can fairly be labelled "general." Thus, a state that did not actively participate in the practice that culminated in the creation of a rule could find itself bound by the rule anyway, at least if that state did not actively dissent during the period of the rule's gestation. Recently, the question whether the federal courts have the authority to compel the President to adhere to rules of customary international law has drawn comment from writers interested in the subject. Some have taken the position that the courts in fact possess such authority, at least when Congress has not by statute established for the United States a rule different from that which international law would apply to the issue in question.' According to these writers, one withstanding to complain of a contemplated presidential action that would violate customary international law should be able to obtain from a federal court an injunction forbidding the action. For example, some have suggested that ...

Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Notes on Contributors -- Chapter 1 Introduction: Exploring the Relationship between Hard and Soft International Law and Social Change -- I Introduction -- II Overview of the Book -- Chapter 2 The Softening of Hard Law and the Hardening of Soft Law: an Extended Synopsis -- i Introduction -- ii Soft Power -- A The Phases of 'soft' Law Regimes -- B The Footfalls of Anthropocene -- iii Towards a Conclusion -- Chapter 3 Promoting Social Change through Treaties and Customary International Law: the Experience of the Inter-American Human Rights System -- i Introduction -- ii The Inter-American System -- A Structure -- B Historical Developments -- iii Illustrative Cases in the Inter-American System -- A Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (1988) -- 1 Brief Factual Overview -- 2 Impact on Social Change -- B Barrios Altos v. Peru (2001) -- 1 Brief Factual Overview -- 2 Impact on Social Change -- C Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (2001) -- 1 Brief Factual Overview -- 2 Impact on Social Change -- D General Usón-Ramírez v. Venezuela -- 1 Brief Factual Overview -- 2 Impact on Social Change -- iv Conclusion -- Chapter 4 Children's Rights: Social Change through the Application of Hard and Soft International Law -- i Introduction -- ii Overview of International Law Pertaining to the Child -- A Convention on the Rights of the Child -- 1 History of Children's Rights and the Making of the Convention on the Rights of the Child -- 2 Ratification and Legal Status -- B Other Binding Treaties That Directly Affect Children's Rights -- C Regional Charter on Children's Rights -- D Optional Protocols to the crc -- E Soft Law Related to the crc -- 1 Rules and Guidelines -- 2 Resolutions -- 3 General Comments of the crc Committee.

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction: A Social Scientific Approach to International Law -- 2. Jurisdiction -- 3. Customary International Law -- 4. Treaty -- 5. International Organization -- 6. Interfunctional Linkage and Fragmentation -- 7. International Adjudication -- Afterword -- Notes -- Index.

This article addresses the lack of international enforcement mechanisms which the author argues pose the most significant challenge to the development of international organizations & the body of international public law they represent. The author illustrates international organizations inability to hold states & other international actor accountable by citing examples from the World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Tribunal, & the United Nations. Finally, the article discusses the United States decision, & the subsequent consequences, to preemptively attack Iraq despite the fact that international public opinion did not support such aggression. C. Goger

For anyone who is interested in the methodology of choice of law, no field is more rewarding than that of contracts. As domestic laws of contracts develop a progressively more intricate relationship between the principles of social regulation and private autonomy, private international law is led to develop choice of law techniques that will keep an appropriate balance between these principles in interjurisdictional cases. Choice of law rules that underemphasize the interests of the parties, and rely instead on the regulatory concerns of states that are affected by the transaction, may place too many obstacles in the way of persons who should be left to arrange their transaction in the way they think best. At the same time, choice of law rules that give too much weight to the parties' wishes may interfere unduly with a state's ability to regulate a transtaction with which it has a legitimate concern. In this respect, balance is more difficult to achieve in contracts than it is elsewhere.

SITUATED IN THE PEACE PALACE IN THE HAGUE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) REMAINS LITTLE KNOWN, IN ITS 50 YEARS, ONLY AN AVERAGE OF ABOUT TWO CASES HAVE BEEN HEARD ANNUALLY BY THE COURT. MANY OF THESE PROCEEDINGS HAVE CONCERNED MINOR ISSUES, SUCH AS BORDER PARCELS AND AIR INCIDENTS. SOME CASES HAVE ADDRESSED IMPORTANT INTERESTS OR ESSENTIAL LEGAL QUESTIONS. BUT RARELY HAVE DECISIVE JUDGEMENTS PUT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTO A NEW LIGHT. THE COURT FAITHFULLY REFLECTS A CHAOTIC AND HETEROGENEOUS INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. THIS HAS CRATED A KIND OF "SETTLEMENT JUSTICE" THAT DEALS MORE IN COMPROMISE THAN IN CONFORMITY WITH THE RULE OF LAW. IN 1986, THE COURT DID DECISIVELY CONDEMN THE U.S. FOR SPONSORING "CONTRA" ATTACKS ON NICARAGUA. BUT MORE FREQUENTLY, PROCEDURAL OR JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS HAVE IMPEDED THE COURT, PREVENTING IT FROM MAKING JUDGMENTS THAT WOULD MORE PRECISELY DEFINE THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPETING CLAIMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

This text gives a general overview of the Code of Private International Law (Act of 16 July 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 27th July 2004), which entered into force on 1st of October 2004. The text focuses primarily on the aspects of the Code which are useful for notaries, such the law of estate and the law of matrimonial property. The text also gives an overview of the general rules of the Code of Private International law, with specific attention to the innovations (such as the escape clause to be found in Article 19).