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This Article develops a framework for analyzing the relation between basic features of statutory and case law and the design and functioning of institutions that enforce this law. The basic premise is that law is inherently incomplete and that this has important implications for law enforcement. In particular, when law is incomplete, special emphasis needs to be placed on the allocation of lawmaking and law enforcement powers (LMLEP) to different institutions such as legislatures, courts, or regulators, in order to attain optimal levels of law enforcement. Using the development of the legal framework governing financial markets as an example to illustrate the conceptual framework, this Article examines how different legal systems have responded to the problem of incomplete law by reallocating lawmaking and law enforcement powers from courts to regulators. Most examples are drawn from the U.K., which has spearheaded financial market development since the mid-19th century. A comparative analysis of the U.S. and German experiences is also presented. This Article regards a law as complete if a law enacted today unambiguously stipulates for all future contingencies; otherwise a law is incomplete. A law may be incomplete if it attempts to specify comprehensively actions that shall be covered but fails to include some which could result in similar harmful outcome. Alternatively, law may be incomplete because it uses open-ended, vague wording, as a result of which the boundaries of the law are not clearly delineated. Incomplete law may be a function of bad drafting, but it is not limited to that. While failure to include all relevant issues that are known at the time a law is drafted or a court verdict is rendered may be the result of oversight, there are a number of other causes for incomplete law, including environmental factors and deliberate design.

"British judges increasingly now pay attention to foreign case law when deciding domestic cases, and are required to interpret and apply international law in domestic courts and administer an international code of human rights. Tom Bingham examines the consequences of this increasingly internationalist outlook of British courts, including cases which rely on a range of foreign cases, cases where an international convention or principle is interpreted and cases in which human rights cases are decided in reliance on principles established elsewhere"--

This study deals with the law of criminal complicity in both its commonlaw dimensions and as modified by legislation in England, in the Australianjurisdictions (i.e ., the Australian States and in the Commonwealth CrimesAct,19H), and in New Zealand.In the criminal law "complicity" denotes partnership in crime. As such,what might be called the doctrine of criminal complicity consists in thatcorpus of principle which governs the joint implication of each of two or morepersons in a given crime. A person my become particeps criminis in one oftwo ways,i.e., by physically perpetrating this crime or by instigating,encouraging the perpetrator to do this. The first offender is usually calleda principal in the crime , and the latter of them an accessory, or secondaryparty in its commission.For the reasons noted at the outset of Chapter One, the major stress inthis study is upon the statement and evaluation of the law relating tocriminal participation as an accessory. Nonetheless, it will of course befrequently necessary to consider the position of the principal in some detailin analysing the law of complicity.This analysis was motivated ay two ambitions, both of them traditional.The first of them was to state the law as it presently stands. This was feltto be justified, in particular, given that prior to this one (which waspublished in an earlier, and somewhat different form by the Law Book Co. Ltd.of Sydney, in July of last year), no monograph-length study had been undertakenof this topic in any of the common law jurisdictions.The seoond objective, one obviously dependent upon the fulfilment of thefirst, was to evaluate the effectiveness of this branch of the law and todetermine whether or not it is in need of legislative reform in each of thesubject jurisdictions, and if so, then in what terms. I have concluded, (1) that the law should continue to recognise a specifically derivative form of accessorial liability (derivative, in the sense that the person who instigates, encourages or assists the principal offender to commit a crime is made liable for this crime,rather than for an independent offence of an ancillary character); and (2) that the law of complicity - and in particular, that part of it dealing with accessorial liability - is susceptible to reform at a number of levels, in each of the subject jurisdictions. I have sought to take account of the law as it stood in the subject jurisdictions in the last months of 1980.

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction: Thinking about Citizenship and Law in an Era of Change -- 2 Exile on Main Street: Popular Discourse and Legal Manoeuvres around Citizenship -- 3 Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context -- 4 Multinational Citizenship: Practical Implications of a Theoretical Model -- 5 The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Demise of Social Citizenship? A Sociolegal Perspective -- 6 Dis-citizenship -- 7 Connecting Economy, Gender, and Citizenship -- Contributors -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y.