Suchergebnisse

The use of the Internet in everyday life has transformed the nature of service provision in Australia. Increasingly, web-based interaction is used to deliver information and perform transactional functions with citizens. It is within this context that the debate for using the Internet to facilitate political elections has emerged. Some observers of the electoral process in Australia have called for Internet voting to be adopted so as to improve the accessibility and efficiency of the voting process. Others have argued against online voting as it is a difficult system to implement in a safe, secure and transparent way. These arguments continue to be waged in policy arenas as electoral stakeholders attempt to balance demands for voter-centric services with the democratic principles that underpin the electoral system. Notably absent in the policy discussions on Internet voting has been the views of the Australian public. This is problematic to the electoral process as the public is also a stakeholder to the , and their satisfaction with elections is an important and necessary mechanism for producing government accountability and responsiveness. As such, this report examines the public's perception of Internet voting through the frames of convenience, trust and secrecy. Drawing information from the experience the Australian public has had with Internet voting and other evoting systems, and triangulating data from citizen experiences with comparable online transactional services, several conclusions can be made about the support that exists for online voting, and the likelihood of the public use an Internet-based electoral system. A Technology Acceptance Model was drawn upon to assess the extent to which the public perceives Internet voting as convenient. It was found that the convenience of Internet voting polarises the Australian public. While over 50% believe that the ability to vote online would make the electoral process easier, a sizeable proportion of the population (28%) think that using the Internet to facilitate elections would make voting more difficult. Through examining contextual factors that influence the decisions and actions of voters in the electoral process, the report reasons that older Australians (those aged over 65) would be the least likely to perceive Internet voting as convenient, and therefore use the service. Meanwhile, persons under 45 would be more willing to use the technology. In particular, citizens aged 24-35 perceive Internet based services, like online voting, as most easy to use. Public trust of an Internet-based electoral system was adjudicated on two fronts. Firstly, whether the public trusted the reliability of the Internet to deliver services. And secondly, whether they trust the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) to provide an online voting system. The report found that Australian citizens typically perceive online transactional services as reliable, even in the face of known technical complications. As well, the public has a high degree of confidence in the AEC to deliver fair and reliable electoral services. Based on these two pieces of knowledge, it is likely that the Australian public would trust, and therefore use an Internet voting system that was administered by the AEC. The report also considered the public's value of secrecy in the voting process and if Australians believe it is the job of public administrators to manage the right to secrecy when casting a ballot. It was found that a strong democratic ethic exists in Australian society, and that citizens are in favour of maintaining the principle of a secret ballot. However, many Australians do not believe electoral management bodies need to administer this standard, and are increasingly turning to alternative forms of voting, such as postal voting, which places the onus of ensuring secrecy on the voter. As such, it is likely that a number of Australians would positively receive an Internet voting system that provides a convenient alternative to paper-based voting, and allows citizens to take responsibility for the secrecy of their own vote. The generally positive perceptions citizens hold in the areas of convenience, trust and secrecy, suggest that a significant proportion of public would be likely to use an Internet voting system at federal elections. With this conclusion in mind, and with knowledge of the AEC's role to provide elector-centric services, the report recommends that further research be conducted which directly consults the public on the subject of Internet voting, and that a trial process of Internet voting should be undertaken that gradually increases the dimensions of the voters and the stakes of the votes for the public.

New data by the Electoral Commission on party funding shows, among other things, that Labour raised a record-breaking £16m in a year through membership fees alone, while the Conservatives received more money from bequests than from living members. Sam Power explains what these figures tell us about the state of play in UK party politics, and how they compare with previous years.

This research note reconsiders evidence on "in-kind" donations presented to the hearings on party funding conducted by the Committee on Standards in Public Life The donation reports of the Electoral Commission, established by the Elections, Parties & Referendums Act (2000), suggest that the scale of trade unions' in kind donations to Labour general election campaigns was greatly overstated in the hearings. Adapted from the source document.

While coverage of events in Cote d'Ivoire seems to have gone quiet, there still exists a dangerous power struggle occurring in the country since the November 2010 election results. The disputed outcome is already having a regional impact as over 300 Ivorians have been killed and another twenty thousand have fled into neighboring countries to escape the violence. There has been a political standoff since the Independent Electoral Commission gave opposition leader Alassane Ouattara victory with 54.1 percent against 44.9 percent for the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo. Gbagbo supporters encouraged his Constitutional Council to annul votes from seven northern departments and declare him the winner. Outtara has also announced he is president and set up rival governments. Adapted from the source document.

The General Elections Commission (KPU) is a state institution that conducts general elections in Indonesia, which includes general election of members of DPR / DPD / DPRD, presidential election of vice president, and general election of Regional Head and Deputy Regional Head. In increasing this participation, it is necessary to encourage the various parties to increase the political participation of the community in the implementation of the General Elections either from the Regional Government, Self or KPU as the Institution that performs the task of conducting the General Elections. This type of research is qualitative with descriptive approach. The sample in this research is the Chairman of KPU and KPU members 1 person, 2 persons pawaslu 2, village apparatus, people and society who have been included in the permanent voter list (DPT) 40 people. In this research, the researcher uses data collecting technique such as: Questionnaire, Interview, and Documentation. The results of this research, According to data sources from the Election Commission of Agam Regency, the number of permanent voters in Agam 2015 Election is 48,325 people. That the number of legislative elections the participation rate of the public as much as 67.24%. Furthermore, the role of the General Elections Commission in increasing the political participation of the people in Agam Regency only put banners on the highway, the results of which found that the implementation of the election must be far from Money politics. In line with the findings discussed above, The Election Commission in Agam Regency has performed its duty as the organizer of the General Election, especially in the Regional Head Election of 2015. This can be seen from the Regional Head Election of 2015 has resulted in one pair of Regional Head and Deputy Head of Region. Problems or obstacles encountered in the implementation of the implementation of elections is a matter of insufficient resources apparatus and budget so that in the implementation of the implementation of elections itself can not be implemented optimally. In the election commission which must be done to overcome the problem of the general election to be completed as soon as possible in a policy to optimize all problems that arise in the field of elections to the electoral commission. The problem of the campaign does not stop at that point alone, the candidates who have spent a lot of money in meeting the needs of their campaigns sociologically assume it is their capital occupied the seat of office which is analogous to the venture capital. As a milestone for the party of democracy party, KPU can use its authority to make regulation (KPU regulation) about the limit of number of candidate's fund to conduct campaign. In the law it is regulated that the financial aspect of the candidate is audited by a public accountant but the way tends to be easily by using funding out of the candidate's fund. This can be seen in ICW's research on the time-making of technical rules related to campaign funds that are very late, In addition to experiencing delays in terms of preparation time, the substance of the arrangements also seem normative. Some of the additions included in this support rule even seem to be absurd and unworkable. Existing rules are deemed not to support the achievement of transparency and accountability of campaign fund.Keywords: Election, Money Politics, KPU

Można postawić tezę, że wybory z 4 czerwca 1989 r. miały dla przyszłości Polski znaczenie zasadnicze. Porozumienie zawarte przy Okrągłym Stole umożliwiało opozycji demokratycznej jedynie obecność w parlamencie i tym samym kontrolę aparatu władzy. Miało też przerzucić na opozycję część odpowiedzialności za państwo. Wynik wyborów spowodował, że obóz komunistyczny musiał władzę oddać w ręce dotychczasowej opozycji. W artykule przedstawiono wysiłki przedstawicieli Komitetu Obywatelskiego w Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej zmierzające do zabezpieczenia rzetelności wyborów. Jest to jednocześnie obraz powstawania w Polsce prawa wyborczego charakteryzującego demokratyczne państwo oraz tworzenia się kultury prawnej społeczeństwa. ; It might be argued that the election of 4 June 1989 was of essential importance for the future of Poland. The agreement reached at the 'Round Table' merely provided for the presence of democratic opposition in Parliament, allowing it to exercise some control of the apparatus of power. The intention of that concession was to pass onto the opposition a share of responsibility for the state. However, as a result of the election that followed, the ruling communists had to actually hand down power to their opponents. This paper describes the efforts that the Citizens' Committee in the State Election Commission made to protect the integrity of the election. It also describes the process of electoral law formation in Poland, as well as the development of the legal culture of society.

The entire electoral process commanded a high level of public confidence. The campaign took place in an open and peaceful environment with no restrictions on freedoms of association or expression. However, the lack of comprehensive and effective campaign finance regulations raised certain concerns among many OSCE/ODIHR EAM interlocutors about transparency, particularly for non-parliamentary parties. (…) Only 15 per cent of all candidates were women and there are no legal requirements to promote their participation. There were no women represented on the Electoral Commission. (ODIHR/Pll)

Виборча галузь влади вже є складовою поділу влади в сучасній державі, і це важлива гарантія верховенства права і умова демократичного функціонування державної влади. Виборча влада стає невід'ємним компонентом механізму поділу влади і системи «стримувань і противаг». Виділення виборчої галузі влади в окрему галузь дозволить розглядати систему державної влади в контексті ефективного її здійснення насамперед Центральною виборчою комісією. Центральна виборча комісія як інститут виборчої галузі влади в Украї ні є постійно діючим, колегіальним, незалежним органом, який діє на підставі Конституції Украї ни, законів Украї ни і наділений повноваженнями щодо організації та підготовки проведення виборів до органів державної влади, всеукраїнських та місцевих референдумів, і, щонайголовніше, здійснює контроль за діяль ністю та консультативно-методичне забезпечення виборчих комісій, які створюються для організації підготовки та проведення місцевих виборів та місцевих референдумів, всі ці ознаки дозволяють розглядати Центральну виборчу комісію як інститут виборчої галузі влади в Украї ні. ; Избирательная ветвь власти уже является составляющей разделения властей в современном государстве, и это важная гарантия верховенства права и условие демократического функционирования государственной власти. Избирательная власть становится неотъемлемым компонентом механизма разделения властей и системы «сдержек и противовесов». Выделение избирательной ветви власти в отдельную ветвь позволит рассматривать систему государственной власти в контексте эффективного ее осуществления, прежде всего, Центральной избирательной комиссией. Центральная избирательная комиссия как институт избирательной ветви власти в Украине является постоянно действующим, коллегиальным, независимым органом, который действует на основании Конституции Украины, законов Украины и наделенный полномочиями в отношении организации и подготовки проведения выборов в органы государственной власти, всеукраинских и местных референдумов, и что самое главное осуществляет контроль за деятельностью и консультативно-методическое обеспечение избирательных комиссий, которые создаются для организации и подготовки и проведения местных выборов и местных референдумов, все эти признаки позволяют рассматривать Центральную избирательную комиссию как институт избирательной ветви власти в Украине. ; The electoral branch is already part of the separation of powers in a modern state, an important guarantee of the rule of law and a condition for the democratic functioning of state authority. Electoral branch becomes an inherent component of the separation of powers and system of checks and balances. The allocation of the electoral branch into a separate branch will make it possible to consider the system of state power in the context of its eff ective implementation, fi rst of all, by the Central Election Commission. The Central Election Commission as an institution of the electoral branch in Ukraine is a permanent, collegial, independent body which operate on the basis of the Constitution of Ukraine and Ukrainian Acts. Moreover, Central Election Commission has the authority to organize and prepare elections to public authority, national and local referendums and most importantly it supervises and advises the election commissions that are being set up to organize, prepare and conduct local elections and referendums. All these characteristics make it possible to consider the Central Election Commission as the institution of the electoral branch in Ukraine.The further development of the Ukrainian state determined the signifi cant interest of research and scientifi c developments on the problem of separation of powers. The purpose of the article is to support the conceptual foundations of the Central Election Commission as an institution of the electoral branch of power in Ukraine.Electoral power is part of the institutional framework of the state, it is closely linked to the constitutional, party and political system, and the result of its action will be diff erent in political - legal and party realities. Electoral power must be formed taking into account national and political features.Thus, on the basis of the foregoing, it can be said that the activities of the electoral bodies, referendum bodies are national in nature. Consequently, this feature is also transferred to the elective branch of government.

Виборча галузь влади вже є складовою поділу влади в сучасній державі, і це важлива гарантія верховенства права і умова демократичного функціонування державної влади. Виборча влада стає невід'ємним компонентом механізму поділу влади і системи «стримувань і противаг». Виділення виборчої галузі влади в окрему галузь дозволить розглядати систему державної влади в контексті ефективного її здійснення насамперед Центральною виборчою комісією. Центральна виборча комісія як інститут виборчої галузі влади в Украї ні є постійно діючим, колегіальним, незалежним органом, який діє на підставі Конституції Украї ни, законів Украї ни і наділений повноваженнями щодо організації та підготовки проведення виборів до органів державної влади, всеукраїнських та місцевих референдумів, і, щонайголовніше, здійснює контроль за діяль ністю та консультативно-методичне забезпечення виборчих комісій, які створюються для організації підготовки та проведення місцевих виборів та місцевих референдумів, всі ці ознаки дозволяють розглядати Центральну виборчу комісію як інститут виборчої галузі влади в Украї ні. ; Избирательная ветвь власти уже является составляющей разделения властей в современном государстве, и это важная гарантия верховенства права и условие демократического функционирования государственной власти. Избирательная власть становится неотъемлемым компонентом механизма разделения властей и системы «сдержек и противовесов». Выделение избирательной ветви власти в отдельную ветвь позволит рассматривать систему государственной власти в контексте эффективного ее осуществления, прежде всего, Центральной избирательной комиссией. Центральная избирательная комиссия как институт избирательной ветви власти в Украине является постоянно действующим, коллегиальным, независимым органом, который действует на основании Конституции Украины, законов Украины и наделенный полномочиями в отношении организации и подготовки проведения выборов в органы государственной власти, всеукраинских и местных референдумов, и что самое главное осуществляет контроль за деятельностью и консультативно-методическое обеспечение избирательных комиссий, которые создаются для организации и подготовки и проведения местных выборов и местных референдумов, все эти признаки позволяют рассматривать Центральную избирательную комиссию как институт избирательной ветви власти в Украине. ; The electoral branch is already part of the separation of powers in a modern state, an important guarantee of the rule of law and a condition for the democratic functioning of state authority. Electoral branch becomes an inherent component of the separation of powers and system of checks and balances. The allocation of the electoral branch into a separate branch will make it possible to consider the system of state power in the context of its eff ective implementation, fi rst of all, by the Central Election Commission. The Central Election Commission as an institution of the electoral branch in Ukraine is a permanent, collegial, independent body which operate on the basis of the Constitution of Ukraine and Ukrainian Acts. Moreover, Central Election Commission has the authority to organize and prepare elections to public authority, national and local referendums and most importantly it supervises and advises the election commissions that are being set up to organize, prepare and conduct local elections and referendums. All these characteristics make it possible to consider the Central Election Commission as the institution of the electoral branch in Ukraine.The further development of the Ukrainian state determined the signifi cant interest of research and scientifi c developments on the problem of separation of powers. The purpose of the article is to support the conceptual foundations of the Central Election Commission as an institution of the electoral branch of power in Ukraine.Electoral power is part of the institutional framework of the state, it is closely linked to the constitutional, party and political system, and the result of its action will be diff erent in political - legal and party realities. Electoral power must be formed taking into account national and political features.Thus, on the basis of the foregoing, it can be said that the activities of the electoral bodies, referendum bodies are national in nature. Consequently, this feature is also transferred to the elective branch of government.

This study essentially considered the relevance of governance networks in election administration in Nigerian. It was acknowledged in the study that governance involves a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule, or the new method by which society is governed. Governance networks were seen in the study as instruments of public policy-making, in which policy-processes take place. Meta-governance was accepted to be the governance of governance, a tool for steering processes in self-regulating governance networks; and also accepted to be about both facilitating and constraining policy processes. It was upheld in the study that the most critical element of network governance is coordination. But in meta-governance, the most critical requirement goes beyond coordination. In this dimension, in election administration in Nigeria for instance, the meta-governor must be a repository of national interest. And indeed, Nigeria's election administration requires a mainstream interest of governance networks. The consummation of the interests of the governance networks would be the dilution of the influence of political leadership on the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). A meta-governing electoral commission is not in any way an absurdity under Nigeria's democratic evolution. However, this meta-governing electoral administrator will not be a creation of a partisan political leadership but a natural fruition of the actions of the governance networks. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n9p177

The role of election management bodies (EMBs) in consolidation of democracy, peace and stability in Africa cannot be overemphasised. Kenya's electoral bodies have struggled to assert their autonomy from the executive, a prerequisite for credible elections, since the advent of multiparty politics in 1991. The violently disputed presidential elections in 2007 were partly triggered by a partisan and politicised electoral body. The Chairman of the defunct Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) controversially declared the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki, winner, igniting unprecedented ethnic violence. In the midst of the crisis, he explosively confessed that he did not know who won the elections. The 2013 elections were meant to restore Kenyans' confidence in elections. However, Raila Odinga, the controversial presidential loser in 2007, once again accused the electoral body, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), of electoral fraud in favour of Uhuru Kenyatta. Consequently, the opposition called for the disbandment of the IEBC. Are electoral bodies per se the cause of perennial disputed elections in Kenya?