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Better legal institutions favor economic development, but only in States withsufficiently constrained executive power. We document this novel pattern acrossdeveloping countries, and build a simple model that illustrates how power, and theinstitutions that constrain or complement it, may affect development. We show that thereis a tradeoff between the two facets of power—enforcement and expropriation. As aruler's power grows, his temptation not to enforce diminishes while the temptation toexpropriate grows. As a consequence, private enforcement optimally evolves into Stateenforcement, and legal institutions, which relax the ruler's incentive constraint onenforcement, lose economic importance vis-à-vis political institutions, which limit theexecutive's ability to expropriate. Our results are consistent with the observed crosscountrypatterns, as well as with historical evidence on the transition from the "LawMerchant" private enforcement system to the State. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

In this volume, we examine how the institutional environment affects entrepreneurial organizations, and vice-versa. This includes not only how the institutional environment constrains both founding processes and the type of organizations founded, but also how institutional dynamics construct new entrepreneurial opportunities, empower and facilitate action, and how entrepreneurs manipulate the institutional environment to serve their own ends. This institutional approach to entrepreneurship shifts attention away from the personal traits and backgrounds of individual entrepreneurs, and towards how institutions shape entrepreneurial opportunities and actions; how entrepreneurs navigate their cognitive, normative, and regulatory environments; and how actors modify and build institutions to support new types of organizations.

Title varies. ; Report year irregular. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Subagency varies. Vols. for 1975-1978 Penal Subcommittee. ; Merged with: Report of the Subcommittee on Charitable Institutions ., and Report of the Educational Committee ., to become Report.

Contents -- About the Authors -- Preface -- Introduction - Margaret Levi, James Johnson, Jack Knight, and Susan Stokes -- Part I: Organization of Interests -- Chapter 1. Mobilizing Institutions and Class Bias in U.S. Electoral Politics, 1964 to 2004 - Jan E. Leighley and Jonathan Nagler -- Chapter 2. Barriers to Participation for Whom? Regulations on Voting and Uncompetitive Elections - Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan -- Chapter 3. Mobilizing Political Engagement and Participation in Diverse Societies: The Impact of Institutional Arrangements - Susan A. Banducci and Jeffrey A. Karp

Internationale Institutionen haben Stabilität und Beharrungsvermögen. Sie erfüllen Funktionen und suchen aus ihrer Eigendynamik, sich an veränderte Rahmenbedingungen anzupassen. Das gilt auch für die NATO nach dem Ende der bipolaren Blockkonfrontation. Sie erfüllt noch Funktionen im Interesse ihrer Mitglieder und wird trotz Sinnkrise sowie Defiziten in ihrer Problemlösungsfähigkeit noch lange als sicherheitspolitischer Akteur die internationalen Beziehungen prägen. Entscheidend ist der Platz, den sie einnehmen will.

Daß es in der Politik - jedenfalls auch - auf Personen ankommt, ist offensichtlich. Ein Blick in die Geschichte und die Erinnerung an Namen wie Bismarck und Adenauer oder Hitler und Stalin macht dies, im Positiven wie im Negativen, für jedermann deutlich. Auch in aktuellen dem okratischen Wahlkämpfen sind es oft Personen, die den Kampf um Mehrheiten entscheiden. Bei den letzten Parlamentswahlen in der Bundesrepublik stellten die Parteien ihre Spitzenkandidaten derart heraus, daß geradezu der Eindruck von Personalplebisziten statt von Parteienwahlen entstand. .