Suchergebnisse

This article reviews the efforts of the Reagan Administration to mediate an agreement between Israel and Lebanon on the Israeli withdrawal, following its 1982 invasion of its northern neighbor. The USA, a superpower, was eventually successful in bridging the differences between the two disputants, whose contradicting interests are presented. Following procedural difficulties, the substantive points of contention were the nature of the security arrangements for Israel in southern Lebanon and the level of normalization between the two countries. The level of the American intervention in the talks gradually was raised to change the positions of the two sides and an agreement was reached only after the US Secretary of State engaged in shuttle diplomacy. A superpower is well suited for mediation. Yet, this article points out the limits on superpower leverage in pursuing its interests. The Israeli—Lebanese agreement was supposed to bring about a stronger central pro-Western Lebanese government. US mistakes, misperceptions and the domestic weakness of Lebanon were the reasons for the failure of this endeavor.

Despite its ubiquity and importance as a means of managing international conflict, mediation has only recently begun to be studied in a systematic manner. This article utilizes an original dataset of international disputes and mediation efforts occurring in the 1945-89 period to assess the character of international mediation and to examine the contextual and process variables which affect mediation outcomes. These variables are classed under four categories: (1) the nature of the disputing parties, (2) the nature of the dispute itself, (3) the identity and characteristics of the mediator, and (4) the strategies and tactics which the mediator employs. In this study, a preliminary analysis is undertaken to determine the nature and degree to which the variables in each of these categories affect mediation outcomes. The results indicate that dispute intensity, mediator strategies and dispute issues exert the greatest influence on the effectiveness of international mediation. A complex of other factors, including the timing of entry into mediation, the power disparity between the disputants and the nature of the disputants' former relations also demonstrate an effect, though somewhat weaker, on mediation outcomes. The article presents conclusions on the effectiveness of international mediation and points the way for more much-needed empirical work in this area.

This article provides a conceptual rationale for the potential complementarity of international mediation and third party consultation or problem-solving within the context of a contingency model. Social conflict is viewed as a dynamic process involving a mix of objective and subjective factors which changes over time, thus creating opportunities for different third party interventions. In the model, the various methods of intervention (conciliation, pure mediation, consultation, power mediation, arbitration and peacekeeping) are matched to one of four stages of conflict escalation where they are deemed to have the most influence on de-escalation. In addition, third party interventions are sequenced within the model to show how combining different methods might work toward the eventual resolution of the conflict. Within this context, mediation and consultation are seen as having two main points of complementarity. In the first instance, consultation which improves the relationship between the parties can serve a useful prenegotiation function. The second point occurs at a higher stage of escalation wherein power mediation, which is deemed useful to control hostility and gain settlement on some substantive issues, is followed by consultation to analyse and de-escalate the conflict to a less intense level. The potential of the contingency model is illustrated through reference to the Cyprus conflict and the numerous third party interventions that have attempted to address it. The analysis indicates that the model helps provide some possible reasons for the success and failure of different interventions over a thirty-five year period. The article concludes that the matching and sequencing of different third party interventions may be necessary for positive influence, especially in highly escalated and protracted conflict.

The distinction is made between mediating services provided to ameliorate international conflicts and who provides the services. The services may be provided by a person, group, or organization playing the role of a mediator, or by a quasi-mediator, a social entity not so designated, who may even be a member of one of the adversaries. The paper examines the kind of contribution social units providing mediating services, but playing different roles, can and do make towards de-escalating international conflicts. The implications of this distinction are examined for various stages of conflict de-escalation: preparing for negotiations, starting them, conducting them, reaching mutual accommodative agreements and sustaining them. Evidence is drawn from cases of mediation conducted officially and non-officially, especially in the US-Soviet and Arab-Israeli conflicts. Certain kinds of mediating actions can be especially well provided by one kind of provider compared to another and the effectiveness of different actions also varies with the stage of the conflict in which the mediating service is conducted.