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L'article a pour objectif de rappeler toutes les mesures administratives, de nature informative ou juridique, qui existent dans le champ réglementaire du Code de l'Environnement, puis de présenter les ZNIEFF, enfin de dresser la liste exhaustive de tous les milieux naturels qui bénéficient d'un statut de protection. L'accent est plus particulièrement mis sur les espaces forestiers, mais sont également mentionnés les sites littoraux ou périurbains. Enfin, quelques éléments de présentation et de réflexion sont donnés pour faire valoir, d'une part, que la connaissance scientifique est encore bien loin d'avoir étudié l'ensemble de la richesse biologique de la forêt tropicale humide et, d'autre part, que les dispositions de protection de la nature font intégralement partie de l'aménagement du territoire et du développement à réaliser en Guyane.

Effective migration partnerships with third countries are a declared goal of the European Union. But views diverge on what good migration cooperation looks like. Using carrots and sticks, also known as conditionality, is a controversial strategy to reach the EU's migration goals. Politicians and experts either frame it as necessary and legitimate, or as post-colonial and counterproductive. Whether one supports conditionality or not, positive and negative incentives have shaped the different types of migration agreements the EU and its Member States have struck in the last decade. Some are formal agreements binding under international law, but most are soft law or handshake deals. They may cover just one specific issue within migration policy, or tie migration to other policy areas. Some are public, others confidential. All these agreements reflect the interests and the leverage which the EU, Member States, and partner countries bring to the table. The three most discussed levers the EU uses to nudge partner countries toward joint migration management are visas, development aid, and trade - the holy trinity of migration conditionality. But the exclusive focus on these three levers is artificial. Europe also uses other levers, such as police or military cooperation and training, diplomatic attention and high level visits, legal migration opportunities, and others. When these levers are used, they generate three kinds of effects: the conclusion of an agreement, common document, or statement (paper), procedural or technical changes (process), and migratory movements (people). But they also bring unintended side effects, such as backlash from the citizens of third countries, or the phenomenon of reverse conditionality, when a third country reacts to threats by reducing border patrols or by supporting irregular onward migration. Lever use of one EU country can also worsen the migration relationship of its EU neighbors with that third country. Despite these high stakes, Europe uses conditionality remarkably inconsistently. Its strategy to create coordination mechanisms to make Member States' approaches more coherent is hobbled by entrenched realities: The cost of coordination is often disproportionate to its benefits, and turf demarcation hinders cooperation. Thus, the chase for coherent conditionality usage in the EU is at best an uphill battle and at worst a delusion. This report puts forward five recommendations to improve Europe's migration conditionality use and debate in the future. It draws on case studies that trace the EU's use of incentives and threats toward Bangladesh, The Gambia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Nigeria, and distills lessons from them. 1. Stop using conditionality as a rhetorical tool and start using it as a practical tool that has legitimate yet limited use. Politicians and experts alike should work to make the debate on conditionality less ideological and more pragmatic. Concretely, opponents of conditionality should acknowledge that applying carrots and sticks can indeed be effective and legitimate, while proponents of conditionality should acknowledge that it only works in specific cases, and that large-scale replicability of successful cases is unlikely. Rejecting or embracing conditionality categorically, as happens so often, prevents a meaningful and nuanced debate on incentives in migration cooperation. 2. If you use conditionality, use it smartly. Policymakers should go through a checklist to use conditionality more effectively and credibly in the future. They should avoid path dependency and use of a lever just because it is there or has worked elsewhere, and instead find the levers a country is most receptive to. They should also adapt the timing and sequencing of their demands to the electoral calendar of the country they are engaging: the case studies show that elections and governmental changes are central determinants of countries' behaviors, perhaps more so than the EU's lever use itself. European policy-makers should also be more consistent in their demands. They should use threats more credibly, and negative levers consciously, not accidentally - as has happened in the past. 3. Make the visa lever fairer and more daunting. The EU should try and make its visa lever fairer by adapting the indicators that measure readmission cooperation, and by monitoring the effects of visa restrictions more systematically. To date, restrictions under Article 25a are not used on the countries that cooperate the least, but on countries that depend most on the EU and do not have a strong veto player friend among Member States. At the same time, the EU should try and make its visa restrictions more daunting. The EU could consider increasing wait times by introducing delays longer than the maximum 45 days, and it could critically review the current visa fee increase structure. Alternatively, Member States should improve the speed and efficiency of their visa delivery to increase the impact of restrictions. The current visa process is so cumbersome that the added hassle brought by visa restrictions has little impact on applicants. A better baseline would make visa restrictions more potent. 4. Let realism reign about development, trade, and legal pathways levers. Policy-makers should come to a more realistic assessment of the potential of the development, trade, and legal pathways levers, as expectations of these levers' powers are overblown. Less for less aid conditionality is hotly debated in theory, but rare and easy to buffer in practice. The trade lever formalization is uncertain, and even if it is formalized, it is unlikely that it will be used. Legal pathways are now in the spotlight, but ways to use them as a positive incentive have either been discarded (resettlement) or are underdeveloped (skill-based schemes). 5. Create alternatives to decrease dependency on conditionality. Europe should also go beyond conditionality and work to solve migration challenges with other or fewer external partners. European countries could piggyback on other countries' established relations with third countries on readmissions, which would allow them to use a path already carved instead of having to carve new paths from scratch. Also, European countries could decrease the urgency to strike migration agreements through internal improvements, such as fixing dysfunctions in their national systems of migration, return, and visa processing, and decreasing their population of irregular migrants through alternative efforts like regularizations. They can also change their strategies at home to improve EU coordination, for instance when they sidestep the go-to solution of yet another coordination format, and instead bring in third-party moderators to create incentives for positive coordination. Migration conditionality, like it or not, is here to stay. The EU will keep expanding its conditionality toolbox. But if it wants this toolbox to be more effective, coherent, and credible, it needs to use it more smartly and selectively than in the past. The use of carrots and sticks will continue. But it will hopefully be driven by more facts and fewer delusions.

Introduction -- Part I. Historical Perspectives -- Vertebrates of Upper Mesopotamia: Present Evidence and Archaeological Data -- Fishing Gears and Methods: A Comparison of Ancient Mesopotamia and Other Ancient Worlds -- Ichthyological Characteristics Available in the Fish Images Existed in the Art of the Ancient Mesopotamia -- The Effectiveness of Ancient Mesopotamian Medical Practices: The Example of šūšu-Licorice -- Part II. The Abiotic Aspects of the Tigris–Euphrates River System -- Management of Water Resources Using Storage Reservoirs -- Estimation of Irrigated Agricultural Area and Water Consumption in Iraq -- The Nature of Tigris–Euphrates Rivers Flow: Current Status and Future Prospective -- Streamflow Alteration Impacts with Particular Reference to the Lower Zab River, Tributary of the Tigris River -- Ecohydrology in Iraq: Challenges and its Future Pathways -- Oil Pollution in the Shatt Al-Arab River and its Estuary 1980–2018 -- Pesticides in the Waters, Sediments, and Biota of the Shatt Al-Arab River for the Period 1980–2017 -- Surface Water Salinity of the Euphrates, Tigris, and Shatt al-Arab Rivers -- Renewable Energy for Water–Energy Nexus in Euphrates and Tigris River Basin: A Literature Review -- Impacts of Dams on Aquatic Biodiversity, Fisheries, Fishes and Their Environment: Problems that Could Be Present in Iraq with Recommendations -- Water, Politics and Dams in the Mesopotamia Basin of the Northern Middle East: How Turkey Instrumentalises the South-Eastern Anatolia Project for Political, Military and Strategic Interests -- Dams and their Impacts on Fishes in Iran -- Part III. The Biotic Aspects of the Tigris–Euphrates River System -- Preliminary Review of the Aquatic Biodiversity in Al-Kahla River, Missan Province, Iraq -- Freshwater Fish Biodiversity in Iraq: Importance, Threats, Status, and Conservation Challenges -- Effect of Climate Changes on the Freshwater Biodiversity in the Mesopotamian Plain: Recommendations for Avoidance and Plans for the Future -- River Corridors as a Refuge for Freshwater Biodiversity: Basic Information and Recommendations to the Policymakers for Possible Implications in Iraq -- Biodiversity of Fungi in Aquatic Environment of Iraq -- Potability of Drinking Water in Basra-Iraq -- Algal Studies in Iraqi Inland Waters. A Review -- The Distribution of Epilitic Diatoms in the Turkish Part of the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin -- Plant Biodiversity in Shatt Al-Arab Estuary and Ecological Variations -- Medicinal Plants of Shatt al-Arab River and Adjacent Area -- The Role of Plants as a Canopy in the Inland Waters: Basic Information for Application in Iraq -- The Zooplankton Fauna of the Turkish Part of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin -- Kinds and Distribution of Icthyoplankton in Shatt Al-Arab River -- Rotifer Diversity in Iranian Waters: A Review -- Biodiversity of the Freshwater Amphipods in Iran -- The Freshwater Molluscs of the Mesopotamian Plain -- Freshwater Annelida of Iraq -- A Critical Checklist of the Inland Fishes Native to the Euphrates and Tigris Drainages -- Fish Fauna of Shatt al-Arab River, Basrah, Iraq: A More than Quarter a Century of Changes -- The Common Carp, Cyprinus carpio: Effect on the Environment and the Indigenous Fish Species in Iraq -- The Good and the Bad in Releasing the Grass Carp Ctenopharyngodon idella in the Freshwater System: Recommendations for the Policymakers in Iraq -- The Avifauna of Tigris and Euphrates River Basin -- The Feasible Approaches to Assist Migratory Birds Visiting the Southern Reaches of Mesopotamia -- A Proposal for Establishing Bird Observatory Centre in the South of Iraq -- The Potential Role of Waterbirds as a Vector in Dispersing Invertebrates and Plants in the South of Iraq -- The Wild Mammals of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers Basin -- The Amphibians and Reptiles of Euphrates and Tigris Basin -- A Preliminary Pictorial Guide to the Herpetofauna of Tigris and Euphrates River Basin -- Policy Guidance for Sustainable Aquaculture in the Inland Waters of Iraq -- How Possible to Use the Desert Area in Iraq for Aquaculture Industry: Basic Facts and Recommondations -- Aquaculture Industry in Iraq: Past, Present, and Future Perspectives -- Towards an Improved Tilapia Farming in Iraq: Recommendations for Future Application -- Information and Recommendations of Aquaculture Stress and its Source in Hatcheries: The Iraqi Aquaculture Industry Investors -- Exotic and Invasive Freshwater Fishes in the Tigris-Euphrates River System -- Part IV. Water Resources -- The Ecology and Modelling of the Freshwater Ecosystems in Iran -- Enhancing Rural Women's Participation in Fisheries in Iraq -- The Impact of Destructive Fishing Gear on the Fish Biodiversity in the Inland Waters of Iraq -- Evaluating Variations in Fisheries by Means of Fishers' Information: Suggested Methodology to Improve Small-Scale Fisheries in Rivers in Iraq -- A Possibility to Apply a Traditional Fisheries Enforcement Programme in the Inland Waters of Iraq -- Market-Resource Relations and Fish Seller Livelihood as Seen in Inland Waters of Iraq -- The Potential Impact of Deformities in Fishes upon Aquatic Production: Case of Iraq -- The Impact of some Social Taboos on Fisheries in Iraq -- Inland Water Fishes and Fisheries in Iran -- The Possibility of Introducing an Inland Fisheries Education in Iraq -- The Marine and Diadromous Fisheries of Iraq -- Part V. Stress of the Environment of the Two Rivers -- Fish Deformities in the Freshwater Fishes of Iraq: A Short Review and a Study Case on the Indian Catfish Heteropneustes fossilis -- The Phenomenon of Fluctuating Asymmetry: As Fish Welfare Indicator Represented by Case Study from the Freshwater Fishes of Iraq -- The Studies on Sediments Pollution by Different Types of Metals in Turkey -- Macroplastic and Microplastic in the Freshwater Environment of Southern Iraq: Evidences Obtained from Freshwater Fish Species -- Heavy Metals in Freshwater Invertebrates of Iran: A Review on the Bioaccumulation and Effects -- Fish Parasites of Tigris and Euphrates River Systems -- The Parasites of Fishes of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers: Iraq and Turkey -- Ornamental Fishes: A Looming Danger for Inland Fish Diversity of Iraq -- Part VI. The Health of the Human Community Inhabiting Freshwater Zones -- Aquatic Snails as a Vector of Diseases to the Human in Iran -- Death by Drowning in Rivers in Iraq -- The Dangerous Catfish Species in the Freshwater System of Iraq: First Time Reports on Cases of Envenomation -- Fish Species of the Order Cypriniformes as a Source of Ichthyootoxin and Ichthyogallotoxin in Iraq: Cases Reports -- First Reports on Cases of Hallucinatory Fish Poisoning (Ichthyoallyeinotoxism) and Scombrotoxic Fish Poisoning in Iraq -- Part. VII. Conservation -- Freshwater Management and Conservation in Iran: Past, Present, and Future -- The Need of Biodiversity Conservation Strategies in Iraq: The State of Protected Areas -- Benthic Macroinvertebrates of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in Turkey -- Freshwater Ecosystem Conservation in Iraq: Recommendations for Management -- Utilising Phenotypic Difference to Regulate Protection Value: A Scheme for Application of a Novel Approach to the Inland Water of Iraq -- Hatchery-Reared Fish Stocks Released into the Wild: A Conservation Problem as Seen in a Case Study from Iraq -- Part VIII. Social Perspectives -- Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full? An Appraisal of the Four Decades of Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) -- Part IX. Food Security -- How Possible to Build Rice–Fish Farming in Iraq in order to Support Food Security Plan: Positive and the Negative Aspects -- The Importance of Non-commercial and Small-Sized Fish Species: A Proposal for an Additional Revenue to Iraq -- Sociocultural Aspects Influence Food Consumption Habits in Iraq: Management of Food Security -- A Preliminary Investigation of Determinants of Food Security in Rural Areas of Basrah Province, Iraq.

With the European Parliament elections already in full swing in some of the European Union's 27 member states, the consensus among EU watchers is that the populist right is poised to make sweeping gains in the pan-European legislature. Some alarmed mainstream commenters warn of a "Trumpian moment" in Europe.It is true that parties broadly fitting in the populist right/national-conservative camp have been going from strength to strength in the EU. Today, they are either leading, are part of ruling coalitions, or offer crucial parliamentary backing in Italy, Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Croatia, and the Czech Republic, with the Netherlands soon to join the club following the electoral victory of Geert Wilders's party. If the populist right wins in Austria later this year, as the polls predict, and manages to form a government, then roughly one third of EU countries will be governed by right-wing populists. For a full picture, in France, the National Rally party is polling around 30% for the European Parliament, far ahead of the liberal President Emmanuel Macron's party, which is stuck at just 15%. And in Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is polling second to the center-right Christian-Democratic Union, ahead of all three ruling coalition parties — center-left social-democrats, Greens, and center-right liberals. In Poland, the Law and Order party, though no longer in government, is still a potent force. Since the European elections are, in effect, a sum of 27 national elections, it is entirely expectable that they will mirror these trends and see a further rise of the populist right. Yet hyperbolic comparisons with the Trumpian phenomenon obscure far more than they enlighten. Two reasons stand out.First, even the most optimistic (or alarming, according to one's perspective) projections do not predict that any of the existing populist right groups in the European Parliament will earn a plurality of the seats in the new assembly. There are currently two such groups: European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID). The polls predict that the more successful of them – ECR – could garner around 86 seats in a 720-member strong assembly (that is an increase from the current 66 seats). ID is expected to win 67 seats (up from the current 49), and that excludes the German AfD, which could bring another 20 but was recently expelled from the ID over its lead member's pro-Nazi comments. Still, both ECR and ID are very far from challenging the center-right European People's Party (EPP) which is widely expected to win the elections with 172 MEPs, as well as center-left Socialists&Democrats (S&D), which is slated to get around 137 seats.Second, the comparisons with Trump do not stand because there is no European equivalent of the Republican Party, and the right populist parties come in many shades and forms. The closest thing the EU has to the Republican party on the pan-European level is the EPP, itself a big tent that uneasily holds together centrist German and Benelux Christian-democrats, French Gaullists, Spanish post-Francoists, Nordic market liberals, and eastern European and Balkan ethnic nationalists. Since a Trump-style takeover of the EPP is impossible, for the populist right to fundamentally reshape European politics, it needs to establish a firm alliance with the EPP while forging its own internal cohesion. That is a tall order. While all parties on the populist right, and increasingly many within the EPP, share restrictive stances on immigration (particularly from Muslim countries), climate action skepticism, and social conservatism of varying degrees, there is a crucial divide on the war in Ukraine. All the EPP parties are solidly pro-Ukraine. So are the leading forces in the ECR — Italian Prime-Minister Giorgia Meloni and the Polish Law and Order. ID, by contrast, offers a more mixed picture: While the Italian Lega, Meloni's coalition partner, generally toes the line on Ukraine, other heavy hitters, such as the French Marine Le Pen, and, before its expulsion, the German AfD, have been seen as far more reluctant to back Kyiv. Add to that one of Europe's chief Ukraine skeptics, the Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban and his Fidesz party, currently without an affiliation in the European Parliament. Leaders like Orban and Le Pen consistently call for a consolidation of the populist right into a single powerful bloc and court the ECR's Meloni and the Poles to that end, but Ukraine remains a powerful deal-breaker. To find a way around it, however, it is the Ukraine skeptics who will more likely have to come around to adopt the mainstream EU line. The Dutch Wilders, whose party sits with Le Pen's ID in the European Parliament, used to be a staunch opponent of military aid to Ukraine, but as soon as he got a shot to form a government in the Netherlands, he shed his previous misgivings and pledged both support for Ukraine and increased defense spending to reach NATO's 2% of GDP target. Le Pen, in what one observer called the "process of Melonisation," is similarly working to overcome her pro-Kremlin image and now offers full-throated support for Ukraine. Orban, of course, remains something of an outlier, but despite punching above his weight, he represents a relatively small Central European country and is dependent on EU cash handouts. Herein lies another key difference with the "Trumpian moment": Whereas in the U.S. the rise of the populist right has led to an emergence of a strong pro-foreign policy restraint camp within the Republican party, the European populist right is more likely to follow the opposite path by accepting the mainstream orthodoxies on foreign policy as a ticket to acceptance and power.That may yet prove to be an Achilles heel for the populist right. While Europe has shown consistent solidarity with Ukraine and resilience in the sanctions war with Russia, there are signs of growing war fatigue. This hasn't translated into demands to abandon Ukraine and appease Russia, but rather an expectation of some sort of a negotiated settlement to the war. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations' EU-wide poll, 41% of Europeans hold the view that the EU should push Ukraine towards negotiating a peace deal with Russia, while 31% say the EU should support Ukraine in taking back the territories occupied by Russia.By failing to articulate the preferences of that 41%, the populist right is leaving the field wide open for competitors from its own camp, as well as forces on the far left. The latter, according to the polls, may not reach even 40 MEPs and won't win any votes in the European Parliament on an anti-war platform, but they could use their presence in the assembly strategically to channel the voice of those Europeans who do not feel represented by the current mainstream on questions of war and peace.

Israel's strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus earlier this week may shatter the month-long ceasefire between U.S. troops and Iran-aligned militias in Iraq and Syria.
While a combination of U.S. strikes and Iranian pressure has reined in the militias for the past two months , Israel may prematurely end the arrangement that kept American soldiers out of harm's way, all the while President Joe Biden has done precious little in practical terms to protect U.S. personnel in the long term by securing a lasting ceasefire in Gaza.
The temporary truce between the U.S. and the Iran-supported militias was never likely to be enduring. A complete end to the attacks would invariably require a ceasefire in Gaza, a reality that Biden administration officials recognize. Just last week, Biden's own Special Envoy to Yemen, Timothy Lenderking, publicly stated that a ceasefire in Gaza would halt Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
But even if the truce survives Israel's attack in Damascus, Biden can't count indefinitely on luck and should not gamble with the lives of American troops. Thus far, he has squandered the opportunity that the truce provided to secure a ceasefire. The Damascus strikes should be a wake-up call for the White House to get serious about pushing Israel to cease its bombardment of Gaza.
While attacks by Iran-aligned militias and the Houthis predate the Gaza conflict, the recent escalation and brazenness since last October are undeniable. According to the Pentagon, there were no recorded attacks by Iran-aligned militias in the third quarter of 2023, which concluded just one week before Hamas's assault on Israel. However, following the outbreak of the Gaza conflict, attacks resumed, with the Pentagon documenting at least 134 incidents targeting U.S. interests in Iraq and Syria in the final three months of 2023. (The only period in which there were no attacks against U.S. interests by the militias was during the brief ceasefire in November 2023.)
But attacks by the militias on U.S. troops have effectively ceased. That may now change, thanks to Israel.
Tehran sees the Israeli strike that killed the senior commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria and Lebanon as a significant escalation. The Iranians are taking a page out of Washington's playbook by holding the U.S. responsible for Israel's actions since Washington insists that Tehran is responsible for Houthi attacks by virtue of Iran arming and funding the Yemeni movement. This was signified by Tehran sending a message to Biden through Swiss intermediaries, which most likely contained a warning that Washington's failure to prevent Israel's actions could prematurely end the truce with the militias. Indeed, in secret talks held in Oman between senior U.S. and Iranian officials, the American demand for Tehran to rein in the militias and the Houthis was met with an Iranian counterdemand that Biden reins in Israel.
Hopefully, cooler heads will prevail in Tehran. Washington recognizes that Iran can badly afford an open war with Israel. Iran has already absorbed significant blows from Israel without retaliating, which is partly explained by Tehran's focus on the long game. But this posture is under intensified pressure from hardline elements inside the regime who argue that the failure to respond has undermined Iran's deterrence against Israel and Iran's credibility among Middle Eastern powers.
Biden's policy, however, cannot be premised on cooler heads prevailing in Iran. When it comes to protecting U.S. troops beyond a temporary truce — which requires a ceasefire in Gaza — Biden's conduct has been nothing short of a dereliction of duty. For the first five months of the Gaza conflict, the Biden administration did little more than issue one tepid call for an eventual ceasefire "as soon as practicable." Last month, it finally allowed a U.N. Security Council Resolution for a Gaza ceasefire to pass by abstaining from the vote. But it then undermined its own abstention by labeling the resolution nonbinding. White House national security communications adviser John Kirby further diluted the impact of the abstention by insisting, "our vote does not, I repeat does not, represent a shift in our policy."
What exactly is this policy? The administration's public statements, including Kirby's remarks after the Israeli strike that killed World Central Kitchen aid workers, seem more like a public relations effort for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu than a coherent policy to promote U.S. interests. President Biden has continued to sidestep Congress to send weapons to Israel, weapons used in the killing of over 32,000 Palestinian civilians. The administration permits Israel to obstruct humanitarian aid while shielding it at the U.N. by vetoing three ceasefire resolutions and refusing to call for an unconditional ceasefire.
Besides protecting Israel from any accountability, Biden has invested his diplomatic capital in a thus far unsuccessful mediation between Israel, Egypt, Qatar, and Hamas to secure a deal that releases all the Israeli hostages and brings about a ceasefire.
While this comes across as a laudable effort on the face of it, it contains a significant problem that has helped prolong the slaughter in Gaza: Just as Biden's draft U.N. resolution linked a ceasefire with a hostage release, so does the deal he is trying to secure with Israel and Hamas. This linkage effectively justifies Israel's indiscriminate bombardment of Gaza: As long as the hostages aren't released, this approach legitimizes the continued bombardment of civilians in Gaza.
As such, Biden's approach has not only failed to secure the release of the Israeli hostages, but it has effectively taken 2 million Gazans as hostages whose lives can only be made safe once the roughly 130 Israeli hostages are released. Moreover, given the regional dynamics and Israel's desire to expand the war to Lebanon and Iran, the lives of American troops in the region are now also hostages to Biden's flawed approach. Biden is effectively prioritizing Netanyahu's desires (who incidentally isn't prioritizing the release of Israeli hostages and who wants a prolonged and widened war) over the lives and interests of Americans.
This is why the U.N. resolution that passed last week de-linked the hostage release from a ceasefire and treated both as independent imperatives. This would be more effective in saving the lives of civilians in Gaza, saving the lives of U.S. troops by avoiding regional escalation, and saving the lives of the Israeli hostages.
This is also the position of Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), an otherwise staunch supporter of Biden. "I have come to the conclusion that there needs to be an immediate pause to hostilities," he said recently. "I would not condition it upon the release of the hostages. I hope that there is an agreement between Hamas and Israel with intermediaries that allows for the release of the hostages. But I think that the humanitarian situation on the ground is so dire today, with famine lurking, that Israel needs to stop military operations right now and focus on restoring order and combating famine."
For the sake of the Israeli hostages, the civilians in Gaza, and American servicemen and women in the Middle East, Biden would be wise to listen to the Senator from Connecticut.

Western countries have asserted since the beginning of hostilities in Ukraine that they would use sanctions as a critical tool to suppress Russia's economy and sever its ability to trade with the rest of the world. They have kept their promise by continually adding to the number of sanctions as Russia's war in Ukraine has stretched into it second year.As of January 2024, the Russian Federation was subject to over 28,000 sanctions and the majority of these occurred after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Approximately 16,000 of these sanctions were imposed against individuals, while nearly 10,000 were imposed against companies and 3,200 against institutions. Additionally, there have been sectoral sanctions such as general trade embargoes on gas and oil. The EU and the U.S. have imposed most of these but countries like Japan, South Korea and Switzerland have also participated. While these sanctions intended to hamper Russia's war effort and foment domestic economic and political instability, most have not achieved these objectives. Russia has maintained its military activities in Ukraine while recent IMF forecasts predict growth of 2.6 percent in 2024 — at a time when many EU countries are heading toward recession amidst significant political uncertainty in 2024 — a pivotal election year in many Western democracies.Perhaps the greatest achievement has been reinforcing Russia's trade pivot to the East and the Global South and away from the European Union. As a result, Russia's trade turnover reached $530.2 billion in the first nine months of 2023. Exports reached $316.9 billion, while imports reached $213.3 billion. Russian exports to Asian countries reached $226.6 billion, an increase of 10.3% year on year, while imports amounted to $139.7 billion, increasing 39.5%. China accounted for $105 billion during the same time period compared to $78 billion for all of 2021. And Chinese imports of fuels were $52.7 billion in 2021 compared to $77.0 billion in the first nine months of 2023. China comprised $81.8 billion in imports to Russia (almost 40%) in the first nine months of 2023 while imports were 54.5 billion in all of 2021. During that same time, Russia's exports to India were $52 billion versus $8 billion for 2021. Indian imports of Russian fuel increased from $4 billion in all of 2021 to $46 billion during the first nine months of 2023.In contrast, Russian exports to the EU were $47 billion in the first nine months of 2023, a significant decrease from $192.8 billion in all of 2021. Russian imports from the EU sunk below $32 billion in the first nine months in 2023 from $81 billion just 21 months earlier. Fuel imports from Russia to the EU collapsed from $120 billion in 2021 to less than $27 billion in the first 9 months of 2023. Lastly, sanctions greatly reduced the share of imports from Russia from 28% in 2021 to 3% in 2023.Building a new trade frameworkThe trade numbers clearly depict the momentous redirection in Russian trade flows during the nearly two years since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But they don't reflect the geopolitical activities underpinning this seismic change nor do they indicate recent initiatives that the Russian government has undertaken to solidify the direction of trade. In this respect, Russia has actively engaged in a wide array of diplomatic activities, ranging from bilateral talks with countries like India and Iran to efforts to expand the membership and geopolitical reach of the BRICS and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).Late last year, India's Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met in Moscow to discuss issues concerning the usual political, defense, and cultural partnerships. They also discussed more seriously, economic cooperation issues intended to buttress the strong growth in Russia-India trade that has occurred since 2022. The focus of these economic discussions centered on logistics, particularly those related to the establishment of the North-South International Transport Corridor (INSTC). All three segments of the corridor are now functional. These include the Western route (Russia-Azerbaijan-Iran-India), the Middle route (Russia-Iran-India) and the Eastern route (Russia-Central Asia-Iran-India). Russia hopes the increased use of the corridor will improve the infrastructure in Caspian ports and the ability to improve the status of Astrakhan and Makhachkala as transport hubs. Now that the Vladivostok-Chennai Sea route or Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC) is also operational, India and Russia will have a realistic opportunity to elevate economic cooperation going forward and this will only bolster bilateral relations.The corridor is beneficial to India as well, both economically and geopolitically. It reflects the Indian elite's desire for viable alternatives to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India is also confident the corridor will provide greater access to Central Asia bypassing Pakistan and continue to strengthen its economic ties with Iran and Russia. Another way that Russia is seeking to enhance regional trade is through the EEU. On December 25, EEU leaders met and signed an agreement with Iran. The agreement marked the end of two years of negotiations and will come into force after the ratification by the national parliaments. The Iran-EEU Free Trade Agreement eliminates tariffs of 87% of traded goods between the parties. It represents Iran's most extensive trade deal to date and it's an important deal for Russia as it solidifies another trade partner and underscores its leading role in the trade group and in Central Asia's economic development. Finally, in January 2024 the BRICS announced the expansion of the group by five new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The new membership will increase total BRICS GDP to $28.5 trillion or 28.1% of global output, compared to the G7 countries' 43.2% of global output. While the expansion of BRICS is notable from an economic perspective, it's more meaningful in a geopolitical context. The addition of Middle Eastern and more African countries gives the group a larger presence along key shipping and trade routes. It also increases the BRICS share of global oil production to 43% and 25% of exports. It's also important to note that BRICS accounts for 72% of global rare earth elements, which are key to high-tech weapons and consumer goods, including circuit boards and mobile phones.While many in the West only pay attention to the rhetoric about Russia's weak and collapsing economy and its economic isolation, Western policymakers need to follow closely Russia's continued initiatives in the geopolitical sphere. Russia's economic engagement may be complicated due to the joining of some difficult geopolitical realities, but the evolving framework has the potential to disrupt the traditional "rules-based global order" if not undermine it. Therefore, a policy of constructive and unrestricted engagement in trade and economic relations on a global scale needs to be a key tool of commercial diplomacy for Western policymakers going forward. This would include greater restraint from the heavy-handed sanctions policies that only reduce Western access to key goods and lead to higher global inflation, the brunt of which is borne by the middle- and lower-class consumer.

After six years of U.S. "maximum pressure," Iran's economy continues to defy dire predictions of economic collapse that motivated Trump's hasty 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (also known as the JCPOA). The Biden administration's continuation of the same policy since 2021 is similarly based on the logic that the weaker Iran's economy is, the more likely Tehran will bend to Washington's will. The economy's resilience is evidenced by the fact that in the first nine months of the Iranian fiscal year (March 21 to December 20, 2023), GDP grew by a 6.7% annual rate, and it is very likely to finish the year in two months with a growth rate exceeding the World Bank and IMF forecasts of about 4%.But, after more than a decade of decline in their living standards, resilience is not what ordinary Iranians are looking for. As a result of Trump's reimposition of sanctions in 2018, Iran's economic growth fell by 13.6 percentage points, from a positive annual growth rate of 9.5% during 2016-2017, when the JCPOA had eased U.S. sanctions, to negative 4.1% per year during 2018-2019.Since 2020, and helped by rising oil revenues, the economy has recovered some, growing steadily, if slowly, by about 4% per year. Even the damage from the Covid-19 pandemic, which was mostly on employment, has been repaired, and employment is now back to its pre-pandemic level. But, as Israel's war on Gaza continues, renewed tensions and proxy fights with the U.S. could put these fragile gains at risk of a reversal.Flawed recoveryThis modest growth has done little to dampen deep dissatisfaction with the economy among ordinary Iranians. Living standards have not yet recovered to their pre-Trump level, and inflation remains very high. In 2022, real household expenditures per capita were 7.7% below their 2017 level, far below where Iranians expected to be now based on two decades of rising real consumption before sanctions tightened in 2011.
Inflation is an even larger source of popular discontent. For reasons that are not peculiar to Iranian society, people show more concern with rising prices than real incomes. They are unhappy with rising prices even if their incomes are keeping up with inflation.
In 2018, with poor prospects from oil exports, the rial lost 2/3 of its value in a short time and caused prices to spike. Inflation rose from 8.1% in 2017 to 26.7% in 2018 and has remained above 30% since. Since the beginning of the Iranian year, a new Central Bank governor has tried to reduce inflation to below 30%, a very modest goal, but so far he has not succeeded. Last month, inflation was at 36.5% annual rate despite tightened credit and fiscal austerity, which shows itself in a stagnant real estate market.This mixed record is what hardliners are presenting to voters in the March 1 parliamentary elections and the record that President Ebrahim Raisi will be defending when he stands for re-election in June 2025. And this is no ordinary re-election because hardliners, who view the Raisi administration as the first "revolutionary government" since the founding of the Islamic Republic, hope to deliver on their promise of economic prosperity. They need to convince voters that their strategy of giving up on the nuclear deal and turning to the East (read China and Russia) can do better than the record of reformist presidents Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) and Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), whom they consider pro-west and "neo-liberal".Both Khatami and Rouhani were re-elected with bigger margins to their second terms. For President Raisi to do the same in 2025 he needs the robust growth rate of the past year to continue in 2024. As I argued last November, meeting this challenge is an important reason why Iranian hardliners are unwilling to get drawn into the Israel-Hamas conflict.Darker clouds on the horizon threaten economic recoveryBesides the fact that economies grow faster when they are recovering from a trough, the growth should slow down in 2024. In addition, rising tensions in the region worsen the prospect for growth. Iran may be intent on not getting involved, but protecting its fragile recovery from an expanding regional conflict may be increasingly difficult. Iran's allies in the "resistance front" in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon are challenging U.S. and Israeli forces. Even if Iran stays out of the fray, the conflict is bound to have a negative effect on Iran's recovery, if only because Washington would try harder to limit Iran's oil exports and refuse Iran access to its previously frozen funds.This month Iran angered Iraq and Pakistan after it bombed two locations in these countries, ostensibly taking revenge for a terrorist attack a month ago in Kerman that killed over 100 bystanders. Adding a third nuclear power to the two that it is already in conflict with – the U.S. and Israel – may show Iran's military resolve but also increases the risk of conflict.Rising tensions have caused the rial, which enjoyed months of stability, to lose 10% of its value in the free market just in the past two weeks. If the rial continues to lose value, the task of bringing inflation down to below 30% will become much harder in the coming months.More lax enforcement of oil sanctions since Biden's election, intended to keep Iran from increasing its stockpile of enriched uranium and obtain the release of U.S. hostages, has allowed Tehran to sell more oil. More oil revenues have been the largest factor in Iran's economic recovery. According to the Statistical Center of Iran, in the last three years the value added of the oil and gas sector has grown three times as fast as the GDP. So, if Washington decides to police Iran' oil exports more aggressively, growth will suffer.Finally, in the longer run, the financial components of U.S. sanctions prevent Iran from taking advantage of its deep devaluations by increasing its non-oil exports. Devaluations have reduced the cost of unskilled Iranian labor in export markets to about $10 per day, half the average unskilled wage in China. Devaluations helped Iran substitute its own products for imports, but there are limits to this substitution, especially with the domestic demand depressed to fight inflation. A fuller economic recovery from the loss of oil exports requires exporting more manufactures and services, which financial sanctions make costly and difficult.Escaping sanctions?Iran's recent diplomatic successes have reduced its isolation but will not translate into economic growth in the short term. In 2023, Iran, aided by China, repaired its broken diplomatic relations with its Persian Gulf neighbors; gained entry into BRICS, an organization that includes rising non-aligned global players; and joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that, at least in one observer's opinion, is a "game changer." While these developments bode well for Iran's ability to resist U.S. sanctions in the long run, they are unlikely to translate into more investment and economic growth in the short run.What these successes have accomplished so far is to convince Iranian hardliners that their strategy of resistance to U.S. pressure has raised the Islamic Republic's global stature, just as the West has tried to isolate it. They see the emerging multipolar world as one in which unilateral sanctions lose their sting and one that allows Iran to turn its newfound geopolitical capital into economic growth.

In the past week, a pair of major stories have blown the doors off the dominant narrative about the Ukraine war, opening the possibility that a ceasefire — or even a peace deal — may be more achievable than previously thought.
The first comes from Politico, which reported Wednesday that American and European officials are "quietly shifting their focus from supporting Ukraine's goal of total victory over Russia to improving its position in an eventual negotiation to end the war."
The U.S. and Europe, according to Politico's sources, have already started to push Ukraine to shift toward defensive operations following a failed counteroffensive earlier this year — a shift that would focus on giving Kyiv a strong hand at the negotiating table.
The report suggests that President Joe Biden's recent comments about Ukraine having won "an enormous victory already" could be the first step in an effort to shift the narrative around eventual concessions. If the reporting is true, then the West is far more open to accepting the idea of territorial concessions in Ukraine than previously thought.
But, as Politico notes, a move toward a pro-negotiation posture will face substantial political difficulties given the Biden administration's previous insistence that it will defend Ukraine "as long as it takes" to achieve Kyiv's key aim of removing Russian troops from the entirety of Ukraine, including Crimea.
And, despite public pronouncements from the Kremlin that it's ready for talks, Ukraine and its strongest Western backers have long argued that they see no hope for negotiation until Russian President Vladimir Putin is removed from power. His goal, they argue, is nothing short of the full subjugation of Ukraine, and a negotiated peace would represent Chamberlain-style appeasement.
That brings us to the second story, which the New York Times (somewhat inexplicably) published on the Saturday before Christmas. Putin, the Times reports, has been signaling since at least September that he is ready for a ceasefire along the current lines in Ukraine.
A "senior international official" told the Times that Putin's public comments about the war are mostly bluster and that the Russian leader has shown consistent interest in pausing the war on current lines. A former Russian official confirmed that the Kremlin is content to stop the fighting as it currently stands but added that Putin is "not willing to retreat one meter."
Moscow's willingness to enter a ceasefire agreement is based on its view that average Russians, despite supporting the war effort in principle, would happily accept a "victory" that falls short of some of the Kremlin's professed aims, the Times reported.
Notably, this openness to talks is nothing new. According to the Times, Putin first signaled his interest in a ceasefire back in the fall of 2022, when a Ukrainian counteroffensive swept Russian troops back to the lines that have more or less held since. The revelation suggests that the Biden administration's long standing argument that there is no partner for peace in Moscow is, at best, misleading.
It also raises questions about what Mark Milley, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, knew when he argued in December 2022 that the war would likely not end in a decisive military victory for either side and that the time appeared ripe for a negotiated peace. Was this a clever response to Putin's overtures? The possibility is hard to ignore.
Taken together, these stories suggest that an opportunity is opening to pursue talks, whether quietly or in a more public forum, to bring this brutal war to an end after nearly two years of fighting. They are also a reminder of a common theme in modern war: No matter how long or hard you fight, you almost never achieve all of your stated goals.
Of course, neither of these stories bears on the thinking of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who has his own domestic issues to deal with and promises to keep. Of particular importance is his commitment to joining NATO, a move that Putin had sought to block by invading in the first place.
And, while Russians may be ready for an end to the war, the Ukrainian public has made clear its opposition to losing any territory. Russia's invasion has left Ukrainians so frustrated that they've even decided to move Christmas from January 7, the Russian Orthodox date, to December 25.
Just a few days ago, a majority of Ukrainians celebrated their first Christmas in December. "It's historical justice," a Ukrainian soldier told AP News. "We need to move forward not only with the world but also with the traditions of our country and overcome the imperial remnants we had."
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— The blockade of Poland-Ukraine border crossings by Polish truckers could finally be coming to an end, according to Reuters, which reported Wednesday that Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is making progress in his efforts to settle the dispute. The main issue is the truckers' demand that the European Union reinstitute a system of permits for Ukrainian trucks entering European territory that was suspended due to Russia's invasion and blockade of Black Sea ports. Though the current regulations will likely stay in force until at least June, the recent election of Tusk — a former president of the European Council — has reportedly facilitated talks to end the blockade, which some officials now say could be over before the new year.
— Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met with Putin on Wednesday during a multi-day trip to Moscow, with talks focused on building a multipolar world order, according to the New York Times. Jaishankar's visit highlights India's unique place in international politics as a powerful state with strong ties to both Russia and the West. The Ukraine war was also reportedly on the agenda, though it is unclear if the diplomat broached the possibility of peace talks.
— Russia threatened a harsh response if the West follows through on its plans to seize Russian Central Bank assets stored in the United States, according to the Guardian. Among the options for retaliation are seizures of Western assets under Russian control or even a full breakdown in relations between Washington and Moscow.
— The Kremlin lashed out at U.S. claims that Russia rejected a prisoner swap, arguing that talks are "extremely delicate" and that a resolution to the issue could be "hampered by being actively discussed in public," according to Reuters. The comments confirm that talks are ongoing to secure the release of ex-Marine Paul Whelan and Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, both of whom the U.S. government considers wrongfully detained. The U.S. envoy for hostage negotiations told PBS that the U.S. is in frequent contact with both men and their families, adding that he hopes to "get them both at the same time."
U.S. State Department news:The State Department did not hold a press briefing this week.