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Tourism sector growth continues to be robust in 2011, consolidating the strong rebound in real Gross Domestic Product, or GDP growth in 2010. Real GDP growth is estimated to be 8.3 percent in 2011, down from 9.9 percent in 2010. Fast growing tourism receipts are supporting higher than expected government revenue outcomes. Recently introduced tax reforms, particularly the tourism goods and services tax, will put medium term fiscal sustainability on a firmer footing. Nevertheless, fiscal consolidation remains the policy priority for the authorities. Discussions with the International Monetary Fund or IMF on a program of support will resume this quarter. to see if agreement can be reached on measures that ensures medium-term fiscal and debt sustainability Domestic financing of the unsustainable fiscal deficit and rising international commodities prices continue to put pressure on the demand for foreign currency. Consequently, foreign reserves have resumed their downward trend after the boost from one-off privatization receipts. Uncertainty related to the recent devaluation of the Rufiyaa has subsided, but it is still trading at the upper end of the band and there remains an approximately 10 percent parallel market premium. The inflationary effects of the devaluation are now being felt with consumer price inflation rising to double digits in recent months.

One of the problems in discussing one-stop shops is that everyone seems to have a different idea of what one is. There have been one-stop shops since at least the 1920s, mostly in the retail trade, epitomized by the development of supermarkets and, in recent years, internet sales outlets. This book is about one particular type of service, namely, business registration, and the various one-stop shops that exist now and might exist in the future. If there is confusion about what constitutes a one-stop shop, there are also a variety of views about business registration. In some countries all businesses have to be registered, in others, only those companies with a legal existence separate from their owners. In some countries, registration is the responsibility of the courts; in others, it is an administrative function handled by a government ministry, semi-autonomous agency, or chamber of commerce. Registration may be a function of a central institution or may be affected at a local level. In all these areas, there is change when it comes to implementing a one-stop shop. It is hardly surprising therefore that there are many different views about what constitutes, or should constitute, a one-stop shop.

There is much in common between the agricultural sectors of the United States and Canada. This chapter begins with a brief background on the two sectors, then reviews their histories of farm policy developments before reporting new estimates of rates of assistance to their farmers and their consequences for taxpayers and consumers. This is followed by an explanation of the politics behind the evolution and gyrations in farm policies in the two countries, and some speculation on the prospect for reform. Since the policy histories and their effects in the two countries are somewhat different, they are discussed sequentially in those sections.

Parte I. Il barone Capitolo I. Il mestiere della armi tra Napoli e Milano (1418-1455) Nella prima parte del capitolo si analizza il contesto famigliare del Sanseverino. Il padre Leonetto apparteneva alla famiglia dei Sanseverino di Caiazzo, un ramo cadetto di incerta legittimità della grande casata baronale. La madre Elisa era figlia di Muzio Attendolo e sorella di Francesco Sforza. Il giovane Roberto, a seguito della conquista del regno di Napoli da parte di Alfonso il Magnanimo, perse tutte le terre che aveva ereditato dal padre e fu costretto a seguire lo Sforza, arruolandosi nella sua compagnia. I suoi parenti Sanseverino, desiderosi di incamerare le sue terre, gli furono ostili. Nella seconda parte del capitolo si ripercorrono le vicende del Sanseverino al servizio dello zio materno, dalla guerra della Marca fino alla conquista del ducato di Milano da parte dello Sforza. Questo evento si rivelerà fondamentale per la carriera del Sanseverino, il quale, alla metà degli anni Cinquanta si trovava ad essere il nipote di uno dei principi più potenti d'Italia. I suoi servigi gli valsero anche l'investitura dei feudi di Colorno e Pontecurone, un matrimonio prestigioso con una da Correggio e una condotta indipendente. Capitolo II. Il recupero dell'eredità paterna nel regno di Napoli (1455-1464) Il capitolo analizza le mosse messe in atto dal Sanseverino per recuperare l'eredità del padre nel Mezzogiorno. Nella prima parte ricostruiamo la missione diplomatica del Sanseverino presso Alfonso il Magnanimo, il quale gli restituì la maggior parte delle sue terre, in omaggio alla nuova intesa fra lui e lo Sforza a seguito del distendersi dei rapporti fra Napoli e Milano dopo la pace di Lodi. La seconda parte, invece, segue le vicende del Sanseverino durante la guerra di successione al regno di Napoli, che lo portarono a recuperare Caiazzo, ottenuta insieme al titolo comitale. Si è cercato, parimenti, di analizzare le strategie messe in atto dal condottiero per creare il contesto politico necessario affinché le terre riconquistate non potessero venire alienate in futuro: da un lato coltivò buoni rapporti con re Ferrante d'Aragona, dall'altro strinse solide intese con gli altri Sanseverino. Capitolo III. Prime delusioni (1465-1466) Il capitolo analizza il tentativo del Sanseverino di ottenere una condotta condivisa da Milano e Napoli, naturale conseguenza della sua doppia natura di condottiero sforzesco e barone meridionale. Il contesto politico ed economico della seconda metà degli anni Sessanta, però lo sfavorì: la riforma dell'esercito demaniale napoletano e la crisi economica milanese lo costrinsero ad andare a servire Firenze, all'epoca alleata del regno e del ducato. Parte II. Il condottiero deluso Capitolo IV. Firenze e il condottiero (1467-1470) In questo capitolo si analizza il difficile rapporto fra il Sanseverino e Firenze. Le importanti richieste del condottiero e la diffidenza della repubblica nel trattare con i mercenari crearono forti tensioni, mitigate solo in parte dalla mediazione dei Medici, del duca di Milano e del re di Napoli. Sullo sfondo di questa vicenda, si è osservato anche il tentativo del Sanseverino di stringere rapporti ancora più forti con il Mezzogiorno, concretizzato dal matrimonio della figlia con un Carafa di Maddaloni. Con il passare del tempo, sempre più sfiduciato dai continui contrasti con Firenze, il condottiero incominciò anche a diffidare dello Sforza e di Ferrante, i quali gli avevano fatto molte promesse, ma ne avevano mantenute ben poche. Capitolo V. L'illusone sforzesca (1470-1476) La prima parte del capitolo analizza la rottura (comunque non traumatica) del Sanseverino con Ferrante d'Aragona e il ritorno al servizio diretto dello Sforza. Il condottiero investì così tutti i suoi sforzi nei suoi interessi nel Nord Italia, conservando però le sue terre nel Mezzogiorno. La seconda parte del capitolo ricostruisce la sua permanenza a Bologna come condottiero sforzesco più importante della Romagna, i suoi rapporti con la città e il suo contributo diplomatico e militare nella regione. Parimenti si osserva la crescita del suo status personale, dovuto alla sua esperienza, un nuovo matrimonio prestigioso con una Malavolti di Siena e il cementarsi dell'amicizia con Lorenzo il Magnifico. La parte finale del capitolo analizza invece il declinare dei buoni rapporti del Sanseverino con lo Sforza, che, dal concedergli nuovi feudi prestigiosi e stipendi regolari, passò a trattarlo con poco rispetto: una nuova crisi economica del ducato rese infatti il soldo sempre meno regolare. Il Sanseverino, inoltre, era stanco della sua inattività bolognese e fece suoi primi tentativi di ottenere un principato indipendente. Il clima di tensione fra il duca e il cugino venne risolto solo dall'assassinio del primo il 26 dicembre 1476. Parte III. Il ribelle Capitolo VI. Uno sforzesco ribelle Il capitolo analizza le mosse del Sanseverino a seguito dell'assassinio di Galeazzo Maria Sforza. Il condottiero, prendendo le parti dei fratelli del duca defunto, scelse la via della ribellione contro la reggenza legittima del giovane Gian Galeazzo Maria Sforza, guidata da Bona di Savoia e da Cicco Simonetta: sperava così di poter sfruttare il momento di confusione politica per accrescere ulteriormente il suo status. Si seguono così tutte le sue vicissitudini in questi anni convulsi: prima, attraverso le carte del processo intentato contro di lui a Milano, le sue trame contro la reggenza; in seguito la sua fuga in Francia presso Luigi XI; poi la sua permanenza ad Asti al servizio del re di Francia prima e del re di Napoli poi. Una volta entrato al servizio di re Ferrante, il Sanseverino aiutò la ribelle repubblica di Genova a respingere l'assalto di un imponete esercito sforzesco. L'ultima parte del capitolo narra invece di come Ludovico Maria Sforza e il Sanseverino riuscirono a rientrare a Milano grazie all'appoggio del re di Napoli e all'abilità militare del condottiero. Capitolo VII. Roberto Sanseverino e Ludovico il Moro (1479-1484) Le imprese analizzate nel capitolo precedente, crearono nel Sanseverino la consapevolezza di essere una figura di primo piano della politica italiana, illudendolo però di poter trattare da pari con Ludovico il Moro: il condottiero si illuse così di poter aspirare al dominio diretto del ducato di Milano. Se però in passato la parentela sforzesca lo aveva aiutato ad ottenere i suoi scopi, in questo caso, lo tradì: il condottiero aveva infatti sopravvalutato la sua posizione all'interno della gerarchia di potere in seno alla famiglia Sforza. Un iniziale accordo di suddivisione dei compiti con il Moro ci fu, ma questi era in posizione di superiorità sul Sanseverino, sia dal punto di vista della legittimità, che da quello dell'abilità politica: l'intesa sarebbe durata finché lo Sforza l'avesse voluto. Ben presto il Sanseverino venne emarginato e fu costretto alla seconda clamorosa fuga dal ducato. Passò al servizio di Venezia, un'opzione di carriera sempre paventata nei carteggi dell'epoca, ma mai concretizzatasi per la volontà del capitano di non rompere con Napoli e Milano. Con la brillante condotta tenuta durante la guerra di Ferrara, il Sanseverino raggiunse l'apice della sua carriera personale, riuscendo a farsi eleggere capitano generale d'Italia con la pace di Bagnolo dell'agosto del 1484. Capitolo VIII. Il nemico della pace d'Italia (1485-1487) Il capitolo analizza l'ultima parte della vita del Sanseverino. In seguito alla pace di Bagnolo, il condottiero si sentì abbastanza potente da tentare di conquistarsi un principato indipendente con le sue sole forze. Dopo aver tentato inutilmente di prendere Siena, però si accorse che senza un rivolgimento generale in Italia, non poteva sperare di ottenere un vero successo e, così, nell'agosto del 1485 decise di appoggiare la ribellione dei baroni del Mezzogiorno, assoldato dal pontefice Innocenzo VIII come gonfaloniere della Chiesa. La guerra che ne seguì si rivelò per lui un disastro e ben presto venne abbandonato dal papa stesso, il quale lo escluse dall'accordo di pace stretto con il re di Napoli nell'agosto del 1486. Senza uno stato che lo appoggiasse, il Sanseverino era estremamente vulnerabile. Ferrante d'Aragona e il Moro non persero quindi l'occasione per eliminarlo: il duca di Calabria lo inseguì, implacabile, dal Lazio fino alla Romagna, dove lo costrinse a sciogliere la compagnia e riparare con pochi uomini in Veneto. Qui gli venne offerto un sussidio mensile, ma non gli venne dato alcun incarico militare. A 68 anni era un uomo finito, senza la sua compagnia e odiato da tutte le potenze italiane. Morì combattendo in Trentino conto gli Austriaci l'anno seguente. ; Part I. The baron Chapter I. The military career between Naples and Milan (1418-1455) The first part of the chapter analyses the family context of Sanseverino. The father Leonetto belonged to the Sanseverino family of Caiazzo, a cadet branch of uncertain legitimacy of the great baronial family. His mother Elisa was the daughter of Muzio Attendolo and sister of Francesco Sforza. Following the conquest of the kingdom of Naples by Alfonso the Magnanimous, the young Roberto lost all the land he had inherited from his father and was forced to follow Sforza, enlisting in his military company. His relatives from the Sanseverino side of the family, eager to obtain his land, were hostile to him. In the second part of the chapter, the story of the Sanseverino goes back to the service of the maternal uncle, from the Marca war to the Sforza conquest of the Duchy of Milan. This event will prove to be fundamental for the career of Sanseverino, who, towards the mid of the fifteenth century, was the grandson of one of the most powerful Italian princes. His services also earned him the investiture of the fiefs of Colorno and Pontecurone, a prestigious marriage with a member of the family of Correggio and an independent condotta. Chapter II. The recovery of the paternal inheritance in the kingdom of Naples (1455-1464) The chapter analyses the strategies made by Sanseverino to recover the legacy of his father in the South of Italy. The first part of the chapter covers the diplomatic mission of Sanseverino to Alfonso the Magnanimous, who returned him most of his land, as a consequence of the new agreement between the king and Sforza - due to the improvement of the relations between Naples and Milan following the peace of Lodi. The second part of the chapter follows the events of Sanseverino during the war of succession to the kingdom of Naples, which led him to recover Caiazzo, obtained together with the title of count. The chapter also tries to analyse the strategies implemented by the condottiero to create a favorable political context to secure the conquered lands avoiding any possible future losses: on the one hand he cultivated good relations with King Ferrante of Aragon, on the other he held firm agreements with the other Sanseverinos. Chapter III. First disappointments (1465-1466) The chapter focuses on Sanseverino's attempt to obtain a joint military company co-financed by Milan and Naples, a natural consequence of his dual nature of Sforzesco condottiero and southern baron. The political and economic context of the second half of the sixties, however, were not favourable to him: the reform of the Neapolitan state army and the Milanese economic crisis forced him to go to Florence, which at that time was allied with both the Naples kingdom and the Milan duchy. Part II. The disappointed condottiero Chapter IV. Florence and the condottiero (1467-1470) This chapter discusses the difficult relationship between Sanseverino and Florence. The demanding attitude of the condottiero and the distrust of the republic in dealing with the mercenaries created strong tensions, mitigated only in part by the mediation of the Medici, the Duke of Milan and the king of Naples. On the background of this affair, Sanseverino attempted to forge even stronger relationships with the South, which resulted in his daughter's marriage to a member of the Carafa di Maddaloni family. Over the time, more and more discouraged by the continuous contrasts with Florence, the condottiero also began to distrust both Sforza and Ferrante, who did not keep their promises. Chapter V. Sforzesco illuson (1470-1476) The first part of the chapter analyses the break (however not traumatic) of the Sanseverino with Ferrante d'Aragona and the return to the direct service of the Sforza. Following this, the condottiero invested all his efforts in his interests in Northern Italy, but kept his lands in the South. The second part of the chapter covers his service in Bologna as the most important Sforzesco condottiero in Romagna, his relations with the city and his diplomatic and military contribution in the region. The chapter also discusses the growth of his personal status, due to his experience, a new prestigious marriage with a Malavolti from Siena and the cementing of his friendship with Lorenzo the Magnificent. The final part of the chapter analyses instead the decline of the good relations of Sanseverino with Francesco Sforza, who, from granting him prestigious new fiefs and regular salaries, went to treat him disrespectfully due to a new economic crisis of the duchy that made the pay less and less regular. Furthermore Sanseverino, tired of his inactivity in Bologna, made his first attempt to obtain an independent principality. The climate of tension between the duke of Milan and his cousin Sanseverino was solved only by the assassination of the first on 26 December 1476. Part III. The rebel Chapter VI. A rebellious sforzesco The chapter analyses the actions of the Sanseverino following the assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza. The condottiero, taking the parts of the deceased duke's brothers, chose the way of rebellion against the legitimate regency of the young Gian Galeazzo Maria Sforza, led by Bona di Savoia and Cicco Simonetta: he hoped to exploit the moment of political confusion to increase his status further. His vicissitudes in these convulsed years include: first, his plots against the regency, emerging from the papers of the trial brought against him in Milan; his escape to France under Louis XI; his stay in Asti first at the service of the king of France first and later at the service of the king of Naples. Finally, once at the service of King Ferrante, Sanseverino helped the rebel republic of Genoa to reject the assault of Sforza's remarkable army. The last part of the chapter explains how Ludovico Maria Sforza and Sanseverino managed to return to Milan thanks to the support of the king of Naples and the military ability of the condottiero. Chapter VII. Roberto Sanseverino and Ludovico the Moro (1479-1484) The undertakings analysed in the previous chapter, created in Sanseverino the awareness of being a leading figure of the Italian politics, but gave him the misperception to be able to deal with Ludovico il Moro: the condottiero thus started aspiring to the direct domination of the Duchy of Milan. However, if in the paste his ties with the Sforza family had helped him to achieve his goals, in this case, they undermined his plans: the condottiero had in fact overestimated his position in the hierarchy of power within the Sforza family. Even from the initial agreement to subdivide the tasks with the Moro, Sanseverino appeared to be in an inferior position, both from the point of view of legitimacy and of political ability: the agreement would have lasted until the Sforza had wanted it. Soon Sanseverino was marginalized and forced to a second and sensational escape from the duchy. He then switched to the service of Venice and, thanks to his brilliant conduct held during the war in Ferrara, Sanseverino reached the peak of his personal career, managing to be elected captain general of Italy with the peace of Bagnolo in August 1484. Chapter VIII. The enemy of the peace of Italy (1485-1487) The chapter is devoted to the last part of Sanseverino's life. Following the peace of Bagnolo, the condottiero felt powerful enough to try to conquer an independent principality with his own strength. However, after trying unsuccessfully to take Siena, he realized that a general upheaval in Italy was the only hope for him to get a real success: in August 1485 he decided to support the rebellion of the barons of the South, and was appointed Gonfalonier of the Church by the Pope Innocent VIII. The war that followed turned out to be a disaster for him and soon he was abandoned by the Pope himself, who excluded him from the peace agreement with the King of Naples in August 1486. Without a state that supported him, Sanseverino was extremely vulnerable. Ferrante d'Aragona and the Moro did not miss this opportunity to eliminate him: the Duke of Calabria pursued him, implacable, from Lazio to Romagna, where he forced him to dissolve his military company and escape with a few men in Veneto. Here he was offered a monthly allowance, but he was not given any military duty. At the age of 68 he was a finished man, without his military company and hated by all the Italian powers. He died fighting the Austrians in Trentino the following year.

From the introduction: The last two years mark a turning point in public perception of human-induced climate change as a problem of global importance. The widespread acceptance that 'most of the observed increase in globally-averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas [GHG] concentrations' has increased political pressure on governments to reduce GHG emissions. At the same time, rising oil prices have made the reduction of dependence on energy imports and diversification of the energy mix strategic imperatives for many countries around the world. While governments worldwide are confronted with this dual challenge, it is of special relevance to China. On the one hand, China has recently become the world's largest emitter of CO2, accounting for 24% of global annual CO2 emissions. China is therefore one of the most important players to effectively mitigate global warming and pressure from governments around the world on China to join emission reductions efforts is mounting. On the other hand, energy demand is growing exponentially and China is increasingly relying on energy imports to satisfy energy needs. Worried that growing dependency on energy imports may be accompanied by foreign-policy and economic pressures that might threaten national security as well as social and political stability, China has implemented a number of policies to address this issue ranging from policies to save energy and reduce energy intensity, to the diversification of oil supply sources and routes, the support of equity oil overseas acquisitions and the build up of strategic oil reserves to the diversification of the energy portfolio. In line with the objective to diversify the composition of the energy mix, China's leadership is increasingly realizing the need to reduce emissions and support renewable energy development. At a recently held Politburo study session, President Hu Jintao exclaimed: 'Our task is tough, and our time is limited. Party organisations and governments at all levels must give priority to emission reduction and bring the idea deep into people's hearts". To address the issue of energy security, the Chinese government has adapted a two-pronged approach. While measures to promote energy savings and efficiency curb the increase in energy demand, the support of renewable and nuclear energy reduces dependency on energy imports and contributes to the broadening of the foundation of energy supply. This study focuses on China's renewable energy policy and the development of wind energy in China in particular. Commitment by the highest levels of government and a host of favourable policies have triggered a boom in renewable energy in China, especially in the wind power sector. A major step in the development of renewable energy in China has been the Renewable Energy Law that came into effect in January 2006. In addition, the government has set ambitious targets for energy intensity reduction, and share of renewable energy of primary energy consumption. China is on the way to become the world leader in renewable energies. In 2007, investment in renewable energies in China amounted to approximately US$ 12 billion, second only to Germany. In terms of installed renewable energy capacity, China leads the world with 151 GW of installed capacity, largely due to the widespread utilization of hydropower for electricity generation. According to a report by the United Nations Environmental Programme, China is the world's leading manufacturer of solar cells, with an estimated annual production capacity of 3.000 MW. China's wind power market was the third biggest worldwide in 2007 and growth rates continue to exceed expectations. In 2009, China is expected to take the lead as the largest manufacturer of wind turbines. Hydro power represents the most important source of renewable energy in China and plays an important part in the power generation portfolio, most notably since the construction of the Three Gorges Dam. Hydro capacity is expected to double to 290 GW until 2020, but concerns about the social and environmental impact of large-scale hydro power are becoming stronger. Although China is the world's leading solar manufacturer, installed solar photovoltaic power capacity amounts to a mere 0.01% of total power generation capacity (80 MW, approx. 50% of which are off-grid). Solar power equipment is produced almost exclusively for export. Considering China's enormous energy demand and the pace of its growth, deployment of solar photovoltaic power is not viewed as a first-rate solution to satisfy China's energy needs, since it features high costs and low efficiencies compared to other renewables like hydro or wind power. While China does not have significant amounts of solar PV capacity, it is the biggest market for solar thermal systems for heating and hot water supply with 64,5% of global capacity, amounting to 68 GW. Biomass covers 13% of primary energy demand, mostly used in rural households for heating and cooking. In 2007, only 0,28% of power generation capacity were fuelled by biomass. The government plans to expand biomass capacity from 2 to 30 GW by 2020. Despite the impressive progress of recent years, renewable energies - excluding hydro - only contribute less than 1% to China's electricity supply and the skies above China's urban areas continue to be shrouded by smog. Since coal-fired power generation accounts for 82,9% of total electricity supply, it is no surprise that half of China's emissions are attributable to power generation. With electricity demand growing rapidly alongside the economy, dependency on coal as the major source for power generation is likely to persist. However, as the most important source of renewable energy next to hydro, and growth of installed capacity constantly accelerating, peaking at about 130% in 2007, wind power is one of – if not the – most promising option on China's path towards diversification of the energy mix. In recent years wind power has become a mainstream source of renewable energy excelling with mature technology and power generation costs almost competitive with conventional power sources, providing a viable alternative to coal as a source of electricity generation. In 2005, just before the development of wind power started to pick up pace, the China Wind Power Training and Research Project (CWPP) of the German Development Cooperation (GTZ) saw its inception, with the aim of improving the conditions for sustained development of wind power in China. Primary objective of CWPP is the support of sustained long-term wind power development in China. To attain this goal CWPP supports the improvement of technical capabilities of private and government institutions and organizations through activities in the fields of wind power training, technical support and research. The project's engagement ranges from training of technicians in charge of operation and maintenance (OM) at wind farms to the introduction and localisation of software vital to wind resource assessment. These capacity building activities are complemented by wind power information services as well as policy advice to relevant government institutions. The CWPP activities and the indicators measuring its success are based on an analysis of framework conditions in 2003/2004. However, since then the general conditions for wind power in China have changed drastically due to policy changes inducing exponential growth of the industry. While from 2000 to 2005 total installed capacity grew at an average rate of 31%, it more than doubled in the last two years. Newly installed capacity increased at an even faster rate averaging 156% annual growth from 2005 till 2007. In light of the boom in the Chinese wind power sector, it is imperative to realign project activities with actual market conditions on the basis of an up-to-date assessment of the current situation and future outlook. This analysis of the wind power sector in China in 2008 will serve as a basis for the review of current CWPP activities with the aim of developing recommendations for adaptations where deemed necessary. Content Methodology: The study is divided into seven chapters. Subsequent to the introduction, the global development of wind power, its major drivers and trends are discussed briefly serving as a backdrop to the study. The third chapter introduces CWPP and its activities along with the current status of project implementation. The fourth and fifth chapter form the main body of this study. Beginning with the current picture of energy supply and demand, the fourth chapter goes on to introduce the relevant government authorities in charge of Chinese renewable energy policy. Since the basis for wind power development is government support, a detailed examination of renewable energy policy in China is given. The policies governing the wind power sector are reviewed in order to explore the origins of the current boom of the wind power industry. The fifth chapter offers an in-depth discussion of wind power in China, including wind power potential, current status of the market and future development as well as the situation with regards to wind power equipment manufacturers and project developers. In the sixth chapter, major determinants that have the potential to negatively affect the perspectives of wind power development in China are identified and discussed. As a conclusion, chapter seven offers recommendations for the realignment of CWPP activities according to the actual needs of the market. A series of expert interviews was conducted within the scope of the study. The experts interviewed included representatives of relevant government authorities, foreign and domestic wind turbine manufacturers, component suppliers, project developers, industry associations, universities, research institutes, consultancies, CDM agencies and environmental organizations. These interviews serve as a supplement to the evaluation of secondary literature and online sources so as to guarantee the timeliness and validity of information in the study. In cooperation with the China Electric Power Research Institute (CEPRI) and the Chinese Wind Energy Association (CWEA) the need for wind power-specific training and education for wind power equipment manufacturers and power generation companies was assessed through two separate surveys. In addition, two polls were conducted among wind turbine and component manufacturers at the China Wind Energy Exhibition 2008 in Shanghai and the Wind Power Asia 2008 in Beijing. These polls helped to identify the major challenges for the wind sector's future development in China and contributed to the assessment of the current situation with regard to human resources and qualification.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: 1.INTRODUCTION7 1.1BACKGROUND7 1.2CONTENT METHODOLOGY9 2.THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT OF WIND POWER10 2.1DEVELOPMENT OF THE GLOBAL WIND POWER MARKET10 2.2DRIVERS AND TRENDS OF WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT12 3.THE GTZ CHINA WIND POWER PROJECT17 4.ENERGY POLICY IN CHINA19 4.1ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND19 4.2RELEVANT PLAYERS IN ENERGY POLICY MAKING22 4.3RENEWABLE ENERGY AND WIND POWER POLICY25 4.3.1THE CONCESSION PROGRAMME AND ORIGINS OF WIND POWER PRICING25 4.3.2THE RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW29 4.3.3INVESTMENT CONDITIONS FINANCIAL INCENTIVES33 5.WIND POWER IN CHINA39 5.1WIND ENERGY RESOURCE CHARACTERISTICS AND DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL39 5.2CURRENT STATUS OF DEVELOPMENT42 5.3MARKET FORECAST45 5.4WIND TURBINE MANUFACTURERS47 5.5WIND TURBINE COMPONENT SUPPLIERS55 5.6PROJECT DEVELOPERS55 5.7PROJECT ECONOMICS56 6.POTENTIAL PITFALLS FOR WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA58 6.1POLICY59 6.2HUMAN RESOURCES60 6.3WIND FARM PERFORMANCE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY63 6.4GRID INTEGRATION64 7.RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GTZ CHINA WIND POWER PROJECT67 7.1WIND POWER EDUCATION TRAINING68 7.2RD AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY BUILDING70 7.3INFORMATION SERVICES71 7.4FINAL REMARKS73 Bibliography72Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 6.1, Potential Pitfalls for Wind Power Development in China: Wind power in China faces a series of adverse outer influences at present. Most of these are not expected to constitute insurmountable barriers to wind power development, but will impact the pace of development nonetheless. The financial crisis on Wall Street that has spread to financial markets around the world, spurs serious worries of a global economic downturn. The renewable energy sector is hit particularly hard by a deterioration of investor confidence, since many observers assume that renewable energy development same as environmental concerns will be shelved until the economies show signs of recovery. The wind industry in China will not be exempt from negative effects of the crisis. Since raising capital will prove difficult in this situation, planned IPOs will be moved back and investments may be deferred. The fall in oil prices in fear of a recession contributes to increase the discrepancy in profitability between conventional power and renewable energy projects (decrease the relative competitiveness of renewables). The rise in coal prices and the credit squeeze further draws liquidity from the market for project development. Rising prices in raw materials drive the increase in wind turbine prices. However, wind power development in China also faces a series of challenges of intrinsic nature. The tremendous pace at which the Chinese wind power sector has been evolving entails an inherent risk of undesirable developments. Reports of wind turbines not performing as expected or even collapsing, lack of due diligence in planning of wind farms, serial production errors in turbines, the counterfeiting of components. These incidents are often portrayed as isolated, but may be representative of greater erroneous trends in the industry. Government regulation will be essential in addressing the issues at stake and preventing them from becoming fundamental barriers to future wind power development. Policy: As mentioned before, government renewable energy and wind power policy have been the single most important driver for wind power development around the world. This is also true for China. A combination of wind power development targets, mandatory market share requirements, economic incentives and protective policies have created a burgeoning wind power market and a thriving domestic industry. Nevertheless, in order to prevent a bust from following the boom, a few adjustments of the policy framework are necessary in order to provide for sustained wind power development. Restrictive government policies, particularly with regard to wind power pricing and foreign investment, pose a serious barrier to the exploitation of a diverse set of investment sources for wind power development in China. Obstructive regulations for FDI, especially with regard to debt financing and CDM project ownership, serve as deterrents for foreign investors. Modes for participation in the regulatory process are unclear, as are rights to appeal regulatory decisions. The lack of a clear pricing policy guaranteeing secure and attractive profit margins for wind power projects has kept many potential investors at bay. Limited access to proper financing and insurance further discourages private and foreign investors. The development of a competitive power sector is also impeded by the dominance of state-owned power generators, who retain strong and often opaque links to state funds, while their levels of profit, subsidies and cross-subsidisation are undisclosed. The government has largely recognized the challenge to open up the market to private and foreign investors. Movement towards further improvement of the policy framework governing wind power is visible. Recently, the government has been addressing many of the most important barriers impeding wind power development. Wind power pricing policy has been slowly moving towards a more predictable and lucrative system of fixed feed-in tariffs. Government action has been taken to alleviate deficiencies regarding reliable wind resource data and the innovation capability of the domestic industry. According to some observers, CDM regulations are expected to be loosened in favour of foreign investors. Still, a number of challenges remain to be addressed, demanding government guidance in order to facilitate sustained, long-term development of wind power in China: - Enforce efforts to provide adequate wind power education and training programmes to ease the human resource deficit. - Establish strong mandatory wind turbine certification standards and support capacity building in the field of turbine testing, in order to ensure turbine quality/reliability and in the long-run improve global competitiveness of the domestic wind industry. - Facilitate smooth grid integration of wind power by: - strengthening the national power grid and interregional transmission capacity, taking into consideration the integration of wind power in the design of grid expansion plans by establishing management regulations and technical specifications to integrate wind power into grid planning; - mapping out comprehensive wind power development plans on national and provincial level in consultation with the grid companies, taking into account construction of other power generation capacity, (interregional) transmission capacity as well as the specific requirements of wind power grid integration; - redoubling research efforts with regard to the analysis of the influence of extensive deployment of wind power on the operation and management of the power grid, intensifying studies on accurate wind power forecasting to allow for effective dispatch of power and establishing a national grid code for wind turbines to ensure maximum electricity output of wind farms. - Tweak FDI, CDM and wind power policies to allow for more diversity in investment and enhance the efficiency of the power sector by creating a fair and open market. Clarify wind power pricing policies and facilitate access to government subsidized bank loans. - Increase transparency within the wind industry and power sector, e.g. with regard to information on wind farm energy output and turbine availability, in order to facilitate competition and intra-industry learning processes, enable timely identification of challenges and build investor confidence. Information transparency is also necessary to improve energy demand and (wind power) supply forecasts and thus provide for proper dispatch of power plants.

The Philippine economy has emerged as one of the fastest growing economies in East Asia, with growth accelerating to 7.1 percent in the third quarter. The acceleration of domestic demand since the first quarter of 2012 reflects the country's strong macroeconomic fundamentals, stronger government finances, and high confidence in the Aquino government's commitment to reform. Sound macroeconomic fundamentals, as seen in low inflation, and large current account surpluses and foreign exchange reserves, have continued to shield the economy from external headwinds, while a more diversified export basket allowed total exports to grow, despite the decline in electronics exports. Overall, the economy is expected to expand by over six percent this year, up from 3.9 percent last year. However, more structural reforms are needed to create more and better jobs, as the overall labor market outcome has been less responsive to the higher economic growth. The economy needs to shift from consumption towards investment, both public and private. The special focus sections of this update demonstrate that the implementation of such reforms can have high payoffs in terms of jobs and inclusive growth. Finally, by scaling-up and broadening several open government/open data initiatives in the country, the strengthening of inclusive institutions would be greatly enhanced, in line with the core principles of this government.

Kenya may be at a "tipping point," the theme of the third Kenya economic update which has a special focus on the transformative impact of information and communication technology (ICT) and mobile money. Over the last decade, ICT has outperformed all others sectors growing at an average of 20 percent per year. The benefits of ICT are starting to be felt in other sectors, and have contributed to the conditions for Kenya to reach this tipping point. Kenya has entered the new decade with renewed and stronger than expected growth. The passing of the new constitution, continued strong macroeconomic policies, and a favorable regional environment have created a new positive economic momentum. Kenya may again be positioned to experience high growth. Over the last three decades Kenya has experienced only two short episodes when economic growth exceeded five percent and was sustained for at least three consecutive years: 1986-88, and 2004-2007. Is Kenya again at the verge of experiencing another growth spurt? Will it last longer and go deeper than the previous two episodes?

Cambodia continues to enjoy robust growth, albeit at a slightly slower pace. Real growth in 2014 is estimated to have reached 7.0 percent. The garment sector, together with construction and services, in particular finance and real estate, continues to propel growth. However, there are signs of weaknesses in garment and agricultural production that are slightly slowing growth. Overall macroeconomic management remains appropriate. Fiscal consolidation continues with further improvements in revenue collection resulting from enhanced administration. Poverty continues to fall in Cambodia (poverty headcount rate in 2012 was 17.7 percent) although the pace of poverty reduction has declined significantly. Cambodia's real growth rate is expected to moderate to 6.9 percent in 2015 and 2016, as it confronts stronger competition in garment exports, continued weak agriculture sector growth, and softer growth in the tourism sector. Recent developments include: the garment sector continues to be one of Cambodia's main engines of growth, the external position remains stable, supported by healthy foreign direct investment inflows, underpinning the overall macroeconomic stability, Exchange rate targeting continues to support price stability, inflation has eased significantly with continuing depressed food prices and the recent decline in oil prices, and financial deepening continues, supporting economic expansion as deposit and credit growth accelerated quickly in 2014.

Afghanistan faces a severe problem of poor nutrition and food insecurity. Chronic malnutrition among Afghan children is one of the highest in the world. This report investigates the status of food insecurity in Afghanistan with a focus on mapping provincial differences and an emphasis on understanding the impact of rising food prices on key measures of food security. It synthesizes findings from analysis of rising food prices and their impact on different measures of food access and utilization (such as calorie intake, protein consumption and the quality of diet) in Afghanistan. The findings are based on the analysis of data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/08, a sample of over 20,000 households from all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. This analytical work is an integral part of the on-going collaboration between the Government of Afghanistan and the World Bank in the domain of poverty and vulnerability assessment. It aims to further the understanding of household wellbeing and vulnerability from the standpoint of food security and complements the earlier work presented in 'poverty status in Afghanistan. Finally, given that poor nutrition and food insecurity affect a sizeable proportion of the Afghan population year-round but more so during bad times, there is genuine need for a scaled-up and well-targeted safety nets program in Afghanistan.

This Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) provides an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the existing financial reporting infrastructure that underpins financial accounting and auditing practices in Cape Verde. The assessment focuses on six pillars of financial reporting infrastructure: statutory framework, professional education and training, accountancy profession, accounting standards, auditing standards, and monitoring and enforcement of the applicable standards. The main purpose of this assessment is to assist the development and implementation of a country action plan for strengthening institutional capacity with attendant effects on enhancing corporate financial reporting in Cape Verde. The findings reveal that Cape Verde has recognized the importance of a strong corporate financial reporting architecture. In terms of accounting and auditing standards, Cape Verde adapted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for the private companies and fully adopted IFRS for banking and insurance institutions sector. However, there is no tradition of financial analysis in the country (except within the financial institutions when issuing credit) and no credit-rating agencies. The banks do not rely on corporate financial statements; generally, the lenders manage credit risks using collaterals. The Bank of Cape Verde mandated IFRS for banks and insurance companies in 2008. In addition, the capacity of regulators would be built to cope with the demands of IFRS-compliant financial reporting. The central bank would include in its scope the regulation of micro-finance institutions, which are currently unregulated. In order to improve the legal framework of corporate financial reporting, there is need to enact a Financial Reporting Act with focus on all regulatory aspects of accounting and auditing.

For the last three years, Pakistan has been making efforts to revive strong and sustained growth. The economy was badly destabilized by the turmoil in the international commodity and financial markets in 2007-2008 and the lack of adequate domestic policy responses to manage those external shocks. The task of stabilizing the economy and reviving the economic recovery has been made difficult by an adverse security situation and domestic politics that has prevented the government from taking timely required, but difficult, stabilization measures. The devastating floods in July-August last year and the recent increase in international oil and food prices have exacerbated the problem. In addition, Pakistan continues to face significant political challenges in achieving durable development. The domestic security situation as a result of campaign against terrorism is a direct and indirect tax on the costs of economic activity and the achievement of the kinds of social stability required to promote a supportive environment for businesses.

Since the last Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) meeting, the PA has continued to strengthen its institutions, delivering public services and promoting reforms that many existing states struggle with. The quality of its public financial management (PFM) has further improved. Education and health in the West Bank and Gaza (WB&G) are highly developed, comparing favorably to the performance of countries in the region as well as globally. Ultimately, sustainable economic growth in WB&G can only be underpinned by a vibrant private sector. The latter will not rebound significantly while Israeli restrictions on access to natural resources and markets remain in place, and as long as investors are deterred by the increased cost of business associated with the closure regime. Education and health indicators for WB&G are impressive and reflect extensive coverage of the population, but a focus on improving the quality of these services remains warranted. Similarly, education investments take time to mature. While the PA is already implementing an education sector plan that highlights the importance of improving the quality of education, the relevance of graduates' skills remains an area requiring further attention. This report will therefore reflect on recent growth trends but also on the future trade regime and employability of the WB&G labor force.

Malaysia is a multiethnic, upper-middle-income country that has relied heavily on income from its natural resources to engineer successful diversification into manufacturing and sharply increased incomes for all ethnic groups. This paper examines the role of the policy-making process and national leadership in effecting this structural change and growth with equity. It discusses the government's role in transforming corporate ownership patterns while nurturing industrial enterprises into niche products within complex value-added chains. At the same time, the paper underscores the difficulties and costs of attempting to move into areas where an economy has no strong advantages, in this case heavy industries. Privatization is seen to have been a powerful tool for expanding private enterprise despite limited entrepreneurial skills, but it is questionable as a sustainable strategy; the aggressive formation of new firms seems to offer better long-term prospects. An appropriate regime of policy making and implementation is required, characterized by political determination, stability, high attention to growth with equity, experimentation, and an ability to learn through implementation, both at home and from the experience of others. These are key factors accounting for the relative success of Malaysia. Nothing in the Malaysian experience suggests that it is possible or desirable to undertake reforms serially; in fact, the evidence suggests that the "reform cluster" approach to policy implementation is more effective because it addresses several coordination problems at the same time.

Relevance of research topic. The number of Ukrainian holding-type organizations and their land bankcontinues to grow, "displacing" small and medium-sized producers from the agricultural economy.Since 2019, state policy has been refocusing on forced support for small and small-scale farms, and after the Ukrainian decentralization reform the leadership of the united territorial communities of the new tools they received depends on the development of small and medium-sized businesses. Formulation of the problem. Today, the actualization of local economic development requires significant financial resources from the united territorial communities. And the formation of their budget depends on the effectiveagricultural sector operation. After the Ukrainian reform of local self-government and decentralization, the economic development of the territories and of Ukraine as a whole, depends on the using of new tools and resources by the community leadership. The solution of theagrarian sphere problems of the united territorial communities is in the plane ofsmall agrarian entrepreneurship state support, strengthening of the state control over the activity of large agro-traders, as well as their social and financial responsibility to the united territorial communities. Analysis of recent research and publications. Theoretical questions on the study of small agrarian entrepreneurship in the development of united territorial communities were engaged in such scientists of the Institute of Economics of NASU, Institute of Agrarian Economics of NAAS of Ukraine, as Shemyakin D., Finagina O. V., Lysetsky A. S., Onishchenko O. M., and other national and foreign scientists. Selection of unexplored parts of the general problem. The issue of the impact of decentralization on theagricultural sector development of the united territorial communities needs to be detailed and further researched. Setting the task, the purpose of the study. The article aim is to investigate the theoretical aspect of organizational and legal foundations of the formation of united territorial communities in Ukraine, assess thesmall agricultural business current state and trace its relationship with the activities of united territorial communities for economic development. Method or methodology for conducting research. The set of general scientific methods of cognition and special methods of economic research are used in the work. Among them: analysis and synthesis, generalization and comparison, system-structural and comparative analysis, systematic method of cognition of economic processes and phenomena, index method and method of statistical groupings for analysis of united territorial communities activity development of the agro-industrial complex of Ukraine. Presentation of the main material (results of work). The article considers the theoretical aspect of organizational and legal foundations of the united territorial communities formation in Ukraine, assesses the current state of small agricultural business and reveals it's main relationships with the united territorial communities activities for region economic development. Territorial communities are voluntary associations of residents of city, village and settlement councils, which directly receive funding from the state budget for the development of education, medicine, sports, culture, and social protection. Financial support from the state gives more opportunities to local communities to implement their own projects. The more active the territorial community, the more projects will be implemented and theterritorial communityprofitability level will be higher, which it will spend on the development of territories. This is the main incentive to attract additional investment to improve people's living standards. In 2020, theUkrainian Cabinet of Ministers adopted 24 orders on the definition of administrative centers and approval ofregional community's territories. There are 1469 territorial communities in our country. After the launch of the decentralization process in Ukraine – the transfer of powers and resources to places from which the community itself determines the direction of funding, small communities require forresource lack for rural development. The solution has beena decision to consolidate several councils by merging, which allowed communities to use common resources for territorial development. Ukraine owns 60.3 million hectares, which is about 6% of Europe's territory.There are 32.7 millionarable land hectares of land in the structure ofUkrainian agricultural territory, of which almost 9 million are used as pastures, hayfields and other agricultural lands. The quarter of agricultural land was never distributed, remaining on the balance of the state. Thus, state and the communal property include 10.5 million hectares of agricultural land, which is 26% of the total area, of which 3.2 million hectares – in the permanent use of state enterprises, 2.5 million hectares – in stock, and the rest – for rent. Almost 40% of the total number of Ukrainian enterprises in the agricultural sector and 38% of the area of agricultural land cultivated by agricultural enterprises are absorbed by agricultural holdings and large agricultural traders. On June 1, 2019, there were more than 160 large agricultural holdings in the country, they cultivate more than 3.6 million hectares of agricultural land. Thus, today in Ukraine the number of holding-type organizations and their land bank continues to grow, "displacing" small and medium-sized producers from the agricultural economy. Thecommunity agrarian branch is a complex multi-sectoral system, the individual subsystems of which are unevenly represented in different territorial formations, but are in close interaction with each other. The role of small agrarian businesses in the development of united territorial community'sagriculture is constantly growing. In recent years, the share of farms has increased by 30%. With the development of farming in the agricultural regions of Ukraine, the opportunities to solve the problem of employment in rural areas and the revival of territories in general are increasing. Therefore, state support for agricultural producers is an important step in order to obtain funds for small business development in the agro-industrial sector. If earlier the preference of vectors of state support was in large agro-traders, then from 2019 the policy of the state was reoriented to the strengthened support of small and small-scale farms. Such support is confirmed by financial preferences for small agribusiness through regional branches of the Ukrainian State Farm Support Fund. Agricultural cooperatives will receive state support through cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture of Ukraine with the assistance of the Department. Thus, today the promissory note form of payment has been abolished, and 70% of the cost of their equipment has been reimbursed for cooperatives. As a result of the crisis of 2014-2016, many Ukrainians started doing business and many successful cases of micro and small agricultural enterprises operating in the regions appeared in the country. However, barriers to rural development are a lack of financial resources and a lack of economic knowledge. Therefore, in order to maximally support farms and agro-industrial entrepreneurship in rural areas by the state, high-quality interaction and communication on the ground is needed. Thus, in addition to financial support, the state program also includes advising agricultural producers. Experienced specialists will help to structure the business, calculate the financial and create a business plan. In 2020, the budget of financial support for the agro-industrial sector of Ukraine is set at 4 billion UAH, which is only 43% of the limit – does not meet 1% of GDP. the real need for financial state support of a key sector of Ukraine's economy. The implementation of the program of financing micro and small agribusiness has great potential not only in the country, but also within each united territorial community. Each of them, which participates in the program of state support of small agrarian business, annually receives about 75 thousand UAH of taxes to its budget. On a national scale, this is an additional UAH 75 million ($ 3.06 million) in taxes to local budgets over 5 years. The possibility of organizational and legal forms of micro and small agribusiness, according to the current legislation of Ukraine, to hire labor – partially solves the problem of unemployment in rural areas. A significant contribution is also made by micro and small agribusiness in increasing the volume of gross domestic product in Ukraine. Small and medium business in Ukraine brings 55% of gross domestic product to the country's economy, and micro and small business 16%, while in Europe the figure is twice as high, and their efficiency is 10 times higher than in our country. It is the subjects of small and medium-sized businesses in the field of agriculture that are powerful catalysts and stimulators of business activity, determine the unification of all participants in economic relations in the country. Therefore, state support and effective development of united territorial community'sagribusiness create the basis for the emergence and functioning of the institutional environment. Thus, giving 12% of Ukraine's GDP and providing jobs for members of the local community, small agribusiness entities need the development of agricultural equipment suppliers, agricultural processors, research institutions that conduct breeding work and develop modern technologies, logistics infrastructure, market structures, as well as institutions of agricultural education. The agro-industrial sphere of the community is the main means of ensuring the socio-economic development of territorial united territorial communitiesand the effective functioning of rural areas. However, the distribution of agricultural land and land ownership remains an urgent problem for united territorial communities, as in addition to the territorial base, the land is a means of agricultural production. The population of the united territorial community is the main consumer of agricultural products produced by small agricultural enterprises. So, it provides a reproduction of labor for the industry. The vector of development of united territorial community'sagricultural production depends on the availability of natural, productive and labor resources of the community. The most energy-intensive are the production of vegetable crops, sugar beets, potatoes, industrial crops, as well as certain livestock industries, which are more often engaged in by farms and small agricultural enterprises. The study found that in Ukraine, government measures are the main obstacle to the development of agro-industrial entrepreneurship in united territorial communities, because it creates an extremely unfavorable climate for the development of small and medium enterprises or prohibits it altogether. For many years in a row, the sources of budget formation, which are generally local taxes, remain a significant problem in the development of agriculturally oriented united territorial communities. The limitation of incomes of agricultural enterprises and the population is the low efficiency of agricultural enterprises, the main reason for which is the low wages of peasants. The reason for this problem in the agricultural sector is low productivity, which forms the added value of agricultural products. Examining the structure of Ukrainian small agrarian business, its players in general education were classified into two large groups: 1. Farmers and agricultural producers living and working in rural areas. They live in a society within the lands of which they rent shares, pay all the necessary taxes, provide residents of general education with jobs, finished agricultural products at affordable prices. 2. Farmers who are registered in Ukrainian cities, however, use the land of the community, paying only the rent of agricultural land, depleting them due to non-compliance with crop rotations. Such agro-traders enjoy state support, soft loans and other preferences, receive super-profits and in no way contribute to the development of agricultural areas and society. These are the activities of large agro-industrial holdings, the form of interaction with rural general education and the mechanisms of social responsibility which need to be worked out with the help of the following measures by the government and agricultural producers: 1) development and restoration of the infrastructure of the united territorial communities and its elements used by agricultural holdings; 2) use of modern ecologically safe agrotechnologies. 3) training of qualified specialists in the field of agro-industrial complex, their employment in modern agro-industrial companies; 4) state support, restoration and preservation of recreational and health facilities of the united territorial communities, including agricultural lands, which are leased by large agricultural holdings; 5) involvement in the economic activity of the agricultural holding of farms on a partnership basis. Thus, partnerships and cooperation between large agricultural holdings and small agricultural producers of united territorial communities can contribute not only to the development of small agricultural businesses in Ukraine, but also to the socio-economic development of society and rural areas in general. The field of application of results. Thescientific research results on the problems of small agricultural entrepreneurship in the development of united territorial communities can be used in the field of state regulation of agribusiness and united territorial communities to support local agricultural producers. Conclusions according to the article. The agro-industrial sphere of the communities is the main means of ensuring the socio-economic development of territorial communities and the effective functioning of rural areas, because the development of farming opportunities increases the problem of rural employment and the revival of territories in general. That is why state support for agricultural producers is an important step to obtain funds for small business development in the agro-industrial sector.

The Silicon Valley Bank failure strikes me as a colossal failure of bank regulation, and instructive on how rotten the whole edifice is. I write this post in an inquisitive spirit. I don't know the details of how SVB was regulated, and I hope some readers do and can chime in. As reported so far by media, the collapse was breathtakingly simple. SVB paid a bit higher interest rates than the measly 0.01% (yes) that Chase offers. It attracted large deposits from venture capital backed firms in the valley. Crucially, only the first $250,000 are insured, so most of those deposits are uninsured. The deposits are financially savvy customers who know they have to get in line first should anything go wrong. SVB put much of that money into long-maturity bonds, hoping to reap the difference between slightly higher long-term interest rates and what it pays on deposits.  But as we've known for hundreds of years, if interest rates rise, then the market value of those long-term bonds fall. Now if everyone comes asking for their money back, the assets are not worth enough to pay everyone back.  In sum, you have "duration mismatch" plus run-prone uninsured depositors. We teach this in the first week of an MBA or undergraduate banking class. This isn't crypto or derivatives or special purpose vehicles or anything fancy. Where were the regulators? The Dodd Frank act added hundreds of thousands of pages of regulations, and an army of hundreds of regulators. The Fed enacts "stress tests" in case regular regulation fails. How can this massive architecture fail to spot basic duration mismatch and a massive run-prone deposit base? It's not hard to fix, either. Banks can quickly enter swap contracts to cheaply alter their exposure to interest rate risk without selling the whole asset portfolio. Michael Cembalist assembled numbers. This wasn't hard to see. Even Q3 2022 -- a long time ago -- SVB was a huge outlier in having next to no retail deposits (vertical axis, "sticky" because they are insured and regular people), and a huge asset base of loans and securities. Michael then asks .. how much duration risk did each bank take in its investment portfolio during the deposit surge, and how much was invested at the lows in Treasury and Agency yields? As a proxy for these questions now that rates have risen, we can examine the impact on Common Equity Tier 1 Capital ratios from an assumed immediate realization of unrealized securities losses ... That's what is shown in the first chart: again, SVB was in a duration world of its own as of the end of 2022, which is remarkable given its funding profile shown earlier.Again, in simpler terms. "Capital" is the value of assets (loans, securities) less debt (mostly deposits). But banks are allowed to put long-term assets into a "hold to maturity" bucket, and not count declines in the market value of those assets. That's great, unless people knock on the door and ask for their money now, in which case the bank has to sell the securities, and then it realizes the market value. Michael simply asked how much each bank was worth in Q42002 if it actually had to sell its assets. A bit less in each case -- except SVB (third from left) where the answer is essentially zero. And Michael just used public data. This is not a hard calculation for the Fed's team of dozens of regulators assigned to each large bank. Perhaps the rules are at fault? If a regulator allows "hold to maturity" accounting, then, as above, they might think the bank is fine. But are regulators really so blind? Are the hundreds of thousands of pages of rules stopping them from making basic duration calculations that you can do in an afternoon? If so, a bonfire is in order. This isn't the first time. Notice that when SBF was pillaging FTX customer funds for proprietary trading, the SEC did not say "we knew all about this but didn't have enough rules to stop it." The Bank of England just missed a collapse of pension funds who were doing exactly the same thing: borrowing against their long bonds to double up, and forgetting that occasionally markets go the wrong way and you have to sell to make margin calls. (That's week 2 of the MBA class.)  Ben Eisen and Andrew Ackerman in WSJ ask the right question (10 minutes before I started writing this post!) Where Were the Regulators as SVB Crashed? "The aftermath of these two cases is evidence of a significant supervisory problem," said Karen Petrou, managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics, a regulatory advisory firm for the banking industry. "That's why we have fleets of bank examiners, and that's what they're supposed to be doing."The Federal Reserve was the primary federal regulator for both banks.Notably, the risks at the two firms were lurking in plain sight. A rapid rise in assets and deposits was recorded on their balance sheets, and mounting losses on bond holdings were evident in notes to their financial statements.moreover, "Rapid growth should always be at least a yellow flag for supervisors," said Daniel Tarullo, a former Federal Reserve governor who was the central bank's point person on regulation following the financial crisis...In addition, nearly 90% of SVB's deposits were uninsured, making them more prone to flight in times of trouble since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. doesn't stand behind them.90% is a big number. Hard to miss.  The article echoes some confusion about "liquidity"SVB and Silvergate both had less onerous liquidity rules than the biggest banks. In the wake of the failures, regulators may take a fresh look at liquidity rules,...This is absolutely not about liquidity. SBV would have been underwater if it sold all its securities at the bid prices. Also Silvergate and SVB may have been particularly susceptible to the change in economic conditions because they concentrated their businesses in boom-bust sectors...That suggests the need for regulators to take a broader view of the risks in the financial system. "All the financial regulators need to start taking charge and thinking through the structural consequences of what's happening right now," she [Saule Omarova] saidAbsolutely not! I think the problem may be that regulators are taking "big views," like climate stress tests. This is basic Finance 101 measure duration risk and hot money deposits. This needs a narrow view! There is a larger implication. The Fed faces many headwinds in its interest rate raising effort. For example, each point of higher real interest rates raises interest costs on the debt by about $250 billion (1 percent x 100% debt/GDP ratio). A rate rise that leads to recession will lead to more stimulus and bailout, which is what fed inflation in the first place. But now we have another. If the Fed has allowed duration risk to seep in to the too-big to fail banking system, then interest rate rises will induce the hard choice between yet more bailout and a financial storm. Let us hope the problem is more limited - as Michael's graphs suggest. Why did SVB do it? How could they be so blind to the idea that interest rates might rise? Why did Silicon Valley startups risk cash, that they now claim will force them to bankruptcy, in uninsured deposits? Well, they're already clamoring for a bailout. And given 2020, in which the Fed bailed out even money market funds, the idea that surely a bailout will rescue us should anything go wrong might have had something to do with it. (On the startup bailout. It is claimed that the startups who put all their cash in SVB will now be forced to close, so get going with the bailout now. It is not startups who lose money, it is their venture capital investors, and it is they who benefit from the bailout. Let us presume they don't suffer sunk cost fallacy. You have a great company, worth investing $10 million. The company loses $5 million of your cash before they had a chance to spend it. That loss obviously has nothing to do with the company's prospects. What do you do? Obviously, pony up another $5 million and get it going again. And tell them to put their cash in a real bank this time.) How could this enormous regulatory architecture miss something so simple? This is something we should be asking more generally. 8% inflation. Apparently simple bank failures. What went wrong? Everyone  I know at the Fed are smart, hard working, honest and dedicated public servants. It's about the least political agency in Washington. Yet how can we be seeing such simple o-ring level failures? I can only conclude that this overall architecture -- allow large leverage, assume regulators will spot risks -- is inherently broken. If such good people are working in a system that cannot spot something so simple, the project is hopeless. After all, a portfolio of long-term treasuries is about the safest thing on the planet -- unless it is financed by hot money deposits. Why do we have teams of regulators looking over the safest assets on the planet? And failing? Time to start over, as I argued in Towards a run free financial systemOr... back to my first question, am I missing something? ****Updates: A nice explainer thread (HT marginal revolution). VC invests in a new company. SVB offers an additional few million in debt, with one catch, the company must use SVB as the bank for deposits. SVB invests the deposits in long-term mortgage backed securities. SVB basically prints up money to use for its investment! "SVB goes to founders right after they raise a very, very expensive venture round from top venture firms offering:- 10-30% of the round in debt- 12-24 month term- interest only with a balloon payment- at a rate just above prime For investors, it also seems like a no-downside scenario for your portfolio: Give up 10-25 bps in dilution for a gigantic credit facility at functionally zero interest rate.If your PortCo doesn't need it, the cash just sits. If they do, it might save them in a crunch. The deals typically have deposit covenants attached. Meaning: you borrow from us, you bank with us.And everyone is broadly okay with that deal. It's a pretty easy sell! "You need somewhere to put your money. Why not put it with us and get cheap capital too?"Update:1) Old Eagle Eye's comment below is fascinating. I am getting the sense that the rules actually preclude putting 2+2=4 together here. Copied here in totoSIVB did have a hedge put on during 2022, but it was limited to its available-for-sale securities ("AFS"). It was precluded from hedging its interest rate risk in held-to-maturity securities ("HTM") by U.S. GAAP rules. [My emphasis] Here is the explanation found at PwC:[PWC Viewpoint Commentary: "The notion of hedging the interest rate risk in a security classified as held to maturity is inconsistent with the held-to-maturity classification under ASC 320, which requires the reporting entity to hold the security until maturity regardless of changes in market interest rates. For this reason, ASC 815-20-25-43(c)(2) indicates that interest rate risk may not be the hedged risk in a fair value hedge of held-to-maturity debt securities." "ASC 815-20-25-12(d) provides guidance on the eligibility of held-to-maturity debt securities for designation as a hedged item in a fair value hedge."][Extracted subsection:"Chapter 6: Hedges of financial assets and liabilities. "6.4 Hedging fixed-rate instruments"6.4.3.4 Hedging held-to-maturity debt securities"ASC 815-20-25-12(d)"If the hedged item is all or a portion of a debt security (or a portfolio of similar debt securities) that is classified as held to maturity in accordance with Topic 320, the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to credit risk, foreign exchange risk, or both. If the hedged item is an option component of a held-to-maturity security that permits its prepayment, the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in the entire fair value of that option component. If the hedged item is other than an option component of a held-to-maturity security that permits its prepayment, the designated hedged risk also shall not be the risk of changes in its overall fair value."]Source: PWC Viewpoint (viewpoint.pwc.com) Publication date: 31 Jul 2022https://viewpoint.pwc.com/dt/us/en/pwc/accounting_guides/derivatives_and_hedg/derivatives_and_hedg_US/chapter_6_hedges_of__US/64_hedging_fixedrate_US.htmlUpdate 2: Thanks to anonymous below for a pointer to a good New York Times article about SVB, what the Fed knew and when. Apparently the bank's supervisors knew about problems for a long time before the bank failed. Whether this is good or bad news for the regulatory project I leave to you.