"A series of recent studies deals with the effects of European Monetary Union (EMU) on regional labour market disparities in the EU. In this context concern has been expressed that EMU together with low labour mobility and inflexible wages will cause increasing regional disparities in the EU. However, the spatial dimension of labour market problems is largely neglected in the corresponding analyses. In contrast, the present paper focuses on the spatial structure of regional unemployment disparities. Regions are tightly linked by migration, commuting and interregional trade. These types of spatial interaction are exposed to frictional effects of distance, possibly causing spatial dependence of regional labour market conditions. The spatial association of regional unemployment is analysed by measures of spatial autocorrelation and spatial econometric methods for a sample of European countries between 1986 and 2000. The results point to a significant spatial dependence among regional labour markets in Europe. Regions marked by high unemployment as well as areas characterised by low unemployment tend to cluster in space. The empirical evidence also suggests that the change in regional unemployment between 1986 and 2000 was associated with an increasing concentration of labour market problems in spatial clusters." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
The report focuses on the relative macroeconomic performance since the global financial crisis of six Northern European countries with a special emphasis on Finland. While fiscal and monetary policies have definitely impacted on macroeconomic outcomes in the six countries examined, as a whole they do not appear to be the key driving forces of the differences observed between the countries. The initial vulnerabilities, the nature of shocks and the resilience of the economies appear more important in explaining the differences. In particular, the weakness of growth in Finland can best be explained by a series of exceptional negative shocks in combination with a too weak capacity of the economy to improve its cost competitiveness in the absence of exchange rate flexibility.
El presente artículo analiza la aplicación de la condicionalidad en
el Mecanismo Europeo de Estabilidad (MEDE) desde la perspectiva de los derechos
fundamentales reconocidos en el ámbito de la Unión Europea. A tal efecto,
se toman como referencia las posiciones doctrinales que han venido defendiendo
la aplicación de los convenios internacionales en materia de derechos humanos
como límite a la condicionalidad introducida por el FMI y otras instituciones financieras
internacionales en sus operaciones con los países en desarrollo. Los organismos
creados en el ámbito de la Unión Europea para dar respuesta a la crisis de
la Deuda pública de 2009-10, y de modo singular el MEDE, organismo creado para
garantizar la estabilidad de la zona euro, han introducido, sin embargo, la condicionalidad
como un elemento estructural en sus operaciones, con una filosofía
parecida a la del FMI, es decir, conseguir el crecimiento económico a partir de la
austeridad, con lo que se ha visto perjudicado el ejercicio de diversos derechos
fundamentales. Ello plantea la cuestión de la compatibilidad de tales políticas con los objetivos y principios de la Unión Europea, definida en su día como «Comunidad
de Derecho» y fundada sobre los valores de los derechos humanos.
La primera ¿y temprana¿ sentencia dictada al respecto por el Tribunal de
Justicia (sentencia Pringle) dejó, sin embargo, en el aire la cuestión de la compatibilidad
de la condicionalidad del MEDE con los objetivos y principios de la Unión
Europea y el respeto de los derechos humanos. Parece, no obstante, que este criterio
tiende a modificarse a partir del reciente fallo en Ledra Advertising, que ha
abierto la puerta a invocar el derecho de propiedad para ser indemnizado por los
daños causados por la aplicación de la condicionalidad. Con todo, será a partir de
la transformación del MEDE en el Fondo Monetario Europeo, si éste se constituye
como institución comunitaria, como puede hacerse efectiva la invocación de los
derechos fundamentales para frenar o mitigar los efectos perjudiciales de la condicionalidad.
Más aún, el control judicial de la condicionalidad en el FME podría
servir como referente para otras instituciones financieras internacionales. Egonkortasuneko Mekanismo Europarrean (EME) baldintzapena
nola aplikatzen den aztertuko dugu artikulu honetan, Europar Batasunaren esparruan
aitortuta dauden oinarrizko eskubideen ikuspegitik. Horretarako, giza eskubideen
alorrean nazioarteko hitzarmenak aplikatzearen alde egin duten jarrera doktrinalak
hartu dira erreferentziatzat, Nazioarteko Diru Funtsak (NDF) eta nazioarteko
beste finantza-erakunde batzuek garapen bidean diren herrialdeekiko operazioetan
txertatu duten baldintzapenari muga jartzeko. Europar Batasunaren eremuan
2009-2010 urteetako zor publikoaren krisiari erantzuna emateko sortu diren organismoek
eta, batez ere, EMEk (euro eremuan egonkortasuna ziurtatzeko organismoak,)
ordea, egiturazko elementu gisa sartu dute baldintzapena haien operazioetan,
NDFaren antzeko filosofia hartuta, hau da, zuhurtziaren bitartez lortu nahi dute
hazkunde ekonomikoa, eta, horren ondorioz, oinarrizko eskubide batzuk ezin izan
dira behar bezala gauzatu. Horrek mahai gainean jartzen du kontu bat, ea politika
horiek bateragarri ote diren Europar Batasunaren helburu eta printzipioekin; hasiera
batean «zuzenbidezko komunitatea» esamoldeaz definitu baitzuten EB, eta
giza eskubideetan oinarrituta eraiki.
Justizia Auzitegiak horri buruz idatzi zuen lehenengo epai ¿goiztiarrak¿ (Pringle
epaiak), ordea, ez zuen zehaztu EMEren baldintzapenak Europar Batasunaren
xede eta printzipioekin eta giza eskubideekiko errespetuarekin bat egiten ote duen.
Hala ere, badirudi irizpide hori aldatzen ari dela, Ledra Advertising-en duela gutxi
eman den epaiaren harira; izan ere, jabetzarako eskubideari dei egiteko atea
ireki du, baldintzapena ezartzearen ondorioz eragindako kalteengatiko ordaina
eskatzeari dagokionez. Hortaz, EME Europako Diru Funtsean eraldatuta bakarrik
heldu ahalko zaie oinarrizko eskubideei, EME erkideko erakunde gisa eratzen bada,
baldintzapenaren ondorio kaltegarriak geldiarazteari edo arintzeari begira. Are
gehiago, Europako Diru Funtsean baldintzapena judizialki kontrolatzea erreferentea
izan liteke nazioarteko beste finantza-erakunde batzuentzat. This article analyses the application of conditionality within the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) from the perspective of the fundamental
rights recognized within the EU. To this end, we take as a reference the doctrinal
positions that have been defending the application of international conventions
on human rights as a limit to the conditionality introduced by the IMF and another
financial international institutions in their operations with developing countries.
The public agencies created within the EU in order to meet the demands of
the public debt crisis of 2009-10, and specifically the ESM, a body created to
guarantee the Euro zone¿s stability, have nonetheless introduced the conditionality
as a structural element in their operations, with a philosophy comparable to that
of the IMF, i.e. to achieve economic growth from austerity, thus impairing the
exercise of several fundamental rights. That raises the question of compatibility of
those policies with the objectives and principles of the EU, defined one day as a
«community of law» and founded upon the values of fundamental rights.
The first ¿and early¿ judgement delivered on this ground by the European
Court of Justice (Pringle case) left nevertheless in the air the compatibility of the
conditionality of ESM with the objectives and principles of the EU and with the
respect to human rights. It seems however that this criteria tends to be modified
by the recent judgment Ledra Advertising that opened the door to invoke the right
to property in order to be compensated by damages caused as a consequence of
conditionality. Even so, it will be after the transformation of the ESM into an European
Monetary Fund, if this is constituted as a Community institution, that invoking
fundamental rights shall be effective in order to stop or mitigate the adverse
effects of conditionality. What is more, the judicial control over conditionality
within the EMF might serve as a reference for other international financial institutions.
Understanding Central Europe as a particular European region is based on historical and cultural heritage of the Mitteleuropa and on the revival of the Central European identity in the 8Oies. The Central European regional cooperation has been promoted in the late 8Oies and early 9Oies, particularly through the following cooperation schemes: Pentagonale/Central European Initiative (now dissolved), the Vishegrad Group and the Central European Free Trade Agreement-CEFTA. These schemes have been supported by the European Union and they fit its strategy of widening that is now based on the differentiated integration, which implies strengthening of economic and monetary union and defence union. + The European Union tends to link Central European region to the Baltic countries, rather than connect it with the South Eastern Europe, which is regarded as a special case, covered by the peace restoration strategy. + Central Europe is a region of uneven development and very diversified cultures and peoples. It is therefore difficult to treat it as a structured European region. EU focuses on a number of states that form "the intersection of different areas of integration", and in this respect Central Europe may be best understood as a development and transformation project that might create a new type of differentiated relationships among states and cultures within Central Europe and between Central Europe and the European Union. Focusing on Central Europe may turn the region into the central project of European development. (SOI : PM: S. 175)
EU policymaking : issues and debates / Laurie Buonanno and Nikolaos Zahariadis -- Principal-agent models / Yannis Karagiannis and Mattia Guidi -- Regulatory governance in the EU / Alessandro Cagossi -- Multiple streams / Nicole Herwig and Nikolaos Zahariadis -- Punctuated equilibrium theory / Christian Breunig, Daniela Beyer, and Marco Radojevic -- The internal market / Laurie Buonanno -- EU competition rules and the European integration project / Angela Wigge and Hubert Buch-Hansen -- Changing governance of cohesion policy / Carolyn Dudek -- Social policy / Claire Dupuy and Sophie Jacquot -- Gender policy / Sophie Jacquot -- Economic and monetary union / Waltraud Shelke -- Banking policy / Stefaan DeRynck -- The globalization trilemma and the EMU's second-order democratic deficit / Nikitas Konstantinidis and Ruben Treurniet -- The EU budget / Gabriele Cipriani -- European immigration and asylum policy / Alexander Caviedes -- Police and judicial cooperation policy / Stephen Rozée, Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard -- European Union privacy and data protection policy / George Christou -- The common foreign and security policy / Sara Kahn-Nisser -- Trade policy / Holly Jarman -- Enlargement policy / Neill Nugent -- The European neighbourhood policy / Mariam Dekanozishvili -- The cap : common dynamics of policy change in an uncommon policy domain / Gerry Alons and Pieter Zwaan -- European energy policy / Nicole Herwig -- EU policy on the environment / Jale Tosun -- Lobbying and interest group politics in the European Union / Andreas Hofmann -- Agenda setting in the European Union / Petya Alexandrova and Marcello Carammia -- Understanding the EU's policymaking institutions / John McCormick -- Strategic framing and the European Commission / Mark Rhinard -- Implementation and enforcement of EU polices / Gerda Falkner -- If evaluation is the solution, what is the problem? / Claire A. Dunlop and Claudio M. Radaelli -- Resisting in times of crisis : the implementation of European austerity plans in Ireland and Greece / Clément Fontan, Sabine Saurugger and Nikolaos Zahariadis -- Resistance in European Union health care policy / Scott L. Greer -- Evasion as a mechanism of resistance (not only) to European law / Annette Elisabeth Töller -- European level policy dynamics in higher education / Martina Vukasovic -- The infusion of Europe in public policy : the case of higher education / Pauline Ravinet
Ukraine on the Road to Europe -- Copyright -- Preface -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1 Background -- 2 Structure of the book and key themes of the authors -- 3 Acknowledgement -- Part I Bridge or Integral Part? Ukraine's Historical, Cultural and Geopolitical Connection with Europe and its Neighbours -- 1 Ukraine between East and West, North and South: Geopolitical Options and Constraints -- 2 Eurasia - Alternative to European Integration or the Wrong Path? -- 3 Russia - Ukraine: Entering a New Phase1 -- 4 The Significance of Poland for Ukraine: Role Model, Bordering State, Integrator? -- Part II Bridges to Europe and the Market Economy: Aspects of a Long Road -- 5 A Second Economic Divide in Europe? -- 6 The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) between Ukraine and the EU) - Idea and Reality1 -- 7 Integrating Ukraine into the World Economy: How, How Fast and Why? -- 8 Infrastructure as an Instrument of National and Regional Development Policy in the European Union and Ukraine -- 9 Are there Regional Economic Policies which Lead to 'Europe'? Voices of Ukrainian Companies in East and West -- 10 Ukraine as the Gas Bridge to Europe? Economic and Geopolitical Considerations -- 11 Reform of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy and Agricultural Policy's Strategies for Ukraine -- 12 Export Orientation and Its Impact on Enterprise Restructuring in Ukraine -- Part III Aspects of Financial and Fiscal Policy in Ukraine -- 13 Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy During Transformation: Experience and Recommendations -- 14 The Role of Long-term Capital for a European Ukraine -- 15 EU Enlargement and Implications for Ukraine: A View from the European Central Bank -- 16 Effects of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on the Ukrainian Economy.
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This paper argues that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) created at Maastricht conformed to the neoliberal theory of interstate federalism in seeking to constitute structural conditions that circumscribed the effective exercise of activist public authority at both the Member State and European level. A response to a perceived 'crisis of governability,' it was designed to address the problem of excessive, and ineffective, governmental interventions in economic matters. By separating monetary and fiscal policy, the EMU ensured that no single public authority at the Member State or European level could control all the main levers of economic government. The Eurozone Crisis challenged this construct by emphasising the need for a coherent and effective exercise of public authority. The problem was thus no longer an excess of government but the absence of effective governmental authority for the EMU as a whole. Eurozone Crisis reforms introduced a greater scope for federal interventions in the domestic affairs of Member States and such reforms have elicited a new constitutional imaginary, expressed by European elites, that emphasises the need to generate 'European sovereignty.' This imaginary departs radically from the original EMU by foreseeing an omnicompetent European governmental apparatus that is able to intervene in, and control, economic developments across the Union in accordance with political objectives. The constitutional imaginary of the EMU can thus no longer meaningfully be called neoliberal. The early response to the COVID-19 Crisis, furthermore, highlights that the objectives pursued under the reformed EMU may depart from the set of policies traditionally associated with neoliberalism. What it should be called instead, however, remains unclear.
This paper discusses the economic effects of EU enlargement for the group of Central and East European accession countries (ACs). It consists of three parts In Part A the financial aspects of accession to the EU are explained. It deals firstly with the outcome of the negotiations at the December 2002 European Council Summit in Copenhagen in relation to the expected flows of net transfers over the period 2004-2006. The most uncertain component of these transfers are related to the project-related funds, their disbursement and fiscal implications because of co-financing requirements. Secondly, we discuss the issue of the longer-run negotiations with respect to the Financial Framework to be decided for the period 2007-2013, here the issue of the formation of likely new coalitions within the enlarged European Union is dealt with and possible winners and losers in such negotiations are identified. In Part B we discuss the difficulties the new members will face upon accession in the conduct of macroeconomic policy. In particular, the crucial issue of fast vs. delayed entry to the European Monetary Union (EMU) will shape the constraints within which the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy will have to take place. It is quite likely that it is this issue which will dominate the medium-run growth prospects of the new members upon accession. Part C explores the longer-run growth and convergence scenarios for the new member states. It describes the relative growth performance of the ACs in relation to the EU so far and discusses the reasons why the growth performances might remain more volatile compared to those of the current EU member countries.
Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of main legal instruments and sources -- List of cases -- List of abbreviations and acronyms -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter 1 The sovereign-banks nexus: An economic analysis -- 1.1 Introductory remarks -- 1.2 Brief historical overview -- 1.3 Why do banks hold domestic sovereign debt? -- 1.3.1 Discrimination and selective defaults -- 1.3.2 Pro-cyclicality of sovereign debt -- 1.3.3 Moral suasion and financial repression -- 1.3.4 Sovereign debt's preferential regulatory treatment and use as collateral -- 1.3.5 Concluding remarks -- 1.4 The sovereign-banks nexus -- 1.4.1 From sovereigns to banks -- 1.4.2 From banks to sovereigns -- 1.4.3 From banks to other banks and to other financial institutions -- 1.4.4 From banks to the real economy (and vice versa) -- 1.4.5 From the real economy to the sovereign (and vice versa) -- 1.4.6 Particular relevance for countries in a monetary union -- 1.4.7 Concluding remarks -- Chapter 2 Case studies from the European sovereign debt crisis -- 2.1 Effects of commercial bank crises on sovereigns -- 2.1.1 Introductory remarks -- 2.1.2 The case of Ireland -- 2.1.3 The case of Cyprus -- 2.1.4 Concluding remarks -- 2.2 Effects of sovereign crises on commercial banks -- 2.2.1 Introductory remarks -- 2.2.2 The case of Greece -- 2.2.3 The case of Cyprus -- 2.2.4 Conclusions -- Chapter 3 An economic analysis of policy options -- 3.1 Introductory remarks -- 3.2 Fiscal policy and why fiscal measures may not be sufficient -- 3.3 Closing the first channel of contagion from banks to sovereigns: Is the European Banking Union an optimal policy response? -- 3.4 Closing the second channel of contagion from sovereigns to banks -- 3.4.1 Revision of the regulatory treatment of sovereign debt holdings and its challenges.
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Economic activity in the euro area is recovering. In the second half of 2003, real GDP grew at an annualized rate of roughly 1½ percent. In contrast with other large industrialized countries, economy-wide capacity utilization has not yet increased. Private consumption has remained the major weak point. However, private investment has increased for the first time since 2½ years and exports have risen rapidly, stimulated by the strong upswing in the rest of the world. A number of leading indicators suggest that the recovery in Euroland has gained some momentum since the turn of the year. Despite an expansionary monetary policy and the dynamic world economy, real GDP in the euro area will rise only moderately in comparison with earlier upswings. This is due to two factors. First, potential output growth in the euro area has apparently decelerated. Second, fiscal policy especially in the large euro-area economies is not sustainable. As governments do not have a credible consolidation strategy, the tax burden is likely to increase in the coming years. Against this background private households? income prospects are subdued and, as a consequence, private consumption will remain comparatively weak. The appreciation of the euro has had a considerable effect on economic activity, but it will not stop recovery. The results of our macroeconometric model imply also that the effects will be small in 2005 if, as we assume, the euro/ dollar exchange rate remains unchanged. Some observers urge the ECB to react to the strength of the euro by cutting interest rates. Whether the ECB should do so depends solely on the way in which the appreciation of the euro impacts the targets embedded in its monetary policy strategy. The main issue is whether the appreciation of the euro will push the inflation rate considerably below the target value. Past experience suggests that it would be unwise to assume it will have a strong dampening effect on consumer prices. Since the beginning of monetary union inflation forecasts have usually been too optimistic. All in all, the ECB is well advised not to cut interest rates in response to recent exchange rate developments. Interest rates in the euro area are already unusually low and stimulate economic activity. The Stability and Growth Pact requires the governments in euro-area countries to achieve a balanced budget or a budget surplus in the medium run. The main problem at present is not that budget deficit to GDP ratios are higher than 3 percent in some countries, but that structural deficits are also very high. Seven years after the adoption of the Pact the large countries still have made no progress on the way to a balanced budget. In Germany and France the structural deficits are even higher than before the monetary union. The recent Stability Programs of these countries suggest that the balanced- budget target has been given up altogether. This is eroding the credibility of fiscal policy and constitutes a heavy blow to economic stability in the euro area. Unsound fiscal policy negatively affects expectations in the private sector and is likely to result in a further deceleration of potential output growth.
This paper aims to analyze the impact of prudential regulation on banking efficiency in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Using system GMM estimator and panel data from 98 banks in WAEMU zone, we find that prudential regulation related to (i) Loan loss provisions (LLPR) positively affect banking efficiency. While (ii) Capital requirements (CAP); (iii) Liquidity requirements (LIQ); (iv) Loan restrictions (LOANR) and (v) Limits on leverage (LLV) negatively influence banking efficiency in the WAEMU zone. Moreover, we find that small and low-risk banks benefit in terms of efficiency, from stringent prudential regulation, while high-risk banks and large banks are the main losers. Similarly, we also find that, in the face of strict prudential regulation, government and domestic banks are inefficient, while the efficiency of foreign and privately managed banks improves. Overall, our findings support the idea that prudential regulation must be well calibrated and adapted to the specific characteristics of banks so that it does not impede banking efficiency and the proper functioning of the banking system, but also, by the same token, financial stability in the WAEMU zone.
Die krisenhaften Entwicklungen seit dem Jahr 2008 haben es für die großen Zentralbanken notwendig gemacht, ihre Leitzinsen auf nahezu Null zu senken. Gleichzeitig bekunden die Zentralbanken, dass sie die Zinsen noch für eine ausgedehnte Zeit niedrig halten werden. In einem solchen Umfeld von niedrigen Zinsen auf Spareinlagen und boomenden Vermögenspreisen stellt sich zunehmend die Frage, welche Umverteilungseffekte hieraus resultieren. Um dieser Frage nachzugehen, wurden Daten aus dem Household Finance and Consumption Survey für Deutschland aus-gewertet. Es zeigt sich, dass weniger die boomenden Aktienkurse und Immobilienpreise, sondern die niedrigen Zinsen auf Spareinlagen und Krediten eine umverteilende Wirkung hatten. So zeigt sich bei jungen Haushalten, die eine Immobilie über eine Hypothek finanzieren und die über wenige Spareinlagen verfügen, dass die Schuldendiensterleichterung den Verlust an Zinserträgen überkompensiert. Bei den älteren Haushalten überwiegt jedoch der Verlust an Zinserträgen, da diese demografische Gruppe tendenziell über einen hohen Anteil an Spareinlagen und nur geringe Schulden verfügt. Auch wenn sich keine Zunahme an Ungleichheit zeigt, so hat ein länger anhaltendes Niedrigzinsumfeld negative Auswirkungen für die Altersvorsorge. Dies ist vor allem vor dem Hintergrund zu sehen, dass die Haushalte hohe Anteile an verzinslichen Spareinlagen halten und nur einen geringen Aktienanteil aufweisen.
This paper studies the adjustment to asymmetric shocks in the CEMAC. Based on the limits of the economic governance in this area, we suggest an off-market stabilization mechanism financed by a constant withdrawal on tax receipts of each country member of the union. In order to show the feasibility and usefulness of this mechanism, we carry out simulations over the period 1980-2008. Our results show that this mechanism is relatively operational and fair. However, its degree of coverage depends on the capacity of each country member to finance it, as well as the economic trend. A certain numbers of recommendations are deduced from these results. ; Cet article traite de l'ajustement des chocs asymétriques en zone CEMAC. Partant des limites du mode de gouvernance économique en vigueur au sein cette zone en la matière, nous proposons un mécanisme institutionnel de stabilisation financé par un prélèvement à taux fixe sur les recettes fiscales de chaque pays membre. Afin de montrer la faisabilité et l'utilité dudit mécanisme, nous effectuons des simulations sur la période 1980-2008. Nos résultats montrent que ce mécanisme est opérationnel et relativement équitable. Toutefois, son degré de stabilisation est tributaire de la capacité des États membres à le financer, et du trend de l'économie. De ces résultats découlent un certain nombre de recommandations.
