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An interview with Aleksei Kuz'mitsky , auditor of the Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation, is presented. Kuz'mitsky describes the importance of Vietsovpetro and Rusvietpetro for economic cooperation between Russia and Vietnam. Moreover, he explains whether the joint examination of records find any violations on the part of Rusvietpetro and reveals the situation in Vietsovpetro. Adapted from the source document.

Government building within the Kremlin located in Moscow, Russia. ; https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fulbrightrussia2018-images/1188/thumbnail.jpg

"The book reveals the interconnection between social, cultural and political protest movements and social and economic changes in a post-communist country like Russia still dominated by bureaucratic rulers and "oligarchs" controlling all basic industries and mining activities. Those interests are also dominating Russia's foreign policy and explain why Russia did not succeed in becoming an integral part of Europe. The latter is, at least, wished by many Russian citizens."--Publisher's website

В статье авторы проводят анализ и выявляют закономерности развития взаимоотношений России и Североатлантического договора. Дается характеристика нынешнего соотношения сил и предлагаются 4 сценария развития взаимодействия России и НАТО в контексте динамично изменяющегося политического миропорядка.The article provides the analysis and identified patterns of the development of Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty relationship. The authors propose characteristic of the current correlation of forces and four scenarios of the development of cooperation between Russia and NATO in the context of the rapidly changing political world order.

As NATO commemorated its 75th anniversary this month, the direction of the alliance's posture toward the Arctic region has been called into question. The recent accession of Sweden means that seven of eight of the world's Arctic nations fall under NATO's security umbrella, with Russia being the outlier. While some analysts see the addition of Sweden and Finland as an opportunity for NATO to "increase its footprint" and "deter Russia," the last thing the alliance needs is to scour for another avenue for confrontation with Russia. Sweden and Finland's NATO membership undoubtedly affects the alliance's influence in the Arctic. In March, over 20,000 NATO soldiers from 13 nations, including Finland, Sweden, and the United States, participated in the latest leg of the ongoing Nordic Response 2024 exercise in Norway. Additionally, over 50 frigates, submarines, and other vessels, as well as over 100 aircraft, were involved in the exercise. Ultimately, Nordic Response 2024 will involve over 90,000 troops from all 32 NATO allies. Defensive exercises are a necessary feature of NATO's newly increased Arctic presence, but the Russian threat in the Arctic should not be inflated.The Arctic served as a frontline in the confrontation between NATO and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Over several decades, Russia has revitalized Soviet-era Arctic bases, which outnumber NATO's by about a third. In recent years, Russia has launched significant investment projects and built up its military presence in the Arctic as it develops a crucial northern maritime route linking Asia and Europe. The United States only has one operational heavy icebreaker — compared to the 40 that Russia currently maintains. Irrespective of hawks sounding the alarm about Russia's supposed "militarization" and "dominance" of the Arctic, Russia retains a relative incapacity to threaten a conventional military land incursion into European Arctic territory. Moscow's military efforts in the Arctic have been mainly defensive in nature as it has established multi-layered anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities around the Kola Peninsula, a fundamental Russian interest. Such developments pose little threat to the United States and its NATO allies, especially as Russia is bogged down in Ukraine. Moreover, given that Russia's Arctic coastline is ten times longer than America's, the "icebreaker gap" is to be expected. Russia's fleet of icebreakers is primarily dedicated to escorting commercial shipping through dangerous polar seas. Otherwise, it performs the same missions as the U.S. Coast Guard: "search and rescue, anti-smuggling, oil spill response, and resupply of remote coastal communities and polar research stations." Regarding force projection capabilities, the American-dominated NATO nuclear submarine fleet outmatches the opposing Northern Fleet of the Russian navy.On top of NATO's military capabilities, the alliance's most influential member, the United States, has placed little military importance on the Arctic. Russia's inability to pose severe threats in the Arctic has led to the region appearing at the bottom of the list in the 2022 Biden-Harris National Security Strategy (NSS) overview of regional policies. In addition, the document lacks any language regarding deterring threats to Arctic allies and partners.Rather than seeing the addition of Finland and Sweden as an opportunity to increase the militarization of the Arctic, NATO should work toward utilizing working groups like the Arctic Council to forge multilateral arrangements to reduce tensions, avoid crises, and mitigate the risks of conflict through an accident or miscalculation. In February, Russia suspended annual payments to the Arctic Council until "real work resumes with the participation of all member countries." Yet, while Russia removed several listed multilateral formats from its official Arctic strategy, it kept the point of "the Arctic Council as the key regional platform coordinating international activities in the region." Thus, Russia doesn't appear poised to form an alternative platform. Tensions are high, and Arctic Council cooperation with Moscow effectively ceased after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Despite this, the Council should refrain from pushing out the largest Arctic player and severing an essential communication channel. Deepening isolation has pushed Russia to look east for partners in the Arctic, namely China. Further ostracization will only incentivize Russia to coordinate more with Beijing in the region. Russia and NATO share an interest in maintaining peace in the Arctic region. A war in such terrain would be extremely costly and difficult for both sides. Furthermore, the Arctic Council has facilitated the improvement of marine safety in the Bering Strait, where the U.S. and Russia share a maritime border. Communication channels and shared objectives must also be kept open to keep the peace there.Amid a worsening situation in Ukraine, escalation in the Arctic region would do no favors for the United States or its NATO allies. Russia's considerable influence in the Arctic is not going to change in the near future. Therefore, taking advantage of existing channels will enable the West to signal to Russia that NATO does not intend to engage in offensive operations but is fully prepared to defend its interests.

As Cold War battle lines are seemingly re-drawn, Russia's various 'frozen' war zones (ongoing separatist conflicts) are often cited as particularly volatile and assumed by some Western commentators and policymakers to be 'next' on Putin's 'wish list'. But, as Helena Rytövuori-Apunen demonstrates here, this is a gross (and dangerous) oversimplification that will only serve to fuel the vicious circle of reciprocal military escalation. Drawing on a range of empirical research and across separatist conflicts in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), Moldova (Transnistria and Gagauzia) and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) and the 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, her timely book provides a balanced assessment and critique of the assumptions and misunderstandings that inform mainstream discussions, as well as placing the conflicts in their proper and complex historical contexts. At a time when there is an increasing tendency to view Russia as the source of all instability in Eastern Europe, Power and Conflict in Russia's Borderlands is essential reading for anyone interested in the geopolitics of post-Soviet Russia, as well as policymakers and practitioners of peace/conflict resolution studies.

While accounts of the end of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires have often stressed the rise of Turkish and German nationalisms, narratives of the Romanov collapse have generally not portrayed Russian nationalism as a key factor. In fact, scholars have either stressed the weaknesses of Russian national identity in the populace or the generally pragmatic approach of the government, which, as Hans Rogger classically phrased it, "opposed all autonomous expressions of nationalism, including the Russian." In essence, many have argued, the regime was too conservative to embrace Russian nationalism, and it most often "subordinated all forms of the concept of nationalism to the categories of dynasty and empire."

This article addresses the current preoccupation with the myth of the social responsibility of business. Economic democracy must fit the circumstances & be comfortable, or it will be put off in favor of the existing structure. Elections mean nothing, as democracy appears where the market exists on the lowest levels. Constructive cries from the Russian empire are based on hopes for the possibility of democracy & markets. Every nation has its history. The US has a communal arrangement, with the most developed local self-regulation, while Germany, France, & Switzerland have faced different struggles in their development. While a myth can never be fully grasped, the myth of social responsibility of business in Russia results from the desire to live in a democratic society. In full agreement with the doctrine of economic imperialism, the burial of communal self-regulation in Russia is the burial of hope that the people grasp the spirit of democracy. The indifference of the intellectual elite with respect to this, & their increasing focus on the existence of the social responsibility of business, suggest that they are in a coma. L. Kehl

"Russo-Ukrainian War: Implications for the Asia Pacific explores the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian war for American and Chinese engagement in the Asia Pacific. It interprets Russia's invasion of Ukraine which began on February 24, 2022 as part of a complex double game where the Kremlin and Washington simultaneously spar, bluffing for high stakes despite catastrophic risks in the name of lofty ideals, while pursuing expedient default agendas. Both sides champion virtuous global orders compatible with their tastes and objectives. Washington seeks to compel Moscow to abide by its rules and vice-versa. The immediate impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War on the Asia Pacific has been to confirm Chinese President Xi Jinping's perception that Washington is committed to low-cost, regime-changing Cold War with China to preserve its status as the world's preeminent superpower. Washington is willing to increase hard power defense spending modestly to tackle the Taiwan and South China Sea issues, but will not compete with China in an arms race, curtail productivity stifling government over-regulation and social spending or curb China's abusive state trading. Emboldened by what Washington considers America's successes in the Russo-Ukrainian proxy war, American President Joe Biden plans to reinforce military spending with attitude management campaigns, moral suasion and coalitions of the willing including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - efforts to spark Chinese color revolution and regime change. Biden diplomatically calls his policy Cold Peace, but his actions bespeak Cold War. Amid the power contestation among the United States, Russia and China, it is naïve in the contemporary world to suppose that the three major powers can permanently subjugate each other. Wise leadership requires satisficing for the attainable good rather than striving for the delusional best"--

The new century with the dynamics of international relations has challenged theories, as it called Popper 'strict universality' and the need for 'numerical universality' theoretical explanations. In the twentieth century, theories of international relations developed, but these theories are in the battle with explanation changes rather than expanding the theoretical framework. The need for new explanations doesn't reject old theories, only requires their axioms to be more inter-theoretical and with new variables that explain the course of the deliberate actions of state actors to the intended purpose. So this theoretical change and the acquisition of some realistic axioms, by adding inter-theoretic variables (pragmatism, foreign policy analysis, offensive realism, and defensive realism), sends us to a theorization we have called "spider diplomacy". Almond in the 1960s considered that "with the decline of the norms and traditions of political sciences, the need for political theory and theories has increased", where we find the same situation today for explaining the new geopolitical and geostrategic circumstances. Therefore, these circumstances we try to explain, through "spider diplomacy" as a hybrid theory for empirical, inductive, probable and testable studies based on three initiatives of international subjects (from state actors to non-state actors, from state actors to other actors' state, and mix). In this research, we have analyzed the causes and the chronology of a diplomatic network, the wild stretch that Russia is trying to make today and Serbia in the new state of Kosovo. But for the illustration, we have taken another example from the past. One of Israel's wars with Arab countries. We have found verifiable, pragmatic and analytical results that prove the "spider diplomacy" scheme is needed.

O artigo tem como finalidade abordar a expansão da política externa da Rússia na Ásia Central, com método dedutivo e estudo de caso na Organização para Cooperação de Xangai (OCX), tomando esta como uma Instituição cujo objetivo é a segurança coletiva dos seus países membros. Partindo do momento em que Vladimir Putin assume o poder já no início do século XXI até o ano de 2015, visto que são os anos cruciais em que o país inicia sua reascensão no cenário internacional, a Rússia, bem como a China, atores mais importantes dentro da (OCX), atuam juntos contra o terrorismo, movimentos separatistas, conflitos de fronteiras, tráfico de drogas, migração, dentre outras temáticas de segurança. Diante disto, por meio da Teoria dos Complexos Regionais de Segurança, será discutido como a Rússia tem feito sua expansão de política externa no âmbito de segurança na região da Ásia Central e como a Organização é fundamental neste processo, visto que a Rússia opta por ser um Estado forte e centralizador em seus assuntos de política externa e a sua participação na Organização é um instrumento internacional importante de atuação, com o seguinte problema de pesquisa: Diante da reascensão da Rússia no cenário internacional no século XXI, como o país consegue impor sua agenda de política externa em segurança na Ásia Central, por meio da Organização para Cooperação de Xangai?


Abstract: This paper aims to address and expand Russia's foreign policy in Central Asia, with deductive method and study of case in Organization for collective security of its members called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), starting from the moment that Vladimir Putin assumes power no longer the beginning of the 21st century, since it is one of the crucial moments in which Russia begins its re-emergence on the international stage. As the main focus of the Organization and a collective security, a Russia, as well as a China, major actors within the International Organization, (OCX), act together against terrorism, separatist movements, border conflicts, drug trafficking, migration, among other security topics. Moreover, by means of the Regional Security Complex Theory, it will be discussed how Russia has made its foreign policy expansion in the Central Asian region and how the Organization is fundamental in this process, since Russia chooses to be a strong and centered on its foreign policy issues and its role in the Organization is an important international instrument of action, with the following research problem: Facing Russia's re-emergence on the international stage in the 21st century, which extent the country manages to impose its security agenda in Central Asia, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?
Keywords: Russia; Security; Regional Complex; Foreign Policy.


Recebido em: Agosto/2018.
Aprovado em: Outubro/2018.

A critical examination of the concept of Natsionalizm, a social phenomenon used by the Soviet Union to crack down on dissent towards the Soviet State. Unlike Nationalism, this new concept was a force used to suppress thought, particularly in Sakha, a Siberian Republic in Northeastern Russia.