Suchergebnisse

The article supports the thesis that despite Cold War style oratory and criticism of the NATO's intervention against Yugoslavia, Russian policy on Kosovo armed conflict represented a realistic and pragmatic approach. It points that Russian leadership was conscious of the domestic political and economic problems as well as the unfavourable post Cold War shift of power and changes of the international system and knew that Russia could not reply to the unilateral NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia. It argues that Moscow admittedly wanted to avoid NATO intervention at the Balkans which inevitably undermined the international position of Russia, but despite some political gestures and claims about the traditional Russo-Serbian friendship had no direct geopolitical interests at the Kosovo conflict, did not believe the Milosevic's 'truths' and actively participated at the high-level international peacemaking initiatives together with the West. It claims that Russia actually supported Western efforts aimed to stop the violence at the province and start political dialogue between Belgrade and Kosovo Albanians about the autonomy of the province. It finally argues that Russian constructive approach 'helped' the Alliance to end its war over Kosovo and stresses that peace proposals offered to Belgrade were collectively worked out and endorsed by the West and Russia.

Syria, Ukraine, the Sochi Winter Olympics, the presidency of the G20 (September 2013) and the G8 (as of January 1, 2014)... Russia has more than ever played a central role on the world stage in recent months. There is a widespread belief that Vladimir Putin's ultimate plan is to rebuild the Russian empire and launch his country into a new cold war with the West. But in fact the master of the Kremlin is a pragmatist at heart. It was cold calculation that led him to throw his weight behind Bashar al-Assad and then mastermind the deal that persuaded Syria to give up its chemical weapons. Similarly, his determination to keep Ukraine in his back pocket owes less to ideological motives than purely strategic reasons: Russia has a long border with Ukraine and needs its neighbor's pipelines to export its oil and gas. Vladimir Putin's Russia is not anti-Western, it is pro-Russian - a distinction worth bearing in mind when dissecting his actions. Adapted from the source document.

In the early 20th century, the Russian public recognized the great reforms of Prime Minister of Russia Pyotr Stolypin for what they were, viz. a "complete overhaul of everything in Russia." They stretched beyond the limits of the empire's domestic policies yet their foreign policy dimension and its impact on Russia's diplomacy remain little studied so far. History has taught us that none of the European states, including Russia, can pursue successful domestic policies without an efficient and well-substantiated foreign policy geared at the country's national interests. This is doubly important in the periods of reforms when newly established state and social institutions change the country's makeup. Foreign policy can be best described as a time-tested instrument the state has been using and continues to use to harmonize the aims of its domestic and foreign policy and achieve their unity for the sake of state (widened today to national) interests. Adapted from the source document.

Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria has been severely shaken for months by a vast internal protest movement, determined to resist come what may, even in the face of terrible massacres by the loyalist army. The entire world has its eyes riveted on Syria. The West, now joined by the Arab League, is pressing the head of state to stop the violence. But in the concert of nations, Russia is following its own score. A long-time Syrian ally, Russia has major interests in the country, which is why the Kremlin has long given Damascus its unalloyed support. By the end of the year, however, because of the unyielding attitude of Assad, this was no longer tenable. Moscow opted for a firmer tone-after all, Assad isn't eternal, and his adversaries could well take over power in the coming months. So Russia is hedging its bets to make sure it doesn't compromise its future in the region... Adapted from the source document.

This essay assumes the significance of spatial imagination in shaping the political and cultural boundaries of the post-Soviet Eurasia and reviews the newly emerged geopolitical arguments in Russia. Rather than perceiving Eurasianist views in Russia as relatively homogeneous, I argue that such thinking is highly diverse and varies from West-friendly versions to those that are openly isolationist and expansionist. To support my argument, I select six recently published Russian volumes and group them into five distinct schools of Russia's geopolitical thinking, each with their own intellectual assumptions, worldviews, and bases of support in the society. While writing on the same subject of the Eurasian geopolitics, each author proposes principally different solutions to the problems that emerged over the 10 years of Russia's post-communist experience. The argument invites us to rethink the nature of Russia's spatial thinking and activities in Eurasia and to seriously consider engaging Russia as an equal participant in a larger collective security-based arrangement in the region.

Marx & Engels expressed their ideas about Russian society revolution repeatedly & consistently. From 1853 on, & to the end of their lives, they viewed Tsarist Russia as a `semiAsiatic' society dominated by an `Oriental despotism'. According to their view, there would occur in Russia not an antifeudal, but an anti-Asiatic, bourgeois revolution. Lenin, who shared this view in 1906, modified its conditions through his orientation toward a new type of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. He was aware that if this revolution did not find the support of a Western socialist revolution, it must lead to a restoration. According to the Marxian concept of Russian society, such a restoration could only be an `Asiatic restoration'. The Marxian concept & the supplementary arguments of the pre-war Lenin contradict the official Soviet interpretation that the USSR moved from feudalism & capitalism to socialism. Marxistically speaking, Russia moved instead from a (semi)-Asiatic society through an ephemeral capitalism to a new & stronger form of Oriental despotism. (See SA 0000). AA-IPSA.

This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Andrzej Walicki, who died in August 2020 – an outstanding Polish historian of ideas and Russian scholar. It is an attempt to summarize the enormous scientific achievements of a representative of the Warsaw school of the history of ideas. His scientific activity has gained wide recognition in the West, being an prominent Polish contribution to world Russian studies. The subject of the scientist's research were Russia, Poland and Marxism. Andrzej Walicki explained to a wide audience in the West, Poland and Russia issues related to the formation of Russian ideas and philosophy, the development of various ideologies in Russia: imperialism, Marxism, liberalism, or the shaping of the platform and the main problematic network of intellectual relations between Poland and Russia. He also researched Polish thought in response to the Russian question, and tried to participate in debates on Polish-Russian relations after the fall of communism and the collapse of the USSR. He devoted much attention to the reception of Marxism in Russia – to what extent it was an ideological import from the West, and to what extent it was based on the native ideological and religious tradition. In the context of Russia's strong utopian predispositions, Andrzej Walicki showed Marxism as a utopia that transformed Russia into its tragic testing ground and whose goals turned out to be unattainable. As a result, his led to the collapse of the moral legitimacy of the communist system and became the fundamental premise for the disintegration of the Soviet empire.

This article examines the nature and implications of the current information/propaganda battle between Russia and the EU by placing it in the context of conceptions of argument and dialogue in international politics. Both sides are engaged in 'perception management' by which they try to defend their actions and influence positively the opinions of foreign publics. This seems far removed from 'communicative action', the Habermasian notion of engagement in argument and dialogue between equals. The article argues that the current crisis in Russia-EU relations is partly the result of the perception on the Russian side that there never was such communicative action – because Russia was not treated as an equal partner in dialogue, and its views/interests were ignored in a number of cases. On this account, Russia therefore became more assertive, culminating in the Ukraine crisis and Russia's outright aggression which it tried to defend using perception management, echoed by the EU's counter-disinformation campaign. We are therefore closer to 'communicative distraction' – attempts to control image and opinion – rather than the debate and dialogue inherent in communicative action. Nevertheless, the article argues that even within these rival perception managements, there is engagement in argument over norms and the application of norms in specific cases. In the present crisis of Russia-EU relations, we cannot expect more; but the fact that there is some form of argument might still provide a potential basis for fuller dialogue in the future.
Russia, EU, Perception Management, Information Warfare, Communicative Action

After 1990, Lithuania and Russia, like a number of other countries of the world, have accepted international agreements and guidelines recommended by the ICOM (International Council of Museums) Code of Professional Ethics which states the belonging of the collections to the locations where they were formed. However, overdue of the rest of Vilnius Museum of Antiquities collections for Lithuania warns that there must be legal intergovernmental agreements between Russia and Lithuania on the return of cultural property to Lithuania. There is a lack of an appropriate juridical position. The agreement between Russia and the Republic of Lithuania (29 07 1991) does not specify the return of cultural property from Russia to Lithuania. The mutual Cooperation Agreement between the Ministries of Culture (06 07 2009) just appealed to the discovery of the cultural property illegally exported to the territory of another state. According to the Lithuanian government decrees, programs, heritage laws, resolutions that refer to the issues of return of the cultural property to Lithuania, concrete recoveries from Russia have yet not been achieved. The National Museum of Lithuania is interested to recover the collections of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities from the Russian Federation. The Museum, which keeps about 1000 items from those collections, is the successor of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities. These items are only the remains of the collection of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities, which were left in Vilnius by the Tsarist Russian authorities, and include also 285 items returned from Soviet Russia.

After 1990, Lithuania and Russia, like a number of other countries of the world, have accepted international agreements and guidelines recommended by the ICOM (International Council of Museums) Code of Professional Ethics which states the belonging of the collections to the locations where they were formed. However, overdue of the rest of Vilnius Museum of Antiquities collections for Lithuania warns that there must be legal intergovernmental agreements between Russia and Lithuania on the return of cultural property to Lithuania. There is a lack of an appropriate juridical position. The agreement between Russia and the Republic of Lithuania (29 07 1991) does not specify the return of cultural property from Russia to Lithuania. The mutual Cooperation Agreement between the Ministries of Culture (06 07 2009) just appealed to the discovery of the cultural property illegally exported to the territory of another state. According to the Lithuanian government decrees, programs, heritage laws, resolutions that refer to the issues of return of the cultural property to Lithuania, concrete recoveries from Russia have yet not been achieved. The National Museum of Lithuania is interested to recover the collections of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities from the Russian Federation. The Museum, which keeps about 1000 items from those collections, is the successor of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities. These items are only the remains of the collection of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities, which were left in Vilnius by the Tsarist Russian authorities, and include also 285 items returned from Soviet Russia.

After 1990, Lithuania and Russia, like a number of other countries of the world, have accepted international agreements and guidelines recommended by the ICOM (International Council of Museums) Code of Professional Ethics which states the belonging of the collections to the locations where they were formed. However, overdue of the rest of Vilnius Museum of Antiquities collections for Lithuania warns that there must be legal intergovernmental agreements between Russia and Lithuania on the return of cultural property to Lithuania. There is a lack of an appropriate juridical position. The agreement between Russia and the Republic of Lithuania (29 07 1991) does not specify the return of cultural property from Russia to Lithuania. The mutual Cooperation Agreement between the Ministries of Culture (06 07 2009) just appealed to the discovery of the cultural property illegally exported to the territory of another state. According to the Lithuanian government decrees, programs, heritage laws, resolutions that refer to the issues of return of the cultural property to Lithuania, concrete recoveries from Russia have yet not been achieved. The National Museum of Lithuania is interested to recover the collections of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities from the Russian Federation. The Museum, which keeps about 1000 items from those collections, is the successor of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities. These items are only the remains of the collection of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities, which were left in Vilnius by the Tsarist Russian authorities, and include also 285 items returned from Soviet Russia.

After 1990, Lithuania and Russia, like a number of other countries of the world, have accepted international agreements and guidelines recommended by the ICOM (International Council of Museums) Code of Professional Ethics which states the belonging of the collections to the locations where they were formed. However, overdue of the rest of Vilnius Museum of Antiquities collections for Lithuania warns that there must be legal intergovernmental agreements between Russia and Lithuania on the return of cultural property to Lithuania. There is a lack of an appropriate juridical position. The agreement between Russia and the Republic of Lithuania (29 07 1991) does not specify the return of cultural property from Russia to Lithuania. The mutual Cooperation Agreement between the Ministries of Culture (06 07 2009) just appealed to the discovery of the cultural property illegally exported to the territory of another state. According to the Lithuanian government decrees, programs, heritage laws, resolutions that refer to the issues of return of the cultural property to Lithuania, concrete recoveries from Russia have yet not been achieved. The National Museum of Lithuania is interested to recover the collections of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities from the Russian Federation. The Museum, which keeps about 1000 items from those collections, is the successor of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities. These items are only the remains of the collection of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities, which were left in Vilnius by the Tsarist Russian authorities, and include also 285 items returned from Soviet Russia.

7. The paper examines the findings of interactive surveys carried out by TVC channel during six months. Interactive surveys in domestic mass media are not representative, but nevertheless they may indicate the most urgent issues of the present economical and political situation in Russia, tension in the relationships between Russia and CIS countries. Special attention is paid to audience reactions to the terrorism and extremism threats. Interactive surveys show dissatisfaction of their participants by authorities' activity, the feeling of unprotectedness from both terrorism threat and (in no less degree) "force" structures. For our respondents contemporary Russia is a completely corrupted country where the interests of common citizens are not protected at all. The survey findings also reveal the nostalgia for the Soviet empire. 8. ; 7. The paper examines the findings of interactive surveys carried out by TVC channel during six months. Interactive surveys in domestic mass media are not representative, but nevertheless they may indicate the most urgent issues of the present economical and political situation in Russia, tension in the relationships between Russia and CIS countries. Special attention is paid to audience reactions to the terrorism and extremism threats. Interactive surveys show dissatisfaction of their participants by authorities' activity, the feeling of unprotectedness from both terrorism threat and (in no less degree) "force" structures. For our respondents contemporary Russia is a completely corrupted country where the interests of common citizens are not protected at all. The survey findings also reveal the nostalgia for the Soviet empire. 8.

This article is a comprehensive analytical study of the problem of individualization of legal entities in terms of innovative development of the Russian Federation and the European Union. Using the latest methodology of scientific research, the authors provide a justification of the legal institution of individualization, as well as offer a wide range of means of individualization of innovation actors and participants, including in the virtual space of the Internet. ; peer-reviewed