Suchergebnisse

Democracies and authoritarian regimes have different approaches to international law, grounded in their different forms of government. As the balance of power between democracies and non-democracies shifts, it will have consequences for international legal order. Human rights may face severe challenges in years ahead, but citizens of democratic countries may still benefit from international legal cooperation in other areas. Ranging across several continents, this volume surveys the state of democracy-enhancing international law, and provides ideas for a way forward in the face of rising authoritarianism.

Intro -- Board of Editors -- Aims and Scope -- Contents -- The Changing Nature of Territoriality in International Law -- 1 The Paradoxical Place of Territory in International Law -- Abstract -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Reshaping the Notion of Territory in International Law -- 1.2.1 Territoriality and Functionalism -- 1.2.2 Territoriality and Cosmopolitanism -- 1.2.3 Territoriality and Technology -- 1.3 Overview of Chapters -- 1.4 Conclusion -- References -- 2 A State Without Territory? -- Abstract -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 State as a Territorial Unit? -- 2.2.1 The Montevideo Definition of the State -- 2.2.2 The Concept of a Deterritorialized State -- 2.2.3 The Functional Theory of the State Territory -- 2.3 Historical Examples of Deterritorialized States? -- 2.3.1 New States Established Without Territory? -- 2.3.2 States Surviving the Loss of Their Territory? -- 2.3.3 The Lack of Historical Precedents -- 2.4 Recent Examples of Deterritorialized States? -- 2.4.1 The Phenomenon of Disappearing States -- 2.4.2 Possible Legal Responses to the Phenomenon of Disappearing States -- 2.4.3 Deterritorialized State as a Response to the Phenomenon of Disappearing States -- 2.4.4 Creation of New Deterritorialized States -- 2.4.5 Alternatives to the Concept of Deterritorialized State -- 2.5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- 3 Territory in the Law of Jurisdiction: Imagining Alternatives -- Abstract -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Centrality of Territory in the Modern Legal Doctrine of Jurisdiction -- 3.3 Unpacking the Epistemic Bias Toward Territory -- 3.4 Non-Spatial Alternatives to Territory -- 3.4.1 Community -- 3.4.2 Temporality -- 3.4.3 Justice -- 3.5 Reconceptualizing Territory -- 3.6 Acknowledging the Political Nature of the 'New Territoriality' -- 3.7 Beholding Transnational Human Rights Claims: Donning Spatial and Non-Territorial Lenses

Are certain countries more likely to comply with international law than others? History has provided an interesting test of several competing theories of international rule compliance in the form of the UN Security Council's Resolution 1373 to combat international terrorism. We apply a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods to test the salience of various national characteristics — domestic political culture, national interests, regionalism, dependency, power, international alliance patterns, past patterns of compliance. In the end, while all the factors seem to have a bearing on the outcome, regionalism and past patterns of compliance emerge as particularly significant.

International law principles enable a rationalisation of the values to which the Union order aspires as a collective political and legal commitment amongst the Member States. The doctrine of Union law supremacy, which parallels that of international law supremacy, emphasises the overriding character of Union legal demands as a set of values and objectives over those of purely domestic origin. A common view that the Union legal order is sui generis or municipal in character fails to explain the directing character of the values underlying the Union project including its legal order. In this article I therefore explore and defend the view that the Union legal order is essentially one of international law. A central contention in this regard is that the supremacy of Union law obligations within the Member States is based on the principle of the supremacy of international law obligations over those originating in the domestic arena. The intensive rationalisation of this principle by the Court of Justice within its case law manages the intrusive domestic legal effects of the values and ideals found in the Union Treaties and illustrates the evolutionary character of the Union project.

The advancement of international law presupposes that the objections are met. The 'realist' objection claims that sovereign states deciding matters cast over the precept that 'might is right'. This title shows the invention of two techniques in positive law: state contracts and transnational arbitration without privity, Any talk of the advancement of international law presupposes that two objections are met. The first is the 'realist' objection which, observing the state of international relations today, claims that when it comes down to the important things in international life-war and peace, and more generally power politics among states-no real advancement has been made: international society remains a society of sovereign states deciding matters with regard solely to their own best interests and with international law all too often being no more than a thin cloak cast over the precept that 'might is right'. Against this excessive scepticism stands excessive optimism: international law is supposedly making giant strides forward thanks especially to the tremendous mass of soft law generated by international organisations over the past sixty years and more. By incautiously mixing all manner of customs, treaties, resolutions and recommendations, a picture of international law is painted that has little to do with the 'real world'. The essays collected in this book are arranged into three sections. The first purports to show from the specific example of international investment law that the past half-century has seen the invention of two genuinely new techniques in positive law: state contracts and transnational arbitration without privity. This is 'advancement' in international law not because the techniques are 'good' in themselves (one may well think them 'bad') but because they have introduced legal possibilities into international law that did not exist heretofore. The second section examines the theoretical consequences of those new legal techniques and especially the way they affect the theory of the state. The third widens the field of view and asks whether European law has surpassed international law in a move towards federalism or whether it represents a step forward for international law. These reflections make for a clearer theoretical understanding of what constitutes true advancement in international law. Such an understanding should give pause both to those who argue that hardly any progress has been made, and to those who are overly fanciful about progress