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AbstractCorrect voting in elections has been extensively analysed in the recent past. However, thus far, correct voting in direct legislation has hardly been investigated. This is all the more surprising since direct legislation is a more demanding form of democracy and, thus, to vote one's true preferences in direct legislation represents a greater challenge than picking the "right" party or the "right" candidate at elections. Moreover, the few researches on the correctness of individual referendum votes used a measurement method that we think has some methodological shortfalls. Instead, we want to propose another better‐suited method of measuring correct voting in direct legislation settings. This method makes use of voters' stances on the issue at stake. Besides, we will scrutinize the share of correct voting as well as its determinants on the Swiss popular vote of November 2009, which included three rather different propositions. The study shows that a majority of Swiss voters are indeed able to vote their true preferences. The ability to vote correctly depends primarily on the individual voter's project‐specific knowledge, but also, under certain circumstances, on the use of heuristics.

We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers' posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper sheds light on the relationship between the optimal decision rule and voting mechanisms. The paper derives the conditions under which the optimal decision rule is equivalent to some well-known voting procedure (weighted supermajority, weighted majority, and simple majority) and shows that these are very stringent. The paper also considers more general voting procedures, as for example allowing for abstentions, and shows that the conditions for reaching the optimal collective choice remain very stringent.

With the votes cast and counted, the political signs down, and the final dollars tallied, most people were glad to have election season behind them. For the election community, however, the groundwork for future decisions was beginning anew. The 2009 session of the Virginia General Assembly again saw a large number of bills related to election administration.1 Included in those were a large number of absentee voting bills.2 For the last fifteen years, legislators have introduced numerous bills related to absentee voting, and roughly half of these bills have succeeded. 3 While the rest of the country considers large election reform such as vote centers and all vote-by-mail, Virginia cautiously makes incremental reform by adding permissible reasons for absentee voting.

With the votes cast and counted, the political signs down, and the final dollars tallied, most people were glad to have election season behind them. For the election community, however, the groundwork for future decisions was beginning anew. The 2009 session of the Virginia General Assembly again saw a large number of bills related to election administration.1 Included in those were a large number of absentee voting bills.2 For the last fifteen years, legislators have introduced numerous bills related to absentee voting, and roughly half of these bills have succeeded. 3 While the rest of the country considers large election reform such as vote centers and all vote-by-mail, Virginia cautiously makes incremental reform by adding permissible reasons for absentee voting.

In this article, I examine several models of voter behavior that are consistent with recent work in political psychology (Fiske and Tetlock, 1997) concerning incommensurability and individuals' reluctance to make decisions involving explicit trade-offs between competing ideals or principles. In so doing, I show that one ramification of such cognitive dissonance is policy convergence in multidimensional (i.e. multi-issue) electoral competition between two parties or candidates. Furthermore, the predicted policy outcome is a weighted median, which represents, on each issue, each voter's preferences to the degree that he or she is likely to use that issue to choose between the candidates. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2007.]