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Current debates on conscientious objection to military service reveal a conflict between conscription and individual freedom of conscience; they question the scope of human rights and liberties as well as raise an issue of their extension. The majority of member states of UN and CoE officially recognize a right to conscientious objection. However, the flow of complaints to international human rights monitoring bodies demonstrates absence of a general consensus on the concept, origin and legal status of this human right. The paper aims to examine, whether and how the right to conscientious objection to military service has a link with fundamental human rights in the main international human rights instruments. Human rights documents of UN and CoE – two international organizations, most relevant for the development of human rights standards – were chosen as the object of research. The scope of analysis is limited to recommendatory documents of UN CHR, PACE and Committee of Ministers of the CoE, the case-law of ECtHR under ECHR as well as the case-law of UN HRC under ICCPR. Results of research show that in the recommendatory documents of UN and CoE institutions the right to conscientious objection to military service is derived from the fundamental right – the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, embedded in Article 18 of ICCPR and Article 9 of ECHR respectively. However, the case-law of UN and CoE institutions is ambivalent in these terms. After a long-term disavowal of the considered right with regard to ICCPR, in 1993 UN HRC explicated that this right can be derived from the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (General Comment No. 22: Article 18 of the ICCPR). Meanwhile, ECtHR (The Commission) does not recognize the right to conscientious objection to military service under ECHR. However, both UN HRC and ECtHR (The Commission) recognize legal consideration of complaints on the violation of the right to such conscientious objection in terms of discrimination. Till January 2007, Article 4 ECHR and Article 8 of ICCPR respectively were regarded to be the only obstacle to originate the right to conscientious objection in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the case-law of UN HRC and ECtHR. According to these institutions, recognition of the right of conscientious objection fell within the jurisdiction of the contracting State Party under these articles. Nevertheless, the January 2007 Communication of UN HRC disavowed the significance of Article 8 of ICCPR and, on the grounds of Article 18, set a task to contracting State Parties to justify non-recognition or restrictions of the right to conscientious objection as well as prove the damage done to the State by the implementation of the right under consideration. A ground-breaking position of UN HRC can be explained by recommendatory character of the decisions, and legal obligatory nature of ECtHR decisions determines a more conservative stance of the latter institution. Notwithstanding, the lately practice of UN HRC demonstrates that this institution claims to embody a driver of international legal recognition of the right to conscientious objection.

In this paper we address Kant's thesis of human beings' unsocial sociability and a number of related themes such as perpetual peace, cosmopolitanism and patriotism and how this thesis was extended by Hegel. We consider Kant's thesis to be a more suitable framework with which to observe modern- day reality than that offered by many of the political and social theories that are currently in use. Although there is no doubt that Kant was a moral philosopher, this thesis shows a certain degree of distrust of mere moral imperatives. The latter are, on their own, ineffective for «humanizing humanity». Today we know that rationality expressed through language is what distinguishes us as a species. However, it is likely that this is not what constitutes us as individuals of this species. Unsocial sociability works well as a conceptual framework with which to address the current difficulties facing democracies, in both the international sphere and in the sphere of their internal pluralism of a cultural and, in some cases, a national, nature. Kant and Hegel are philosophers of History because both offer ways to overcome many conflicts through politics. From a contemporary perspective, unsocial sociability is a concept which complements —in an individual dimension (Kant) as well as in a socio-political dimension (Hegel)— what is an unavoidable feature of the contemporary world: the pluralism of values, interests and identities, which are usually agonistic in nature, and which are endowed with emotional components. ; En este artículo abordamos la tesis de Kant sobre la insociable sociabilidad de los humanos y algunos temas conexos como la paz perpetua, el cosmopolitismo y el patriotismo, así como su continuación por parte de Hegel. En la tesis kantiana vemos un marco más adecuado para observar la realidad actual que el ofrecido por muchas de las teorías políticas y sociales más en uso. A pesar de que Kant era sin duda un filósofo moral, la tesis mencionada responde a cierta desconfianza sobrevenida hacia los meros imperativos morales. Estos últimos, por sí mismos, resultan ineficaces para «humanizar a la humanidad ». La racionalidad pasada por el lenguaje es lo que más nos distingue como especie. Sin embargo, probablemente no sea esto lo que más nos constituya como individuos de esta especie. La insociable sociabilidad, que caracteriza la doble pulsión conflictiva y cooperativa de los humanos, supone un concepto- marco que permite pensar mejor las dificultades actuales de las democracias, tanto en la esfera internacional como en el de proceder a una acomodación política estable de su pluralismo interno de carácter cultural y, en su caso, de carácter nacional. Kant y Hegel son filósofos de la historia porque esta última ofrece ejemplos de la superación de muchos conflictos mediante la política. Desde una perspectiva contemporánea, la insociable sociabilidad es un concepto que complementa tanto en sus dimensiones individuales (Kant) como sociopolíticas (Hegel) lo que también resulta ser un rasgo insuperable del mundo contemporáneo: el pluralismo de valores, intereses, e identidades que habitualmente revisten un carácter agonístico y que remiten a componentes emocionales.

Current debates on conscientious objection to military service reveal a conflict between conscription and individual freedom of conscience; they question the scope of human rights and liberties as well as raise an issue of their extension. The majority of member states of UN and CoE officially recognize a right to conscientious objection. However, the flow of complaints to international human rights monitoring bodies demonstrates absence of a general consensus on the concept, origin and legal status of this human right. The paper aims to examine, whether and how the right to conscientious objection to military service has a link with fundamental human rights in the main international human rights instruments. Human rights documents of UN and CoE – two international organizations, most relevant for the development of human rights standards – were chosen as the object of research. The scope of analysis is limited to recommendatory documents of UN CHR, PACE and Committee of Ministers of the CoE, the case-law of ECtHR under ECHR as well as the case-law of UN HRC under ICCPR. Results of research show that in the recommendatory documents of UN and CoE institutions the right to conscientious objection to military service is derived from the fundamental right – the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, embedded in Article 18 of ICCPR and Article 9 of ECHR respectively. However, the case-law of UN and CoE institutions is ambivalent in these terms. After a long-term disavowal of the considered right with regard to ICCPR, in 1993 UN HRC explicated that this right can be derived from the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (General Comment No. 22: Article 18 of the ICCPR). Meanwhile, ECtHR (The Commission) does not recognize the right to conscientious objection to military service under ECHR. However, both UN HRC and ECtHR (The Commission) recognize legal consideration of complaints on the violation of the right to such conscientious objection in terms of discrimination. Till January 2007, Article 4 ECHR and Article 8 of ICCPR respectively were regarded to be the only obstacle to originate the right to conscientious objection in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the case-law of UN HRC and ECtHR. According to these institutions, recognition of the right of conscientious objection fell within the jurisdiction of the contracting State Party under these articles. Nevertheless, the January 2007 Communication of UN HRC disavowed the significance of Article 8 of ICCPR and, on the grounds of Article 18, set a task to contracting State Parties to justify non-recognition or restrictions of the right to conscientious objection as well as prove the damage done to the State by the implementation of the right under consideration. A ground-breaking position of UN HRC can be explained by recommendatory character of the decisions, and legal obligatory nature of ECtHR decisions determines a more conservative stance of the latter institution. Notwithstanding, the lately practice of UN HRC demonstrates that this institution claims to embody a driver of international legal recognition of the right to conscientious objection.

Current debates on conscientious objection to military service reveal a conflict between conscription and individual freedom of conscience; they question the scope of human rights and liberties as well as raise an issue of their extension. The majority of member states of UN and CoE officially recognize a right to conscientious objection. However, the flow of complaints to international human rights monitoring bodies demonstrates absence of a general consensus on the concept, origin and legal status of this human right. The paper aims to examine, whether and how the right to conscientious objection to military service has a link with fundamental human rights in the main international human rights instruments. Human rights documents of UN and CoE – two international organizations, most relevant for the development of human rights standards – were chosen as the object of research. The scope of analysis is limited to recommendatory documents of UN CHR, PACE and Committee of Ministers of the CoE, the case-law of ECtHR under ECHR as well as the case-law of UN HRC under ICCPR. Results of research show that in the recommendatory documents of UN and CoE institutions the right to conscientious objection to military service is derived from the fundamental right – the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, embedded in Article 18 of ICCPR and Article 9 of ECHR respectively. However, the case-law of UN and CoE institutions is ambivalent in these terms. After a long-term disavowal of the considered right with regard to ICCPR, in 1993 UN HRC explicated that this right can be derived from the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (General Comment No. 22: Article 18 of the ICCPR). Meanwhile, ECtHR (The Commission) does not recognize the right to conscientious objection to military service under ECHR. However, both UN HRC and ECtHR (The Commission) recognize legal consideration of complaints on the violation of the right to such conscientious objection in terms of discrimination. Till January 2007, Article 4 ECHR and Article 8 of ICCPR respectively were regarded to be the only obstacle to originate the right to conscientious objection in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the case-law of UN HRC and ECtHR. According to these institutions, recognition of the right of conscientious objection fell within the jurisdiction of the contracting State Party under these articles. Nevertheless, the January 2007 Communication of UN HRC disavowed the significance of Article 8 of ICCPR and, on the grounds of Article 18, set a task to contracting State Parties to justify non-recognition or restrictions of the right to conscientious objection as well as prove the damage done to the State by the implementation of the right under consideration. A ground-breaking position of UN HRC can be explained by recommendatory character of the decisions, and legal obligatory nature of ECtHR decisions determines a more conservative stance of the latter institution. Notwithstanding, the lately practice of UN HRC demonstrates that this institution claims to embody a driver of international legal recognition of the right to conscientious objection.

The topic of the paper is the principle of self-determination of peoples in international law and the limits of its implementation. The aim of the paper is to analyze and evaluate theoretical and practical aspects of regulation and implementation of the principle of self-determination of peoples. In the first part of the paper we examine the evolution of the principle in international law. The origin of the principle of self-determination of peoples is connected with the American and French revolutions in late XVIII century and the idea that government derives from the will of people. After the First World War the principle became the ideal of USA president Woodrow Wilson and it was used in redrawing the map of Europe, its practical application was inconsistent though. Since the dismemberment of European empires and the creation of the new national states were based on economic interests, historical claims and strategic calculations we can think of the principle of self-determination of peoples till the Second World War as the political declaration only. The principle of self-determination of peoples got the status of the right of international law under the regime of United Nations in the context of decolonization. Though the formulation of the principle in the Charter of United Nations is abstract, its content is clarified by the resolutions of the General Assembly. The scope of the principle was revised after the Cold War. It became obviously that the right of self-determination overstep the limits of decolonization and the questions about the holders of the right and the right of unilateral secession were raised. In the second part of the paper we analyze the scope of the principle of self-determination of peoples. The principle can be divided into "internal" and "external" self-determination. The former means the right of people to determine its political and economical regime. Civil and political rights claimed by international instruments are the guarantees of the "internal" self-determination. The "external" self-determination means the right of the people to determine its international status and is connected with the problem of the claim to secede. The right of secession does not exist in the instruments of international law, but it is not forbidden either. That is why in some cases it can be justified. The restriction of the right of self-determination is directly connected with the principle of territorial integrity. "External" self-determination, which influences the boundaries of a territory, does not contradict the principle of the territorial integrity if it is implemented by the people, which is the holder of the right of self-determination. In the context of the principle of self-determination a people means an entire population of particular territorial union. It is questionable whether the recognition of the right to unilateral secession would eliminate the ethnic conflicts; the respect to human rights and the preservation of identity of peoples should be a key to the future peace of multinational states.

This article asks questions about the relationship between private experiences and the behavior in public life. The conceptual point of origin is the possible proximity between the personal and political body. Particularly, the question is asked in which way the actions of citizens that have experienced violence are affected. As Frederico Neiburg proposes, normative visions disqualify the combination of politics and personal conflicts, treating them as survival of a premodern past and describing them as a spectacle. Good politics is imagined "as the dominion of rational and abstract men and women, free of personal connections." Exactly in the exacerbation of the neoliberal model of the isolated, rational individual it is more difficult to appreciate how certain experiences of constructing meaning in private life are projected onto public life. That is why this text is oriented at discussing some commonplaces with which we associate violent action, because they allow us to go beyond, whenever possible, a narrow conception of individualist, economicist or minimalist citizenship. ; El artículo se pregunta por las relaciones entre experiencias en la esfera privada y el comportamiento en la vida pública. El punto conceptual de partida es la proximidad posible entre el cuerpo personal y el cuerpo político. En particular se plantea de qué manera se afecta la acción como ciudadanos de las personas que han experimentado violencia personal. Como lo plantea Federico Neiburg, las visiones normativas descalifican la combinación entre política y conflictos personales tratándolos como sobre vivencias de un pasado premoderno y describiéndolos como espectáculo. La buena política es imaginada «como el dominio de hombres y mujeres racionales y abstractos, libres de lazos personales». Justamente en la exacerbación del modelo neoliberal de individuo racional, aislado, se hace más difícil apreciar la forma en que ciertas experiencias de construcción de significado en la vida privada se proyectan sobre la pública. Por ello este texto se orienta a discutir algunos lugares comunes con los que asociamos la acción violenta, pues nos permiten sobrepasar, en lo posible, una estrecha concepción de ciudadanía, individualista, economicista o minimalista. ; O artigo pergunta-se pelas relações entre experiências na esfera privada e o comportamento na vida pública. O ponto conceitual de partida é a proximidade possível entre o corpo Pessoal e o corpo político. Em particular se expor de que maneira afeta-se a ação como cidadãos das pesoas que tem tido experimentado a violência Pessoal. Como expor Federico Neiburg, as visões normativas desqualificam a combinação entre política e conflitos pessoais tentando-os como sobre vivências dum passado pré moderno onde se descreve como um espectáculo. A boa política é imaginada «como o domínio dos homens e das mulheres racionais e abstratos, livres de laços pessoais». Justamente na exacerbação do modelo neo-liberal do individuo racional, isolado, se faz mais difícil apreciar a forma em que certas experiências de construção de significado na vida privada projetam-se na pública. Por isso este texto orienta-se a discutir alguns lugares comuns con os que associamos a ação violenta, pois permitem-nos superar, no possível, uma estreita concepção de ciudadanía, individualista, economicista o minimalista.

O objetivo deste artigo é discutir os deslocamentos de sentido e lugar da questão social no cenário público nacional. Mais concretamente: o deslocamento da pobreza como questão e como figuração pública de problemas nacionais, de um lugar politicamente construído – lugar da ação, da intervenção e da invenção, da crítica, da polêmica e do dissenso – para o lugar não-política, onde é figurada como dado a ser administrado tecnicamente ou gerido pelas práticas da filantropia. A Constituição de 88 e as alternativas democráticas que vinham se desenhando no horizonte político do País são aqui tomadas como parâmetro para avaliar o sentido político das transformações em curso no Brasil. Por outro lado, o deslocamento das figurações públicas da pobreza interessa porque é nele que se evidencia a lógica de destituição de direitos por via do esvaziamento ou neutralização dos espaços de conflito, de representação, negociação e ação: a atual redefinição conservadora das relações entre Estado e sociedade, e em particular o novo perfil hoje proposto para as políticas sociais, estão significando mais do que o desmanche de direitos e conquistas sociais pois trata-se da erosão das referências públicas a partir dos quais direitos (e a questão pública neles implicada) podem ser formulados – trata-se do encolhimento das condições de sua enunciação. Essa dupla erosão – dos direitos e das condições de sua formulação como linguagem pública, é o núcleo do argumento desenvolvido ao longo deste texto. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Direitos, questão social, comunidade solidária, terceiro setor, refilantropização da pobreza BRAZILIAN "NEW SOCIAL MATTERS": HOW THE FIGURES OF OUR DELAY HAVE BECOME SYMBOLS OF OUR MODERNITY The objective of this article is to discuss the displacements of social matters of sense and place in the public national scenario. In a more concrete way, the displacement of poverty as a matter and as a public representation of national problems, occupying a politically structured place – a place for action, intervention and invention, of critic, polemic and dissent, to the non-political place where it is shown as datum to be technically controlled or managed by philanthropic practices. The 1988 Constitution and the democratic alternatives being developed in the Country's political horizon are adopted here as a parameter to assess the political meaning of the ongoing transformations in Brazil. On the other hand, the displacement of the public representations of poverty is of interest, because through it the logic of the destitution of rights can be shown, by emptying or neutralizing the places of conflict, representation, negotiation and action; the present conservative redefinition of the relationships between State and society, and especially the new profile proposed nowadays for the social policies. They mean more than the dismantling of rights and social conquest, because they deal with the erosion of the public references from where the rights (and the public issue implied in them) can be formulated – the shrinking of the enunciation conditions. This double erosion – of the rights and its formulation conditions as public language – is the core of the argument developed throughout this text. KEY WORDS: Rights, social matter, community, third sector and poverty new philanthropy Publicação Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.br

The political change in the 1980'es and 1990'es in the Black Sea Region has introduced many questions regarding its future as the region faces massive problems like conflicts on territory, drop of production levels in the 1990'es and related poverty, and last but not the least, environmental problems. The size of the region also blurs the picture. However, briefly there are three major influences that mark the future development of the region: globalization, regionalization and Euro-Asian integration. We propose that under these three influences, a new global integration zone, consisting of multiple networks between cities of the Black Sea Region is emerging. Our proposition that a new global integration zone is emerging within the Black Sea Region depends on three assumptions: Our first assumption is that neo-liberal globalization and regionalization (and particularly Euro-Asian integration) lead to development of similar political changes in the region. Our second assumption is that neo-liberal globalization and regionalization lead to development of similar spatial socio-economic developments within the Black Sea Region which brings some cities to the fore to gain power in the national and global organization of production. Our third assumption is that there is increasing trans-national integration between subject cities. Emergence of such a zone is perhaps most important for policy makers at the local level who have to face either positive or negative on-site effects of globalization and regionalization. Increasing socio-economic inequalities, excessive agglomeration of economic activities and population, diversification of population and increasing complexity of problems cripple traditional city management and planning practices in these countries which have a strong central planning and administration background. Due to practical reasons, we limit our study to integration of two sub-national regions, the province of Istanbul, and the province of Odessa which are also sister cities. Province of Istanbul may be recalled as Greater Istanbul, or Istanbul Metropolitan City since at 2004 due to change in the administrative legislation. Province of Odessa includes the city of Odessa as well as other cities within the province. We may conclude that there is progressive convergence in the political grounds between Turkey-Ukraine and Istanbul-Odessa, mainly in the framework of the global structures that are predominantly part of the Euro-Atlantic supra-structure. Though there is not much evidence of similarity in spatial development of Istanbul and Odessa, particularly due to political inclarity and problems of administrative decentralization in Ukraine, there is evidence of economic and social integration, between Turkey-Ukraine and Istanbul-Odessa, which experiences slow development, and negative side effects like informal activities. As a conclusion we may argue that integration of two regions might heavily depend on the Ukrainian foreign and domestic policies, and the decisions of supra-national structures like the World Trade Organization and EU. We may expect a progress in economic integration by the removal of trade barriers, where Istanbul and Odessa would be direct beneficiaries as both production and transfer centres. Further administrative decentralization in Ukraine might lead to a re-population in Odessa Region, as happened in Istanbul after the 1980 period.

During the last few decades sustainable development has become a frequent topic among policy makers. In order to achieve this goal, the local level in the society has been regarded as one of the levels where changes towards a more sustainable development must come about. To this end, the Swedish state has used different instruments of control to influence its municipalities to start these changes. One example is the Local Investment Programme (LIP) which supported many different local investment programmes in Swedish municipalities between 1998-2002. The municipality of Luleå, where changes of the public transportation system were on the political agenda, received in 2000 financial support for a project called Public transportation in change. The aim of the project was to create a more attractive public transportation system, i.e. bus system, in order to get more people to choose the bus for their daily travels. Policy processes are however not always as rational as policy makers might think. Instead, they can sometimes be characterized as an incremental process with sudden changes. In order to conceptualize such processes, especially agenda- setting and decision making, John Kingdon has developed the multiple- streams framework (MS). According to this framework the policy process is separated into three streams; problem, policy and politics. When a window of opportunity opens, a policy entrepreneur with the right skills and institutional position might couple the streams thereby creating a policy change. The aim of this study is to describe and analyze the policy process underpinning the public transportation in Luleå kommun and explain why the process developed the way it did. The purpose is thereby to contribute to the understanding of the problems that are associated with local policy making regarding public transportation and sustainable development. Another aim is to test whether MS is applicable in a local context. The empirical material is made up of documents, interviews with policy makers, material from the local newspapers and a survey to the public. It is concluded that the 2002 election to the municipality council was the window of opportunity that finally brought about the introduction of a new bus system. The LIP programme mainly affected the local process in a positive way. It might even have been another reason that the new bus system was realized at this point. There were some problems concerning the institutional arrangement around the LIP programme, which seems to have caused a minor delay in the project. The study also indicates that sustainable development at the local level is associated with many problems. Rhetorically sustainable development is regarded as an important goal, but in reality there are differences about how to view and realize the concept. Sustainable development has been described as ecological, economical and social sustainability in cooperation or that they can be ranked. It is concluded that economical constraints seem to set the conditions in reality. Finally, MS has been found useful in a local context as well. MS have weaknesses concerning how it addresses value based conflicts and institutional arrangements. While this study deals with those problems, it is suggested that more studies should be conducted. ; Godkänd; 2006; 20070109 (haneit)

Muslim-Christian relations have been an important element of the social and political dynamics of Indonesia during the New Order period (1966-1998), and an ever sensitive object of Government policy. The relations between Muslims and Christians have been tense because of mutual suspicions existing between them. These mutual suspicions have been reflected in, and exacerbated by, the antagonistic discourses in which the Muslim and Christian leaders perceived each other as a threat against their respective religious communities. Among the Muslims, the Christian threat has been called 'Kristenisasi' (Christianisation). In the Muslim discourse, Christianisation meant unfair and aggressive efforts to convert Muslims to Christianity. The Muslim fear of Christianisation sometimes led several Muslims to violent action, by attacking church buildings and Christian schools. They also demanded that the Government control and restrict Christian missions by (1) making strict requirements for obtaining permission to erect a new place of worship; (2) restricting religious propagation only to those outside the five recognised religions; and (3) controlling foreign aid for religious institutions; (4) prohibiting inter-religious marriage; (5) requiring that religion classes given at schools should be taught by a teacher whose religious background was the same as that of students. The Government generally responded ambiguously to these demands: they were materialised into regulations, but were loosely implemented. Whereas the Muslims felt insecure and threatened by Christianisation, the Christians were afraid of the threat of an Islamic State. For the Christians, to have to live under an Islamic state in which the shar?'a law was implemented would mean that they would be turned into second-class citizens. To protect themselves from the threat of the Muslim ideological ambition, the Christians decided to ally with the emerging power of the army. This political choice was apparently natural for the Christians because, like the politically secular-oriented Muslims among the civilians, the army was known as the strongest proponent of the nationalist ideological outlook (as opposed the Islamic ideology). One of the consequences of this alliance was that the Christians became less critical if not totally supportive to the New Order authoritarianism. Worse than that, in their protest against certain Government policies, it was not uncommon that the Muslims blamed the Christians as the brain behind those policies. This was typically true when Muslims opposed certain Government policies clearly or allegedly came from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a think tank established by an important group of Catholic activists in cooperation with two important army generals. Despite its ambiguous responses to the Muslim-Christian conflicts, since early 1970s, the Government sponsored inter-religious dialogue events in which religious leaders were invited to talk about a common discourse on development. Not all Muslim and Christian intellectuals, however, agreed with the Government imposed discourse. Some of them developed a counter discourse on social justice by developing a theology of liberation. In 1990s, some private institutions were established to promote dialogue. It was in this period that some Muslim and Christian intellectuals developed a common discourse on democracy and pluralism.

ÖZETBu tez Avrupa Siyasi İşbirliğinin Ortak Dış ilişkiler ve Güvenlik Politikasına evrimini ve Güney Kafkasya'daki işleyişini değerlendirmektedir. Ancak, Avrupa dış siyaset yapımı Avrupa Birliği içinde ve Birliği çevreleyen bölgede etkili birtakım aktörleri hesaba katmak zorundadır. Güney Kafkasya, Avrupa Birliği'nin dış ve güvenlik politikalarını şekillendiren çok sayıda sistemik ve sürekli değişken düşünüldüğünde eşsiz bir vakadır.Araştırma, AB; Rusya; Birleşik Devletler; bölgesel aktörler: Türkiye ve İran; Güney Kafkasya devletleri: Gürcistan, Ermenistan ve Azerbaycan ve son olarak da AB'ye üye devletler: Almanya ve Birleşik Kırallık'ın siyasi eylemleri arkasında yatan motivasyon, amaç ve mantığa bakmaktadır.Ulus devletler, uluslararası örgütler, şirketler, bölgesel ve komşu toplumlar, farklı etnisiteler, sivil toplum örgütleri ve Ermeni Diasporası arasındaki karmaşık ilişkiler ağı ve bütün bu aktörlerin değişen öncelikleri, beklentileri ve olanakları bu çalışmanın konusu içine girmektedir. Araştırma, AB'nin Yugoslavya'daki çatışmalara cevaben ve Barcelona süreci aracılığıyla takip ettiği politikaların ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılışı sonrasında yeni ve yakın çevresinde yer alan Güney Kafkasya'ya yönelik politikasının karşılaştırmalı bir değerlendirmesini sunmaktadır. Araştırma, AB'nin Güney Kafkasya'ya yönelik Yeni Komşuluk Politikası ile çeşitli politika araçları olan İşbirliği ve Ortaklık, TACIS, TRACECA ve INOGATE projelerini incelemektedir. Avrupa Birliği'nin sivil gücü, yeni komşuları için bir çekim gücü oluşturması ve devletler ile toplumların Batı Avrupa'nın eksik bir yansıması olarak yeniden şekillendirilmesi mantığı üzerine inşa edilen yapısalcı yaklaşımı Avrupa dış siyasetine egemen olmaktadır. ABSTRACTThis dissertation assesses the evolution of the European Political Cooperation into the Common Foreign and Security Policy and how it is working in the South Caucasus. However, the making of European foreign policy has to regard a number of actors that are influential in and around the territory surrounding the European Union. The South Caucasus is a unique case, when the multiplicity of systemic and constant variables that shape the foreign and security policies of the EU is considered. Thus, the research looks at the motives, objectives and logic behind the activities of the EU, Russia, The United States, the regional actors: Turkey and Iran, the South Caucasus states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and finally the EU member states: Germany and the United Kingdom. The complex web of relations among the nation states; international organizations; firms; regional and neighbouring societies; different ethnicities; non-governmental organisations; the Armenian Diaspora and the differing priorities, expectations and capacities of all these actors is also the subject of this study. The research provides a comparative examination of the EU action in response to the conflicts in Yugoslavia and through the Barcelona process, with the EU's policy towards its new and close periphery, the South Caucasus, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Hence, the research examines the EU's response to the South Caucasus by means of the New Neighbourhood Policy and policy tools of Development Cooperation and Association, TACIS, TRACECA and INOGATE. Hence, the civil power of the European Union, its magnetism for the New Neighbourhood and its constructivist approach built upon the rationale of re-moulding the states and societies as the lesser-self of the West Europe dominates the European foreign policy.

As with any rapid technological development, the biotechnology revolution is putting great strains on the ability of law to adapt to new challenges and threats. Although there is general agreement on the need to regulate biotechnology in many different fields of human activity (agriculture, life sciences, forensic science) domestic law remains deeply divided over the best approach to take. This book is the first attempt at covering the most pressing legal issues raised by the impact of biotechnologies on different categories of international norms. Through the contribution of a selected group of international scholars and experts from international organizations, the book addresses 1) the international status of genetic resources, both in areas of national jurisdiction and in common spaces such as the international sea bed area and Antarctica; 2) the relevance of environmental principles in the governance of modern biotechnologies; 3) the impact of biotechnologies on trade rules, including intellectual property law; 4) the human rights implications, especially in the field of human genetics; and 5) the intersection between general international law and regional systems, especially those developed in Europe and Latin America. The overall objective of the book is to provide an up-to-date picture of international law as it stands today and to stimulate critical reflection and further research on the solutions that will be required in years to come ; Part I. The international legal regime of biotechnology : general aspects. -- 1. International law for biotechnology : basic principles / F. Francioni. -- 2. Biodiversity and biotechnology : consolidation and strains in the emerging international legal regimes / R. Pavoni. -- Part II. Biotechnology and the protection of the environment. -- 3. Biotechnology, biodiversity and sustainable development : conflict and congruence? / C. Redgwell. -- 4. Bioprospecting on the deep seabed : a legal gap requiring to be filled / T. Scovazzi. -- 5. Biotechnology and marine biogenetic resources : the interplay between UNCLOS and the CBD / G. Cataldi. -- 6. Antartic bioprospecting : is it compatible with the value of Antarctica as a natural reserve? / P. Vigni. -- 7. Bioprospecting in Antarctica : a new challenge for the Antarctic treaty system / A. Guyomard. -- Part III. Biotechnology and international trade issues. -- 8. The WTO dispute over genetically modified organisms : interface problems of international trade law, environmental law and biotechnology law / E.-U. Petersmann. -- 9. Traditional knowledge, biodiversity, benefit-sharing and the patent system : romantics v. economics? / H. Ullrich -- 10. International trade in GMOs : legal frameworks and developing country concerns / S. Zarrilli. -- Part IV. Biotechnology and human rights. -- 11. Agricultural biotechnology, food security and human rights / M. E. Footer. -- 12. Biotechnology, human dignity and the human genome / F. Lenzerini. -- 13. Indigenous peoples' rights, biogenetic resources and traditional knowledge : the case of the Sateré-Mawé people / M. Fraboni and F. Lenzerini. -- Part V. Biotechnology and regional economic integration systems. -- 14. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the governance of biotechnology in the European Union / P. Šturma. -- 15. The EU risk management of genetically modified organisms and the Comission's defence strategy in the biotech dispute : are they inconsistent? / S. Poli. -- 16. Biotechnology and regional integration systems; legislation and practices in the Andean community countries / F. Novak

During the last 15 years the entire Western Balkan region has undergone dramatic changes. With the fall of the Berlin wall and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, new states were formed and transition started, although in some countries it was quite delayed. Simultaneously, during the nineties, much of the region experienced wars and destruction, waves of refugees, internal displacement of population, devastation of the economy, demolition of institutions and impoverishment of citizens. Absolute poverty, determined through the estimation of household consumption at which families, after paying for essential non-food expenditures just attain minimal nutritional needs, in almost all of the Western Balkans is still relatively high, and is not showing significant tendencies of decreasing. A large concentration of the population and households just above the poverty line additionally demonstrates the challenges faced by the entire region while undergoing the transition process. In some countries extreme poverty, meaning that not even basic food needs can be met, has been registered. On the other hand, relative poverty, defined as the share of those who are excluded from the minimum acceptable way of life in states in which they live, is not particularly high. Due to the relatively high standard of living in the past and high expectations of the population that living standards would increase in a relatively short period of time, the subjective perception of poverty in the entire region is very much present. Groups that stand out as especially vulnerable and excluded are the unemployed, dependents and the less educated. At the level of the household, in some countries households with many children and elderly households are particularly vulnerable. The poorest often live in the rural areas and in the underdeveloped regions. In addition, especially vulnerable groups, who cannot even be completely covered by standard surveys, but are poor and socially excluded by many indices are the Roma, refugees and IDPs and persons with disabilities. Concurrently undergoing transition, post conflict reconciliation and reconstruction and striving to pursue their European Union future, the Western Balkan countries face many challenges. One of the greatest challenges is to focus on programs and activities that will lead to equitable and sustained economic growth that will also benefit the vulnerable groups. Almost all Western Balkan countries, through their national plans and programs, have marked employment growth and job creation as the most important single mechanism for exiting poverty. The second priority may be an increase of education coverage and improving the quality of education, although reduction of poverty and social exclusion presupposes improvement in the areas of developing appropriate social safety nets, health care systems, securing adequate housing, participation in decision making and protection of human rights. Bearing in mind the commitment of the Western Balkan countries to meet the globally agreed goals manifested in the MDGs, their efforts to proceed with anti-poverty strategies and aspirations in terms of EU accession, it is of the utmost importance to explore the synergies between these agendas to ensure that the processes reinforce each other.

About The British and Their Laws in the Eighteenth Century: Law and legal institutions were of huge importance in the governance of Georgian society: legislation expanded the province of administrative authority out of all proportion, while the reach of the common law and its communal traditions of governance diminished, at least outside British North America. But what did the rule of law mean to eighteenth-century people, and how did it connect with changing experiences of law in all their bewildering complexity? This question has received much recent critical attention, but despite widespread agreement about Law's significance as a key to unlock so much which was central to contemporary life, as a whole previous scholarship has only offered a fragmented picture of the Laws in their social meanings and actions. Through a broader-brush approach, The British and their Laws in the Eighteenth Century contributes fresh analyses of law in England and British settler colonies, c. 1680-1830; its expert contributors consider among other matters the issues of participation, central-local relations, and the maintenance of common law traditions in the context of increasing legislative interventions and grants of statutory administrative powers. About Legislation, Magistrates, and Judges: High Law and Low Law in England and the Empire: The contrast between superior and appellate courts on the one hand, and lower level tribunals on the other, is familiar to every criminal lawyer. In common law jurisdictions inferior courts have usually been distinguished by large numbers of defendants, relatively few legal issues, and many apparent human problems, and not much legal assistance for those accused. Direct or indirect descendants of the jurisdiction of the English country and borough magistrates, inferior courts spread throughout the empire, sometimes as direct transplants, sometimes as adaptations of already established European traditions. In newly conquered Quebec the British made use of the capitaines de milice before establishing justices in 1764, giving them also a summary jurisdiction in debt not shared by their counterparts in England; in South Africa, the landdrost acted in the Cape until 1827; in both early New South Wales and Newfoundland, antecedent military and naval jurisdictions, and in Australia conflict between the free settler and ex-convince populations, gave a strong local flavour to the institution or popular attitudes toward it. Their later development in different countries has been equally distinctive. On one of the most significant issues, the place of law magistrates, there are great differences in current practice. In Ontario, Canada a largely professional magistracy came into being in the mid-nineteenth century, and the few surviving magistrates quietly expired about 1990. In England, in contrast, lay magistrates still do something like 95 percent of criminal adjudication, albeit sometimes guided with a strong hand by their clerks. The incursions of stipendiaries in the mid-nineteenth century were reversed in England, although the Blair government is apparently moving in the direction of professionalization. Even in Scotland, usually thought to have had a minimal lay jurisdiction until the present, there was considerable activity by the justices and other lay judges both before and after 1707, and an actual expansion of jurisdiction as late as the mid-1970s, hotly debated by the profession and the parties.

This article considers several explanations for the international human rights movement's sudden heightened attention to rule of law. The human rights movement has increasingly encountered conceptual, normative and political challenges. Perhaps, as de Mello suggested, rule of law will be a "fruitful principle to guide us toward agreement and results," and "a touchstone for us in spreading the culture of human rights." We still live in a world where widespread human rights violations are the norm rather than the exception. Rule of law is seen as directly integral to the implementation of rights. Rule of law may also be indirectly related to better rights protection in that rule of law is associated with economic development, which is related to better rights performance. Rule of law is integral to and necessary for democracy and good governance. Attempts to democratize without a functional legal system in place have resulted in social disorder. Rule of law is said to facilitate geopolitical stability and global peace. According to some, it may help prevent wars from occurring in the first place. It also provides guidelines for how war is carried out, and is central to the establishment of a rights-respecting post-conflict regime. Post 9-11 concerns over terrorism have also focused attention on rule of law. In addition, rule of law provides a rhetorical basis for challenging the world's sole reigning superpower. Taking each of these factors in turn, I critically analyze the relationship between rule of law and human rights. The relationship is complex and defies easy summary across such a broad range of issues. Nevertheless, a provisional summary that highlights some of the key findings and conclusions may be helpful. First, on the whole, rule of law is desirable. However, it is clearly no panacea for any of these problems. Second, rule of law is more useful in addressing some concerns than others. Appealing to rule of law will do little to resolve the conceptual and normative difficulties at the core of the human rights agenda. Third, the empirical evidence to support the assertion that rule of law leads to more rights and wellbeing is limited, and subject to doubts about causality. There is good reason to believe that wealth rather than rule of law is mainly responsible for better rights performance, although rule of law may also have some independent impact. Fourth, although rule of law and liberal democracy generally go hand in hand, they need not. Rule of law is possible in non-democratic states, and in democratic but non-liberal states. Rule of law may proceed, and is generally a precondition for, democratic consolidation. Fifth, we should not put too much faith in the ability of rule of law to prevent war, limit atrocities during war, or rein in a superpower bent on going its own way. Finally, rule of law is only one component of a just society. In some cases, the values served by rule of law will need to give way to other values. Invoking rule of law in most cases signals the beginning of normative and political debate, not the end of it.