Suchergebnisse

Sollte der Europäische Rat im Dezember oder später grünes Licht dafür geben, EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Ukraine und Moldau zu eröffnen, dann geht es nicht mehr nur um symbolische Solidarität mit einem von Russland überfallenen bzw. be­drohten Nachbarn. Vielmehr beginnt im Schatten des Krieges ein neues Kapitel der Erweiterungspolitik. Nach der Türkei und den sechs Ländern des Westlichen Balkans bildet Osteuropa mit der Ukraine, Moldau und Georgien den dritten Erweiterungsraum. Spätestens seit Russlands Vollinvasion in der Ukraine versteht Brüssel unter Erweiterung die Expansion in strategisch wichtige Räume. Geopolitische Forderungen nach schnellen Beitritten nagen dabei an der konservativen Erweiterungsdoktrin - nach der es weder Rabatte auf die Kopenhagener Kriterien für eine EU-Mitgliedschaft geben darf noch Abkürzungen auf dem Weg zur Aufnahme. Hinzu kommt, dass die Beitrittsfragen bald in die Fährnisse der Kriegsdiplomatie geraten könnten, wenn es um dauerhafte Sicherheit für die Nachkriegs-Ukraine gehen wird. Die Europäische Kommission greift nun Ideen auf, wie neue Mitglieder schrittweise integriert werden könnten. Damit versucht sie, dem Dilemma zwischen Geo- und Integrationspolitik auszuweichen. (Autorenreferat)

"Der 28. Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Union wird Kroatien heißen. Am 9. Dezember 2011 wurde der Beitrittsvertrag in Brüssel unterzeichnet, zum 1. Juli 2013 soll das Land der EU beitreten. Damit wird Kroatien jedoch nicht nur das erste, sondern für die kommenden Jahre auch das einzige Land in der Region des Westlichen Balkans sein, um das sich die Union erweitert. Zum einen ist der relativ geradlinige EU-Kurs Kroatiens nicht die Regel, sondern die Ausnahme in einer Region, in der Fragen der Stabilisierung und ungelöste bilaterale Konflikte noch zahlreiche Hindernisse für die EU-Integration der betroffenen Staaten aufwerfen. Zum anderen zeichnen sich – verschärft durch die aktuelle Verschuldungs- und Wirtschaftskrise – auch innerhalb der EU eine klare Tendenz hin zu einer strikten Handhabung der Beitrittskonditionalität und eine zusehends skeptische Haltung gegenüber neuen Erweiterungen ab. Die Frage, wie die EU ihre Anziehungs- und Transformationskraft gegenüber dem Westlichen Balkan aufrechterhalten kann, stellt sich vor diesem Hintergrund mit besonderem Nachdruck." [Autorenreferat]

When representatives of the U.S. government and Congress debated military intervention in the conflict in Bosnia in 1995, they were not just talking about an American troop contribution. The dispute became a focal point for issues such as relations with the U.N. and NATO and the general desirability of multilateral peacekeeping. What elicited the strong responses were trade-offs inherent to the internationalization of security policy: security gains were measured against concerns about the national interest, democratic legitimacy, and effects on the rule of law. However, despite their role in shaping future policy these types of responses lack systematic analysis. Following a qualitative content analysis, this paper offers a response overview. I distinguish three phases in the debate and illustrate that turning points were brought on by the momentum of events in the Balkans rather than D.C. Yet, arguments seem to have developed a 'symbolic power' independent of their direct effect on the course of events. While the U.N. was strongly contested NATO proved to be a 'common denominator' with some disciplining power over internationalization's critics. In defense of the intervention, the Clinton administration portrayed multilateralism as a useful tool. This strategy helped sell internationalization to Congress. But it also required a non-committal rhetoric which would serve opponents of international security organizations beyond 1995. ; Als Vertreter der U.S. Regierung und des Kongresses 1995 über eine militärische Intervention in Bosnien diskutierten, stand nicht nur ein amerikanischer Truppenbeitrag zur Debatte. Das Thema war Anlass für eine grundsätzliche Auseinandersetzung über das Verhältnis zur UNO, zur NATO und darüber, inwieweit friedensschaffende Maßnahmen im Verbund wünschenswert seien. Die Heftigkeit der Reaktionen lässt sich auf Güterkonflikte zurückführen, die mit der Internationalisierung von Sicherheit einhergehen: Zugewinne an Sicherheit durch internationale Organisationen werden abgewogen gegen das nationale Interesse, demokratische Legitimität und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Obwohl diese Reaktionen Einfluss auf zukünftige Politik nehmen können, sind sie bisher nicht systematisch erforscht worden. Basierend auf einer qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse, liefert dieses Papier einen Überblick über die Reaktionstypen der Bosnien-Debatte. Ich unterteile die Debatte in drei Phasen und zeige, dass die Eigendynamik der Entwicklungen im Balkan die Richtung stärker beeinflusste als Washington. Dennoch entfalteten die vorgebrachten Argumente unabhängig von ihrem direkten Einfluss eine 'symbolische Kraft'. Während die UNO stark umstritten war, erwies sich die NATO als kleinster gemeinsamer Nenner, der auf die Kritiker der Internationalisierung disziplinierend wirkte. Um die Intervention zu verteidigen, stellte die Clinton-Regierung Multilateralismus als nützliches Werkzeug dar. Diese Strategie half zwar bei der Vermittlung. Sie erforderte allerdings eine unverbindliche Rhetorik, die den Gegnern internationaler Sicherheitspolitik über die Debatte von 1995 hinaus Argumente lieferte.

The first part of this article is a short introduction into Sufism, seen as a unique mode of expressing the internal, mystical dimension of Islam. In this section, the history, doctrine and ritual practice of the main dervish communities have been considered. In the second part, predominantly based on the author's preliminary field study of the extant dervish communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, more attention has been dedicated to the revival of Islamic mysticism in a contemporary context. In terms of sociology of religion, the revitalization of Sufism in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be understood within the broader framework of the revival of classical religiosity in the Balkans. After World War Two, the activities of the dervish orders in Bosnia were prohibited, mainly due to the modernist Islamic community supported by the ruling structures. This, of course, should be taken into consideration when discussing the issue of Islamic orthodoxy versus mysticism. A complete renewal of Sufism has taken place in the 1990s, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and completion of the war. Therefore, one is dealing here with the renewal of classical religiosity, because Sufism had been developed within Orthodox Islam in Bosnia since the Ottoman period.

Examines the United Nations' role in the intervention & prevention of genocide. The authors concur that the success rate of the UN as far as genocide prevention has been dismal. The primary reason for this inaction may be found in the divergent political interests exerted by members of the United Nations Security Council. In spite of the 1992 Agenda for Peace, initiated by then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the 1994 Rwandan genocide & the 1995 slaughter of Muslim men & boys at Srebrenica bear tragic witness to UN ineffectuality. An August 2000 Brahimi Report severely criticized UN efforts but indicated remedial action. The article further discusses prosecution & current challenges as illustrated by a historical overview of the Indonesian genocide in East Timor during the mid-70s. Authors conclude that the UN is still in search of a role in which humanitarian issues will assume a higher priority than they once did. 13 References. S. de Haast

One of the many controversies that survived the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina concerns the responsibility for several of the most deadly artillery attacks against civilians during the three-year siege of Sarajevo. Although indiscriminate artillery fire accounted for a small fraction of the total civilian deaths during the war, graphic video footage of the mass slaughter exercised a disproportionate effect on world public opinion and, therefore, on Western policymakers who felt constrained to "do something." On at least three occasions, individual artillery explosions in the Bosnian capital prompted immediate international intervention that substantially determined the course and resolution of the conflict. The persistence of controversy is informed by a combination of factors, including the substantial consequences of the Western response, the inconclusiveness of some of the forensic data, and the conflicting statements of civilian survivors, journalists, spokesmen for the belligerents, and U.N. officials—all of whom have been accused of some degree of bias by one side or another. Nearly a decade later, testimony and forensic evidence presented at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has shed new light on these incidents, presenting a more comprehensive and authoritative historical baseline account of the "mortar massacres," much as it has for a plethora of criminal acts committed by all sides during the wars of Yugoslav succession. The Tribunal recently released documentation detailing some of the mortar attacks that occurred in the city of Sarajevo, including forensic reports compiled by the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which had not been previously made public. The bulk of this information is contained in the Tribunal Judgment and corresponding Dissenting Opinion of the former commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps (SRK), Major General Stanislav Galić. Although the reliability of judicial testimony and other evidence is invariably limited by the abilities and resources of both the prosecution and defense, the trial transcript has cleared away at least some of the fog of war, making it somewhat less difficult to apportion responsibility for the disputed attacks. This article integrates the Galić transcript with earlier, wartime U.N. documentation, press releases, and media reports, supplemented by interviews conducted by the authors with military experts familiar with the characteristics of the weaponry employed by the besiegers. It also endeavors to place the most notorious incidents in the broader context presented by the multiplicity of artillery attacks that took place in urban areas across Bosnia between 1992 and 1995.

The author points up the proverbial complexity of Yugoslavia & the inadequacy of its political structure, made up of six republics, five peoples, four languages, three religions, two alphabets, & one party. That is why the subjective orientations of its peoples went counter to its existence, leading to its disintegration following the first multiparty elections. Serbs & Montenegrins were its partisans & due, to a lack of democratic political culture, they launched the war for the preservation of Yugoslavia. The properties of the political culture of the peoples living on its territory had acted as trip-wires for that war, & defined its form, course, & intensity. The aggressors belong to the Eastern civilizational sphere, speak the Serbian language, write in the Cyrillic alphabet, are culturally tribally oriented, want to live in Yugoslavia & Greater Serbia (which would be socialist), & are adherents of repressive types of political culture. The victims belong to the Western civilizational sphere, are Catholics & Muslims, speak Croatian (Croato-Serbian), write in the Latin alphabet, are culturally communally oriented, & favor the participatory political culture. During the Serbian & Montenegrian aggression, two civil wars erupted in Bosnia & Herzegovina: (1) between the Muslims & the Croats & (2) between the Muslims. The participants of this war all swear their allegiance to the state of Bosnia & Herzegovina, but differ in their visions of its political structure. The Muslims wish for a unitarian state of Bosnia & Herzegovina, the Croats want it to be a federal state, & the Serbs are against any separate state of Bosnia & Herzegovina. 7 Tables, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.