Suchergebnisse

"Our forecast model for German Bundestag elections relies on three predictors: (1) the popularity of the incumbent chancellor (hence the christening of it as the 'Chancellor Model'); (2) the long-term partisan balance in the German electorate; and (3) the cost of ruling, as captured by the tenure of the government in office. The model forecasts the vote share of the governing parties (typically two, such as Social Democrats and Greens, or Christian Democrats and Free Democrats), except for instances of a grand coalition. The coefficients of the predictors are estimated based on elections since 1949, the beginning of the Federal Republic. The out-of-sample forecasts of the model deviate from the actual results by just over one percentage point, on average. The first real-time test of the model came in 2002. The forecast issued three months before Election Day picked the incumbent vote share to the decimal (47.1% for the SPD-Greens coalition); for the 2005 election, called a year early, our forecast three
weeks before Election Day was just three-tenths of a percentage off the mark. For the upcoming election, we offer separate forecasts, conditional at this moment, for each of the two parties in the grand coalition." (authors abstract)

Manuscript Type: Empirical
Research Question/Issue: This study seeks to find evidence of discrimination behind the scarce presence women on Spanish boards of directors through factors within firms linked with different theories of discrimination.
Research findings/Insights: Using data on the boards of directors from the top 1000 Spanish companies in 2005 and 2008, we identify some signals of discrimination. We find that women directors are scarcer in those sectors where there are less female managers or where the directors are mainly draw on the firm's executive staff. There is also evidence of the dynamics of Becker's theory of discrimination, since time and competition are determinants of the women's presence on Spanish boards. We also find a positive relationship between the number of women already on the board and the likelihood of adding a woman. This could signal some kind of underestimation of women's skills and preconceptions about their attitudes (such as risk-aversion).
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study provides empirical support for the prediction of Becker's theory of discrimination. The study also furnishes evidence of false preconceptions concerning the skills and risk attitudes of female managers.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Education and mentoring initiatives to improve the training of the female candidates helps to reduce discrimination before reaching the board, as well as better work- and family-life balance. Once they are in the pool of candidates, transparency and objectivity in selection procedures and/or even the establishment of a women's quota on boards may contribute to dismiss employers' negative beliefs about their capabilities in the long run.
Key words: Corporate Governance; Board of Directors; Gender Discrimination; Glass Ceiling.
Classification JEL: G34, J16, M14, C35.

Research Question/Issue: The specific monitoring effect of boards of directors versus industry regulation is unclear. In this paper, we examine how the interaction between bank-level monitoring and regulatory regimes influences the announcement period returns of acquiring banks in the US and twelve European economies. Research Findings: We study three board monitoring mechanisms (independence, CEO-chair duality and diversity) and analyze their effectiveness in preventing underperforming merger strategies under bank regulators of varying strictness. Only under strict banking regulation regimes, board independence and diversity improve acquisition performance. In less strict regulatory environments, corporate governance is virtually irrelevant in improving the performance outcomes of merger activities. Theoretical Implications: Our results indicate a complementary role between monitoring by boards and bank regulation. This study is the first to report evidence consistent with complementarity by investigating the effectiveness (rather than the prevalence) of governance arrangements across regulatory regimes.
Policy Implications: Our work offers insights to policymakers charged with improving the quality of decision-making at financial institutions. Attempts to improve the ability of bank boards to critically assess managerial initiatives are most likely to be successful if internal governance is accompanied by strict industry regulation.