Suchergebnisse

This paper investigates the take-up rate or claim-waiting period rate of the unemployed under the South African Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) system. The goal is to identify disincentive effects that income replacement rates (IRR) and accumulated credits may have on the claimant's behavior in terms of their claim waiting period rate (or how quickly they apply for UIF benefits). Utilizing nonparametric and semi-parametric estimation techniques, we find that there is little evidence, if any, for job disincentives or moral hazard problems. More specifically, the majority of claimants that are quickest to claim the UIF benefits are those who have worked continuously for at least four years and accumulated the maximum allowable amount of credits. The authors also note that claimants' waiting periods are indifferent with regard to levels of income replacements yet extremely sensitive to the amount of credits accumulated. Ultimately, the recipients of the UIF benefits do not rely heavily on the replacement incomes and prefer waiting longer for employment opportunities as opposed to exhausting their accumulated credits. The semi-parametric Cox's Proportional Hazard (PH) model confirms that there is a positive relationship between the claimant's accumulation of credits and the associated take-up rate of the UIF.

Backed by sound economic policies and until the global crisis, a buoyant global economy, many developing countries made significant movement toward achieving the 2015millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly those for poverty reduction, gender parity in education, and reliable access to safe water. But even before the global economic crisis, progress in achieving some MDGs, especially those on child and maternal mortality, primary school completion, hunger, and sanitation, was lagging. The global food, fuel and economic crises have set back progress to the MDGs. An estimated 64 million more people are living on less than $1.25/day than there would have been without the crisis. The challenges ahead are achieving the MDGs requires a vibrant global economy, powered by strong, sustainable, multi-polar growth, underpinned by sound policies and reform at the country level; improving access for the poor to health, education, affordable food, trade, finance, and basic infrastructure is key to accelerating progress to the MDGs; developing countries need to continue to strengthen resilience to global volatility in order to protect gains and sustain progress toward the MDGs; the international community must renew its commitment to reach the 'bottom billion', particularly those in fragile and conflict-affected countries; and global support for a comprehensive development agenda including through the G20 process is critical. In the wake of recent global crises, and with the 2015 deadline approaching, business as usual is not enough to meet the MDGs.

Nicaragua's state domination of productive capacity from the late 1970s to 1990, coupled with the civil war of the 1980s, left the economy with hyperinflation, large fiscal and current account deficits, and an external debt that was six times gross domestic product. As a result, economic activity declined at a sharp rate. By 1993, per capita income had fallen by a full 60 percent from the 1977 level. By the early 1990s the country was receiving aid equivalent to more than 70 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Subsequent administrations tried to address the country's economic problems through fiscal and monetary discipline and market-oriented reforms to redefine the role of the state. There were some successes, for example, decisive government action reduced inflation to around 10 percent by 1995, but many reforms failed due to their slow pace and to continued political volatility. The Bank supported the reform agenda with two economic recovery credit operations in the early 1990s. The results were less positive than expected, as the government's capacity to privatize state-owned enterprises and otherwise reform the public sector wavered in the face of political instability. The lack of political consensus prompted the Bank to withdraw from structural adjustment lending for several years. An opening for re-engagement was provided in 2002 when, after several failed attempts, Nicaragua successfully implemented the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). This allowed the Bank to respond to the government's request for assistance to close a financing gap through fast disbursing budget support in the form of a programmatic structural adjustment credit. While technically a structural adjustment loan, the credit supported objectives based on budget-based goals already attained in implementing a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which had been prepared by the government in 2001. In this sense, the credit was the last structural adjustment loan and the precursor to the Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs).

The Pentagon released its proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2025 this week. There were no major surprises, unless you're shocked by the fact we are continuing to over-invest in a strategy and a military force structure that is making the world less secure.If this budget goes through as requested, the Pentagon and related activities like work on nuclear warheads at the Department of Energy will come in at $894 billion. That's slightly less than the number being debated for this year, but far more than the levels achieved at other major turning points like the Korean and Vietnam wars or the peak of the Cold War. Meanwhile, Congress has shown little ability to provide adequate input or oversight of these huge figures. Over five months into the new fiscal year, it has yet to even pass a 2024 budget.What could possibly justify devoting these enormous sums to the Pentagon at a time of urgent national need to address other threats to our lives and livelihoods, from climate change to epidemics of disease to rampant inequality? The primary answer is the same one we have heard repeatedly in recent years: China, China, and China.But as I have noted in a recent paper for the Brown University Costs of War Project, by any measure the United States already spends two to three times as much on its military as China does, and outpaces it by far in basic military capabilities like nuclear weapons, naval firepower, and modern transport and combat aircraft. In the areas where there is room for doubt about the relative military power of the two rivals, from emerging technology to the likely outcome of a war over Taiwan, dialogue and diplomacy offer a far better chance of reaching a stable accommodation than spinning out scenarios for "winning" a war between two nuclear-armed powers, or by running a costly new arms race.Unfortunately, the rhetoric and resources underpinning the new Pentagon request are more consistent with arms racing than accommodation. The department remains firmly committed to its plan to build thousands of "autonomous, attritable systems" by August 2025, with the express purpose of developing the ability to overwhelm China in a conflict in Asia. In plain English, this means building swarms of drones and other high-tech systems controlled by artificial intelligence. And the plan is for these systems to be cheap and readily replaced if large numbers are destroyed in battle.The idea that the U.S. arms industry can produce large numbers of new systems quickly and affordably, and build replacements on short notice, runs contrary to the experience of recent decades. It's an exercise in wishful thinking that could result in the worst of both worlds — spurring China to increase its investments in next generation military technology even as it is unclear whether the United States can develop and integrate it successfully in any reasonable time frame.Far from increasing our security, once these new systems are developed and fielded they will almost certainly make the world a more dangerous place. This point is underscored in a new report from Public Citizen which notes that "[i]ntroducing AI into the Pentagon's everyday business, battlefield decision-making and weapons systems poses manifold risks."For example, although current Pentagon guidelines pledge to keep humans in the loop in decisions to engage in lethal force, once autonomous weapons are produced on a large scale the temptation to use them without human intervention will be great. This in turn will have a cascade of potential negative effects, from dehumanizing the targets of these systems, to making it easier to contemplate going to war, to risking mass slaughter caused by a malfunction in one of these complex systems.And as Michael Klare has written in an analysis for the Arms Control Association, the dangers of AI and other emerging military technologies are likely to "expand into the nuclear realm by running up the escalation ladder or by blurring the distinction between a conventional and nuclear attack."Klare also rings the alarm bell about the real risks of technical failures involving next generation technologies:"Non-military devices governed by AI, such as self-driving cars and facial-recognition systems, have been known to fail in dangerous and unpredictable ways; should similar failures occur among AI-empowered weaponry during wartime, the outcomes could include the unintended slaughter of civilians or the outbreak of nuclear war."These are all strong reasons to go slow and evaluate the consequences of applying AI to military operations, not engage in uncritical cheerleading that gives lip service to risk assessment while moving full speed ahead towards deployment of autonomous systems. To his credit, President Biden has pledged to promote talks with China on "risk and safety issues related to artificial intelligence." An analysis by Sydney Freedberg of Breaking Defense points out that "the Chinese have been showing signs they are receptive, particularly when it comes to renouncing AI command-and-control systems for nuclear weapons." More discussions of this sort are urgently needed before moving full speed ahead on AI-driven weapons.The urge to deploy AI and other emerging military technologies without adequate deliberation or scrutiny is just one of the troubling elements to come out of this week's Pentagon budget release. Staying the course on the Pentagon's plan to build a new generation of nuclear weapons and continuing to subsidize a policy of global military reach that has helped spark the disastrous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are more likely to fuel future conflicts than prevent them. And despite President Biden's recent, tougher rhetoric in response to Israel's slaughter of tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza, the White House fact sheet issued in conjunction with the Pentagon budget release provides a whitewashed, wildly misleading description of the U.S. role in enabling Israel's brutal attacks:"After Hamas's horrific terrorist attacks against Israel, the President has led the United States to support Israel's right to defend its country and protect its people in a way that upholds international humanitarian law, while ensuring the Palestinian people have access to vital humanitarian aid and lifesaving assistance."It is impossible to square these claims with the actual situation in Gaza, and attempting to do so makes a mockery of the administration's repeated references to supporting a "rules-based international order."The bottom line is that the United States is spending far too much on the Pentagon, much of it in service of goals that are likely to cause far more harm than good. It's time to reverse course, but neither the White House nor a majority in Congress are likely to do so of their own accord.We must pay closer attention to the consequences of the massive military spending and widespread military activities being carried out in our name, and stand up for more realistic policies that can set the stage for a future free of unnecessary conflicts and dangerous arms racing. We can't afford to let the Pentagon and the policies it underwrites continue on autopilot, promoting military approaches to problems that don't have military solutions, all too often with disastrous results.

As the war in Ukraine moves into its third year, Russo-Japanese relations continue to deteriorate from the level that existed prior to the Russian invasion in 2022. Relations between the two countries have never been smooth. Relations have been hampered since World War II by the inability to conclude a treaty formally ending hostilities between the two countries and a disagreement resulting from an old territorial dispute involving a chain of Pacific islands known in Japan as the Northern Territories and in Russia as the Southern Kuriles. Even before the Ukraine conflict, Tokyo had complained about increased Russian military deployments on the islands. Despite these lingering post-World War II hostilities, Shinzo Abe, who served as prime minister from 2012 to 2020, helped foster warmer relations with Moscow as he attempted to court Russia as a buffer against China, Japan's greatest security threat. According to TASS, Putin and Abe met in person over 25 times and held about ten phone calls. Their last meeting took place in the fall of 2019 and their last telephone conversation was held on August 31, 2020, when Putin called Abe.The cornerstone of the Putin-Abe relationship was based on strong personal respect as well as mutual interests in increased trade, particularly to feed Japan's need for commodities. Abe also saw Russia as a potential buffer against an increasingly hostile China. In 2013, Russo-Japan trade approached a record $34.8 billion and remained strong throughout the decade despite fluctuating oil prices. As recently as 2021, total trade turnover was still above $20 billion, with 45% percent consisting of fuel exports to Japan. After the Ukraine invasion in February 2022, Tokyo revoked Russia's most-favored-nation status as part of a series of economic sanctions, including asset freezes targeting Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian central bank. According to The Japan Times: "without the most-favored-nation status under the World Trade Organization rules…tariffs imposed on salmon imported from Russia have been raised to 5% from 3.5% and those on crab to 6% from 4%." As a result of these and fuel-related sanctions, total trade amounted to barely $10 billion in 2023.A decrease in imports of Russian coal by 67.1%, as well as a 44.9% drop in supplies of cars to Russia and Japanese spare parts and components by 32.5% amid sanctions against Moscow were the main factors behind the contraction of trade turnover. Energy resources and transport vehicles still account for over 69% of total trade turnover. Despite the decrease in total trade, a February report from JETRO, the Japanese External Trade Organization, claims that 156 companies and economic organizations were active in Russia before 2022 and 35% reported they continue business without any changes.Until the fall of 2023, Japan's $12.1 billion contribution to Ukraine over the past two years consisted mostly of financial and humanitarian aid as its military equipment provisions have primarily been limited to non-lethal weapons. However, in December, Moscow reacted angrily when Japan stated it would be prepared to ship Patriot air defense missiles to the United States after revising its arms export guidelines. This represents Tokyo's first major overhaul of such export curbs in nine years. Although Japan's new export controls still prevent it from shipping weapons to countries that are at war, it may "indirectly benefit Ukraine in its war with Russia as it gives the United States extra capacity to provide military aid to Kiev."The diplomatic situation has taken on a more contentious character recently as well.The Moscow Times reports that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on February 20 "slammed Japan's prime minister after he said his government remains committed to signing a peace treaty with Moscow to resolve the territorial dispute over an island chain claimed by Tokyo." Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said in a policy speech to parliament earlier that day that Tokyo "remains fully committed" to negotiations over what Japan refers to as the Northern Territories and signing an agreement formally ending World War II. Kishida also said that his government's support of Ukraine and sanctions against Russia "would not waver." Mevedev responded on X: "We don't give a damn about the 'feelings of the Japanese' concerning the so-called 'Northern territories." He added, "They're not 'disputed territories,' but Russia." This is indicative of the stance the Russian government has taken to Japan as an "unfriendly" country.Japan has also taken economic initiatives towards reconstruction in Ukraine that are not pleasing to Moscow. In mid-February, the government of Japan hosted the Japan-Ukraine Conference for Promotion of Economic Growth and Reconstruction. The conference, organized by the Japanese and Ukrainian governments as well as business organizations and JETRO, can only be viewed as an indicator of Japanese geopolitical priorities in support of the status quo in Europe. Moreover, Japanese efforts to spearhead reconstruction efforts send a clear indication that its priorities are allied with the United States and Europe Union. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Japanese and Ukrainian government agencies and companies signed more than 50 deals, Japan pledged 15.8 billion yen ($105 million) in new aid for Ukraine to fund demining and other urgently needed reconstruction projects in the energy and transportation sectors, and President Kishida also announced the opening of a new government trade office Kyiv. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine its military cooperation with China has gotten stronger. Japan views their growing military cooperation as an unprecedented threat as it could become isolated in the region. As a result, it continues to try and demonstrate its commitment to the status quo in terms of supporting international sovereignty and law and order. While Japan's elites would like to continue the stability offered by its Cold War military alliance with the United States and South Korea, they understand the U.S. may no longer share the same interests in the region. Moreover, relations with South Korea are fractured and can make the alliance with the United States dysfunctional at times. This requires Japan to continue to seek openings with Russia that are in its own national interests. Although the Abe administration may have represented the peak for Russo-Japanese relations and such a level of relations is not replicable in the short term (particularly while Russia is still at war with Ukraine) it is in both Russia and Japan's interests to foster cordial relations, if not entirely friendly ones, via business, cultural and other non-government exchanges. Japanese companies still share a desire to resume business operations and invest in Russia once the war concludes in Ukraine. In April 2022, negotiations were concluded between the two countries regarding salmon and trout fishing and other potential fishing agreements could be concluded in the future.In addition, January 2024 saw double the number of Russian visitors to Japan as in January 2023. These are just two areas for positive interaction. However, a considerable measure of restraint will be required as a long war with Ukraine may erode possibilities even in these areas.

A mounting maritime dispute between China and the Philippines, underwritten by spiraling U.S.-China tensions, threatens to ignite the South China Sea. "China-Philippines relations are at a crossroads," Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned his Philippine counterpart Enrique Manalo in a call on Dec. 20 following a string of contentious encounters in the South China Sea, including allegations that Chinese boats rammed a Philippine coast guard ship and fired water cannons at a resupply vessel. China, Wang Yi told Manalo, will "definitely safeguard its rights" and "respond resolutely" if the Philippines "colludes with malicious external forces to continue causing trouble and chaos." Wang's warning comes on the heels of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr's announcement earlier this year that his government is mulling a tripartite security pact with the U.S. and Japan. The Philippines and its treaty ally, the United States, have repeatedly accused China of harassing Philippine vessels in the South China Sea. "We condemn, once again, China's latest unprovoked acts of coercion and dangerous maneuvers against a legitimate and routine Philippine rotation and resupply mission," said Jay Tarriela, spokesperson for the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS), on the heels of a confrontation earlier this month near the Second Thomas Shoal. "These actions reflect not only reckless disregard for the safety and livelihoods of Filipinos, but also for international law," State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said in a Dec. 10 statement."The United States stands with our Philippine allies in the face of these dangerous and unlawful actions. We reaffirm that Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft – including those of its Coast Guard – anywhere in the South China Sea," Miller added.China, which claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, previously accused Philippine coast guard ships of trespassing in what it describes as Chinese waters. A 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling found China's maritime claims in the South China Sea — commonly referred to as the nine-dash line — to be legally baseless. Beijing, which rejected the court ruling as "ill-founded" and "naturally null and void," has persisted in vigorously defending its expansive claims as part of a larger delimitation dispute also involving Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. What exactly is at stake for China in its intensifying dispute with Manila and, by extension, its U.S. ally? "I think a lot of people in southeast Asia are mystified by why China is so pushy on this question," said Sarang Shidore, Director of the Global South Program at QI, adding that the unresolved issue of Taiwan's status is far more important to Beijing. "The South China Sea, these tiny features and islands, their economic potential is relatively small, there's fishing, but none of this rises to the level where you'd think China would be risking so much by pushing a very expansive claim," Shidore added. There are fishing and maritime disputes across the world, even including between allies, noted Lyle Goldstein, Director of Asia Engagement at Defense Priorities. "We have a major maritime territorial dispute with Canada… France and Britain go at it all the time over fisheries. It's fairly normal activity even among friends," Lyle told RS. The China-Philippines squall is far from the only theater in Beijing's ongoing maritime disputes, but it has escalated to a greater degree than many of the others due to Manila's readiness to push back against China's pressure tactics. Beijing has not engaged in an escalatory spiral with Malaysia and Brunei, despite their conflicting maritime claims, because these two states "are unlikely to make an issue of Chinese incidents and they don't really even talk about them," said Shidore, adding that their desire to preserve economic ties with China makes them "willing to absorb some costs." The Philippines has taken a more strident approach vis-à-vis Beijing than others in the South China Sea, said Shidore, partly as a byproduct of American presence in the region. "I think U.S. involvement is a big reason —the fact that the U.S. is present in the theater, and there is an alliance commitment, makes the situation not just a China-Philippines issue but a China-U.S. issue, and that's when everything changes from the Chinese perspective," he added. "The Chinese, I think, are more concerned about the U.S., at this point, than the Philippines," continued Shidore, "the U.S. presence is making them see red and emboldening all the nationalist and hawkish forces in the Chinese structures." American obligations under the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty have raised concerns that Washington could find itself embroiled in a war in the South China Sea in the event of a direct military confrontation between China and the Philippines. "I think, unfortunately, all the signs are there for an escalating conflict," Goldstein said. "They [the Chinese] perceive that the stakes for them are very high," Goldstein explained. "I believe all this tension with the Philippines is an outgrowth of Taiwan tension," he said, noting that the Luzon strait, situated just south of Taiwan, has become an increasingly important fixture in U.S. preparations for a Taiwan contingency following the sharp spike in cross-strait tensions accompanying Nancy Pelosi's 2022 visit to Taipei. "The U.S. has been trying to put in place the groundwork to prepare for a day when they have to surge forces in a major way into Luzon," he said. Beijing, in reaction to these developments, has sought to dial up the pressure on Manila with threats and maritime shows of force. "The subtext is: if you are going to cooperate with the U.S. on the Taiwan scenario, your interests will suffer badly, and that, I think, is why this bullying is occurring," Goldstein said. Shidore said the White House, in light of growing regional tensions, should "pull back in being so frontal on this issue, whether rhetorically or materially, in terms of its presence in the theater." The U.S. has an active interest in exercising its substantial leverage over Manila "to nudge its more vulnerable partner to be more restrained in some of its actions," Shidore wrote in a piece published by The Diplomat last week. "We shouldn't be encouraging the Philippines to get into a fight with China — they are likely to lose that fight," said Goldstein. "We do have a treaty with the Philippines… but that treaty should be read very narrowly. It should be read as, we defend the main islands of the Philippines — if they are threatened acutely, we will be there," he added. "And if it means we need to put some defensive forces in those areas to reassure the Philippines, I'm okay with that. But my view is that we should not even consider going to war over rocks and reefs or different interpretations of the law of the sea. That would be extremely foolish and reckless, and it would be very hard to explain to American taxpayers." The China-Philippines maritime dispute does not, in of itself, reflect anything approaching an existential conflict. It has, however, become an increasingly dangerous proxy and potential flashpoint for underlying China-U.S. tensions in the South China Sea.

The EU Council summit of December 14-15 offered a significant, if perhaps mainly symbolic, gesture toward Ukraine in agreeing to the formal opening of accession negotiations. But at the same meeting, the bloc failed to approve financial (not military) support for Ukraine for the four-year period through 2027, amounting to 50 billion euros. Approval of this aid was vetoed by Hungary. Thus, a very muddled message about how EU countries are dealing with the Ukraine war issue, nearly two years from the start of the Russian invasion in Feb. 2022. Supporters of the aid package have agreed to take it up again in January, and, if necessary, to get commitments from the 26 supporters of the package to provide the funding for Ukraine bilaterally, rather than as part of the EU budget. In the lead-up to the meeting, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban pledged to block both the opening of accession talks and the financial aid package. In the end, he left the room just before the vote to open accession talks was held. He may have done so because, days before the Council meeting, the Commission unblocked 10 billion euros of funding for Hungary that had been suspended because of Hungary's failure to meet EU rule-of-law standards. In acquiescing to the opening of accession talks for Ukraine, Orban is very much aware that the process will require unanimous approval by the Council at many junctures ahead. Moreover, it may be very protracted: accession talks are still ongoing with North Macedonia (since 2020), Montenegro (2012), Serbia (2014) and Albania (2022). But the war aid issue is much more urgent. According to the Kiel Institute's Ukraine assistance scorecard, the EU institutions have been to date by far the largest provider of financial support to Ukraine. The IMF has cautioned that even a brief delay in providing this support could potentially destabilize Ukraine's precarious fiscal situation and the provision of essential services to its people. ​The mood in Europe shifting?Efforts to persuade Orban to end his opposition to the Ukraine aid package could well produce results in time for a January reconsideration, but the optics of the EU hesitations are not good, coming as they do in lockstep with those of Washington. These developments have been widely depicted in Western media as a failure of President Zelensky's personal lobbying efforts to unblock essential U.S. and EU aid before the end of 2023. Hungary was alone in open opposition to the two measures of support for Ukraine. It is nevertheless clear that the mood in Europe has turned cooler on Ukraine, given the Eurozone's weak economic performance and the failure of the counteroffensive to make any significant territorial gains. The recent electoral success of the populist, Euro-skeptic Freedom Party in the Netherlands, whose leader Geert Wilders has long opposed military aid to Ukraine, can be interpreted as part of a trend toward Ukraine fatigue in Europe. On the other side of the ledger, pro-European and pro-Ukraine Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who led liberal forces to victory in October against the nationalist-populist former ruling party, made his inaugural appearance at the Council summit and firmly aligned himself against Orban. Although French President Emmanuel Macron had also personally lobbied Orban to change his position, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz claimed credit for persuading him to leave the room when the accession vote was about to be taken. Interpreting the accession decision— strategic intent and economic constraintsThe EU Council voted unanimously to open EU accession talks with Ukraine for "strategic" reasons — because not doing so would have been seen as a rebuke to Ukraine's deepest aspirations. The appeal of this message of encouragement to Ukraine apparently was enough to assuage the worries in several member states in Central and Eastern Europe about the potential impact on their own national economics of eventual EU membership for Ukraine. A leaked internal analysis from the Commission estimates the budgetary impacts of an EU enlarged to include Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and six western Balkans states. By far the most significant impact would be due to Ukraine's accession. The study found that EU agricultural and cohesion funds for Ukraine as an EU member would amount to 186 billion euros in the first seven years. Agricultural support to other EU members would need to fall by about a fifth, and the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta – would no longer be eligible to receive cohesion funding. Unless there were a dramatic reform of EU programs, the enlargement to include nine new members would turn several net recipient countries into net contributors to the EU budget. The politics of such a dramatic reversal of fortunes in countries accustomed to EU largesse could be difficult to manage and might well give rise to greater popular euro-skepticism. Early indications of this potential impact have arisen in Poland, where popular support for the Ukrainian war effort remains quite robust. However, the situation has been clouded since mid-2023 by emerging grievances among those affected by competition from Ukraine. Troubles arose earlier this year among Polish grain producers affected by cheaper Ukrainian grain. Since November 6, Polish truckers' grievances have erupted in protests involving hundreds of trucks at all major border crossings, bringing Ukrainian trucks' passage to a standstill. The protesters claim that a relaxation of permit requirements for Ukrainians trucks entering the EU — a measure adopted by the European Commission to support Ukraine's economy after Russia's invasion — has harmed the livelihood of Polish truckers. In recent weeks, Hungarian and Slovakian truckers have joined in blocking major border crossings with Ukraine to their respective countries. Prime Minister Donald Tusk has stated that he will end the blockade but will do so in a way that meets some of the Polish truckers' grievances. Even as a convinced European, Tusk is proceeding cautiously. The opening of accession talks is a substantial watershed for Ukraine, but it seems highly unlikely that Ukraine could accomplish the daunting agenda of legal and institutional reforms required for accession while being engaged in a full-scale military confrontation on its territory. Bulgarian regional expert Ivan Krastev argues that the providing of this long-term perspective to Ukraine in fulfillment of its aspirations to be recognized as fully European and a part of the West may induce greater willingness by Ukraine's leaders to consider pursuing a negotiated settlement. "Only strong security guarantees and a promised European future could persuade Ukrainians to accept territorial concessions at some point," he said.In other words, the promise of Europe, while genuine on its own terms, may also serve as encouragement of efforts to end the war short of the full accomplishment of Ukrainian war aims.

The long-anticipated move by leftist MP Sahra Wagenknecht to form a new left-populist party opens the prospect of a more active debate within Germany on the policy course taken by the now highly unpopular coalition of Social Democrats, Greens and liberal Free Democrats (FDP).The potential appeal of this new party will depend largely on whether voters agree that the policy of supporting Ukraine is responsible for Germany's economic downturn.Party ConfigurationThe German political scene has evolved in recent decades away from the alternation in power of the center right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the center left Social Democrats (SPD), often with the FDP in coalition with one or the other of these, to present a spectrum of parties including the center left Green party, the far-left Die Linke (the Left) party and the right-wing nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD).With the lone exception of AfD, these parties all broadly support Ukraine's war effort, until Ukraine itself is ready to seek a negotiated settlement. CDU/CSU support now stands at 29.4%. The AfD comes second with 21.2%. Support for the three governing parties together has fallen to 35.6%. The AfD's spectacular rise in polls seems to many analysts to suggest a generalized dissatisfaction with the status quo, and not necessarily the sudden conversion of many Germans to far-right extremist views. Wagenknecht has called this a "representation gap," one that her party would seek to exploit. The long-anticipated announcement on October 23 of the launch of a new party led by Die Linke MP Sahra Wagenknecht makes the course of German politics much less predictable. Even more than the AfD, the new party foregrounds its opposition to the prevailing stance on the war in Ukraine. Antiwar politics and the "representation gap"A majority of Die Linke's Bundestag delegation has backed tough sanctions against Russia, while still opposing weapons exports to Ukraine. Tensions within the parliamentary delegation grew as Wagenknecht, in public and in the Bundestag, assailed the sanctions policy and called for the opening of negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The party has hovered since the last election just below the 5% threshold of support needed to win representation in the Bundestag. The breaking away of Wagenknecht and her nine colleagues from the Die Linke faction reduces that party to a parliamentary group, rather than a faction, affecting its funding and other prerogatives in the Bundestag.Wagenknecht and the nine other Die Linke MPs who have joined her effort to form the new party have provisionally named it the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance. They plan to have the party officially formed and ready to contest the European Parliament elections of June 2024 and three state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg (all in the former East Germany) later next year. This timing seems well chosen: European Parliament elections are typically favorable to smaller parties, and many voters in the eastern states are, for various reasons, favorable to the Wagenknecht initiative. A snap poll reported on October 31 found that 14% of voters could imagine themselves voting for the new party. This would immediately place it in fourth place, behind the CDU/CSU, AfD, and the SPD, and ahead of the Green party. The new party's impact would be felt mostly on the AfD, but would attract support from all parties other than the Greens and Die Linke itself. Wagenknecht's stated aim is to fill a "representation gap," which means her party will seek to represent those German voters who do not support further arming of Ukraine and who favor efforts to settle the conflict through diplomacy. Evidence of the existence of this gap is the spectacular rise of AfD which began just after Russia's invasion in February of 2022 (when AfD support stood at 9.5%) and more recent polls placing AfD support above 20% since mid 2023. As of March of this year, about 30% of Germans found the arming of Ukraine to have been excessive, and a small majority — 52% — said diplomatic efforts to end the conflict had not been adequate. More recently, a majority (52%) opposed providing Taurus missiles to Ukraine.Wagenknecht's anti-war popularityWagenknecht has been an MP since 2009 and was co-leader of Die Linke in the Bundestag from 2015 to 2019. Born in East Germany, she became active after 1989 in the post-communist Party of Democratic Socialism, initially heading its leftmost, avowedly communist wing. The PDS merged with disaffected leftists of the west German SPD in 2007 and became Die Linke, which for some time enjoyed some electoral success, including in western Germany. Former SPD leader and finance minister, Oskar Lafontaine, was co-founder of Die Linke and is Wagenknecht's husband.Because of her frequent appearances on political talk shows, Wagenknecht is fairly well known to the German public. Often the lone dissenter against the prevailing posture on Ukraine, her arguments are always persuasive, articulate and above all dispassionate. She is a controversial figure, but one that remains among the most popular German politicians. A recent poll showed her finishing third behind Defense Minister Pistorius and CSU leader Markus Söder in national approval ratings.Ukraine War positions: AfD and WagenknechtAlthough AfD's published program states that there can be no viable security order in Europe that excludes Russia, this issue is not often emphasized in their appeal to voters. By contrast, Sahra Wagenknecht's notoriety is entirely wedded to her very public antiwar stance. In February 2023, Wagenknecht joined Alice Schwarzer, a leading anti-war activist and editor of the feminist journal EMMA, to put forward a Manifest für Frieden (Manifesto for Peace) and inviting signatures online.The antiwar demonstration in Berlin on February 25, led by Wagenknecht and Schwarzer, attracted participation by about 10,000 people, but did not produce the momentum that the organizers might have hoped for.Wagenknecht has called herself a "conservative leftist," faulting Die Linke with having built its support base among younger, urban progressive voters while allegedly neglecting voters of the working class. This dispute has taken the form of a contest between an identity vs a class basis of leftist politics. Wagenknecht argues for the refocus of the left on defense of the interests of the German working class. She has sounded some caution about what she sees as excessive openness to flows of migrants.What does it mean?The launch of organizational efforts to form Wagenknecht's new party opens the prospect of a more active debate within Germany on the policy course taken by the weak governing coalition. Wagenknecht has stated that she and her party will not cooperate with AfD. The AfD made a very strong showing in recent state elections in the prosperous western states of Hesse and Bavaria, suggesting that its own potential is not confined to eastern Germany. By filling a tempting "gap" in German politics, the Wagenknecht alliance could endeavor to to curb the rise of AfD.

As the war between Israel and Hamas rages on, with horrifying humanitarian toll for the civilians in Gaza, the United States is continuing its unwavering support for Israel: it is not only sending Israel arms and shielding it from criticisms at the United Nations, but also boosting the deterrence against the so-called "axis of resistance," which includes Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.The U.S. moves to show solidarity with Israel are understandable. However, unless they are complemented by a credible diplomatic strategy in pursuit of a comprehensive stabilization in the Middle East, not only will they fail to bring the U.S. any benefits, but, to the contrary, they would risk entangling it in a wider regional war. To prevent such a dire scenario, Washington should, in addition to its existing contacts in the region, launch a direct channel to Tehran and seek serious talks about the future not only of Gaza and Palestine, but the broader Middle East.Since the war started on October 7, following Hamas's terrorist attack on Israel, Washington reportedly warned Tehran, through third parties, against expanding, either directly or through allies, the front against Israel. To deter Iran, Biden sent an attack submarine to the Persian Gulf, in addition to two aircraft carriers with warplanes and other military assets already dispatched to the region in the immediate aftermath of Hamas's attack.The usual suspects in Washington were quick to jump on the war's bandwagon to push for their favorite obsession: make it all about Iran. Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.), true to form, threatened military action to target Iran's oil infrastructure. United Against Nuclear Iran, hawkish advocacy group, painted doomsday scenarios of impending multi-front "Iranian escalation" against Israel. And others like the Atlantic Council's Matthew Kroenig fell back on a tired cliché of Iran and its allies being the principal source of all instability in the Middle East.Making the Israel-Hamas war being all about Iran not only completely denies Palestinians' own agency and conditions under the occupation. It also misreads actual Iranian policies, as opposed to the rhetoric.As usual, Tehran presents a mix of ideology and pragmatic pursuit of national interest. Top officials, starting with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while expressing full support for Hamas, clearly emphasized that Iran had no operational role in the attack of October 7. Iran is not willing to confront Israel or the U.S. directly as such a conflict would be too destructive for it and its most prized assets in the region, like the Lebanese Hezbollah. Hence, Tehran insists that the "resistance front" has autonomy in its actions against Israel and the U.S.Another factor that the rulers in Tehran need to take into account is that the Iranian population on the whole cares far more about the difficult economic conditions in their own country rather than Gaza. With the regime hard-liners doubling down on divisive policies, such as insistence on mandatory hijabs for women, the gap between the establishment and significant portion of the Iranian population is growing. Since the commitment to Palestine is one of the Islamic Republic's enduring identity badges, it is not surprising that a growing disaffection with the system translates into a weaker support for Iran's involvement in what many Iranians consider a foreign conflict.The fact that Iran is compelled to act, so far, in a restrained fashion, opens a window of opportunity for some bold, creative diplomacy on the U.S. side. A true diplomatic effort should go far beyond sending warnings to Tehran through third parties like Qatar, Oman, or Iraq. It should include direct talks not only about how to end the war in Gaza, but also the outlines of a broader order in the Middle East.Given the entrenched enmity between the U.S. and Iran, it may seem like a tall order. Yet, as international relations scholar Stephen Walt reminds us, some of the roots of the current situation could be traced to the Madrid peace conference on the Middle East in 1991 and subsequent Oslo agreements on Palestine. While crediting then-President George H.W. Bush and his secretary of state James Baker with a serious effort to bring peace to the Middle East, Walt points to a fatal flaw of the Madrid/Oslo process: the exclusion of Iran and the whole "rejectionist" front from the discussions, which only incentivized Iran to act as a spoiler against a regional order that was being shaped explicitly against its interests.Importantly, that happened at a time when Iran, exhausted by the long, brutal war with Iraq and under the pragmatic presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani was showing signs of moderation and willingness to re-engage with the U.S. Rebuffed, Iran turned to Islamic Jihad and other extremist Palestinian groups that contributed to a collapse of the peace process.As the U.S. and its allies ponder their next steps, they should avoid repeating the same fatal mistake. The costs of non-relationship between Washington and Tehran are already highlighted by the almost daily attacks by the Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq on U.S. military assets in those countries. The U.S. retaliates in what it claims to be "self-defense strikes" against Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the absence of a meaningful diplomatic track and de-escalation mechanisms, these exchanges could easily spiral out of control and lead to a direct military confrontation between the U.S. and Iran.In such a scenario the U.S. would have little regional support as the Arab and Islamic world is focused on ending Israel's war in Palestine, not joining a new one against Iran. It is highly meaningful that it was the war in Gaza that provided the context for the first visit of Iran's president Ebrahim Raisi to Saudi Arabia after years of hostility — for a joint meeting of the League of Arab States and Organization Islamic Conference. A handshake between Raisi and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman in Riyadh would have been unthinkable only a few years ago.The U.S. should encourage these regional reconnections and establish its own direct dialogue with Iran. The alternative — dividing the region neatly into the moderates (such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Jordan) and pariahs (Iran and its allies and proxies) — has been tried and failed abysmally. The consequences of this failure are being tragically played out in Gaza. Establishing direct talks with Iran will not solve all of the region's problems. It may also carry domestic political risks for Biden in the pre-election year. But doubling down on the strategy of exclusion of Iran from any solution in Gaza and future security configuration in the Middle East is guaranteed to perpetuate the cycles of violence in the region.

Recent elections in Central Europe swept out incumbents, but in opposite directions, with the nearby Ukraine war and its impact on citizens and the economies never far from the political surface.Poland's liberal opposition managed to defeat the stubborn hold on power of the conservative nationalist party that has ruled since 2015. With the exception of the far-right Konfederacja party, the victors and the vanquished in Poland both support Ukraine's war effort. However, the campaign period exposed some economic grievances related to supporting Ukraine's European Union membership bid.In Slovakia, former prime minister Robert Fico, whose SMER party combines social democratic welfare policies with conservative nationalism, defeated the pro-EU and pro-Ukraine incumbents by emphatically opposing further military aid for Ukraine. Poland: Return to the European fold?The victory of Poland's liberal opposition in the October 15 parliamentary elections was momentous for the European Union, since it could signal the end of the uneasy relations with Europe under Poland's conservative Law and Justice party (PiS).The prospective coalition will be composed of the Civic Platform led by former Prime Minister Donald Tusk, along with the centrist Third Way coalition and the New Left bloc. Together, these three parties won 54% of the vote in a record turnout. Tusk, who served as president of the EU Council from 2014 to 2019, is committed to unblocking over 30 billion euros withheld by the EU pending the reversal of measures taken by PiS seen as having curbed judicial independence.Although it has no obvious coalition partner, PiS got the largest share of votes of any single party at 35.6 percent, allowing their leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski to claim a victory of sorts. The Law and Justice party, having governed for eight years, will be formidable in opposition, in part because the PiS-aligned President Andrzej Duda's term ends only in 2025. Even if Duda bows to the election arithmetic and allows Tusk and partners to form a new government, PiS can rely on the presidential veto and court challenges to hobble Tusk's policy agenda.Law and Justice took a stubborn anti-German stance while in power and has sought to depict Tusk and other liberal opponents as agents of Germany. Moreover, Kaczynski has long accused Tusk of conspiring with Russia to cause the Polish presidential aircraft to crash as it attempted to land in the Russian city of Smolensk in 2010. For several years prior to this event, Tusk had, as Prime Minister, pursued a limited rapprochement with Russia, part of his attempt to bring Polish diplomacy more into alignment with that of France and Germany.A rare exception among nationalist-populist parties in Europe, PiS enthusiastically pushed for greater and more advanced weapons deliveries to Ukraine. However, during the election campaign this fall, PiS exploited Ukraine fatigue among Polish farmers calling for barring Ukrainian grain from the Polish market. In mid-September, in the midst of the electoral campaign, Duda likened Ukraine to a drowning man that risked taking others down with it.Polls indicate that many Poles resent the alleged economic impact of the roughly 1 million Ukrainian refugees resettled in the country. The Polish population seems to be torn between this resentment and the otherwise still solid support for Ukraine's war effort. There are also unresolved historical grievances held by some Poles against Ukrainians. Insightful polling last year concluded that Poles love Ukraine but not Ukrainians. PiS in opposition will likely seek to block Ukrainian EU accession, which can easily be depicted as disadvantageous to Polish economic interests and will respond to the frustrations exposed by the swing in public opinion.Slovakia's elections move country away from Ukraine supportSlovakia's elections of September 30 brought former Prime Minister Robert Fico's SMER (Direction) party back to power in coalition with two other parties. Fico and his coalition partners — the social democratic Voice Party and the hard-right nationalist Slovak National Party — campaigned openly on halting military support to Ukraine and on resisting any new sanctions on Russia. The pro-EU and pro-Ukraine Progressive Slovakia finished a distant second.Slovak public opinion shows a swelling Ukraine fatigue. Inflation, a weak economy and a general positive disposition among many Slovaks toward Russia are among the causes.At his first EU summit on October 27, Fico announced an end of any further military support from Slovakia to Ukraine and called for the EU to press for a negotiated settlement. He pledged to oppose any new sanctions against Russia that would adversely affect Slovakia's economy. In these positions, Fico and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban were in close alignment. Since matters of foreign and security policy in the EU are decided unanimously, Hungary and Slovakia have some leverage over policy outcomes.How might the balance have shifted?The Polish election result may well reinforce Poland's already pronounced Atlanticist orientation. But Tusk's government may also align Poland more closely with the somewhat more nuanced and reserved position taken by Germany on supporting Ukraine. Germany has been cautious to avoid escalation of the conflict in Ukraine and has only reluctantly come on board with the US in the provision of longer-range and more advanced weaponry. Poland, under its conservative government, publicly derided German hesitations. This may change under Tusk.Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French president Macron have also championed intensified cooperation in defense-industrial modernization for Europe, a cause which Poland has not heretofore espoused. This could also change under Tusk's leadership. But Tusk's role will be under constant challenge, since PiS will hope to divide his coalition and bring forward new elections. The ongoing drag on the Polish economy will ensure that the question of balancing support for Ukraine with other objectives will not disappear from public discourse.Kaczynski's PiS was strongly in sympathy with Orban's Hungary in decrying the imposition of the European normative agenda on the scope of their powers. But the two parties never began to close the gap between their views on questions of war and peace. Relations between the two countries will now be far less cordial.Slovakia, on the other hand, is a small but unreserved ally for Hungary in resisting further military support for Ukraine. Fico has already fully committed Slovakia to opposing new military aid from the EU to Ukraine and any new sanctions against Russia. This will on balance reduce the marginalization of Hungary in the EU and in NATO.The net effect of these two elections leave the disposition of Europe as a whole toward support for Ukraine still very much in play. Poland returns to the top table of European decision-making but in doing so will be expected to accommodate to some extent the views of Germany and France. Slovakia under Fico will offer important cover to Orban's Hungary, which would otherwise be isolated.

On October 19, the USS Carney shot down four missiles and multiple drones fired from Houthi controlled Yemen. Saudi Arabia reportedly intercepted a fifth missile. US officials said the missiles and drones were headed north, possibly toward Israel. On October 27, what appears to be an errant Houthi drone or missile damaged a building in Taba and a projectile or debris fell near Nuweiba, Egypt. Yemen's Houthi rebels, the preeminent military power in Yemen, are in danger of ensnaring themselves and Yemen in an escalatory loop that will lead to a re-acceleration of fighting in Yemen. While the Houthis do possess missiles and armed drones that can reach Israel, neither are likely to evade Israel's air defenses. The latest provocations by the Houthis will have no impact on the Israel-Hamas war, but they may provoke retaliatory strikes by the U.S. and its allies. It is probable that the Houthis will respond to any airstrikes by further escalating missile and drone launches which may well target Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthis have successfully targeted sites deep within the territory of both countries, including vital energy infrastructure. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain involved in the war in Yemen and both will be forced to respond to Houthi led attacks, possibly with renewed airstrikes of their own.The Houthis, a Zaidi Shi'a group, are allied with Iran and receive material and technical support from Iran. However, they are rooted in Yemen's socio-cultural matrix. Unlike Hezbollah, Iran has less control over the Houthis' decision making. Iran can and does limit the operational breadth of Hezbollah and its other proxies. In the case of the Houthis, the most senior leadership, among whom all decisions of consequence are made, is closed to all but the highest-ranking members of the organization. It is possible that Iran had no foreknowledge of the Houthis' decision to launch missiles toward Israel. The Houthis' decision to launch missiles and drones toward Israel is first and foremost driven by the group's domestic concerns. The organization faces growing discontent among the 80% of Yemen's population of 32 million that it rules over. While the Houthis' brutally efficient security services maintain an iron grip on power in most areas, there are some cracks emerging in the Houthis' power base. Yemen's economy is moribund, its currency (divided into a Houthi controlled and government controlled rial) is in free fall, and public sector salaries have not been regularly paid since 2016.In addition to acute economic problems, which are Yemen-wide, the Houthis have also stoked resentment by recent moves to overtly consolidate their top-down control of northwest Yemen. On September 27, the Houthis announced the dissolution of the National Salvation Government. Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthis, outlined the need for "radical change, to be commenced with the restructuring of government." The speech and the dissolution of the government are in many respects a repudiation of Yemen's republican history. The "reforms" called for by Abdul Malik also sideline the Houthis' allies from Yemen's former ruling party, the General People's Congress (GPC). The Houthis' move to formally consolidate their rule over northwest Yemen is a high risk strategy that has fueled resentment among many of the increasingly impoverished Yemenis they rule over.By launching missiles and drones toward Israel, the Houthis are hoping to distract Yemenis from their failure to deliver economic opportunity. At the same time, the Houthis are well aware of how the launches, at least in the short-term, are to be perceived by many Yemenis. Anti-Israel sentiment in Yemen, as in much of the Muslim world, is high and rising. The Houthis' attempt to target Israel may be viewed favorably by many Yemenis, even those living outside of Houthi control. The Houthis must also be seen to be abiding by their infamous shi'ar (scream/ slogan) that states, "death to America, death to Israel, curse upon the Jews."The Houthis are also keen to further burnish their credentials as a member of the "Resistance." Iranian financial and material assistance to the Houthis, while often exaggerated, is consequential. Iran has contributed to the Houthis' development of a wide and growing range of largely domestically assembled missiles and armed aerial and maritime drones. Ironically, the Houthis' increasing competence with the development and use of missiles and drones with ever greater ranges combined with their opaque decision making are a liability for Iran. Despite its rhetoric, the Iranian government has little interest in a regional war. The Iranian economy is fragile and the government is contending with significant internal unrest.Before Hamas' attack on Israelis, the Houthis and Saudi Arabia were making significant progress in their bi-lateral negotiations with one another. These negotiations were subtly aided by Iran which put pressure on the Houthis to fully engage with the Saudis. The Saudi government recognizes that there is no viable military solution to the problem of Houthi control of northwest Yemen.Instead, the Saudis sought to engage with the Houthis' leadership in a way that attempts to foster more moderate members of the organization. At the same time, the Saudis have maintained their support for the Houthis' domestic rivals, namely the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and select forces allied with the IRG.In the aftermath of the Houthis' missile launch as well as threats by the group to target ships transiting the Red Sea, Saudi-Houthi negotiations are likely to be paused or shelved indefinitely. If the Houthis' attacks continue — and it is likely that they will— the prospect of reaching any kind of agreement between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis will dim further. On October 24, the Houthis appear to have targeted a Saudi military post near Jabel al-Dawd killing four Saudi soldiers. This follows a September 25 attack by a Houthi drone on Bahraini soldiers serving on the Saudi-Yemeni border that resulted in the death of four soldiers. Both attacks are an ominous sign of where Saudi-Houthi relations may be heading. Unfortunately for Yemen and the region, the Houthis' ability and willingness to become belligerents in the Israel-Hamas war is going to add fuel to a simmering fire. Despite the expiration of the April 2022 ceasefire, Yemen's warring parties have avoided a return to widespread fighting due to a delicate balance of power among rivals. The Houthis' actions and the response they may justifiably illicit from the US and its allies will upset this balance of power. If this happens, fighting across Yemen will reaccelerate with grave consequences for not only the long-suffering Yemeni people, but also for the wider region. Any new attacks on the Houthis by outside powers will ensure that the hardliners who are ascendant within the organization predominate. This will all but guarantee the start of an escalatory cycle with few off-ramps.

It was highlighted the process and was analysed the reasons pf spreading Russian language and narrowing the sphere of the using Ukrainian language in Ukraine in the second part of the 1940s-1980-s. On the materials of Dnipropetrovs'k region, one of the most developed region of the republic in the agrarian and agricultural sphere, it was shown that it was caused by the politics of the highest state-party leadership of the URSR and the most powerful agricultural construction in the first afterwardecade in the region's towns/cities during that the wide-involvement of the significant mass of people happened from different territories of the Soviet state and their subsidence on the permanent residence in the cities that made the using of Russian language objectively acceptable as the language of the international communication. The combination of these two factors contributed the large-scale deterioration of the Russian language in all spheres of production , administrative and managerial, cultural, everyday life and in the production, was identified the russification of the high, secondary special and professional education, general schools, nursery schools. Russian language became the language of the everyday life for the majority of the urban population. It was detected that the same tendencies started to appear in the village environment. It was analysed the forms and methods of its russification. The attention is focused on the factors that was promoted the wide-spreading and the fixing of the Russian language in the region. The serious influence on this situation had the policy that began to do in the USRS after the ending of the World War II on the initiative of the secretary of the CPSU Zhdanov A. It was called «zhdanivshchyna». The new outbreak of repression was happened during this period that was directed against scientific and creative intelligence. It was happened under the slogan of the struggle with "crawl" in front of west with "the rootless cosmopolitanism", "nationalism", the departure from marxism-leninism doctrine in science, culture, art. It is indicated that, as a result of such policy of the state, the region evolved from monolingual to bilingual. It's known that the situation with permanent ringing of the using of Ukrainian language didn't wick the negative among the population of the region. This position was based on the socially-economic factors (the best security of the industrial and grocery goods, higher salary compared to non-industrial regions, and the level and quality of life). The narrowing of the language sphere of the most Ukrainian ethnic region testified about the inorganic nature of the processes of the language policy in the Republic and the great role of the party-stare leadership in a sphere of the region russification. It's assigned that the process of russification supervised by the manifestations of anger up to the national history, culture, the perception of everything Ukrainian as less valuable. It's shown the demographic intertance of the carried out policy. ; Освещен процесс и проанализированы причины распространения русского языка и сужения сферы применения украинского языка в Украине во второй половине 1940-х‒1980-х гг. На материалах Днепропетровской области, одной из самых аграрно и промышленно развитых областей Украины, показано, что вызвано это было политикой высшего государственно-партийного руководства СССР и мощным промышленным строительством в первые послевоенные десятилетия в городах области, в ходе которого происходило широкое привлечение значительных людских масс из разных территорий Советского государства и оседание их на постоянное место проживания в регіоне, что делало естественным использование русского языка как языка межнационального общения. Показано, что сочетание этих двух факторов способствовало масштабному распространению русского языка во всех сферах производственного, административно-управленческого, культурного, повседневной жизни области, межличностного общения в быту и на производстве, определило русификацию заведений высшего, среднего специального и профессионального образования, общеобразовательной школы, детских дошкольных учреждений. Русский стал для большинства городского населения области языком повседневного общения. Выявлено, что аналогичные тенденции начали проявляться и в сельской среде. Проанализированы формы и методы ее русификации. Внимание сосредоточено на факторах, способствовавших широкому распространению и закреплению в области русского языка. Серьезное влияние на такую ситуацию оказала политика, осуществлявшаяся в СССР по инициативе секретаря ЦК ВКП (б) А. Жданова. В ходе ее в республике произошел новый подъем репрессий, вследствие которых наиболее пострадала научная и творческая интеллигенция. Проводилась она под лозунгами борьбы с «поклонением» перед Западом, с «безродным космополитизмом», «национализмом», «уходом» от марксистско-ленинского учения в науке, культуре, искусстве. Отмечается, что в результате такой политики государства область постепенно эволюционировала от преимущественно монолингвистической к билингвистической. Показано, что ситуация с перманентным сужением использования украинского языка не вызывала негатива у населения области. В основе такой его позиции лежали социально-экономические факторы (лучше обеспеченность региона промышленными и продуктовыми товарами, выше, по сравнению с непромышленными регионами, заработная плата, уровень и качество жизни). Сужение языковой среды украинского этнического большинства области свидетельствовало о неорганичности процессов языковой политики в республике и значительной роли партийно-государственного руководства всех уровней в русификации региона. Отмечено, что процесс русификации сопровождался проявлениями пренебрежения к национальной истории, культуре, восприятием всего украинского как неполноценного. Показано демографические последствия проводимой политики. ; Висвітлено процес і проаналізовано причини поширення російської мови і звуження сфери вживання ‒ української в Україні у другій половині 1940-х–1980-х рр. На матеріалах Дніпропетровської області, однієї з найбільш аграрно і промислово розвинутих областей республіки, показано, що викликано це було політикою вищого державно-партійного керівництва СРСР та потужним промисловим будівництвом у перші повоєнні десятиліття у містах області, в ході якого відбувалося широке залучення значних людських мас з різних територій Радянської держави та осідання їх на постійне проживання у містах, що робило об'єктивно прийнятним використання російської мови як мови міжнаціонального спілкування. Поєднання цих двох факторів сприяло масштабному поширенню російської мови у всіх сферах виробничого, адміністративно-управлінського, культурного, повсякденного життя області, міжособистісного спілкування у побуті і на виробництві, визначило русифікацію закладів вищої, середньої спеціальної та професійної освіти, загальноосвітньої школи, дитячих дошкільних закладів. Російська стала для більшості міського населення області мовою повсякденного спілкування. Виявлено, що аналогічні тенденції почали проявлятися і в сільському середовищі. Проаналізовано форми і методи його русифікації. Зосереджено увагу на факторах, що сприяли впродовж зазначеного періоду широкому поширенню і закріпленню в області російської мови. Серйозний вплив на таку ситуацію мала політика, що почала здійснюватися в СССР після закінчення Другої світової війни за ініціативи секретаря ЦК ВКП(б) А. Жданова. У ході її у республіці відбувся новий спалах репресій, спрямований проти наукової і творчої інтелігенції. Відбувалася вона під гаслами боротьби з «плазуванням» перед Заходом, з «безрідним космополітизмом», «націоналізмом», «відходом» від марксистсько-ленінського вчення в науці, культурі, мистецтві. Зазначається, що внаслідок такої політики держави область поступово еволюціонувала від переважно монолінгвістичної до білінгвістичної. Показано, що ситуація з перманентним звуженням використання української мови не викликала негативу у населення області. В основі такої його позиції лежали соціально-економічні фактори (краща забезпеченість регіону промисловими і продуктовими товарами, вищі, порівняно з непромисловими регіонами заробітна плата та рівень і якість життя). Звуження мовного середовища української етнічної більшості області свідчило про неорганічність процесів мовної політики у республіці та велику роль партійно-державного керівництва у напрямку саме русифікації регіону. Зазначено, що процес русифікації супроводжувався проявами зневаги до національної історії, культури, сприйняттям всього українського як меншовартісного. Показано демографічні наслідки здійснюваної політики.

The purpose of this article is to set out the multiannual process for establishing the European Ombudsman's office and the reasons for its establishment. It presents the history of the first European Ombudsmen and the history of the European Communities from a legal perspective. The author goes back to the reasons for setting up the European Ombudsman's body, which were the lack of legitimacy in the European Union. The role of bodies such as the European Ombudsman is to ensure that citizens' rights are actually respected. The European Ombudsman strengthens the rule of law in the European Union and complements the role of the courts by providing a cheap, accessible individual remedy and, on the other hand, complements the representative function of the European Parliament by becoming the centre of independent critical assessment and improvement of the quality of European administration. The rule of law serves to maintain the EU system as a supranational system. It is the construction of the axis of integration. If there is a lack of trust in the community in this respect, it begins to be treated differently. It is therefore important that the European Ombudsman fulfils his Treaty obligations as a body of the European Union effectively. ; p.zawadzki@uwb.edu.pl ; Uniwersytet w Białymstoku ; Arcimowicz J., Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich: aktor sceny publicznej, Warszawa 2003. ; Barcz J. (red.), Prawo Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2004. ; Doliwa-Klepacka A., Doliwa-Klepacki Z.M., Struktura organizacyjna (instytucjonalna) Unii Europejskiej, Białystok 2009. ; Dubowski T., Wysoki przedstawiciel unii do spraw zagranicznych i polityki bezpieczeństwa, Białystok 2017. ; Garlicki L., Ewolucja instytucji Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich w świecie współczesnym, [w:] Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich, red. L. Garlicki, Warszawa 1989. ; Grzybowski M., Ombudsman w państwach nordyckich. Geneza, ewolucja i współczesne oblicze instytucji, [w:] Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich, red. L. Garlicki, Warszawa 1989. ; Gillingham J., Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to economic community, Univeristy of Missouri, St. Louis 1997. ; Ipsen H.P, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Verlag 1972. ; Jackiewicz A., Prawo do dobrej administracji w świetle Karty Praw Podstawowych, "Państwo i Prawo" 2003, nr 7. ; Klepacki K., Instytucja ombudsmana na szczeblu lokalnym na przykładzie Wielkiej Brytanii – wybrane aspekty, "Internetowy Przegląd Nauk o Administracji" 2018, nr 1(1). ; Lenaerts K, Van Nuffel P., Constitutional law of the European Union, London 2005. ; Legrand A., Une institution universelle : L'ombudsman?, "Revue internationale de droit compare" 1973, vol. 25 no 4. ; Liber M., Duński Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich, "Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis" 2005, nr 1. ; Mielnik B., Obywatelstwo Unii Europejskiej, Wrocław 2000. ; Nugent N., The Government and Politics of the European Union, Macmillan Education UK 2017. ; Sadowski P., Skarga do Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich Unii Europejskiej, "Studia Iuridica Lublinensia" 2006, nr 7. ; Söderman J., A Thousand and One Complaints: The European Ombudsman en Route, "European Public Law" 1997, vol. 3. ; Söderman J., Good Administration: a Fundamental Right, [in:] Justice and Home Affairs in the EU. Liberty and Security Issues after Enlargement, ed. J. Apap, Northampton 2004. ; Söderman J., Le citoyen, l'État de droit et le principe de transparence, "Revue du droit de l'Union européenne" 2001, vol. 4. ; Söderman J., Convention on the Future of Europe, "European Ombudsman Newsletter" 2003, nr 23. ; Söderman J., The Early Years of the European Ombudsman, [in:] The European Ombudsman. Origins, Establishment, Evolution, Luxembourg 2006. ; Söderman J., The role and the impact of the European Ombudsman in access to documentation and transparency of decisionmaking, [w:] Opennes and Transparency in the European Union, ed. V. Deckmyn, I. Thompson, Maastricht 1998. ; Weiler J.H.H, The Jean Monnet Program, European Union Jean Monnet Chair in cooperation with the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg 2003. ; Opello W.C., Portugal's New Ombudsman: A Preliminary Evaluation, "Luso-Brazilian Review" 1981, Vol. 18, No. 2. ; Zdanowicz M., Wybór orzeczeń Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Wspólnot Europejskich, Białystok 2007. ; Zubik M., Księga XX-lecia Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich w Polsce, Biuro Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich, Warszawa 2008. ; Jednolity Akt Europejski, Dziennik Urzędowy, L 169 z 29 czerwca 1987 r. ; Traktat o Unii Europejskiej, Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej, C 202, 7 czerwca 2016 r. ; Traktat o Funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej, Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej, C 202, 7 czerwca 2016 r. ; Karta praw podstawowych Unii Europejskiej, Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej, C 202 z 7 czerwca 2016 r. ; Traktat z Lizbony, Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej, C 306 z 17 grudnia 2007 r. ; Sprawa 53/81 D. M. Levin v. Staatseckretaris van Justitie. ; Wyrok Trybunału z dnia 12 listopada 1969 r., Erich Stauder przeciwko Stadt Ulm - Sozialamt. Wniosek o wydanie orzeczenia w trybie prejudycjalnym Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart - Niemcy. ; Sprawa 29-69. ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:1969:57. ; Wyrok Trybunału z dnia 4 grudnia 1974 r., Yvonne van Duyn przeciwko Home Office. Wniosek o wydanie orzeczenia w trybie prejudycjalnym: High Court of Justice, Chancery Division – Zjednoczone Królestwo. ; Sprawa 41/74. ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:1974:133. ; Dyrektywa 90/364/EWG w sprawie prawa pobytu, Dz.U. L 180, 26. ; Dyrektywa 90/365/EWG w sprawie prawa pobytu. ; Dyrektywa 90/366/EWG w sprawie prawa pobytu dla studentów. ; EUROPEAN COUNCIL, ROME, 14 and 15 DECEMBER 1990 r., PRESIDENCY CONClUSIONS Part 1,2,3,4. ; The European Ombudsman, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. ; Luxembourg, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005 ISBN 92-95022-85-8 Printed in Belgium. ; Ley Orgánica 3/1981, de 6 de abril, del Defensor del Pueblo., Publicado en BOE de 07 de Mayo de 1981. ; Lov om Stortingets ombudsmann for forvaltningen sivilombudsmannsloven., Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet 1962. ; Meeting of the Heads of State or Government the Hague 1-2 december 1969 r. ; The Netherlands National Ombudsman Act., Act of 4 February 1981 (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1981, 35), most recently amended by Act of Parliament of 12 May 1999 (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 1999, 214). ; Towards European citizenship, Implementation of point 10 of the final communique issued at the European Summit held in Paris on 9 and 10 December 1974 r., Report presented by the Commission to the Council on 3 July 1975 r. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 7/75. ; Organy ochrony prawnej w wybranych krajach Unii Europejskiej, Biuro Analiz i Dokumentacji, Zespół Analiz i Opracowań Tematycznych, Kancelaria Senatu, Marzec 2011 r. ; On 2 December 1969, in the Final Communiqué from the Hague Summit, the Heads of State or Government of the Six declare their determination to pursue the aim of the unification of Europe and to strengthen the European Communities. ; Report drawn up on behalf of the Legal Affairs Committee on the appointment of a Community Ombudsman by the European Parliament, 6 April 1979 (PE 57.508/fin.). Rapporteur: Sir Derek Walker-Smith ; Rezolucja projektu Traktatu ustanawiającego Unię Europejską, Dz.U. 1984 nr C 77. ; Säädösmuutosten hakemisto: Suomen Hallitusmuoto (94/1919), Helsingissä 17 päivänä heinäkuuta 1919 r. ; Suomen perustuslaki., Eduskunnan päätöksen mukaisesti, joka on tehty valtiopäiväjärjestyksen 67 §: ssä määrätyllä tavalla, säädetään: 11.6.1999/731. ; Sweriges rikes grundlagar och konstitutionella institutioner [1809-1841], samt Norriges grundlag [1814]. Med. ett fullständigt register öfwer Swenska Grundlagarne och Riks-Akten, Örebro 1842 r. ; Vigencia desde 27 de Mayo de 1981. Revisión vigente desde 05 de Noviembre de 2009. ; 19 ; 1 ; 443 ; 459

Bir ülkede yabancıların hukuki statülerine ilişkin düzenlemelerin önem arz etmesi, ülkede yabancıların sayısının önemli surette artması, hukuki statülerinin farklılık göstermesi sonucu söz konusu olur. Yabancıların ülkelerinden ayrılmasının nedeni, başka bir ülkede çalışmak, yaşamak gibi herhangi zorlayıcı bir etkenden bağımsız olabileceği gibi; savaş, doğal felaketler, güvenlik ihtiyacı gibi etkenlere de dayanabilir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Cumhuriyet döneminde yabancılar ülkemize farklı nedenlerden gelmiş olmakla birlikte, özellikle Suriye'de 2011 yılında başlayan iç karışıklık sonucu Türkiye'ye yönelen kitlesel ve ani akım toplum tarafından da hissedilir hale gelmiştir. Iç hukuk bakımından hem bireysel hem de kitlesel iltica hareketleri bakımından ulusal mevzuattaki ana kaynak 1994 İltica Yönetmeliğiydi. Yönetmeliğin kapsamına bireysel olarak iltica etmek isteyenler, hedef iltica ülkesine gitmek üzere transit ülke olarak Türkiye'de bulunanlar ile topluca iltica etmek isteyenler girmekteydi. İltica ile ilgili meseleler temelde 1994 Yönetmeliği ve genelgelerle halledilmekteydi Türkiye Mültecilerin Hukuki Durumuna Dair 1951 Cenevre Sözleşmesine taraf olmasına rağmen, bu konu, kanun düzeyinde düzenlenmemişti. AB Müktesebatına Uyum Programı çerçevesinde, hazırlık çalışmalarına 2009 yılında başlanan ve uzun bir çalışma sonunda tamamlanan taslak metni 2012 yılında Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisine (TBMM) sunulan 6458 sayılı Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 04.04.2013 tarihinde TBMM tarafından kabul edilmiş; Cumhurbaşkanı tarafından onaylanarak 11.04.2013 tarihli, 28615 sayılı Resmî Gazetede yayımlanmıştır. Teşkilata ilişkin olanlar hariç diğer hükümlerin bir yıl sonra, yani 11.04.2014 tarihinde yürürlüğe girmesi öngörülmüştür. YUKK'un hazırlanmasında, başta Avrupa Birliği müktesebatına ve Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi kararlarına uyum olmak üzere birçok etken bulunmaktadır. Türk hukukunda birçok yenilik ve değişiklik getiren YUKK, yabancılarla ilgili tüm konuları kapsayan bir düzenleme değildir; ancak YUKK'un yabancılarla ilgili çoğu dağınık düzenlemeleri tek bir çatı altında topladığını söyleyebiliriz. Hükümler, yabancılar, uluslararası koruma ve teşkilat başlıkları altında kaleme alınmıştır. Kanunda, yabancıların ülkeye girişi, ikametleri, sınır dışı edilmeleri, idari gözetim, vatansızların statüsü, uluslararası koruma ile idarî teşkilatlanma hususlarının düzenlenmiştir. Yürürlüğe girmesinden beş sene sonra, 24.12.2019 tarih ve 30988 sayılı Resmi Gazetede yayınlanan Bazı Kanunlarda ve 375 s. Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamede Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun ile YUKK'un bazı maddelerinde değişiklik yapılmıştır. Makalemizde, önem arz eden değişikliklere değinilecektir. ; he regulations regarding the legal status of foreigners are important in a country, where the number of foreigners in the country increases significantly and where their legal status varies. The causes of migration are very diverse. Persons may have decided to immigrate to another country as a result of challenging factors such as war, natural disasters, security need, but also depending on noncoercive reasons wishing to live or to work in another country. Although there were migration movements to our country due to different reasons during the Ottoman Empire and Republican period4, the phenomenon of migration has been felt by the society especially after the massive and sudden migration movement directed to our country as a result of the social upheaval and violent conflict that started in Syria in 2011. In the framework of the Harmonization Programme to the European Union's legislation, preparation works began in 2009 and the preliminary draft was handed over to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 2012. Code on Foreigners and International Protection, dated 04.04.2013 and numbered 6458, was published in the Official Gazette dated 11.04.2013 / numbered 28615. Its provisions except for the ones regarding the organization of Directorate General of Migration Management entered into force one year after the publication date on Official Gazette, namely on 11.04.2014. In the preparation period of the code, a wide range of factors has been taken into account like the EU's acquis and case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The code doesn't cover all the issues regarding the foreigners; but it can be said that the code has merged a wide range of scattered regulations regarding foreigners under the same roof. In the code followings have been regulated entry of the foreigners into the country, residence permits, deportation, administrative detention, international protection and administrative organization. 5 years after having entered into force some amendments have been made in the Code on Foreigners and International Protection by the Act published in the Official Gazette dated 24.12.2019 / numbered 30988, regarding Amendments in Some Codes and Decree Nr. 375. In this article the important amendments will be explained.Inadmissable (INAD) passenger is a term having been used in aviation terminology to define passengers who are not allowed to enter a country they want to travel. According to civil aviation conventions the INAD passengers are sent back by airline, if the passenger is unable to show the valid documents at the international arrivals terminal or if the documents shown are deemed invalid. They are actually foreigners, who aren't accepted to the country. Therefore they are not same as the foreigners in the country, who are subject to deportation rules. In practice the INAD passengers had to wait in waiting areas. The amendment in the code reflects the actual situation of INAD passengers. But it hasn't enhanced the circumstances of them, many important issues were not regulated such as right of objection, right to seek legal advice, right to apply for international protection. Humanitarian residence permit may be granted to foreigners who cannot apply for other kinds of residence permits, but who still need residence permit due to humanitarian reasons such as child's best interest, health issues etc. The statement in the article "Approval of the Ministry and for maximum one-year periods has been abolished and the authority to give approval has been delivered to the General Directorate within the time limits determined by the Ministry. In this way, it has been paved the way for granting a long-term humanitarian residence permit, which, by its nature, should be decided urgently. By means of this amendment, the bureaucracy has been reduced and it is aimed a faster decisionmaking mechanism. According to the appeal system in the code it was foreseen, that objections of some groups of foreigners stated in Art. 53 para. 3 do not stay of execution of deportation process. By means of the new amendment the exceptions have been abolished, so will the deportation process stay upon the objection of any foreigner. Objection to the administrative court against the deportation decision has been reduced from 15 days to 7 days. It could be to my opinion a possible violation of the effective application right according to Art. 13 of European Convention on Human Rights. A new concept has taken place in the code. The administration may decide to take administrative measures instead of administrative detention. According to the reasoning of the amendment it has been aimed not depriving the foreigners of their liberty. Among these are family-based return, voluntary return counseling, pursuing public interest volunteer activity, electronic monitoring etc. The most striking amendment is electronic monitoring in terms of right of liberty. It should have been made a more detailed regulation as of implementation of electronic monitoring.

Introduction. This article examines the theoretical and practical principles of institutional and institutional prerequisites for ensuring the development of regional natural gas distribution operators in modern economic conditions. The author's position on the substantiation of the high level of importance and relevance of the role of the institutional environment in the structure of ensuring the maximum level of efficiency of the process of development of regional gas distribution networks was also reflected. All possible manifestations of maximum efficiency in the main and additional activities of gas distribution network operators in the Western region of Ukraine are outlined. It was proved that it is the developed form of institutional support and the environment that covers the presence of the required institutions, as well as mutually harmonizes them. This aspect affects the internal business processes that take place in the activities of regional gas distribution companies, their organizational and technical development, as the formation of the image at the interregional and international levels, as well as increasing the quality and reliability of distribution services among natural gas consumers. As a result of the study of the institutional basis, as well as the nature of institutions and their possible impact on the efficiency of gas distribution organizations in the western region, the latter was conditionally divided into basic and related activities. The purpose of the article. Research of institutional preconditions for ensuring the development of regional gas distribution network operators. Results. It is known that today the level of stability of the environment of gas distribution companies in Ukraine is insufficient, at the same time their regional position is unbalanced, which in turn implies the need to find new directions and mechanisms to help overcome various crises and trends on the way to highly efficient and unhindered their development. It is the aspect that Ukrainian regional gas distribution companies are an important component of national energy security and independence, including the stable and continuous supply of consumer demand in the natural gas distribution market, at the same time have almost always a monopoly position and is the center for the implementation of speculative decisions at the highest state level, necessitates large-scale development of institutional support to regulate their activities with the obligation to the delineation of the boundaries of potential development. An important aspect of the future development of regional gas distribution companies in a rather unstable operating environment is the creation of a broad-based institutional environment that will ensure balance and regulate relations between the consumer sector, government institutions, and the gas distribution companies themselves. At the same time, it will create appropriate conditions for the constant increase in the level of competitiveness of the latter. From this, we can conclude that institutional efficiency is directly dependent on the aspect - who exactly ensures their creation and further control of their functioning. After all, the degree of functional efficiency and further successful development of regional gas distribution network operators in Ukraine will depend on how skillfully the country will create equal conditions for absolutely all participants of the natural gas distribution market by implementing institutional incentives and restrictions. Thus, it is the institutional form of the approach to ensuring the further development of regional gas distribution organizations that is focused on the study of institutions and institutions that contribute to the regulation of their activities. In other words, the institutional form of regulating the activities of regional gas distribution network operators is a directed activity of natural gas distribution market participants, which to some extent affects the functioning and further development of gas distribution companies in the region towards continuous improvement of their structure, overall strategy, and management system. , common values, etc .; including taking into account the impact of social, economic, legal, and political institutions in the face of various kinds of instability. Quite important in the process of institutionalization of the process of functioning of gas distribution companies are market institutions and institutes, including: financial, infrastructural, legal and functional; private property; competition. We offer a study of the prospects for the introduction of possible changes in the activities of regional gas distribution companies because of established institutional dogmas. Today, it is not effective enough, and in some regions of Ukraine there is no form of state support for the implementation of relevant programs of innovation and scientific and technological progress has led to a significant deterioration in the distribution of natural gas consumers. After all, there is still a high level of wear of gas distribution networks and their significant resource and energy consumption, there are no innovative solutions. Among the reasons that led to such a market position of regional gas distribution companies is the lack of institutional support, which is the lack of proper foundations for the implementation of innovative solutions, lack of necessary material and financial support to update technological solutions in production, corruption, etc. Today, due to the lack of normal and functional institutional support, there are no proper contractual processes that would be established between suppliers and consumers of natural gas in the regions based on transparency. In our opinion, the formation of institutional approaches and tools for their implementation will increase the efficiency of gas distribution companies in the region, improve the quality of services provided, and will stimulate all participants in the distribution market among natural gas consumers in the region. It is also worth noting that the vast majority of regional gas distribution companies are part of a rather complex "vertical" structure. In turn, as is known from the course of institutional theory, under the conditions of the vertical form of structural construction of the enterprise, there is also a fairly high level of possible costs for its management. Conclusions. It is important to note that the institutional environment, which will be expressed in the presence of all necessary institutions, as well as their coherence with each other today, is a significant and dominant entity in terms of ensuring maximum efficiency and further development of gas distribution companies in the western region of Ukraine. We believe that the most effective and functioning institutional environment will create conditions for maximizing the level of internal processes at gas distribution companies; the most effective organizational and technological development; harmonizes mutual relations between all market participants. ; В зазначеній статті було досліджено теоретичні та практичні засади інституціональних та інституційних передумов забезпечення розвитку регіональних операторів розподілу природного газу в сучасних умовах господарювання. Також було відображено позицію автора щодо обґрунтування високого рівня важливості та актуальності ролі інституціонального середовища в структурі забезпечення максимального рівня ефективності процесу розвитку регіональних газорозподільних мереж. Окреслено усі можливі прояви максимальної ефективності в основній та додатковій діяльності операторів газорозподільних мереж Західного регіону України. Було доведено, що саме розвинена форма інституційного забезпечення та середовища охоплюють присутність потрібних інституцій, а також взаємно узгоджує їх. Даний аспект впливає на внутрішні бізнес-процеси, що мають місце в діяльності регіональних газорозподільних підприємств, на їх організаційно-технічний розвиток, як формування іміджу на міжрегіональному та міжнародному рівнях, а також збільшення рівня якості та надійності послуг по розподілу серед споживачів природного газу. В результаті дослідження інституціонального базису, а також природи інституцій та їх можливого впливу на ефективність діяльності газорозподільних організацій західного регіону, останню було умовно поділено базову та дотичну діяльність.