Suchergebnisse

This report examines the theoretical and practical synergies between three intervention models that are currently being employed to improve local governance in developing countries: 1) democratic decentralization or devolution; 2) community participatory approaches, and; 3) rights-based approaches. The aim is to identify the possibilities and challenges of an 'integrative approach' to local governance that combines the strengths of each of the three intervention models. It is assumed that an integrative approach can help enhance efforts to improve the downward accountability of local governments, enhance equity in the distribution of services and in various citizens' access to influence, and increase citizen participation in local governance processes. This is supported by a number of empirical cases from Africa, Latin America, Asia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are presented in the report. Each case also highlights a number of context-specific challenges to using an integrative approach, such as available financial resources, national policy environments and local conflicts. The report fills this gap by both identifying theoretical synergies and by drawing on the few empirical cases that exist.

This report highlights the great potential of the agribusiness sector in Africa by drawing on experience in Africa as well as other regions. The evidence demonstrates that good policies, a conducive business environment, and strategic support from governments can help agribusiness reach its potential. Africa is now at a crossroads, from which it can take concrete steps to realize its potential or continue to lose competitiveness, missing a major opportunity for increased growth, employment, and food security. The report pursues several lines of analysis. First, it synthesizes the large body of work on agriculture and agribusiness in Africa. Second, it builds on a diagnosis of specific value chains. As part of this effort, the value chain for Africa's largest and fastest-growing food import, rice, is benchmarked in Senegal and Ghana against Thailand's rice value chain. Third, 170 agribusiness investments by the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) in Africa and Southeast Asia are analyzed to gain perspective on the elements of success and failure. Fourth, the report synthesizes perspectives from the private sector through interviews with 23 leading agribusiness investors and a number of other key informants. In conclusion, the report offers practical policy advice based on the experience of countries from within and outside Africa. The huge diversity of Africa's agro-ecological, market, and business environments, however, necessarily means that each country (and indeed regions within countries) will need to adapt the broad guidance provided here to the local context. Annex 1, concerning the rice value chain, was authored by John Orchard, Tim Chancellor, Roy Denton, Amadou Abdoulaye Fall, and Peter Jaeger. Annex 2, containing interviews with 23 leading agribusiness players in Africa, was authored by Peter White.

Mexico is privileged by geography. It is a country with a dual North American and Latin American identity that can serve as a bridge between the two regions. Mexico stands to gain from the current global geopolitical context that involves economic competition between the US and China, armed conflict in the Middle East and in Ukraine, and a desire for many companies to be close to the largest and most dynamic economy in the world, the United States. What Mexico does not have is a clearly articulated strategy to take advantage of the nearshoring opportunity, which, by definition, will not last forever. Given its geographical location and its vertical integration with the US and Canadian economies, enshrined under the USMCA, Mexico is by far the most obvious place to relocate manufacturing or service operations from China, but it is not the only option either. Various states in the US, and other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and South East Asia will also be making their pitches to investors. Given the commercial and security tensions that exist with China, some authorities in the US realize that they need to up their game to consolidate relationships with other Western Hemisphere countries, which is why a group of both Republican and Democratic senators have put together the Americas Act. This legislation, which was introduced in early March, would establish programs to promote greater trade, investment, and people-to-people ties throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, potentially expanding the USMCA. "At its core, the Americas Act is a multi-billion-dollar job creation tool for the U.S. and its allies in Latin America and the Caribbean," said Representative Adriano Espaillat (D-NY). "With its reshoring and nearshoring loans, tax benefits, and other targeted grant assistance for workers at home and in our Western Hemisphere partner countries, the Americas Act will bring jobs and investment back to our Hemisphere and stem the root causes of migration by putting more money into the pockets of working families."While the idea of expanding the USMCA beyond North America might be an attractive idea for boosting regional competitiveness from a US perspective, it would erode the privileged trade advantages that Mexico currently enjoys in its relationship with the US and Canada, something the next presidential administration in Mexico should consider as plans are developed to push forward to proactively attract nearshoring foreign direct investment (FDI). As it stands, Mexico's FDI numbers sound encouraging. But of the $36 billion dollars registered in 2023, only $5bn were new investments [1], which means nearshoring may be happening, but the tide is bringing in soft waves, not the desired tsunami. Creating the optimal ecosystemPresident Andrés Manuel López Obrador issued an executive order on October 11th, 2023 that provides for fiscal incentives for particular industries, including the agricultural sector, auto parts manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and the film industry, among others, as well as incentives for worker training. [2] This decision gained little attention, and while it is better than nothing, it is too little too late. Given Mexico's geographical comparative advantages, fiscal incentives are not the core of what companies want when they analyze whether to locate their operations in the country. Rather, investors need a business and public policy ecosystem that allows them to optimize opportunities and minimize risks over long periods of time, something that Mexico's next government can do a lot to improve. Creating a winning nearshoring strategy for Mexico implies a complex series of considerations and a reinvigorated investment promotion strategy globally, something that fell apart with the elimination of ProMexico —a federal agency that had been charged with promoting foreign trade and investment— at the beginning of the AMLO administration. While the former ProMéxico's operations surely could have been optimized, eliminating the organization completely and leaving promotion to the already overly taxed embassies was a mistake. As a result, Mexico has lost precious time and valuable relationships, and the country now needs to interrupt its leisurely walk and start sprinting. Below are reflections on the core issues that should be addressed to create optimal conditions for attracting and retaining foreign investment. Embrace the energy transitionIn order to be able to receive significant new amounts of investment, Mexico will need to produce both larger quantities of energy and ensure that it comes from cleaner sources. Global companies that consider Mexico as a place to invest long term need access to low-emission hydrocarbons, as well as renewable energy, and Mexico is lacking in both. Given Mexico's complex history that views oil as a fundamental part of the country's sovereignty, embracing the energy transition from a political perspective has posed challenges. AMLO did all he could to roll back the opening up of the energy sector to private sector participation that began in 2014, and invested hundreds of millions of dollars in public funds to prop up the ailing national oil monopoly, Pemex. He also strengthened the monopoly of the national electricity company, CFE, making it harder for companies to generate their own electricity resources or explore renewable options. Suffice it to say that instead of developing Mexico's comparative advantages in wind, solar, and geothermal renewable energy, in recent years Mexico has invested in the energy resources of the 20th Century, not the 21st. While highly frustrating from both a pragmatic energy production and climate change abatement perspective, it is not too late to make adjustments that can boost supply and offer lower emission hydrocarbons and renewable energy to the Mexican population. A good place to start to increase energy efficiency and security, would be to capture the methane emissions (natural gas) stemming from Pemex's oil production facilities. Based on their own scientific studies, the Environmental Defence Fund estimates that by capturing the emissions from Nuevo Pemex alone, Mexico could fill 50% of the country's residential demand for natural gas. At the moment, instead of capturing these emissions, Pemex burns the methane; the state-owned company's laser-focused aim is to produce oil. Foolhardy. Consistency in regulation and the rules of the gameI use the turn of phrase "consistency in regulation and the rules of the game" so as to avoid the also much-needed but more theoretical term, "rule of law." Businesses need to know that when they make a decision that will affect the long-term sustainability and profitability of their organizations, they are making a co-investment with the country where they have decided to do so. In fact, this is perfectly in line with the idea of attracting investment that will add to the well-being (bienestar) of the Mexican communities where these investments will be made. The investment needs to be good for both sides with a long-term view of success. As a result of the setbacks in the opening up of the energy sector and the suboptimal situations in which companies like Constellation Brands found themselves in recent years, yellow flags have been raised, making some in the private sector weary. Companies will be waiting to see how the next government views its own role in establishing a trustworthy business environment. Science and innovationGlobally we need to embrace science as a fact-based tool for providing the solutions that will allow our species to continue surviving on this planet. And Mexico is no exception. Taking a science-based approach is critical for issues like climate change, which is intimately tied to the energy sector mentioned above, and is also linked to urban planning, infrastructure investment, and human health. It is through science and innovation that we will find the solutions that can provide well-being for the communities that make up our nations and regions. In Mexico, the regulatory framework approach to issues like Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cybersecurity, tends to be short-sighted and focused on providing the government with the tools of control, which in this day and age is an exercise in futility. New trends in technology do need to be regulated to prevent threats to national security and critical infrastructure, ensure respect for human rights and to maintain market conditions that are competitive. Doing so requires ensuring the active involvement of the private sector, which understands these tools and their implications best. If the goal is to encourage more investors to see Mexico as a viable nearshoring hub, a policy of support for science and innovation is critical. Increase public investment In general the Mexican state needs to invest more in public goods and services across the board in areas like health, education and infrastructure. Mexico is the OECD country that invests the least, with a rate of public sector investment of 1.3% in 2020, 0.7% below the 2007 rate. Public sector investments lag because Mexico's public revenue generation is the least effective in the OECD and one of the lowest in the region. Mexico's tax-to-GDP ratio in 2021 stood at 16.7%, below the Latin America and Caribbean average of 22% and far below the OECD average of 34%. [3] A serious look at public finances is required to make the investments needed to decrease poverty and increase equality. Spurring investment in public goods and services will be a challenge for the next federal government given that Mexico faces a sizable budgetary deficit, which is forecasted to reach 5.9% of GDP in 2024 —a historic high according to the most recent official figures and an increase of 1.6% percentage points relative to 2023. [4]Human capital While the same could be said for many countries - the US included - Mexico's public education system is deficient, a fact that creates great social inequities as well as challenges for companies looking for talent. The most recent results of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) showed that the knowledge and skills of 15-year-old students in mathematics, reading and science has declined, with Mexico ranked 51st out of 81 countries analyzed.[5] Analysts tend to focus on the number of engineers in Mexico given its manufacturing base, and while their talents are certainly needed, there are other soft skills —effective communication, as well as analytical and creative thinking— that need to be emphasized more in Mexico's educational system if we intend to successfully integrate our economy into global supply chains and take advantage of emerging technologies. It must be okay to think innovatively and question the status quo, something that is still a rarity in the work culture of Mexico. Further, Mexico needs to consider female gender empowerment a cornerstone of its economic policy; a country cannot excel by leaving 51% of the population to languish in the informal sector. Mexico has one of the lowest workforce participation rates in Latin America (below Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica) because women shoulder the burden of care from birth to death.[6] This has to change. On a positive note, the feminist movement is stronger and better organized than ever in Mexico and is advocating for government programs that will provide assistance with the burdens related to family care. Oxfam has done particularly valuable work in this regard.[7] Invest in Infrastructure via PPPsAccording to some estimates, Mexico needs to invest around 5% of GDP[8] a year in infrastructure to meet the needs required for optimal competitiveness, a very tall order given that Mexico currently invests only 1.5% of GDP. Given limited public resources, embracing Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) provides an excellent option. PPPs help enable financing under long-term risk-sharing arrangements and are something that Mexico should utilize in order to attract nearshoring dollars that can establish valuable infrastructure assets for years to come. Foreign policy as a domestic policy toolThe administration of AMLO has been fond of saying that the best foreign policy is a domestic one, without explaining very clearly how that might work. What is clear, however, is that a wise foreign policy can significantly add to domestic policy goals, such as job creation. Mexico's incoming administration would do well to use Mexico's size and relevance to at the very least punch at its weight, something it has stopped doing globally over the last five years. Mexico needs to develop a strategy with respect to China and not just let things happen without intention. And that is not to say that Mexico has to adopt the same policies of the US, on the contrary. It may be in the best interests of Mexico to adopt a conscious strategy of "non-alignment," but at the moment we have a non-strategy, which makes us vulnerable to the long-term strategies of other countries that, without a doubt, are doing their own planning. Teamwork is goodAttracting nearshoring dollars should be viewed as a team effort in Mexico, with the public and private sectors communicating and strategizing together. The goal is to work as a team to encourage investment that will bring jobs, economic growth, new technologies and improved well-being. Like many societies globally, Mexico has been divided against itself in recent years. A team that has no clear plan and that mistrusts its own players, rarely wins. Loving one's country is about caring about the people who live in it. When that kind of solidarity is emphasized, it shows and leads to victories. The North American PowerhouseMexico, Canada and the US already have economies that are vertically integrated in many sectors, from the automotive industry to the agricultural sector. Given the complexities of current geopolitics, renewing the commitment to work together as a region behooves all three countries. The USMCA will be reviewed in 2026 and instead of seeing this as a moment to challenge the agreement's value, it should be viewed as an opportunity to strengthen the agreement for mutual benefit. The US economy has proved incredibly resilient in the wake of both the pandemic and global economic turbulence, something that is a big advantage for its neighbors to the north and the south. Further, the US has achieved energy independence over the last decade, and together with Canada and Mexico North America can build the next generation of energy solutions based on a transition toward multiple renewable energy solutions. This will indeed make North America the ideal place for investment for decades to come and a true global energy powerhouse. Opportunities do not last forever Mexico would do well to understand that opportunities do not last forever. As a nation, we need to hit the ground running in 2025, work together, and create a prosperous future that is in the interests of all citizens within and without the national borders. Between 30 and 40 million Mexicans live beyond the nation's borders and nearshoring opportunities will also provide them with the possibility of joining a team focused on achieving sustainable prosperity. Regional footnote: An exciting time to celebrate North America will take place the same year as the review of the USMCA, the World Cup 2026. The opening game will take place in the Azteca Stadium, a perfect moment to display the size, importance, and cultural significance of the Mexican nation, together with our North American counterparts. My hope is that via this celebratory event, more North Americans of the US, Canada, and Mexico will embrace a regional identity, making future cooperation more ambitious and politically viable. [1] Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad (www.imco.org.mx ). [2] Diario de la Federación, 11 de octubre de 2023: DECRETO por el que se otorgan estímulos fiscales a sectores clave de la industria exportadora consistentes en la deducción inmediata de la inversión en bienes nuevos de activo fijo y la deducción adicional de gastos de capacitación. [3] https://www.oecd.org/tax/revenue-statistics-mexico.pdf [4] Pre-criterios Generales de Política Económica 2025", Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, https://www.finanzaspublicas.hacienda.gob.mx/work/models/Finanzas_Publicas/docs/paquete_economico/precgpe/precgpe_2025.PDF [5] https://www.oecd.org/publication/pisa-2022-results/country-notes/mexico-519eaf88/ [6] The women's labor force participation rate in Mexico continues to be one of the most lagging in Latin America, at around 49%, well below the OECD average of 65% and 58% for the region.[7] https://oxfammexico.org/trabajo-de-cuidados-y-desigualdad/ [8]https://www.cnec.org.mx/blogs/post/declaración-de-méxico-sobre-la-importancia-de-la-infraestructura-y-su-planeación-a-largo-plazo-para

Mexico is privileged by geography. It is a country with a dual North American and Latin American identity that can serve as a bridge between the two regions. Mexico stands to gain from the current global geopolitical context that involves economic competition between the US and China, armed conflict in the Middle East and in Ukraine, and a desire for many companies to be close to the largest and most dynamic economy in the world, the United States. What Mexico does not have is a clearly articulated strategy to take advantage of the nearshoring opportunity, which, by definition, will not last forever. Given its geographical location and its vertical integration with the US and Canadian economies, enshrined under the USMCA, Mexico is by far the most obvious place to relocate manufacturing or service operations from China, but it is not the only option either. Various states in the US, and other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and South East Asia will also be making their pitches to investors. Given the commercial and security tensions that exist with China, some authorities in the US realize that they need to up their game to consolidate relationships with other Western Hemisphere countries, which is why a group of both Republican and Democratic senators have put together the Americas Act. This legislation, which was introduced in early March, would establish programs to promote greater trade, investment, and people-to-people ties throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, potentially expanding the USMCA. "At its core, the Americas Act is a multi-billion-dollar job creation tool for the U.S. and its allies in Latin America and the Caribbean," said Representative Adriano Espaillat (D-NY). "With its reshoring and nearshoring loans, tax benefits, and other targeted grant assistance for workers at home and in our Western Hemisphere partner countries, the Americas Act will bring jobs and investment back to our Hemisphere and stem the root causes of migration by putting more money into the pockets of working families."While the idea of expanding the USMCA beyond North America might be an attractive idea for boosting regional competitiveness from a US perspective, it would erode the privileged trade advantages that Mexico currently enjoys in its relationship with the US and Canada, something the next presidential administration in Mexico should consider as plans are developed to push forward to proactively attract nearshoring foreign direct investment (FDI). As it stands, Mexico's FDI numbers sound encouraging. But of the $36 billion dollars registered in 2023, only $5bn were new investments [1], which means nearshoring may be happening, but the tide is bringing in soft waves, not the desired tsunami. Creating the optimal ecosystemPresident Andrés Manuel López Obrador issued an executive order on October 11th, 2023 that provides for fiscal incentives for particular industries, including the agricultural sector, auto parts manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and the film industry, among others, as well as incentives for worker training. [2] This decision gained little attention, and while it is better than nothing, it is too little too late. Given Mexico's geographical comparative advantages, fiscal incentives are not the core of what companies want when they analyze whether to locate their operations in the country. Rather, investors need a business and public policy ecosystem that allows them to optimize opportunities and minimize risks over long periods of time, something that Mexico's next government can do a lot to improve. Creating a winning nearshoring strategy for Mexico implies a complex series of considerations and a reinvigorated investment promotion strategy globally, something that fell apart with the elimination of ProMexico —a federal agency that had been charged with promoting foreign trade and investment— at the beginning of the AMLO administration. While the former ProMéxico's operations surely could have been optimized, eliminating the organization completely and leaving promotion to the already overly taxed embassies was a mistake. As a result, Mexico has lost precious time and valuable relationships, and the country now needs to interrupt its leisurely walk and start sprinting. Below are reflections on the core issues that should be addressed to create optimal conditions for attracting and retaining foreign investment. Embrace the energy transitionIn order to be able to receive significant new amounts of investment, Mexico will need to produce both larger quantities of energy and ensure that it comes from cleaner sources. Global companies that consider Mexico as a place to invest long term need access to low-emission hydrocarbons, as well as renewable energy, and Mexico is lacking in both. Given Mexico's complex history that views oil as a fundamental part of the country's sovereignty, embracing the energy transition from a political perspective has posed challenges. AMLO did all he could to roll back the opening up of the energy sector to private sector participation that began in 2014, and invested hundreds of millions of dollars in public funds to prop up the ailing national oil monopoly, Pemex. He also strengthened the monopoly of the national electricity company, CFE, making it harder for companies to generate their own electricity resources or explore renewable options. Suffice it to say that instead of developing Mexico's comparative advantages in wind, solar, and geothermal renewable energy, in recent years Mexico has invested in the energy resources of the 20th Century, not the 21st. While highly frustrating from both a pragmatic energy production and climate change abatement perspective, it is not too late to make adjustments that can boost supply and offer lower emission hydrocarbons and renewable energy to the Mexican population. A good place to start to increase energy efficiency and security, would be to capture the methane emissions (natural gas) stemming from Pemex's oil production facilities. Based on their own scientific studies, the Environmental Defence Fund estimates that by capturing the emissions from Nuevo Pemex alone, Mexico could fill 50% of the country's residential demand for natural gas. At the moment, instead of capturing these emissions, Pemex burns the methane; the state-owned company's laser-focused aim is to produce oil. Foolhardy. Consistency in regulation and the rules of the gameI use the turn of phrase "consistency in regulation and the rules of the game" so as to avoid the also much-needed but more theoretical term, "rule of law." Businesses need to know that when they make a decision that will affect the long-term sustainability and profitability of their organizations, they are making a co-investment with the country where they have decided to do so. In fact, this is perfectly in line with the idea of attracting investment that will add to the well-being (bienestar) of the Mexican communities where these investments will be made. The investment needs to be good for both sides with a long-term view of success. As a result of the setbacks in the opening up of the energy sector and the suboptimal situations in which companies like Constellation Brands found themselves in recent years, yellow flags have been raised, making some in the private sector weary. Companies will be waiting to see how the next government views its own role in establishing a trustworthy business environment. Science and innovationGlobally we need to embrace science as a fact-based tool for providing the solutions that will allow our species to continue surviving on this planet. And Mexico is no exception. Taking a science-based approach is critical for issues like climate change, which is intimately tied to the energy sector mentioned above, and is also linked to urban planning, infrastructure investment, and human health. It is through science and innovation that we will find the solutions that can provide well-being for the communities that make up our nations and regions. In Mexico, the regulatory framework approach to issues like Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cybersecurity, tends to be short-sighted and focused on providing the government with the tools of control, which in this day and age is an exercise in futility. New trends in technology do need to be regulated to prevent threats to national security and critical infrastructure, ensure respect for human rights and to maintain market conditions that are competitive. Doing so requires ensuring the active involvement of the private sector, which understands these tools and their implications best. If the goal is to encourage more investors to see Mexico as a viable nearshoring hub, a policy of support for science and innovation is critical. Increase public investment In general the Mexican state needs to invest more in public goods and services across the board in areas like health, education and infrastructure. Mexico is the OECD country that invests the least, with a rate of public sector investment of 1.3% in 2020, 0.7% below the 2007 rate. Public sector investments lag because Mexico's public revenue generation is the least effective in the OECD and one of the lowest in the region. Mexico's tax-to-GDP ratio in 2021 stood at 16.7%, below the Latin America and Caribbean average of 22% and far below the OECD average of 34%. [3] A serious look at public finances is required to make the investments needed to decrease poverty and increase equality. Spurring investment in public goods and services will be a challenge for the next federal government given that Mexico faces a sizable budgetary deficit, which is forecasted to reach 5.9% of GDP in 2024 —a historic high according to the most recent official figures and an increase of 1.6% percentage points relative to 2023. [4]Human capital While the same could be said for many countries - the US included - Mexico's public education system is deficient, a fact that creates great social inequities as well as challenges for companies looking for talent. The most recent results of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) showed that the knowledge and skills of 15-year-old students in mathematics, reading and science has declined, with Mexico ranked 51st out of 81 countries analyzed.[5] Analysts tend to focus on the number of engineers in Mexico given its manufacturing base, and while their talents are certainly needed, there are other soft skills —effective communication, as well as analytical and creative thinking— that need to be emphasized more in Mexico's educational system if we intend to successfully integrate our economy into global supply chains and take advantage of emerging technologies. It must be okay to think innovatively and question the status quo, something that is still a rarity in the work culture of Mexico. Further, Mexico needs to consider female gender empowerment a cornerstone of its economic policy; a country cannot excel by leaving 51% of the population to languish in the informal sector. Mexico has one of the lowest workforce participation rates in Latin America (below Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica) because women shoulder the burden of care from birth to death.[6] This has to change. On a positive note, the feminist movement is stronger and better organized than ever in Mexico and is advocating for government programs that will provide assistance with the burdens related to family care. Oxfam has done particularly valuable work in this regard.[7] Invest in Infrastructure via PPPsAccording to some estimates, Mexico needs to invest around 5% of GDP[8] a year in infrastructure to meet the needs required for optimal competitiveness, a very tall order given that Mexico currently invests only 1.5% of GDP. Given limited public resources, embracing Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) provides an excellent option. PPPs help enable financing under long-term risk-sharing arrangements and are something that Mexico should utilize in order to attract nearshoring dollars that can establish valuable infrastructure assets for years to come. Foreign policy as a domestic policy toolThe administration of AMLO has been fond of saying that the best foreign policy is a domestic one, without explaining very clearly how that might work. What is clear, however, is that a wise foreign policy can significantly add to domestic policy goals, such as job creation. Mexico's incoming administration would do well to use Mexico's size and relevance to at the very least punch at its weight, something it has stopped doing globally over the last five years. Mexico needs to develop a strategy with respect to China and not just let things happen without intention. And that is not to say that Mexico has to adopt the same policies of the US, on the contrary. It may be in the best interests of Mexico to adopt a conscious strategy of "non-alignment," but at the moment we have a non-strategy, which makes us vulnerable to the long-term strategies of other countries that, without a doubt, are doing their own planning. Teamwork is goodAttracting nearshoring dollars should be viewed as a team effort in Mexico, with the public and private sectors communicating and strategizing together. The goal is to work as a team to encourage investment that will bring jobs, economic growth, new technologies and improved well-being. Like many societies globally, Mexico has been divided against itself in recent years. A team that has no clear plan and that mistrusts its own players, rarely wins. Loving one's country is about caring about the people who live in it. When that kind of solidarity is emphasized, it shows and leads to victories. The North American PowerhouseMexico, Canada and the US already have economies that are vertically integrated in many sectors, from the automotive industry to the agricultural sector. Given the complexities of current geopolitics, renewing the commitment to work together as a region behooves all three countries. The USMCA will be reviewed in 2026 and instead of seeing this as a moment to challenge the agreement's value, it should be viewed as an opportunity to strengthen the agreement for mutual benefit. The US economy has proved incredibly resilient in the wake of both the pandemic and global economic turbulence, something that is a big advantage for its neighbors to the north and the south. Further, the US has achieved energy independence over the last decade, and together with Canada and Mexico North America can build the next generation of energy solutions based on a transition toward multiple renewable energy solutions. This will indeed make North America the ideal place for investment for decades to come and a true global energy powerhouse. Opportunities do not last forever Mexico would do well to understand that opportunities do not last forever. As a nation, we need to hit the ground running in 2025, work together, and create a prosperous future that is in the interests of all citizens within and without the national borders. Between 30 and 40 million Mexicans live beyond the nation's borders and nearshoring opportunities will also provide them with the possibility of joining a team focused on achieving sustainable prosperity. Regional footnote: An exciting time to celebrate North America will take place the same year as the review of the USMCA, the World Cup 2026. The opening game will take place in the Azteca Stadium, a perfect moment to display the size, importance, and cultural significance of the Mexican nation, together with our North American counterparts. My hope is that via this celebratory event, more North Americans of the US, Canada, and Mexico will embrace a regional identity, making future cooperation more ambitious and politically viable. [1] Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad (www.imco.org.mx ). [2] Diario de la Federación, 11 de octubre de 2023: DECRETO por el que se otorgan estímulos fiscales a sectores clave de la industria exportadora consistentes en la deducción inmediata de la inversión en bienes nuevos de activo fijo y la deducción adicional de gastos de capacitación. [3] https://www.oecd.org/tax/revenue-statistics-mexico.pdf [4] Pre-criterios Generales de Política Económica 2025", Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, https://www.finanzaspublicas.hacienda.gob.mx/work/models/Finanzas_Publicas/docs/paquete_economico/precgpe/precgpe_2025.PDF [5] https://www.oecd.org/publication/pisa-2022-results/country-notes/mexico-519eaf88/ [6] The women's labor force participation rate in Mexico continues to be one of the most lagging in Latin America, at around 49%, well below the OECD average of 65% and 58% for the region.[7] https://oxfammexico.org/trabajo-de-cuidados-y-desigualdad/ [8]https://www.cnec.org.mx/blogs/post/declaración-de-méxico-sobre-la-importancia-de-la-infraestructura-y-su-planeación-a-largo-plazo-para

Financial regulation affects government revenue whenever it imposes both the mandatory quantity and price of government bonds. This paper studies a banking regulation adopted by the National Bank of Ethiopia in April 2011, which forces all private banks to purchase a fixed negative-yield government bond in proportion to private sector lending. Having access to monthly bank balance sheets, a survey of branch costs and public finances documentation, the effect of the policy on government revenue can be tracked. This is compared to three plausible revenue-generating alternatives: raising funds at competitive rates on international markets; distorting the private lending of the state-owned bank; and raising new deposits through additional branches of the state-owned bank. Three main results emerge: the government revenue gain is moderate (1.5-2.6 percent of the tax revenue); banks comply with the policy and amass more safe assets; banks' profit growth slows without turning negative (from 10 percent to 2 percent).

학위논문(박사)--서울대학교 대학원 :국제대학원 국제학과(국제협력전공),2020. 2. 박철희. ; 북한은 탈냉전기 이래 핵과 미사일이라는 비대칭 전력의 개발을 통해 사실상의 핵보유국으로 자리잡게 되었다. 미국의 주요 동맹국들은 비대칭 위협에 대한 재래식 억제·방어전략으로 위협을 사전에 탐지·예방(prevent)·선제(preempt)·요격(intercept) 할 수 있는 미사일방어망 (Ballistic Missile Defense, BMD)과 정보감시정찰체계 (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, ISR) 분야의 무기획득에 적극적인데 반해 한국은 이 두 분야에 대한 자체전력증강에는 제한적이고 미국과의 동맹관계로부터 제공되는 핵우산(nuclear umbrella)과 같은 미국의 확장억제전략 (extended nuclear deterrence)과 주한미군에 배치된 미국의 첨단자산에 의존하는 양상을 나타내고 있다. 북한의 비대칭 전력증강에도 불구하고 한국이 미사일방어망과 정보감시정찰체계에 보다 동맹의존적인 이유는 무엇인가? 기존의 선행연구들은 한미동맹의 특수성에 입각하여 한국의 동맹의존적 무기획득, 제한적 자체전력증강을 한국에 주둔하고 있는 미국의 전력, 한미연합방위체제(ROK-US Combined Defense System) 등에 대한 합리적, 구조적, 제도와 같은 경로의존적인 현상이라고 본다. 하지만 본 논문은 이러한 결정론적이고 한국의 사례에 국한된 분석은 한국이 북한이라는 비대칭 위협에도 불구하고 유사한 안보환경 및 동맹관계에 놓인 다른 미국의 주요 동맹국들보다 제한적인 전략증강양상을 설명하기에는 불충분하다고 판단한다. 특히 이스라엘과 대만과 같은 미국의 동맹국들은 한국보다 현저히 낮은 국방비와 무기의 구입·개발과 관련된 방위력개선비에도 불구하고 한국보다 적극적인 자체 미사일방어망과 정보감시정찰체계를 확보하였다. 동아시아내 미국의 주요 우방국인 일본은 한국 보다 최첨단의 미국의 전략자산을 배치하고 있음에도 불구하고 미국이 제공하는 핵우산과 주일미군의 첨단자산에 '유용한 중복자산(useful redundancy)'이라고 불릴 정도의 미사일방어망과 정보감시정찰체계에 대한 자체전력을 확보하였다. 한국의 국방비는 1990년대부터 2019년 현재까지 최소 3배까지 증가해왔고, 2018년에는 세계 국방비 지출 상위 10위를 기록하면서 미국 무기의 최대수입국으로 사우디아라비아와 호주 다음으로 상위 3위로 자리매김하였다. 2015년부터는 방위력개선비 부문에서 일본을 능가하였다. 이런 배경에서 한국이 북한이라는 비대칭 위협에도 불구하고 여전히 다른 동맹국들보다 자체전력증강에 제한적인 양상은 흥미롭지 않을 수 없다. 본 논문은 국가들의 전력증강(armament)이 외부위협과 환경이라는 독립변수가 어떻게 정책결정자들의 위협인식(threat perception)과 국내환경(domestic context)이라는 개입변수에 따라 변용된다고 주창한 신고전적 현실주의(neoclassical realism)를 적용하여 한국의 미사일방어망과 정보감시정찰체계 획득에 대한 포괄적인 국가교차(cross-national) 및 시계열(cross-temporal)의 비교연구를 하였다. 논문의 전반부분인 제3장에서는 한국을 미국의 주요 동맹국인 일본, 대만, 영국, 독일의 사례와 비교하여 한국의 케이스를 보다 객관화, 일반화하여 설명하고자 하였고, 후반부분인 제4장에서는 한국의 첫 진보정부였던 김대중 정부(1998-2003)부터 박근혜 보수정권(2013-2017)까지의 정권별 비교를 하여 한국이 소위 북한과 동맹에 대한 시각이 대립적인 진보-보수의 정권교체에도 불구하고 미사일방어망과 정보감시정찰체계라는 첨단자산 분야에는 동맹안주적인 자체전력증강이라는 지속성이 나타났다고 보여준다. 본 논문을 이와 같은 현상을 한국의 안일한 (complacent), 동맹안주적인(alliance-complacent) 전력증강이라고 명명한다. ; Despite North Korea's increasing asymmetric nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, what explains South Korea's restraint in armaments in the ballistic missile defense (BMD) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities? Unlike how the ability to detect, prevent, preempt, or at least 'hit-to-kill' incoming threats in advance have made both BMD and ISR highly interrelated and critical armaments in other US allies' response to asymmetric threats, South Korea has retained heavy reliance on the US's security provisions and stationing of advanced weapons system. While existing literatures lended little room for comprehensive comparative analysis, portraying South Korea's alliance-reliant defense system more or less rational, structural, and/or path-dependent continuity from the US's military presence and the ROK-US combined defense system – the distinctive attributes of the ROK-US alliance – this study finds that South Korea retains intriguing resilience in restraining autonomous defense capabilities in the BMD and ISR capabilities. Bringing neoclassical realism as major theoretical underpinnings, this study argues that South Korea's relative restraint in autonomous armaments in the BMD and ISR capabilities arises from policy leaders' accumulated state-strategies in reinforcing the alliance-reliance in the state-of-the-art weapons system. As North Korea's emergence as de facto nuclear power aggravated South Korea's reliance on asymmetric division of force structure with the US (alliance structure), the vacillating threat perception on North Korea and armament priorities in lower-cost offensive strike capabilities in both progressive and conservative regimes reinforced South Korea's confinement to alliance-reliant armaments in the BMD and ISR. Stripped to the essence, neoclassical realism is what Ira Katznelson, Barry R. Weingast (2005), and Park Cheol Hee (1998) would call a 'situated rationalist' approach to states' armaments, in which variation in states' arming becomes more conditional to how external threats become filtered through policy leaders' perception and their domestic contexts (Rose 1998; Schweller 2004; 2006; Taliaferro 2006). While systemic imperatives remain primary forces in driving states' arms build-up, states' armaments can be inflated and/or abated, 'situational' to policy leaders' perceived realities in neoclassical realism than in unilateral pursuit for power-maximization. Chapter III, in application of the theory, focuses on attenuating previous literatures' deterministic or exceptionalist inclination in constructing understanding on South Korea's armaments. Putting forth a cross-national framework to contextualize South Korean case among other US allies, including Japan, Taiwan, UK, and Germany, this study argues that while the structural forces arising from the level of asymmetric threats and alliance structure with the US are primary in shaping overall trajectories of the US allies' armaments in the BMD and ISR, variations under similar exogenous influences arise from how the policy leaders perceive and respond to the given asymmetric threats (policy leaders' threat perception) within their geopolitical context, and to the extent that they seek and mobilize resources for self-reliant or alliance-reliant armaments. In the latter half of the dissertation, Chapter IV, this study further elaborates on South Korea's 'accumulated' restraint or ambivalence from cross-regime comparisons on South Korea's armaments in the BMD and ISR capabilities. This study disconfirms the conventional view that the so-called "progressive-conservative split" among policy leaders has been at the heart of South Korea's limited armaments, particularly when it comes to the state-of-the-art BMD and ISR weapons system. While progressive regimes have been deemed more reconciliatory to North Korea and seek more autonomous policy towards armament and alliance-reliance, when conservatives were seen as more hardlined to North Korea, favorable to pro-alliance armaments as means for security, ideological divide mattered less when it came to the BMD and ISR capabilities. Although policy and ideological divergence have appeared to cause variations in the outset of each administration from President Kim Dae-jung to Park Geun-hye (1998-2017), both progressive and conservative regimes have recurred to alliance-reliance in the BMD and ISR under the existing division of labor under the ROK-US combined defense system. Although progressive regimes under Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) administrations have taken more reconciliatory approach to North Korea's asymmetric threats and emphasis on self-reliance in armaments, the progressive regimes have been situationally induced, however "reluctant," to resume to alliance-reliant armaments in the BMD and ISR capabilities. When power transferred back to conservative regimes under Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) administrations, North Korea's rapid increases in asymmetric threats have restored pro-alliance or alliance-reliant proclivity in armaments, reinforcing South Korea's restrained armament in autonomous BMD and ISR capabilities. Punctuated with economic crisis, ebb and flow in North Korea's asymmetric provocations, caught in between the increasingly contentious US-China rivalry in the region, continuity than change can be found in arming in the lower-cost, possibly homegrown, offensive missiles and conventional strike capabilities. Neither progressive and conservative governments have pursued armaments beyond the structural influences from asymmetric capability gap with North Korea and resilient asymmetric division of force structure with the US. This study concludes in Chapter V with discussions on the progressive Moon Jae-in administration and implications of the study. ; I. INTRODUCTION 1 1. Puzzle: South Korea's Restraint in Armaments 1 2. Existing Explanations and their Limits 13 3. Main Argument 41 4. Composition of Research 47 II. ANALYTICAL INNOVATION 49 1. Bringing Realism Back In Neoclassical Realism: Situated Rationality for Capability Aggregation 49 2. Analytical Framework 57 1) For Cross-national Comparison 57 2) For Cross-regime Comparison 67 III. SOUTH KOREA'S RESTRAINED ARMS ACQUISITION IN CROSS-NATIONAL CONTEXT 75 1. The US Allies' Arms Acquisition Patterns in the BMD and ISR 75 1) Arming against Imminent Asymmetric Threats 75 (1) Active Arms Acquisition for Capability Aggregation: Japan 77 (2) Restrained Arms Acquisition for Symbolical Capability Aggregation: Taiwan 100 2) Arming under Latent Asymmetric Threats 116 (1) Proactive Arms Acquisition for Alliance and Technological Edge: UK 116 (2) Passive Arms Acquisition: Germany 130 2. South Korea's Restrained Arms Acquisition in the BMD and ISR 137 1) North Korea's Asymmetric Threats & Alliance-reliant Armaments 137 2) Case of Missile Defense: Between the US's BMD and KAMD 140 3) Case of ISR: OPCON Transfer & Armament Priorities 146 3. Summary of Findings 153 IV. SOUTH KOREA'S RESTRAINED ARMS ACQUISITION IN CROSS-REGIME CONTEXT 159 1. Restraint under Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998-2003) 159 1) Reconciling with Non-nuclear North Korea 160 2) Reinforcing Alliance-reliant Armaments 171 2. Fleeting Pursuit for Self-reliant Armaments under Roh Moo-hyun Administration (2003-2008) 179 1) Continued Reconciling with North Korea 179 2) Fleeting Pursuit for Self-reliant Armament to Alliance-dependence 182 3. Complacent Restraint under Lee Myung-bak Administration (2008-2013) 192 1) Complacency despite Rivalry against North Korea 192 2) Alliance-reliance for Pragmatism 202 4. North Korea's Emergence as De facto Nuclear Power and Park Geun-hye Administration (2013-2017) 206 1) Towards Alliance-cooperative BMD within the Parameters of the Alliance 209 2) Constraints under Accumulated Complacency in the ISR 216 5. Summary of Findings 220 V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 225 1. Limits of Arming South Korea Complacently and Moon Jae-in Administration's Perilous Venture 225 2. South Korea's Alternatives to Restrained Armaments 237 REFERENCES 241 ABSTRACT IN KOREAN 275 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 279 ; Doctor

Malaysia is a multiethnic, upper-middle-income country that has relied heavily on income from its natural resources to engineer successful diversification into manufacturing and sharply increased incomes for all ethnic groups. This paper examines the role of the policy-making process and national leadership in effecting this structural change and growth with equity. It discusses the government's role in transforming corporate ownership patterns while nurturing industrial enterprises into niche products within complex value-added chains. At the same time, the paper underscores the difficulties and costs of attempting to move into areas where an economy has no strong advantages, in this case heavy industries. Privatization is seen to have been a powerful tool for expanding private enterprise despite limited entrepreneurial skills, but it is questionable as a sustainable strategy; the aggressive formation of new firms seems to offer better long-term prospects. An appropriate regime of policy making and implementation is required, characterized by political determination, stability, high attention to growth with equity, experimentation, and an ability to learn through implementation, both at home and from the experience of others. These are key factors accounting for the relative success of Malaysia. Nothing in the Malaysian experience suggests that it is possible or desirable to undertake reforms serially; in fact, the evidence suggests that the "reform cluster" approach to policy implementation is more effective because it addresses several coordination problems at the same time.

Botswana has had a stable democratic government and good governance since independence in 1966. With a sustained high average economic growth (about 9 percent) fueled by the diamond mining industry, it is the only country in Africa listed among the 13 'economic miracles' of the world for 1960-2005. The total fertility rate remains high in Sub-Saharan Africa, with 25 countries showing a rate greater than 5.0. In contrast, Botswana experienced the greatest fertility decline in the region during 1980-2006, with the total fertility rate decreasing from 7.1 in 1981 to 3.2 in 2006. The Botswana national family planning program, judged the strongest in Africa, contributed to this decline. The government strongly committed to meeting family planning needs, integrated maternal and child health/family planning (MCH/FP) and sexually transmitted infection (STI) services in 1973. The government spends about 18 percent of its total budget on health, a higher proportion than the Abuja declaration's target of 15 percent.

A 2018 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with computer security company McAfee, estimated that cybercrime costs the world almost $600 billion or .8% of the global Gross Domestic Product (CSIS, 2018, p. 4). In response to this booming element of transnational crime, states, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, and individual citizens have sought to implement systems for the investigation, prosecution, and restitution of these crimes. One such solution is the development and enactment of international law. On December 27, 2019, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Russia-led resolution A/74/401, entitled "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019, Countering the use)." Vehemently opposed by Western states such as the United States, the resolution approved the establishment of a committee of experts to evaluate the potential for an international cybercrime treaty (United Nations). While international cooperation of this kind is commendable, Western states and human rights groups have professed concerns that the vague language of the resolution has the potential to erode the human rights protections afforded to citizens under international law (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). The purpose of this paper is to identify the human rights concerns of Russia's proposed United Nations resolution and analyze the obligations the international community has to uphold relevant human rights protections while balancing international cooperation necessitated by international law and legal norms. The first section of this paper provides historical background on the relationship between cyber issues like cybercrime and international law. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Graduate category. ; Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 1 International Law & the Cyber Domain: Assessing the Human Rights Concerns of Cyber Legislation GD520 International Law and the International System Dr. John Becker Norwich University College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Kathryn R. Lamphere 23 May 2020 Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 2 Introduction A 2018 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with computer security company McAfee, estimated that cybercrime costs the world almost $600 billion or .8% of the global Gross Domestic Product (CSIS, 2018, p. 4). In response to this booming element of transnational crime, states, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, and individual citizens have sought to implement systems for the investigation, prosecution, and restitution of these crimes. One such solution is the development and enactment of international law. On December 27, 2019, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Russia-led resolution A/74/401, entitled "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019, Countering the use)." Vehemently opposed by Western states such as the United States, the resolution approved the establishment of a committee of experts to evaluate the potential for an international cybercrime treaty (United Nations). While international cooperation of this kind is commendable, Western states and human rights groups have professed concerns that the vague language of the resolution has the potential to erode the human rights protections afforded to citizens under international law (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). The purpose of this paper is to identify the human rights concerns of Russia's proposed United Nations resolution and analyze the obligations the international community has to uphold relevant human rights protections while balancing international cooperation necessitated by international law and legal norms. The first section of this paper provides historical background on the relationship between cyber issues like cybercrime and international law. International Cyber Law Background The cyber domain is often presented as another realm, a world that exists outside of the mostly tidy borders the international community has used to separate themselves. Aligning with Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 3 this view is the notion that cyberspace cannot be regulated because it expands beyond the traditional idea of territorial sovereignty (Kanuck, 2010, p. 1573). These ideas raise two concerns over the identification and prosecution of cybercrime. The first concern is the conflict between "cybercrime, which is global in scale, and police activities that are confined to national borders (Cangemi, 2004, p. 166)." The conflict arises in the very structure of the Internet, which "can be characterized as a multitude of individual, but interconnected, electronic communications networks (Zekos, 2008, p. 30)." This interconnectedness has created a grey area within the legal system, where no one entity has regulatory control over what happens in that area. The second concern is far more technical and highlights the transient nature of information and data (Cangemi, 2004, p. 166). The source of information can be easily masked to hide its actual location, and data "may be amended, moved, or altered in a few seconds (p. 166)." The speed in which data travels presents a significant hurdle to the legal and law enforcement mechanisms typically used to investigate crimes. As Cangemi notes, this creates "an appreciable risk that the evidence of cyber-offences will disappear" long before implementing the required resources (p. 166). Nevertheless, despite these concerns, "nation-states do strive to exercise their sovereignty over cyberspace (Kanuck, 2010, p. 1573)." The physical elements of cybercrime, such as the location of the people perpetrating the crimes or the location of the hardware used to execute the crimes, are used as a connecting link to allow governments "to address cyber conflicts involving both state and nonstate actors as matters to be resolved by sovereign powers under their respective legal systems (p. 1573)." When evidence moves beyond territorial borders, states seek to invoke bilateral or international action to further pursue the crime. This model follows the same formula that society developed over time, whether it be in stopping crimes such as international drug trafficking or heinous acts of terrorism. The international community is well-Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 4 versed in this cycle, and the "nature of the international legal system affords this sovereign-centric approach primacy under the United Nations (U.N.) Charter regime (p. 1573)." If the international community is content in continuing to use this cycle, then "international legislation and action are essential to combat the phenomenon" of cybercrime (Pocar, 2004, 27). The essential requirement of international involvement and negotiation has rung true in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, as the international community takes steps to evolve international law to include cyber issues, specifically cybercrime. The 1980s introduced international consultation on cybercrime by multiple organizations. In 1983, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) commissioned a two-year study focusing "on the possibility of harmonizing and internationalizing national cybercrime laws (Brenner, 2012, p. 133)." OECD later published a report in 1986 summarizing the results of the study and recommending countries criminalize certain cybercrimes. In 1985, the Council of Europe convened its own study, which involved a four-year focus on "the legal issues raised by cybercrime (p. 133)." In 1997, the Council of Europe convened another study tasked with "the drafting of a cybercrime treaty that would harmonize national laws dealing with cybercrime offenses and investigations (p. 133). In 2001, the study's efforts came to fruition in the creation of the Convention of Cybercrime. Also referred to as the Budapest Convention, the international treaty entered into law in July 2004 with the principle objective of "pursuing a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation (Council of Europe, 2001, Preamble)." As of 2018, 29 states have ratified the treaty, but the rapid development of technology has resulted in the convention becoming outdated, leaving governments and organizations calling for a new treaty (Murphy, 2018, p. 549) (Shackelford, 2014, p. 312). Russia's 2019 United Nations resolution is the latest attempt to modernize international cyber Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 5 law and has received much adulation despite its vague, concerning language and human rights implications. The next section of this paper addresses human rights and provides an overview of states' obligations to this arena as members of the international community. Human Rights & the International Community Modern international human rights law begins with the first article of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), which dictates that one of the purposes of the UN is to "achieve international cooperation…in promoting and encouraging "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 785)." While the Charter provided minimal specificity as to what "respect for human rights" entailed, this provision and others within the Charter catalyzed a new international perspective on human rights. In joining the United Nations, members inherently accepted "the proposition that the Charter had internationalized the concept of human rights (p. 787)." Furthermore, the Charter insinuated that "states were deemed to have assumed some international obligations relating to human rights (p. 787)." Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter cemented the beginnings of these obligations, requiring member states to "take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of purposes" such as promoting "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all (United Nations, 1945, Article 55, 56)." The specificity of human rights became more overt when the United Nations devoted the UN Commission on Human Rights to the task of drafting non-legally-binding human rights instrument. In December 1948, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Murphy, 2018, p. 402). Composed of thirty articles, the declaration instituted vital human rights and eventually "served as a template for numerous subsequent treaties on human rights (p. 404)." As a result, the Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 6 Universal Declaration on Human Rights "has come to be accepted as a normative instrument in its own right (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 787)." Both documents uphold two pedestals of traditional international law as it pertains to human rights. The first pedestal retains responsibility for "the treatment by one state of another's nationals, an area known as state responsibility for injury to aliens (p. 389)." Although addressed at the state level, this notion asserts that individuals are afforded certain protections when in another state. The second pedestal, advanced by scholars such as Hugo Grotius, focuses on "the protection of persons against the acts of their own governments (p. 389)." It is this pedestal that introduces what is now known as humanitarian intervention, or the "idea of state intervening to protect the other state's nationals (p. 389)." Together, both the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration are "considered to spell out the general human rights obligations of all UN member states," of which there are now 193 (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 787) (Murphy, 2018, p. 59). Each international legal instrument has lent itself to the creation of international institutions dedicated to monitoring "compliance by the states parties with the obligations imposed by these instruments (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 788)." Such institutions include entities like the UN Human Rights Council and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (p. 788). Together, the instruments and institutions "laid the normative foundation of the contemporary international human rights revolution" and "influenced, in part at least, the contents of the legal norms under which international criminal tribunals operate today (p. 791)." The criticality of these elements to the international system, particularly as it pertains to international law, is justification for using each as measuring tools with which to judge the new UN cyber-focused resolution objectively. The third section of this paper will assess the purpose of the resolution and explain the supporting argument for its contents. Supporting Arguments & Analysis of A/74/401 Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 7 In order to truly understand the intent of international laws, it is crucial to develop an understanding of the stances actors take concerning the specific issues at hand. This understanding is of particular importance when discussing Resolution A/74/401 and the underlying views of cyberspace. Two opposing perspectives lie at the heart of debates surrounding the cyber domain and Internet governance and center around the notion of sovereignty. The first perspective is that "many governments are attempting to exert sovereignty in cyberspace in the same way as they do in physical domains (Nocetti, 2015, p. 111)." For these governments, the dominance of private sector institutions within cyberspace and "the unfettered internet access of their fellow citizens" are causes of concerns (p. 111). This sentiment is particularly true within the Russian government. Under its traditional views of governance, Russia "conceives of cyberspace as a territory with virtual borders corresponding to physical state borders, and wishes to see the remit of international laws extended to the internet space (p. 112)." Furthermore, Russia's domestic fears of an open Internet fuel its international concerns. Russia sees the Internet as "politically disruptive because it enables citizens to circumvent government-controlled 'traditional media (p. 113).'" It aligns this perspective "with the inherently authoritarian nature of the Russian regime (p. 114)." Russia's negative perception of the Internet as it is today ultimately lends itself to Russia's ideal mechanism of perpetuating its belief that "global internet governance is envisioned as an issue of high politics in which states - and the interstate balance of power-play – play an essential role (p. 116, 117)." Under this mechanism, it is little wonder that Russia has led international legal initiatives to refine control over the Internet since the Council of Europe's enactment of its Convention on Cybercrime. In a Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release following the General Assembly's adoption of Resolution A/74/401, Russia proclaimed that the "resolution shows that the world community urgently needs to develop a universal, comprehensive, and open-ended convention Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 8 on countering cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019)." The adopted resolution's language appears to align with this projected intent from Russia. The resolution stresses "the need to enhance coordination and cooperation among States in combating the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes" and notes "the importance of the international and regional instruments in the fight against cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." In order to fulfill these objectives, the resolution establishes an "intergovernmental committee of experts, representative of all regions" that will "elaborate a comprehensive international convention on countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019)." Remarks of supporting nations support this appearance of cohesion. The representative from Nicaragua indicated the resolution would address cybercrime "in a more representative, democratic and transparent manner, taking into account the individual circumstances of developing and developed countries (Third Committee, 2019, Meetings Coverage)." China echoed this support, stating the resolution "is conducive to filling legal gaps in international cooperation (Third Committee)." At the same time, Belarus declared that "international cooperation is vital in investigating and combating cybercrime (Third Committee)." At face value, the resolution is a gesture of goodwill, a written contract to pursue options to disrupt cybercrime that will benefit all states. However, Russia's press release takes these notions a step further, realigning its message to its traditional view of international politics. It notes, "the resolution proposed by Russia essentially enhances states' digital sovereignty over their information space and ushers in a new page in the history of global efforts to counter cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019)." Furthermore, the press release dictates that the "convention must be based on the principles of respecting state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs (2019)." There are two Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 9 essential points within this statement that require further analysis. The first is the reassertion of the authoritarian construct with which Russia chooses to view cyberspace. In a press release initially dedicated to lauding the necessity of international cooperation, Russia simultaneously defaults to its traditional views of the international community and advocates for a "digital Westphalia (Nocetti, 2015, p. 117)." In recognizing sovereignty, Russia insinuates that the international community will successfully legislate mechanisms that will reduce cybercrime. A quick review of the supporting states in favor of the resolution upholds Russia's authoritarian views (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In addition to China, Nicaragua, and Belarus, countries like Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are only some of the 88 Member States of the General Assembly who voted to adopt the resolution. Unsurprisingly, these states also abide by similar authoritarian perspectives on international law and sovereignty. China, for example, maintains a "comprehensive, multidimensional system that governs Internet infrastructure, commercial and social use as well as legal domains (Liang & Lu, 2010, p. 105)." This system supports "Internet censorship" and "China's single-party political system and its heavy intervention in Internet development (p. 105)." Given the nature and history of these states' political systems and methods of governance, the sudden focus on international cooperation generates questions of the underlying goals that may hide behind the official demands of the resolution. The second point requiring acknowledgment is the additional re-emphasis of sovereignty while also emphasizing non-interventionist beliefs in discussing non-interference in internal affairs. The resolution itself makes no mention of sovereignty or internal affairs beyond assisting countries with improving "national legislation and frameworks and build the capacity of national authorities" to deal with cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). Despite the lack of language on this topic, the leading state on this initiative, Russia, felt the need Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 10 to emphasize its sovereignty in a press release about the resolution (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). Once again, Russia gives the impression that there may be a hidden desire layered within the words of the resolution. Additionally, the concept of non-interference within the international system is not without exceptions. The most critical exception being suspicion of human rights violations. As previously stated, humanitarian intervention and protecting citizens from their own government is a staple of international human rights law (Murphy, 2018, p. 389). Therefore, while non-interference in domestic matters is undoubtedly an essential tenet of international law, the resolution cannot call for international cooperation to combat cybercrime and simultaneously ignore the international cooperation required to maintain peace and security (United Nations, 1945, Charter of the United Nations). The next section of this paper will address these obligations to cooperation as it pertains to human rights while also highlighting the opposing arguments against Resolution A/74/401. Opposing Arguments for A/74/401 & Analysis of Human Rights Concerns The first perspective at the heart of the cyber domain debates, as described previously, is modeled after authoritarian beliefs and government control. The second perspective, modeled after a more Western approach to governance, is the belief of a free and open Internet that should remain decentralized and that "the best regulatory system is one that develops organically (Shackelford, 2013, p. 53)." A free Internet is more firmly the belief of the United States. This idea introduces the initial context necessary to understand the United States' opposition to the Russian-led cybercrime resolution. Even before the rapid development of the Internet, American foreign policy internalized the notion of "free flow of information internationally as an important element of national security (McCarthy, 2011, p. 92)." Former Secretary of State George Schultz argued that the free flow of information "undermined the Soviet Union and authoritarianism (p. 92, 93)." At its earliest beginnings, the Internet was a product of American ingenuity and, as a Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 11 result, built with a bias for "American libertarianism (p. 93)." In the present, the West has developed this concept in the "context of freedom expression, protection of intellectual property rights, and national security (Powers & Jablonski, 2015, p. 3)." As former Secretary of State Clinton asserted, the United States and other Western nations support the "freedom to connect" in opposition to efforts by states such as China, Iran, and Russia to create state-level information infrastructures designed for censorship (p. 3). The historical rivalry and disagreement between the two states on information, particularly as it pertains to cyberspace, only further roots the United States' opposition to the new United Nations cybercrime resolution. In its statement to the United Nations during the 49th & 50th meetings of the Third Committee, the United States expressed disappointment "with the decisions of the sponsors of this resolution to bring it to the Third Committee (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019)." Contrary to the resolution's focus on cooperation, the United States' proclaimed the resolution would "drive a wedge between Member States and undermine international cooperation to combat cybercrime at a time when enhanced coordination is essential (United States Mission to the United Nations)." Furthermore, the United States asserted Russia's actions in introducing the resolution essentially bypass the "expert-driven, consensus-based process and therefore is not in line with their precedent (United States Mission to the United Nations)." Other Western states appear to agree with the United States assertions, as states such as the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Republic of Korea, and Germany composed part of the 58 Member States who opposed the adoption of the resolution (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In a manner similar to the states in favor of the adoption, some opposed states made remarks in agreement with those of the United States during the Third Committee. Finland, on behalf of the European Union, remarked that "there is no consensus on the need for a new international instrument to fight cybercrime" and that the draft "represents a duplication of resources (Third Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 12 Committee, 2019, Meetings Coverage). Canada and Australia presented similar sentiments, remarking that "the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is an important baseline for international cooperation" and that the new resolution "seeks to undercut consensus and will diminish existing global efforts that are already delivering results (Third Committee, 2019)." There is one remaining argument against the new cybercrime resolution: the potential that the document's vague language will create an environment where human rights will be more easily violated if left unchecked (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). In a letter to the United Nations General Assembly, 37 organizations and six individuals expressed their concern for human rights protections as they pertain to the cybercrime resolution (Association for Progressive Communications (APC), 2019, Open Letter, p. 4). The first concern is a lack of clarity surrounding the scope of the "use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (APC, p. 1)." If left undefined, the language in the resolution arguably "opens the door to criminalising ordinary online behaviour that is protected under international human rights law (APC, p. 1)." If steps to do so were taken as a result of the new resolution, they would be in direct violation of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights; who stated in 2011 that "human rights are equally valid online as offline (Shackelford, 2019, p. 168)." The second concern offered by non-government entities is the increasing trend in "criminalising ordinary online activities of individuals and organisations through the application of cybercrime laws (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 1, 2)." The letter even goes so far as to quote the UN Special Rapporteur over these concerns, that the "surge in legislation and policies aimed at combating cybercrime has also opened the door to punishing and surveilling activists and protestors in many countries around the world (APC, p. 2)." If used in such a manner, these initiatives, in addition to the UN cybercrime resolution, are in direct violation of the Charter of United Nations and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Within the Charter of the United Nations, efforts to Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 13 restrict or punish opposition elements such as activists or protestors violates Articles 55 and 56, which requires states to cooperate with the UN in achieving the organizations' purposes such as promoting human rights (United Nations, 1945, Article 55, 56). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights provides more specific language with which to attribute potential violations. The open letter notes that legislation of this kind is used to "criminalise legitimate forms of online expression, association and assembly through vague and ill-defined terms that allow for arbitrary or discretionary application (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 2)." Immediately, legislation that allows for criminalization of these elements is in direct violation of Articles 18, 19, and 20, which declare "all persons have a right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and assembly (Murphy, 2018, p. 402)." Furthermore, violations such as these also violate article two, which guarantees people "the right to life, liberty, and security" and dictates that "these rights are to be held without discrimination of any kind (Murphy, p. 402, 403)." Upholding these rights within cyberspace continues to fall in line with the Western perspective on the Internet. As McCarthy quotes, "the Internet is arguably the greatest facilitator for freedom of expression and innovation in the world today (McCarthy, 2011, p. 94)." The status of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as "legitimate norms within the international system" permits this interpretation and application of international law to future resolutions (p. 94). If states are signatories to the declaration, any future adoption of any resolution must adhere to the principles and freedoms guaranteed by it. Resolution A/74/401 does refer to human rights protections, "reaffirming the importance of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the use of information and communication technologies (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." However, the resolution's open language is in direct contradiction to this promise, if not clarified. As the open letter indicates, "simply reaffirming the importance of respect for human rights" is "insufficient to safeguard human rights while Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 14 countering cybercrime (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 2)." The final section of this paper recommends additional actions that may further unify opposing entities on this resolution while simultaneously addressing all human rights concerns. Recommendations The Russian-led supporters of the resolution and the United States-led opposition are unified in one common element, at least in writing. The element is that consensus and international cooperation are vital in addressing cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019). This notion is in concert with the Council of Europe, who remains the only entity to successfully orchestrate an international cybercrime treaty (Council of Europe, 2004, Convention on Cybercrime). In 2001, the Council of Europe postulated that "solutions to the problems posed must be addressed by international law, necessitating the adoption of adequate international legal instruments" that can "ensure the necessary efficiency" required to combat cybercrime (Pocar, 2004, p. 28). If the international community determines that another cybercrime treaty is required within the intergovernmental committee of experts authorized by Resolution A/74/401, then the new treaty should consider the aims of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In doing so, the United Nations should strive to create a "basic framework for the establishment by contracting states of domestic substantive and procedural laws" in a manner that allows states to "cooperate expeditiously with one another (Pocar, 2004, p. 30)." If successful, the United Nations will be able to "establish procedures for relevant international relations" and provide "forms of cooperation between national judicial authorities as many interact with each other both swiftly and efficiently (p. 31)." Furthermore, the necessity of these requirements is supported by the very nature of the "the world-wide dimension of the Internet," Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 15 which "implies that its illegal use and related offenses must prompt responses and concerted efforts from all relevant domestic and international authorities (p. 34)." The non-governmental organizations' open letter to the United Nations supports the need for cooperation but takes it one step further than the states themselves. In its current structure, the Internet is a public-private endeavor, with private entities dominating cyberspace (Nocetti, 2015, p. 111). The present language of the United Nations cybercrime resolution allows for an intergovernmental committee of experts. However, it does not expand on the actual composition of the committee (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). Noting that Russia and other authoritarian regimes prefer non-government entities to use the government as a proxy for communication, it can be inferred that a Russia-led resolution intends the committee to be comprised of only government entities (p. 117). The open letter rightly points out that collaboration on cyber issues must expand beyond state cooperation. Addressing cybercrime is "necessarily a multi-stakeholder endeavour" that "requires government officials and experts, members of the technical community, civil society, the private sector, and scientific and research institutions (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 4)." An assessment of this viewpoint reveals that a committee dedicated to combatting cybercrime cannot rely on government expertise alone. In order to accurately reflect the composition and requirements of a private-public Internet, all discussions surrounding this resolution should involve both private and public entities. Therefore, the committee should be reformed to more accurately reflect the Internet's users. In doing so, the United Nations breaches the divide between authoritarian and more democratic governments, further increasing cooperation on this resolution. However, increased cooperation through a broader, inclusive committee and implementation of lessons learned from the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime will not ensure that the future convention successfully resolves the resolution's weaknesses. In Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 16 modern-day, the international system emphasizes international human rights more than ever before, as "this branch of international law has experienced phenomenal growth over the past one hundred years (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 807)." This growth has contributed to the "growing political impact of human rights on the conduct of international relations and the behavior of governments (p. 807)." If real success is desired within international governance, then the committee established under the "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes" resolution must account for human rights protections when determining the requirements of the "comprehensive international convention (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." As the representative from Costa Rica during the 49th and 50th meetings of the Third Committee, "the international community must protect and observe fundamental freedoms, including the right to privacy (Third Committee, 2019, Meeting Coverage)." Until there is consensus on "sensitive topics such as…State responsibility to prioritize and protect human rights," the future proposed convention will fall short of its goal of achieving complete international ratification (Third Committee). Conclusion As cyberspace expands in conjunction with the rapid advancement of technology, the fear of the unknown drives further division between already opposing states in the international system. Resolution A/74/401 is the latest testament to the evolution of politicization within Internet governance. In addressing a topic that impacts every Internet-accessible region of the world, the resolution simultaneously magnifies the opposing perspectives of states as it pertains to sovereignty within the cyber domain. Furthermore, it reignites the protracted debate over whether or not human rights obligations addressed in such documents as the Charter of the United Nations or Universal Declaration on Human Rights are legally binding. Preventing further polarization requires both an acknowledgment of a fracturing international system of Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 17 governance and a proposed solution to address the issue. While state-centric governance provides legitimacy and the potential for a higher allocation of resources dedicated to protecting the Internet, increased sovereignty also "risks sacrificing innovation, complicates the regulatory environment of cyberspace, and may threaten a positive vision of cyber peace (Shackelford, 2013, p. 50)." These risks are why an alternative method to an intergovernmental committee must develop in response to the resolution. This method should integrate a multi-stakeholder construct to more fully recognize the competing impacts of cybercrime and fairly address the allegations of human rights infringement. One such method is polycentric governance, a system composed of "diverse organizations and governments working at multiple levels" in order to "increase levels of voluntary cooperation or increase compliance with rules established by governmental authorities (p. 330)." Individually, each organization or type of government faces its own unique hurdles. Together, they "contribute to a governance regime that is multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-type, and multi-sectoral in scope that could complement the top-down governance model increasingly favored" by states such as Russia or China (p. 331). Implementing polycentric governance to more equitably debate the appropriate response to international cybercrime will create an international community willing to consider the developing convention. In doing so, the environment will be better suited to determining whether or not the international system can leverage international law to investigate and prosecute cybercrime. Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 18 References Association for Progressive Communications (APC). (2019). Open Letter to UN General Assembly: Proposed international convention on cybercrime poses a threat to human rights online. Retrieved from https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/Open_letter_re_UNGA_cybercrime_resolution_0.pdf Brenner, S. (2012). Cybercrime and the Law: Challenges, Issues, and Outcomes. Northeastern University Press. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/norwich/reader.action?docID=1085118&ppg=124 Buergenthal, T. (2006). The Evolving International Human Rights System. The American Journal of International Law, 100(4), 783-807. Retrieved from https://www-jstor-org.library.norwich.edu/stable/pdf/4126317.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae4ea9f31648cbd83f8f97bc7dae8e67a Cangemi, D. (2004). Procedural Law Provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. International Review of Law Computers & Technology, 18(2), 165-171. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5272830680 Center for Strategic & International Studies & McAfee. (2018). Economic Impact of Cybercrime – No Slowing Down. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-impact-cybercrime Council of Europe. (2004). Convention on Cybercrime. Retrieved from https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185 Hakmeh, J. & Peters, A. (2020). A New UN Cybercrime Treaty? The Way Forward for Supporters of an Open, Free, and Secure Internet. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-un-cybercrime-treaty-way-forward-supporters-open-free-and-secure-internet Kanuck, S. (2010). Sovereign Discourse on Cyber Conflict Under International Law. Texas Law Review, 88, 1571-1597. Retrieved from https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/cyberwar/papers/reading/Kanuck.pdf Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 19 Liang, B., & Lu, H. (2010). Internet Development, Censorship, and Cyber Crimes in China. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 26(1), 103–120. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5322181473 McCarthy, D. (2011). Open Networks and the Open Door: American Foreign Policy and the Narration of the Internet. Foreign Policy Analysis, 7(1), 89-111. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2019, December). Press Release on the UN General Assembly Vote on the Russian Draft Resolution on Countering Cybercrime. Retrieved from https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3988579 Murphy, S. (2018). Principles of international law (3rd edition). West Academic Publishing. Nocetti, J. (2015). Contest and Conquest: Russia and Global Internet Governance. International Affairs, 91(1), 111-130. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5721220595 Pocar, F. (2004). New Challenges for International Rules Against Cyber-Crime. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 10(1), 27-37. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5649374698 Powers, S. & Jablonski, M. (2015). The Real Cyber War: The Political Economy of Internet Freedom. University of Illinois Press. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/903245891 Shackelford, S. J. (2013). Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business, and Relations: In Search of Cyber Peace: Vol. Revised Edition. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/882104883 Shackelford, S. (2019). Should Cybersecurity Be a Human Right? Exploring the "Shared Responsibility" of Cyber Peace. Stanford Journal of International Law, 55(2), 155–184. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/8185136062 United Nations General Assembly. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html United Nations General Assembly. (2019). Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes. Retrieved from https://www.undocs.org/A/74/401 United Nations Third Committee. (2019, November). Meetings Coverage Seventy-Fourth Session, 49th & 50th Meetings. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gashc4284.doc.htm United States Mission to the United Nations. (2019, November). Statement on Agenda Item 107 'Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes.' Retrieved from https://usun.usmission.gov/statement-on-agenda-item-107-countering-the-use-of-information-and-communications-technologies-for-criminal-purposes/ Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 20 Zekos, G. (2008). Electronic State Sovereignty. The Icfai University Journal of Cyber Law, 7(4), 30-60.

This doctoral thesis examines how European merger control law is applied to the energy sector and to which extent its application may facilitate the liberalisation of the electricity, natural gas and petroleum industries so that only those concentrations will be cleared that honour the principles of the liberalisation directives (IEMD and IGMD ). In its communication on an energy policy for Europe, adopted on 10/01/2007, the Commission emphasized that a real internal European energy market is essential to meet Europe's three energy objectives, i.e. competitiveness to cut costs for citizens and undertakings to foster energy efficiency and investment, sustainability including emissions trading, and security of supply with high standards of public service obligations (Art. 106 TFEU). The EU issued three pre-liberalisation directives since the 1990s. Dissatisfied with the existing monopolistic structures, i.e. in Germany through demarcation and exclusive concession agreements for the supply of electricity and natural gas, which were until 1998 exempted from the cartel prohibition provision (§ 1 GWB), and the prevalence of exclusive rights on the energy markets, the Commission triggered infringement proceedings against four member states under Art. 258 TFEU. The CJEU confirmed that the Commission has the power to abolish monopoly rights under certain circumstances and the rulings had the effect of convincing the member states to enter into negotiations for an opening up of energy markets owing to the internal market energy liberalization directives of 1996 / 1998 / 2003 / 2009 / 2019 (IEMD and IGMD) . The core element of the IEMD and IGMD is to abolish exclusive rights and offer primarily at least large industrial electricity and gas consumers to choose their supplier (market opening for eligible consumers) and to grant negotiated or regulated third party access to transmission and distribution grids so to address natural monopolies. The second liberalization package of 2003 brought a widening of market opening and acceleration of pace of market opening to a greater number of eligible customers (all non-household consumers since July 2004 and all consumers since July 2007) and an increase in the provisions on management and legal unbundling. In parallel, two regulations regulate the access to cross-border electricity infrastructure (interconnectors) and the third party access to gas transmission networks. Two further Directives addressed the security of natural gas and power supply and a third deals with energy end use efficiency and services , a fourth dealt with the promotion of co-generation and a fifths covers marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive in combination with the Hydrocarbons-Licensing Directive ) backed by the public procurement directive in the energy sector. A regulation covers energy statistics. The implementation of the second energy package was slow and the Commission launched infringement proceedings against 5 member states in front of the CJEU (Art. 258, 256 TFEU). The 3rd energy package of 2009 addressed ownership unbundling of key-infrastructure ownership and energy wholesale and retail supply consisting of three regulations and two directives, deals with independent regulators, an agency for the cooperation of energy regulators (ACER) and cross-border cooperation (the European Network for transmission system operators for electricity and gas [ENTSO-E/G] and a regulation on cross-border grid access for electricity and natural gas. Another new regulation deals with market integrity and transparency . Hence, new regulations regulate guidelines on electricity balancing, congestion management, long-term capacity allocation, the code for grid access and transmission system operation . Other regulations address the guidelines for a European cross-border energy infrastructure, which has to be interpreted in the context of European environmental impact assessment law, the submission of data in electricity markets, establish a network code on demand connection , rule on a network code for grid access for direct current transmission systems, define guidelines on electricity transmission system operation, regulate a network code on electricity emergency , deal with security of natural gas supply and establish a programme to aid economic recovery by granting financial assistance. Finally, Directives promote the usage of renewable energies, regulate common oil stocks, the safety of offshore oil and gas production and the quality of petrol and diesel fuels. The 4th liberalization package consists of a new IEMD2019 and IGMD2019, of a new regulation on European cross-border electricity trade, of a regulation on risk preparedness in the electricity sector, of a new agency for the cooperation of European energy regulators, addresses energy efficiency and rules on good governance in the energy union. Since 2008, the Art. 194 I-II TFEU governs the ordinary legislation procedure in the energy sector (internal market in energy, security of energy supply, energy efficiency, energy saving, renewable energies, interconnection of energy grids) notwithstanding of unanimous decision making in case of energy taxation matters (Art. 194 III TFEU). A brief analysis of the economic implications of concentrations is followed by an assessment of the evolution of European merger control law under Art. 66 ECSCT, Art. 101 and 102 TFEU, the merger control regulation of 1989 and its significant amendments of 1997 and 2004. Then, the theoretical findings are contrasted to the results of recent merger proceedings in the energy sector with a focus on the VEBA/VIAG decision. Several deficiencies are established which limit the efficacy of merger control as a tool of offsetting shortcomings in the secondary EC law with regard to the liberalisation of the electricity and gas supply industry (IEMD and IGMD). Commitments proposed by the parties of a given concentration and accepted by the Commission as being sufficient to remedy a serious potential of dominance may only be of subsidiary relevance to the liberalisation of sectors owing to a number of analytical and practical drawbacks. One dominant drawback relates to the fact that the commitments depend always on parties' proposals and can never be imposed ex officio. Others relate to the blunt authorisations provided by the wording of Art. 6 and 8 MR1997 and MR2004 as to the implementation of undertakings. With regard to acquisitions of U.K. regional electricity companies by EdF, it is elaborated that the current merger control law leaves no scope for reciprocity considerations regarding acquisitions by incumbent companies in liberalised markets even though the acquirer is a protected public undertaking. Moreover, it is established that different decisions apply inconsistent market definitions. By means of the VEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEW cases, the question is addressed which causes are responsible for the established analytical and practical deficiencies of merger control in the energy sector. It is stated that the weaknesses of the IEMD 2009/72/EC and IGMD 2009/73/EC are partly responsible for weak undertakings which do not sufficiently remove the scope for dominance on the affected markets and which do not rule out any possibility of impediments of effective negotiated or regulated TPA and do not remove any commercial incentive of the grid subsidiaries of the vertically integrated companies as to access which discriminates between intra and extra group applicants. It is reported that another argument relates to the limited scope that the Commission has if it wants to remedy deficiencies of written primary law owing to the extraordinary nature of the implied powers doctrine based on the principle of constitutional state. Adverse political influence against competition authorities is also judged. Further, it is analysed that accidental regulation based on incidental provisions imposed on undertakings which may or not implement a concentration is by no means a consistent and non-discriminatory and predictable tool to overcome drawbacks of primary or secondary European law in a given sector owing to the democratic principle and the constitutional state doctrine. It is discussed that secondary legislation with regard to energy networks is inter alia restricted by Art. 345 TFEU and provisions of national constitutions which protect property rights against dis-proportionate expropriations or re-definitions of property. Further, legal authorisations of said calibre will have to be connected to a system of state liability law. Adverse political pressures are considered. The same is true for egoistic national policies which abstain from transnational task forces in order to settle difficulties and disputes. Furthermore, the adverse effect of different stages of the maturity of domestic markets, different consumer patterns and a potential isolation of the system is not neglected, because these conditions make it more difficult to apply consistent standards as to the appropriate market definition in order to facilitate harmonisation. The implementation of the VEBA/VIAG merger is discussed, as the former was further complicated owing to specifically evaluated circumstances which were difficult to predict. Nevertheless, the Commission is not exempted from the duty to take due care concerning potential impediments as to the realisation of parties' commitments. In contrast to the negative aspects, it can be highlighted that the Commission quickly realised flaws of the energy liberalisation project as expressed by the present form of the IEMD and IGMD. Consequently, the co-ordinative and innovative mechanisms of Florence and Madrid were created in order to boost the development of effective cross border trade - i.e. tariff systems and interconnector congestion management. It will be concluded that undertakings put forward by the parties and accepted by the Commission should be restricted to a subsidiary legal instrument, only applied if strictly necessary to overcome certain detrimental aspects of given concentrations in order to provide a hint for the legislator, to specify its legislation. Competition as a de-central distributor of risk, wealth and power will be extended to its maximum extent, if wholesale consumers benefit from lower energy prices which allow greater productivity of European products on the world markets in combination with higher environmental standards owing to modern, cost-efficient plants. A successful implementation will be described by liquid spot markets for power accompanied by tools of financial risk management like forwards, futures and options. These will be valuable indicators of efficient liberalisation of the European electricity and gas supply industries. ; Diese Doktorarbeit untersucht wie das Europäische Fusionskontrollverfahrensrecht auf den Energiesektor angewendet wird und in welchem Ausmaß seine Anwendung die Liberalisierung der Elektrizitäts-, Gas- und Erdölmärkte unterstützt, so dass nur solche Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse freigegeben wurden, die die Prinzipien der Liberalisierungsrechtsakte (Binnenmarktstromrichtlinie und Binnenmarktsgasrichtlinie). In ihrer Mitteilung über eine Energiepolitik für Europa, angenommen am 10.01.2007, betonte die Kommission, dass ein realer Energiebinnenmarkt essentiell ist, um Europas drei Energieziele zu erreichen, d.h. Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, um Kosten für Bürger und Unternehmen zu senken, um Energieeffizienz und Investitionen zu fördern, und Nachhaltigkeit, darin eingeschlossen ein Emissionshandel, und Energieversorgungssicherheit mit hohen Standards von öffentlichen Dienstleistungspflichten (Art. 106 AEUV). Die EU erließ drei Prä-Liberalisierungsrechtsakte seit den 1990er Jahren . Unzufrieden mit den existierenden monopolartigen Strukturen, d.h. in Deutschland durch Demarkationsverträge und ausschließliche Konzessionsverträge für die Versorgung von Strom und Erdgas, die bis 1998 vom allgemeinen Kartellverbot ausgenommen waren (§ 1 GWB), und die Vorherrschaft von ausschließlichen Rechten auf den Energiemärkten, löste die Kommission Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen vier Mitgliedstaaten gemäß Art. 258 AEUV . Der Gerichtshof bestätigte, dass die Kommission das Recht hat, ausschließliche Rechte unter gewissen Bedingungen abzuschaffen, und die Urteile hatten den Effekt, die Mitgliedstaaten zu überzeugen, in Verhandlungen für eine Marktöffnung der Energiemärkte gemäß den Energiebinnenmarktrichtlinien von 1996, 1998, 2003, 2009 und 2019 einzutreten (Strombinnenmarktrichtlinie und Gasbinnenmarktrichtlinie). Das Kernelement der Strombinnenmarktrichtlinie und Gasbinnenmarktsrichtlinie ist es, ausschließliche Rechte abzuschaffen und primär zumindest großen industriellen Strom und Gasverbrauchern das Recht einzuräumen, ihren Versorger frei zu wählen (Marktöffnung für auswählbare Verbraucher) und einen verhandelten oder regulierten Drittparteizugang zu Übertragungsnetzen und Verteilungsnetzen zu gewähren, um natürliche Monopole zu regulieren. Das zweite Liberalisierungspaket von 2003 brachte eine erweiterte Marktöffnung und Beschleunigung der Geschwindigkeit der Marktöffnung zu einer größeren Zahl von auswählbaren Verbrauchern (alle Nicht-Haushaltskunden seit Juli 2004 und alle Konsumenten ab Juli 2007) und eine Ausweitung der Vorschrift über Management- und rechtliche Entflechtung . Parallel dazu regeln zwei Verordnungen den Zugang zu grenzüberschreitenden Elektrizitätsinfrastrukturen (Interkonnektoren) und den Drittparteizugang zu Gas Übertragungsnetzwerken. Zwei weitere Richtlinien adressieren die Versorgungssicherheit von Erdgas und Strom und eine dritte behandelt die Energieendnutzungseffizienz und Dienstleistungen , eine vierte Richtlinie beschäftigte sich mit der Förderung von Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung und eine fünfte deckt Meeresumweltschutzpolitik ab (Marine Strategie Rahmenrichtlinie in Verbindung mit der Kohlenwasserstoff-Lizensierungsrichtlinie, verstärkt durch die Richtlinie über das öffentliche Auftragswesen im Energiesektor. Eine Verordnung behandelt Energiestatistiken. Die Umsetzung des zweiten Energiepakets war langsam und die Kommission leitete Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen 5 Mitgliedstaaten ein beim Europäischen Gerichtshof (Art. 258, 256 TFEU). Das dritte Energiepaket von 2009 adressierte die eigentumsrechtliche Entflechtung von Schlüssel-Infrastrukturen und die Energiegroßhandelsversorgung und die Kleinkundenenergieversorgung bestehend aus drei Verordnungen und zwei Richtlinien, beschäftigt sich mit unabhängigen Energieregulierungsbehörden, einer Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit von Energieregulierungsbehörden (ACER) und der grenzüberschreitenden Kooperation (das Europäische Netzwerk für Übertragungsnetzwerkoperatoren für Strom und Gas [ENTSO-E/G] und eine Verordnung über grenzüberschreitenden Netzzugang für Strom und Erdgas . Eine andere Verordnung behandelt die Marktintegrität und Transparenz. Außerdem regulieren neue Verordnungen Grundzüge der Strom-Balancierung, Verstopfungsmanagement, langfristige Kapazitätszuweisung, den Kodex für den Netzzugang und die Operation des Übertragungsnetzes. Andere Verordnungen regulieren die Grundsätze für eine europäische grenzüberschreitende Energie-Infrastruktur, welche im Kontext des europäischen Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfungsrechts interpretiert werden muss, die Einreichung von Daten über Strommärkte, etablieren einen Netzwerkkodex über Nachfrageverbindung, regeln einen Netzwerkkodex für den Netzzugang für Gleichstromübertragungssysteme, definieren Richtlinien über Stromübertragungssystemoperation, regulieren einen Netzwerkkodex über Stromversorgungsnotfälle, behandeln Erdgasversorgungssicherheit und etablieren ein Programm, um der ökonomischen Wiederherstellung zu helfen, indem finanzielle Hilfen gewährt werden. Schließlich fördern Richtlinien die Nutzung von erneuerbaren Energien, regulieren gemeinsame Erdölvorräte, die Sicherheit der Hochsee Erdöl- und Erdgasproduktion und die Qualität von Benzin und Diesel Kraftstoffen. Das vierte Liberalisierungspaket besteht aus einer neuen Strombinnenmarktrichtlinie 2019 und einer Erdgasbinnenmarktrichtlinie 2019, aus einer neuen Verordnung über europäischen grenzüberschreitenden Stromhandel, aus einer Verordnung übrer Risikovorbereitung im Stromsektor, aus einer neuen Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit der Europäischen Energie-Regulatoren, adressiert Energieeffizienz und regelt die gute Geschäftsführung in der Energieunion. Seit 2008 regelt Art. 194 I-II AUEV das ordentliche Gesetzgebungsverfahren im Energiesektor (Binnenmarkt für Energie, Energieversorgungssicherheit, Energieeffzienz, Energieeinsparung, erneuerbare Energien und die Interkonnektion von Energienetzen) unabhängig vom einstimmigen Entscheiden im Bereich von Energiebesteuerungen (Art. 194 III AEUV). Eine kurze Analyse der wirtschaftlichen Implikation von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen folgt die Untersuchung der Evolution des Europäischen Fusionskontrollverfahrensrechts gemäß dem ehemaligen Art. 66 EGKSV, Art. 101 and 102 AEUV, der Fusionskontrollverfahrensverordnung von 1989 und ihrer signifikanten Änderungen von 1997 und 2004. Dann werden die theoretischen Ergebnisse den Resultaten der Fusionskontrollverfahren im Energiesektor gegenübergestellt mit einem Schwerpunkt auf der VEBA/VIAG Entscheidung. Mehrere Schwachstellen werden herausgestellt, welche die Effektivität der Fusionskontrolle im Energiesektor herausstellen, die die Effektivität der Fusionskontrolle als ein Werkzeug zum Ausgleich der Schwachstellen im Sekundärrecht der EU mit Bezug auf die Liberalisierung der Strom- und Erdgasversorgungsindustrien mindern (Elektrizitätsbinnenmarktrichtlinie und Erdgasbinnenmarktrichtlinie). Verpflichtungszusagen auf Vorschlag der Partien eines Unternehmenszusammenschlusses, die von der Kommission angenommen worden sind, um hinreichend zu sein, um ein seriöses Potential von Marktbeherrschung zu adressieren können nur auf hilfsweise Relevanz zur Liberalisierung on Wirtschaftssektoren dienen gemäß einer Anzahl von analytischen und praktischen Nachteilen. Ein relevanter Nachteil bezieht sich auf das Faktum, dass die Verpflichtungszusagen der Parteien immer auf den Parteivorschlägen fußen und dass sie niemals ex officio auferlegt werden können. Andere Nachteile beziehen sich auf die grobe Autorisierung der Kommission, wie sie nahegelegt wird durch den Wortlaut von Art. 6 and 8 Fusionskontrollverordnung 1997 und 2004 bezogen auf die Umsetzung von Nebenbestimmungen. Mit Bezug auf die Akquisition von regionalen Stromunternehmen im Vereinigten Königreich durch EdF wird herausgearbeitet, dass das gegenwärtige Fusionskontrollverfahrensrecht keinen Ansatz für Reziprozitätserwägungen lässt mit Bezug auf Akquisitionen durch amtierende Unternehmen in liberalisierten Märkten, auch wenn der Erwerber eine geschützte öffentliche Unternehmung ist. Außerdem wird herausgearbeitet, dass unterschiedliche Entscheidungen inkonsistente Marktdefinitionen herausarbeitet. Durch die VEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEW Entscheidungen wird die Frage beantwortet, welche Ursachen verantwortlich sind für die etablierten analytischen und praktischen Nachteile der Fusionskontrolle im Energiesektor. Es wird herausgestellt, dass die Schwächen der Elektrizitätsbinnenmarktrichtlinie 2009/72/EG und der Erdgasbinnenmarktrichtlinie 2009/73/EG zu gewissen Anteilen verantwortlich sind für schwache Nebenbestimmungen, die nicht hinreichend den Anwendungsbereich für Marktbeherrschung auf den betroffenen Märkten eliminieren und die nicht jedwede Möglichkeit von Erschwernissen des verhandelten oder regulierten Drittparteizugangs zu Infrastrukturen ausschließen und welche nicht den kommerziellen Anreiz der Netztochtergesellschaften der vertikal integrierten Unternehmen entfernen, zu unterscheiden zwischen Intra- und Extra-Gruppen Netzzugangspetenten. Es wird geschildert, dass sich ein anderes Argument auf den limitierten Anwendungsbereich bezieht, dass die Kommission, wenn sie es möchte, um Nachteile zu adressieren des primären Gemeinschaftsrechts gemäß der außergewöhnlichen Natur der impIizierten Befugnisse Doktrin basieren auf dem Prinzip des Rechtsstaates. Gegenteilige politische Einflussnahme gegen Wettbewerbsbehörden wird außerdem untersucht. Darüber hinaus wird analysiert, dass akzidentielle Regulierung basierend auf Nebenbestimmungen, die vielleicht oder nicht einen Unternehmenszusammenschluss implementieren unter keinem Gesichtspunkt ein konsistentes und vorhersehbares Werkzeug ist, um Nachteile des primären oder sekundären Europäischen Rechts in einem gegebenen Sektor zu überwinden gemäß dem Demokratieprinzip und dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip. Es wird diskutiert, dass sekundäre europäische Rechtssetzung mit Bezug auf Energienetzwerke unter anderem durch Art. 345 AEUV begrenzt wird und dass Vorschriften nationaler Verfassungen, die Eigentumsrechte garantieren, gegen die unverhältnismäßige Enteignung oder Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmungen des Eigentum schützen . Darüber hinaus werden rechtliche Ermächtigungen des besagten Kalibers gewürdigt und mit einem System von Staatsverantwortlichkeitsrecht verbunden. Gegenteilige politische Drücke wurden erwogen. Das gleiche trifft zu für egoistische nationale Politiken, die von nationalen Taskforces Abstand nehmen, um Schwierigkeiten und Streitigkeiten zu adressieren. Außerdem wird der gegenteilige Effekt von unterschiedlichen Phasen der Reife häuslicher Märkte, unterschiedlichem Verbraucherverhalten und einer möglichen Isolation des Systems untersucht und nicht vernachlässigt, weil diese Bedingungen es schwieriger machen, konsistente Standards mit Bezug auf die sachgerechte Marktdefinition anzuwenden, um die Harmonisierung zu erleichtern. Die Einflüsse der VEBA/VIAG Fusion wird diskutiert, weil diese Entscheidung weiter erschwert war und kompliziert wurde durch spezielle ausgewertete Umstände, die schwierig vorherzusehen waren. Dennoch war die Kommission nicht befreit von der Verpflichtung, um notwendige Sorgfalt anzuwenden bezogen auf potentielle Erschwernisse bezogen auf die Realisierung der Verpflichtungszusagen der Parteien. Im Gegensatz zu den negativen Aspekten kann herausgestellt werden, dass die Kommission schnell Schwachstellen des Enerigeliberalisierungsprojektes erkannt hat, wie es durch die gegenwärtige Form der Elektrizitätsbinnenmarktrichtlinie und der Erdgasbinnenmarktrichtlinie geprägt wird. Konsequenterweise wurden die koordinierenden und innovativen Mechanismen der Foren von Florenz und Madrid geschaffen, um die Entwicklung effektiven grenzüberschreitenden Energiehandels voranzutreiben, d.h. Tarifsysteme und Interkonnektorenverstopfungsmanagements. Es wird der Schluss gezogen, dass Unternehmen, vorangetrieben durch die Parteien und angenommen durch die Kommission, davon ausgenommen wurden sollen, ein subsidiäres rechtliches Instrument zu begrenzen, um gewisse schädliche Aspekte einer gegebenen Unternehmenskonzentration zu überwinden, um für einen Hinweis and den Gesetzgeber zu sorgen, seine Gesetzgebung zu spezifizieren. Wettbewerb als ein dezentrales Verfahren zur Verteilung von Risiko, Wohlstand und Macht wird ausgedehnt zu seinem maximalen Ertrag, wenn Großhandelsverbraucher von geringeren Energiepreisen profitieren, die eine gesteigerte Produktivität Europäischer Produkte auf den Weltmärkten bewirken in Kombination mit höheren Umweltstandards durch den Einsatz moderner, kosteneffzienter Produktionsstätten. Eine erfolgreiche Implementierung wird beschrieben durch liquide Spot-Märkte für Energie, begleitet durch Werkzeuge des finanziellen Risikomanagements wie Forward-Derivate, Future-Derivate und Optionen. Diese wurden wertvolle Indikatoren einer effizienten Liberalisierung der Europäischen Elektrizitäts- und Erdgasversorgungsindustrien sein.