The "deliberative development" approach to policy reform has gained popularity in both academic and policy circles without a clear understanding of the requirements for its success. Based on a reading of the deliberative democracy literature, we detail those requirements, finding them to be quite restrictive. We then examine Bolivia's 2000 National Dialogue, a national deliberation on development policy, and find—not surprisingly—that these requirements were generally missing. More importantly, we demonstrate that the lack of these requirements is not benign: the institutional characteristics of the Dialogue had direct effects, and the Dialogue continues to affect Bolivia's politics in debatable ways. The late 1990s and early part of this decade witnessed what appeared to be a major change in the approach of international development institutions to policy reform. The most important evidence of this change was the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. This initiative, which arose in 1999 in the context of updating the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries' (HIPC) Initiative, required countries to prepare a PRSP prior to receiving debt relief (see International Monetary Fund and International Development Association, 1999). Each country's PRSP was to outline an overall strategy to reduce poverty, including structural reforms such as trade and privatization as well as specific anti-poverty programs. These PRSPs are now required to receive any World Bank or IMF concessional assistance. What made the PRSP initiative particularly innovative and noteworthy was that the Bank and Fund required that the strategy be developed in a "participatory" way. That is, the PRSP needed to be based on some sort of consultative process by which the government solicited input from various societal groups—including local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), businesses, and unions—and then incorporated those preferences in the policy. This approach to government policymaking seemed to go directly against a line of academic work on economic reform that had been influential in these institutions for years (e.g. Sturzenneger and Tommasi, 1998), arguing that there was an inverse relationship between the success of economic reform and the amount of participation of society in making policies. Having criticized this old approach for years, most NGOs and developing country governments supported the new direction taken by the World Bank and IMF. In fact, few critics of the approach (e.g. Stewart and Wang, 2003) have critiqued the idea of participation, most instead focusing their critiques on the poor "extent" and "quality" of participation. In one of the benchmark articles supporting this "deliberative" approach to policy reform, Peter Evans (2004) notes that such an approach to policymaking is supported by work by the economists Amartya Sen (1999) and Dani Rodrik (2000), who argue that participation and public deliberation are means to better policies. Evans writes, "If it were possible to implant this sort of deliberative process in political units large enough to impact developmental trajectories—say, the provincial or municipal level—we would have something that could be called 'deliberative development'" (2004: 37). Discussing examples from Porto Alegre, Brazil, and Kerala, India, Evans goes on to argue that this type of development is not only desirable, but attainable. Despite its increasing popularity in the academic and policy worlds, we still know little about what is needed for the deliberative development approach to be successful. While it may be true that political processes in Porto Alegre, Kerala, and elsewhere have exhibited deliberative aspects as well as positive development outcomes, the particular details of how the former relates to the latter remain murky. Are deliberative processes appropriate for all development decisions? Are there particular characteristics of the society that need to be present in order for deliberation to work well? Are there particular characteristics of the deliberative institutions that need to be present? Can there be any negative effects if deliberation is not done well? If the deliberative development approach is to be considered a viable and superior policymaking alternative, these questions must be answered.
It is a striking point that, in the general context of the municipal administration's reform, this administration itself is never brought into discredit. When criticisms are formulated, they concern the fact that not all municipalities are able to offer their inhabitants the services which they normally may expect, as well for their immediate human development as for the adapted extension of the material infrastructure and of their vital environment. This normally raises the question of the municipalities' administrative power.The factors which determine that power can be considered in direct or indirect connection with the number of inhabitants.In the first place, the population has to be sufficiently differentiated to enable the conception of a development-policy that comes up to the requirements of the present society. One may assume that in municipalities with 2.000 inhabitants, which perform a centre-function or are located near a town-centre, the possibility exists to elect a properly composed common council. For rural municipalities the numberof inhabitants must undoubtedly be higher. Moreover, the municipality should have the disposal of specialised personnel to help the municipal authorities with the conception and practice of their policy. InBelgium a municipal secretary cannot do bis work properly if the municipality does not count 2.500 to 3.000 inhabitants.In the second place, administrative power is determined by available finances. Calculations have been made per category of municipalities, based on disposable data concerning 196.5 and 1966.As far as the extraordinary accounts are concerned, which essentially refer to investment expenses, it is relevant to note that the average figures per inhabitant are equally high in municipalities with less than1.000 and with 10.000 inhabitants. But, taking into account the cost of planned infrastructure-works, it is a fact that only from 10.000 inhabitants on a municipality has the disposal of sufficient finances to performa development-policy.The figures concerning ordinary accounts, which refer to operation- and administrative costs, show that a municipality with less than 1.000 inhabitants - although offering less services - has to spend more perinhabitant than a municipality with 5.000 to 10.000 inhabitants. lts fiscal charge is also higher than that of a municipality belonging to the latter category.The figures clearly show the disadvantage of smaller municipalities.In that context one should not forget that practically 63 to 70 % of ordinary expenses concern the actual operations and municipal debts.
Seen in proportional relations, small municipalities have but little means to take care of policy-tasks.To be complete «municipality with administrative power» also means «municipality with a democratic function». As a matter of fact, administrative power is not exclusively determined by sufficient financialresources or by a minimum of differentiation of the inhabitants. Generally speaking one can assume in this context that the geographical size of the territory does not normally hamper the functioning of alocal democracy. More attention however should be given to the question if that functioning is not rather hindered by the number of inhabitants, when a certain population-maximum is exceeded. lt appearsindeed that local authorities have less appeal in urbanised municipalities or as soon as a population-number of 20.000 to 30.000 inhabitants is reached. For that reason, attempts should be made in bigger municipalities to stimulate the population's participation in policy-matters.Activities with a definitively technical character, need a wider approach. So it seems more advisable to work on the basis of regions, rather than on the basis of large municipalities.Taking into account the big number of small municipalities, one can state as a conclusion that the municipal elections miss a great part of their signification in the majority of Belgian municipalities. Practically two thirds of them have no possibility to perform an adapted policy.Changing the constitution of those who are responsible for that policy cannot give much of a result as there are no material means to realize a modern policy with administrative power.
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The American public almost unanimously agrees that the nation's War on Drugs has been a huge failure. Now, South American leaders have a plan to form an alliance with key nations to initiate a new, non-violent approach to drug crime. This is a critical opportunity for the Biden administration to combat organized crime while regaining geopolitical credibility by promoting peace.
Since the United States' War on Drugs began more than five decades ago, the nation has spent over a trillion dollars enforcing drug policies domestically since 1971.
Meanwhile, the number of drug cartels in the Americas has only increased, as have the casualties.
The U.S. is not alone in these failed efforts. Both drug-related violent crime and drug trafficking itself are at record highs in a number of countries around the hemisphere. According to InSight Crime, cocaine trafficking is at historic highs, and the homicide rate in Andean countries is skyrocketing. Clearly, violent efforts to combat drug use and trafficking are ineffective. Fortunately, some South American politicians are suggesting a new solution.
Colombian President Gustavo Petro recently proposed the creation of an alliance between Latin American and Caribbean states looking for a different way to fight organized crime and drug trafficking. In his speech at the Latin American and Caribbean Conference on Drugs on September 9th, Petro argued that "it is time to rebuild hope and not repeat the bloody and ferocious wars, the ill-named 'war on drugs', viewing drugs as a military problem and not as a health problem for society." Petro likened the policy to "genocide" against the Colombian people, with more than 200,000 civilians dying in the country as a direct result of the civil conflict — including drug violence — since 1958.
Presidents Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico and Luis Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil have already supported this new approach, at least rhetorically. At the conference, representatives from 17 countries signed a statement agreeing to the need to "rethink the global war on drugs" and focus on "life, peace, and development."
Unfortunately, some countries in Latin America have taken the opposite perspective, embracing militarization and "mano dura" (hard hand) policies based on the record of autocrat Nayib Bukele of El Salvador. Many U.S. policymakers promote similar tactics, including a ludicrous U.S. invasion of Mexico. Ecuador and Honduras, in response to rising homicide rates, chose to militarize counternarcotics, leading to more death, instability, and democratic backsliding.
But these violent tactics have never worked. Not only did the U.S.-led War on Drugs fail miserably, but the nation also played a large role in inciting violence in Central America by supporting violent groups and governments in the hopes of tackling drug traffickers and left-wing guerrillas in the region. The security infrastructure in most Central American countries is a direct result of U.S. involvement during the Cold War.
By promoting a violent solution to the drug crisis and emboldening anti-drug militias, the U.S. has created more drug cartels. According to records from the Drug Enforcement Administration, Colombian paramilitaries have become the largest domestic drug producers and traffickers in Colombia. They were originally propped up, funded, and armed by the United States.
Under the Reagan administration, Latin American factions and dictators engaging in drug trafficking, including the Contras in Nicaragua, and Manuel Noriega in Panama, were also supported by the U.S. In Mexico, the U.S. and Mexican governments' policy of decapitation — removing top leaders from cartels — led to fractionalization and the creation of more cartels battling over resources and power, making Mexico a narco-state with hundreds of groups.
In light of the negative influence that Washington has had on the War on Drugs throughout the American regions, the Biden administration should extend an olive branch to Petro and support his new alliance. By inviting Petro and other sympathetic Latin American leaders to the White House, or to a Latin American city with a connection to the War on Drugs, Biden could discuss a regional, non-violent approach that would repair international ties with South and Central American countries and renew the nations' vision for reducing drug crime. Involving the U.S. publicly would give weight to the transition and bring international media attention to the drug problem.
The alliance's members and leading in-country experts could then come up with a list of policies to be implemented across the hemisphere in line with the new non-violent approach. Those policies should then pass the legislatures and become law in the respective countries.
The list could include harm-reduction programs to reduce consumption, scholarship programs for youths in high-risk areas, public education programs, housing subsidies, negotiation with drug-trafficking organizations, reintegration programs for former members, funding for public mental health counseling, and large-scale investment in public projects to boost employment in low-income communities.
Examples of the far-reaching success of these policies should be included to support their validity and implementation. In addition, regimes that continue their hardline policies should be isolated and condemned by alliance members. El Salvador, Honduras, and Ecuador have suspended constitutional rights and liberties to bolster the rights of the security state. In doing so, they have sacrificed civilian life, institutional stability, democracy, and human rights in exchange for temporary security. The United States should put diplomatic pressure on political leaders like Nayib Bukele of El Salvador and Xiomara Castro for militarized drug policies that perpetuate this behavior.Unifying the Americas around this approach would help equalize the burden of the drug problem while sharing the benefits of the new approach's success. Leaders of the alliance should publicly call out problematic policies within these regimes. Petro has already done this with El Salvador. Other countries wanting to adopt the "hard hand" approach to counternarcotics should beware of the political, diplomatic, and economic consequences of adopting illiberal and unsuccessful drug policies. Proposing an invasion of Mexico won't help tackle the drug problem, promote U.S. security interests, or restore U.S. influence around the region. Supporting a new South American alliance would do this and more.
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Every so often I am reminded of how counter-productive US engagement in the world has become. Of how, after miserable failure after failure, this country's foreign policy makers keep trying to run the globe and fail again. From the strategic defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan to the feckless effort to sway the excessive Israeli military operation in Gaza, the US has squandered its power, exceeded its capabilities, and just plain failed.My reminder was a recent New York Times piece lamenting the failure of US efforts to keep terrorists out of the Islamic areas of West Africa.For more than 25 years, spending billions of dollars, the US has been providing weapons and training for African militaries, has established a separate US military regional command for Africa, has provided both intelligence and military support for counter-terror operations, and established operating military bases or deployed forces in West Africa, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Guinea. The Times report is incomplete; it does not include Chad, Somalia, or Djibouti, where the US has deployed and operated forces for more than two decades.Ostensibly the goal of all these military efforts has been to strengthen the ability of African militaries to prevent and defeat terrorism and, secondarily, to build or strengthen democratic governance.The Times, which has reported on these efforts rather uncritically for two decades, acknowledges that there are more terrorists than ever in these countries. Moreover, Christopher Maier, DoD Assistant Secretary for special operations policy in the Pentagon, admitted to the Times that "our general desire to promote democratic governments and having healthy governance there has not gone particularly well."That's an understatement. Beyond increasing the number of terrorists and terrorist organizations, the military forces trained and armed by the US have taken over governments. This year, those new leaders began throwing the US military out of their countries, along with the French military, who have been deployed there for years. In Niger, the US military is closing down its new $110 m. operating base, from which the US used drones to spy on and attack terrorist groups in the region."It's about time," is my reaction. The US military should never have been in these countries to begin with or, if they were, only as a secondary aspect of US efforts to help strengthen governance and the economies of these impoverished nations. Even then, it is not clear the US has any capability either to stop terrorists, train other militaries to stop terrorists, or "strengthen governance" in another country. We certainly can't do that using military force. But military force has been at the heart of US policy in Africa for more than two decades.So what went wrong and what to do about it? Is this just a case of adjusting US policy to be more effective, as the Times article suggests? Or is something fundamentally wrong with US policy? After years of working on security assistance and cooperation policies, I think it is the latter. The US way over-militarized the security problem. The US does not do the training and equipping job particularly well – military effectiveness is uneven, at best. And US programs have proven counterproductive with respect both to counter-terrorism and democratic governance. It's not time to reform the policy; it is time to close down US security cooperation and assistance in Africa.It has been clear to me for nearly 15 years that these programs were doomed. As Becky Williams and I concluded in a 2011 report for the Stimson Center, the fundamental flaw in US security assistance and cooperation programs, especially in Africa, is that the Pentagon is in charge. Over the past three decades, the Defense Department and, specifically, the US military has taken over how these policies and programs are defined, what their goals are, and how they are implemented. The State Department, which once had the lead in security assistance programs, has lost a good deal of its authority to oversee and evaluate these efforts.The military's definition of security in Africa is a major part of the problem. I call it a "security first" approach. The focus of the military's view is that you can't have a functioning government unless the border and interior of a country are "secure" or safe. From this point of view, one cannot have a responsive government before there is military security. Democracy and good governance have to wait. As the West African experience is amply demonstrating, "security first" actually leads to greater insecurity. Militaries in these countries consume more and more of the nation's budget, impoverish their economies, and, through their operations, stimulate the very threat the military says it is trying to eliminate. Too many of these US-trained and supported military leaders seize political power, with greater arbitrary oppression the result. More terrorists and less democracy are certain to follow. Research suggests, instead, that security depends on strong civilian governing capabilities and more effective civilian administration. The administration of a nation needs to be in place before the military can be properly controlled and used. Governance and stronger states actually come before strong militaries.That's a fancy way of saying militaries that are too powerful in nations where government is too weak, are a threat to security and to democracy, and are an incentive to greater terrorist activity and internal unrest.So I have thought for some time, that if anything can be done to help other nations with a security problem, strengthening the governance of that nation and, alongside that, its economy need to take precedence over bulking up their armed forces.Consulting with the State Department between 2008 and 2012, I made a stab at trying to link security funding to good governance, as an incentive to the African countries with which we were engaged. I wrote a paper for State that proposed a challenge fund – some of US security assistance dollars would be put in a pool. Countries that wanted help could compete for the funds, but the criteria for getting them would include such practices as a free press, legislative oversight, publicly disclosed military budgets, a civilian ministry of defense, among other things. Good governance, in other words, would be the road to support for security needs. I wish I could direct you to the paper, but like many ideas, it was killed before it made the State Department's budget request.I even took a shot at consulting with the World Bank to make the examination and reform of military institutions in the countries they assisted part of their regular budget reviews of those countries, something the Bank had never done before. They produced a great report, but it sank like a stone at the Bank, which has been averse to examining this growing sector of government spending in places like West Africa lest the scrutiny alienate the Bank's more authoritarian members.So here we are, at what could be the end of the line. Lots of money, lots of failure, and sent packing by the militaries the US supported. And today I wonder whether even the reforms I was suggesting would have made any difference. These now seem to be the reforms the policy makers are examining; the Times piece indicates that people at State and DoD are now saying " gee, we need to integrate this military stuff with governance and economic development stuff."I have no doubt we are about to see lots of budget requests for programs that purport to do just that. But based on the abysmal failure of US governance and economic reform plans in Iraq and Afghanistan, I have little faith that the US civilian institutions can properly define and implement such reforms from the outside.The world is not hungering for such reforms, especially in Africa where authoritarianism and corruption are expanding. Moreover, the Chinese and the Russians have made it clear they will provide plenty of assistance without any such governance and reform strings attached. What's more, the US is now at the brink of being a failed democracy itself; hardly a model for anyone else.So I think it is time for restraint; to bring these military forces home and bury US assistance programs. They don't work; they don't achieve the projected goals; they waste funds; and they are counter-productive.Real reform can only come from within. Were an outside power, say France or Britain, to intrude into the dysfunctionality of US politics and try to change things, that intrusion would be unwelcome.As with the US, so it is with any country, the prospects for change in Africa depend on the awareness and willingness of the population in these countries to own their own change processes, demand accountable and responsive governance, and then seek the external support they need to make it happen. Then, and only then, can outside support become useful and effective. This article was republished with permission from The Sheathed Sword.
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Ukrainian officials continue to engage in direct, back-channel discussions with their Russian counterparts, with "tough" and "unpleasant" in-person meetings happening along the border between the two countries and in Istanbul, according to a new report from the Washington Post.The reported topics of conversation are far more limited than the early days of the conflict, when a ceasefire or even a peace deal appeared possible. The officials focus instead on practical issues like prisoner swaps, and the return of Ukrainian children who have been taken to Russia.The report sheds useful light on the status of diplomatic efforts related to the war, including the role of international intermediaries and mediators. Turkey, Qatar, the UAE, the Vatican, and Saudi Arabia are the main state-level players in this regard, and the International Committee of the Red Cross has also played a role.One notable area in which Ukrainian and Russian officials have never engaged in one-on-one meetings is the question of Ukrainian grain exports, which largely flowed via the Black Sea prior to the war. According to the Post, the talks "took place in a four-sided format: Turkey; the United Nations; Ukraine and Russia, which was represented by Defense Ministry officials."These discussions resulted in one of the only positive diplomatic signs since the war began: the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which created corridors for shipping much-needed foodstuffs through the Russian blockade. Rustem Umerov, who has since become Ukraine's defense minister, helped lead the Istanbul-based talks, a role made easier by Umerov's fluency in Turkish, the Post notes.But Russia killed the deal earlier this year over allegations that the West had not upheld its side of the bargain, which Moscow says included a relaxation of sanctions on fertilizers and related chemicals.When it comes to prisoner swaps, Ukraine views Turkey and Saudi Arabia as key players whose role "ensured that Russia was less likely to back out, to avoid angering two of Moscow's important partners," the Post writes.The report also reveals the complex role played by the Vatican, which has led on efforts to return noncombatants like military cooks and medics. The Holy See, under Pope Francis, has attempted to rebuild ties with the Russian Orthodox Church, led by Patriarch Kirill.While the war has put a strain on those efforts, some aspects of the rapprochement between the Christian denominations are paying off, according to the Post. Ukraine reportedly passes lists of prisoners to the pope's envoy in the country, who then sends the names to the Holy See. Next, Vatican officials forward the documents to the Russian Orthodox Church, and Kirill himself brings them to the Kremlin's attention.The most positive revelation in the Post's reporting is the news that "groups of children have come back to Ukraine on a semiregular basis" following direct negotiations with Russia, which has quietly felt the pressure of the International Criminal Court warrant against President Vladimir Putin for alleged unlawful transfers of Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied areas.Groups of Ukrainian children "have been dropped off at a far western part of the Ukraine-Belarus border, cross over by foot, and are met in Ukraine by Save Ukraine, a nongovernmental organization," the Post writes.In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan moved forward a parliamentary proposal to ratify Sweden's accession to NATO, putting Stockholm one step closer to joining the alliance, according to AP News. But another obstacle remains: Hungary, whose ruling party has accused Swedish officials of telling "blatant lies" about the state of the country's democracy, pushed back a vote on the issue until at least next month. One ruling party lawmaker said there was "little chance" that Hungary would ratify Sweden's accession to NATO this year. — With dwindling support for Ukraine aid at home, U.S. President Joe Biden has started making the argument that its massive new funding proposal will be a boon for the American economy, according to Politico. The new line, which is a far cry from previous arguments about defending democracies and the rules-based order, is in large part aimed at Republicans who see Ukraine as a distraction from other priorities and are intent on expanding the U.S. defense industrial base. This angle will likely draw fire from progressives, who often note that military spending is far less effective at creating new jobs than other kinds of government investment.— Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on Wednesday, opening the door to a new era of nuclear weapons testing amid increased tensions between Washington and Moscow, according to Reuters. Putin framed the decision as an effort to "mirror" the U.S. position on the treaty, which it signed but never ratified. While Russia claims it will only resume testing if the U.S. does so first, new reporting from CNN shows that both countries have expanded their nuclear testing facilities in recent years.— The Biden administration's public support for alleged Israeli war crimes in Gaza has led to charges of hypocrisy from many leaders in the Global South who have bristled at Western claims of moral clarity regarding the war in Ukraine, according to the Washington Post:"When the war in Ukraine first broke out, Palestinians were elated by the tough stance taken by Western capitals against one country occupying another's land, said Nour Odeh, a Ramallah-based Palestinian political commentator. 'But it seems that occupation is only bad if the guys who are not on your side are doing it.' (...)There is a perception that the West 'cares more about Ukrainian refugees, about Ukrainian civilians suffering, than we do when they are suffering in Yemen, in Gaza, in Sudan, in Syria,' said Hanna Notte, a Berlin-based Eurasia analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.That helps illustrate why the West has failed to woo countries like India and Turkey into supporting sanctions against Russia. Given the situation in Gaza, that effort is unlikely to succeed any time soon."U.S. State Department news:In a Monday press conference, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said the U.S. is "deeply concerned" about Russia's ongoing detention of an American-Russian journalist for Radio Free Europe, who faces charges of failing to register as a foreign agent and has been in Russian custody since June. "We have requested consular access; so far it has not been granted. We will continue to press for it," Miller said, adding that "we have not even been officially notified of her arrest by the Russian Government."
The article is devoted to the study of the acceptability of the introduction of digital technologies in the electoral process and their compliance with democratic standards.It is indicated, that the Recommendation CM / Rec (2017) revised the problematic aspects of the legal regulation of electoral technologies in accordance with the current stage of development of science and information technology and today remains virtually the only agreed act, containing requirements for electronic voting. The most common digital technologies in the election process are highlighted: devices for direct recording of electronic voting without a paper ballot form; means of scanning the ballot; technical mechanisms for speeding up the counting of votes; online voting system via a computer or mobile device with Internet access; a device for voter identification online or at a polling station (including by recording fingerprints or the retina). The following essential principles of this method of election are summarized: clarity of procedure, reliability, stability of electoral legislation and broad public support.The authors highlight the following advantages of the electronic election system - the presence of a coordinated, verified, labile voter register; increases administrative efficiency; reduces long-term costs of financial and labor resources; eliminates the possibility of manipulation; speeds up the counting of votes; improves political transparency; overcomes the problems of ignorance of the electorate.The article proves that elections, referendums or other forms of democracy, conducted using digital technologies, must meet the requirements and general principles of suffrage. Legitimation of digital technologies is possible only in the absence of discriminatory advantages. Therefore, the possibility of using digital technologies is possible in the case of organizing the technical perfection of the electronic voting system and counting of votes, as well as their alternatives, along with the classic form of voting ; Стаття присвячена дослідженню прийнятності впровадження цифрових технологій у виборчому процесі та їх відповідності демократичним стандартам.Вказується, що Рекомендації CM / Rec (2017) переглянула проблемні аспекти правового регулювання виборчих технологій відповідно до сучасного етапу розвитку науки, техніки та інформаційних технологій та на сьогодні залишається практично єдиним узгодженим актом в якому містяться вимоги до системи електронного голосування. Виокремлено найпоширеніші цифрові технології при виборчому процесі: пристрої прямої фіксації електронного голосування без паперової форми бюлетня; засоби сканування виборчого бюлетеня; технічні механізми пришвидшення підрахунку голосів; система онлайн-голосування через комп'ютер або мобільний пристрій із доступом до Інтернету; пристрій ідентифікації виборця онлайн чи на виборчій дільниці (у т.ч. шляхом фіксування відбитків пальців чи сітківки ока). Узагальнено такі суттєві принципи цього способу виборів: визначеність процедури, надійність, стабільність виборчого законодавства та широка громадська підтримка.Авторами виокремлено наступні переваги електронної системи виборів – наявність узгодженого, вивіреного, лабільного реєстру виборців; підвищує адміністративну ефективність; зменшити довгострокові витрати фінансових та трудових ресурсів; усуває можливість маніпуляцій; пришвидшує підрахунок голосів; поліпшує політичну прозорість; долає проблеми неосвідченості електорату.У статті доведено, що вибори, референдуми чи інші форми демократії проведені за допомогою цифрових технологій, повинні відповідати вимогам і загальним принципам виборчого права. Легітимація цифрових технологій можлива виключно у разі відсутності дискримінаційних переваг. Тому використання цифрових технологій можливе в разі організації технічної досконалості системи електронного голосування та підрахунку голосів, а також їх альтернативності поряд із класичною формою реалізації виборчого прав ; Статья посвящена исследованию приемлемости внедрения цифровых технологий в избирательном процессе и их соответствия демократическим стандартам.Указывается, что Рекомендации CM / Rec (2017) пересмотрела проблемные аспекты правового регулирования избирательных технологий в соответствии с современного этапа развития науки, техники и информационных технологий и сегодня остается практически единственным согласованным актом в котором содержатся требования к системе электронного голосования. Выделены наиболее распространенные цифровые технологии при избирательном процессе: устройства прямой фиксации электронного голосования без бумажной формы бюллетеня; средства сканирования избирательного бюллетеня; технические механизмы ускорения подсчета голосов; система онлайн-голосования через компьютер или мобильное устройство с доступом к Интернету устройство идентификации избирателя онлайн или на избирательном участке (в т.ч.шляхом фиксирования отпечатков пальцев или сетчатки глаза). Обзор такие существенные принципы такого способа выборов: определенность процедуры, надежность, стабильность избирательного законотавства и широкая общественная поддержка.Авторами выделены следующие преимущества электронной системы выборов - наличие согласованного, выверенного, лабильного реестра избирателей; повышает административную эффективность; уменьшить долгосрочные расходы финансовых и трудовых ресурсов; устраняет возможность манипуляций; ускоряет подсчет голосов; улучшает политическую прозрачность; преодолевает проблемы неосвидчености электората.В статье доказано, что выборы, референдумы и другие формы демократии проведенные с помощью цифровых технологий, должны соответствовать требованиям и общим принципам избирательного права. Легитимация цифровых технологий возможна только в случае отсутствия дискриминационных преимуществ. Поэтому возможность использования цифровых технологий возможно в случае организации технического совершенства системы электронного голосования и подсчета голосов, а также их альтернативности наряду с классической формой реализации избирательного права
El desempleo juvenil, en la actualidad económica y social, de los países de Latinoamerica y en especial en Colombia, se ha convertido en una problemática que requiere especial atención en las agendas de los gobiernos, especialmente de los Gobiernos locales o municipalidades, donde se acentúa mucho más el fenómeno. El autor pretende establecer una manera de afrontar dicha problemática, basándose en conceptos asociados al desarrollo social y económico, como lo son: El Desarrollo Humano, como principio rector de la economía local que garantiza la democracia, la inclusión y la potencialización del capital humano y la generación de confianza que se traduce en capital social. La Gobernanza desde la práctica que se concreta en las APP (Alianzas Publico Privadas) como modelo de Responsabilidad Social de los actores del territorio, para producir riqueza social y La Economía Social, que se concreta a través de la promoción y encadenamiento del emprendimiento desde las capacidades y las habilidades y no solo desde la demanda productiva; para finalmente ver de manera integrada un modelo de Desarrollo Social. El trabajo presenta una estructura analítica de los conceptos y teorías fundadas con respecto al desarrollo humano, especialmente citando a autores como Manfred Max Neef, Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz, Bernardo Kliksberg y Sergio Boisier, entre otros actores que recopilan y dirigen sus postulaciones hacia una economía alternativa o bien llamada del tercer sector. hace un recorrido por la situación actual del empleo en Colombia, hasta llegar a la situación actual de la población joven en el Municipio de La Ceja, con lo que propone un marco de realidad, para el análisis político y empresarial; por último, establece una metodología de análisis desde un marco conceptual y una matriz categorial, que engloba los conceptos, la realidad y el objeto social de desarrollo para una localidad a partir de los jóvenes. Una evaluación de los conceptos, a partir de la valoración de los jóvenes de La Ceja, en función de sus necesidades según Max Neef, así como de su visión y relación con empresas privadas y públicas, es lo que se define como conclusión y establece una estrategia y propuesta política que debe seguir una pequeña ciudad que pretenda implementar un modelo de economía social. ; Youth unemployment in the currently economic and social context, in Latin American countries and especially in Colombia, has become a problem that requires special attention on the agendas of governments, especially local governments or municipalities, where it is accentuated much more the phenomenon. The author intends to establish a way to face this problem, based on concepts associated with social and economic development, such as: Human Development, as the guiding principle of the local economy that guarantees democracy, inclusion and the empowerment of human capital and building trust that translates into social capital. The Governance from the practice that is specified in the PPAs (Public-Private Alliances) as a model of Social Responsibility of the actors of the territory, to produce social wealth and Social Economy, which is specified through the promotion and chaining of entrepreneurship from capacities and skills and not only from the productive demand; to finally see an integrated model of Social Development. This work presents an analytical structure of concepts and founded theories regarding human development, especially citing authors such as Manfred Max Neef, Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz, Bernardo Kliksberg and Sergio Boisier, among other actors who compile and direct their studies towards a alternative economy, olso called the third sector. It makes a review of the current situation of employment in Colombia, until reaching the current situation of the young population in the Municipality of La Ceja, thus proposing a reality framework for political and business analysis. Lastly, it establishes an analysis methodology from a conceptual framework and a categorical matrix, which encompasses the concepts, the reality and the social object of development for a locality based on young people. An evaluation of the concepts, based on the assessment of young people from La Ceja, based on their needs according to Max Neef, as well as their vision and relationship with private and public companies, is what is defined as a conclusion and establishes a strategy and political proposal to be followed by a small city that intends to implement the social economy model.
The article is devoted to the study of the acceptability of the introduction of digital technologies in the electoral process and their compliance with democratic standards.It is indicated, that the Recommendation CM / Rec (2017) revised the problematic aspects of the legal regulation of electoral technologies in accordance with the current stage of development of science and information technology and today remains virtually the only agreed act, containing requirements for electronic voting. The most common digital technologies in the election process are highlighted: devices for direct recording of electronic voting without a paper ballot form; means of scanning the ballot; technical mechanisms for speeding up the counting of votes; online voting system via a computer or mobile device with Internet access; a device for voter identification online or at a polling station (including by recording fingerprints or the retina). The following essential principles of this method of election are summarized: clarity of procedure, reliability, stability of electoral legislation and broad public support.The authors highlight the following advantages of the electronic election system - the presence of a coordinated, verified, labile voter register; increases administrative efficiency; reduces long-term costs of financial and labor resources; eliminates the possibility of manipulation; speeds up the counting of votes; improves political transparency; overcomes the problems of ignorance of the electorate.The article proves that elections, referendums or other forms of democracy, conducted using digital technologies, must meet the requirements and general principles of suffrage. Legitimation of digital technologies is possible only in the absence of discriminatory advantages. Therefore, the possibility of using digital technologies is possible in the case of organizing the technical perfection of the electronic voting system and counting of votes, as well as their alternatives, along with the classic form of voting ; Стаття присвячена дослідженню прийнятності впровадження цифрових технологій у виборчому процесі та їх відповідності демократичним стандартам.Вказується, що Рекомендації CM / Rec (2017) переглянула проблемні аспекти правового регулювання виборчих технологій відповідно до сучасного етапу розвитку науки, техніки та інформаційних технологій та на сьогодні залишається практично єдиним узгодженим актом в якому містяться вимоги до системи електронного голосування. Виокремлено найпоширеніші цифрові технології при виборчому процесі: пристрої прямої фіксації електронного голосування без паперової форми бюлетня; засоби сканування виборчого бюлетеня; технічні механізми пришвидшення підрахунку голосів; система онлайн-голосування через комп'ютер або мобільний пристрій із доступом до Інтернету; пристрій ідентифікації виборця онлайн чи на виборчій дільниці (у т.ч. шляхом фіксування відбитків пальців чи сітківки ока). Узагальнено такі суттєві принципи цього способу виборів: визначеність процедури, надійність, стабільність виборчого законодавства та широка громадська підтримка.Авторами виокремлено наступні переваги електронної системи виборів – наявність узгодженого, вивіреного, лабільного реєстру виборців; підвищує адміністративну ефективність; зменшити довгострокові витрати фінансових та трудових ресурсів; усуває можливість маніпуляцій; пришвидшує підрахунок голосів; поліпшує політичну прозорість; долає проблеми неосвідченості електорату.У статті доведено, що вибори, референдуми чи інші форми демократії проведені за допомогою цифрових технологій, повинні відповідати вимогам і загальним принципам виборчого права. Легітимація цифрових технологій можлива виключно у разі відсутності дискримінаційних переваг. Тому використання цифрових технологій можливе в разі організації технічної досконалості системи електронного голосування та підрахунку голосів, а також їх альтернативності поряд із класичною формою реалізації виборчого прав ; Статья посвящена исследованию приемлемости внедрения цифровых технологий в избирательном процессе и их соответствия демократическим стандартам.Указывается, что Рекомендации CM / Rec (2017) пересмотрела проблемные аспекты правового регулирования избирательных технологий в соответствии с современного этапа развития науки, техники и информационных технологий и сегодня остается практически единственным согласованным актом в котором содержатся требования к системе электронного голосования. Выделены наиболее распространенные цифровые технологии при избирательном процессе: устройства прямой фиксации электронного голосования без бумажной формы бюллетеня; средства сканирования избирательного бюллетеня; технические механизмы ускорения подсчета голосов; система онлайн-голосования через компьютер или мобильное устройство с доступом к Интернету устройство идентификации избирателя онлайн или на избирательном участке (в т.ч.шляхом фиксирования отпечатков пальцев или сетчатки глаза). Обзор такие существенные принципы такого способа выборов: определенность процедуры, надежность, стабильность избирательного законотавства и широкая общественная поддержка.Авторами выделены следующие преимущества электронной системы выборов - наличие согласованного, выверенного, лабильного реестра избирателей; повышает административную эффективность; уменьшить долгосрочные расходы финансовых и трудовых ресурсов; устраняет возможность манипуляций; ускоряет подсчет голосов; улучшает политическую прозрачность; преодолевает проблемы неосвидчености электората.В статье доказано, что выборы, референдумы и другие формы демократии проведенные с помощью цифровых технологий, должны соответствовать требованиям и общим принципам избирательного права. Легитимация цифровых технологий возможна только в случае отсутствия дискриминационных преимуществ. Поэтому возможность использования цифровых технологий возможно в случае организации технического совершенства системы электронного голосования и подсчета голосов, а также их альтернативности наряду с классической формой реализации избирательного права
The project researches how protest action of urban social movements may aid to underpin wider and more inclusive local community self-development processes. To that end, the discussion is circumscribed by the notions of space and radical planning. Space, thereupon, constitutes both a 'reifying' (after Lefebvre) and 'heterotopological' (after Foucault) spatial lens as well as an integrating grid, with which to crosscut across the diverse topics and disciplines that the research comprises: urban research, (urban) planning, (urban) social movements and community organizing/development. Their inherent 'contradictions' and complex interactions among them are therewith spatially examined. Furthermore, radical planning alludes to the theory and practice of planning that react to ̶ and somewhat counteract ̶ the consequences of an urban development largely spelled out by a global market rationality, safeguarded by top-down state-led planning mechanisms and that directly impacts dynamics of local community development. Along with that, a case study is incorporated to test, refine and further develop, upon concrete phenomenology, some of the main findings derived from the literature review. The account of Paso Ancho, an urban community in southern San José, Costa Rica, is analyzed throughout the autonomous political organization and actions of its dwellers, which triggered a process of self-steered and inclusive participation by advancing a local development agenda aimed at improving social and spatial conditions. All in all, it is believed that direct community action, in the long run, helps to create a more equal environment ̶ in both social and spatial terms ̶ for it also enhances local participatory democracy within and even beyond official (urban) planning processes. ; Im Projekt wird erforscht, wie Protestaktionen der urban-sozialen Bewegungen offenere und inklusivere kommunale Selbstentwicklungsprozesse unterstützen können. Zu diesem Zweck wird die Diskussion durch die Begriffe Raum und radikale Planung abgegrenzt. Raum konstituiert daraufhin sowohl einen »reifizierenden« (nach Lefebvre) und »heterotopologischen« (laut Foucault) analytischen Umfang als auch ein umfassendes Gitter, um quer über die verschiedenen Themen und Disziplinen (Stadtforschung, (Stadt-)Planung, (Stadt-) soziale Bewegungen, Community-Organizing und kommunale Entwicklung), die die Forschung enthält, zu gehen und ihre inhärente 'Widersprüchlichkeiten' und komplexen Interaktionen räumlich zu untersuchen. Des Weiteren bezieht Radikale Planung sich auf die Planungstheorie und Planungspraxis, die auf und gegen die Auswirkungen einer Stadtentwicklung reagieren und angehen, die weitgehend beeinflusst von einer globalen Marktrationalität und abgesichert von staatlichen Planungsinstrumenten wird und die die Dynamiken der kommunal-lokalen Entwicklung direkt beeinträchtigt. Außerdem ergänzt ein empirischer Teil die Forschung, um einige der wichtigsten Erkenntnisse von der theoretischen Debatte, nach konkreter Phänomenologie, zu testen, zu verfeinern und weiter zu entwickeln. In diesem Sinne wird die Fallstudie von Paso Ancho, eine städtische Gemeinde im südlichen San José, Costa Rica ausgewertet. Die Bewohner/innen von Paso Ancho haben den Umfang ihrer politischen Aktion verändert und autonom eine lokale Agenda, die auf kommunalen Entwicklungsaspekten basiert (z.B., Sanierung von verlassenen öffentlichen Räume, Abfallwirtschaft, Förderung von kulturellen Aktivitäten, u.a.) entworfen. Zusammenfassend wird angenommen, dass eine direkte Aktion der Gemeinschaften auf lange Sicht hilft, ein gerechteres Umfeld sowohl in sozialer und räumlicher Hinsicht zu gestalten, da sie die lokale und partizipative Demokratie, nicht nur innerhalb aber auch außerhalb der offiziellen (städtischen) Planungsprozesse, erhöht. ; El proyecto investiga la forma en que las acciones de protesta de los movimientos sociales urbanos pueden llegar a fomentar procesos de desarrollo local-comunal autónomo más amplios e inclusivos. Para ello, las nociones de espacio y planificación radical enmarcan la discusión. Espacio, a este respecto, constituye tanto un lente «cofisicante» (siguiendo a Lefebvre) y «heterotopológico» (según Foucault) de análisis, como un entramando integrador de los diversos temas y disciplinas que la investigación abarca: estudios urbanos, planificación (urbana), movimientos sociales (urbanos) y organización y desarrollo comunal. Esto con el fin de examinar, en términos espaciales, sus inherentes contradicciones y complejas interrelaciones. Por otro lado, la formulación «planificación radical» se refiere a la teoría y práctica de la planificación que reacciona y, en cierto modo, contrarresta las consecuencias de un crecimiento urbano que es dictado, en gran medida, por una racionalidad de mercado global; salvaguardado por mecanismos verticales y estatales de planificación; y que altera, directamente, dinámicas de desarrollo local- comunal. La investigación se complementa con un caso de estudio, con el fin de probar, refinar y seguir desarrollando, en una fenomenología concreta, algunos de los principales resultados derivados del debate teórico. El caso de Paso Ancho, una comunidad urbana ubicada en el sur de San José, Costa Rica, se analiza a través del cambio de escala y ámbito de acción política que sus pobladores realizaron con el fin de producir, de manera autónoma, una agenda local con un enfoque en aspectos de desarrollo comunal: rehabilitación de espacios públicos abandonados, manejo de desechos sólidos, promoción de actividades culturales, entre otros. Se cree, en líneas generales, que la acción comunal directa contribuye a la creación de un medio ambiente ̶ social y espacialmente ̶ más equitativo, dado que se aumenta la democracia local participativa dentro e, incluso, fuera de los procesos de planificación (urbana).
Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasıyla birlikte yıkılan iki kutuplu dünya sistemi ile dünyanın hemen hemen her coğrafyasındaki devletler için ulusal güvenlik kavramı önemli bir dönüşüm yaşamaya başlamıştır. Soğuk Savaş döneminin önemli bir parçası olan Türkiye de dünya genelinde yaşanmaya başlayan bu dönüşümden muaf olmamıştır. Türkiye gibi pek çok devlet için ulusal güvenlik - hem Soğuk Savaş sırası hem de öncesinde- genel olarak geleneksel bir anlayış çerçevesinde ve ulusal devlet düzeyinde askeri bir bakış açısıyla tanımlanmaktaydı. Soğuk Savaş'ın bitmesiyle güvenliğin sadece tanımı değil alanı da genişlemiş ve güvenlik çalışmaları gündemine göç, çevre, demokrasi, insan hakları ve ekonomi gibi farklı konuları da almaya başlamıştır. Diğer bir deyişle, güvenlik askeri boyutunun ötesinde, sosyal, siyasi, iktisadi ve çevresel boyutları da kapsayacak şekilde genişlemiştir. Soğuk Savaş'ın bitmesiyle Türkiye'nin ulusal güvenliğinde küçük çapta bir dönüşüm başlamıştı. Ancak gerçek manada bir dönüşüm, Türkiye'nin Kopenhag siyasi kritererleri çerçevesinde AB'ye aday ülkeymiş gibi 'ilerleme raporları' ile değerlendirilmeye başlandığı 1998 Cardiff Zirvesi ile başlamıştır. Bu makalenin amacı da AB'ye üyelik adına yerine getirilmesi gereken Kopenhag siyasi kriterlerinin Türkiye'nin ulusal güvenlikte yaşadığı bu kapsamlı dönüşümdeki rolünü ve etkisini inceleyip analiz etmektir. Yapılan analiz sonucunda AB üyelik sürecinde Kopenhag siyasi kriterlerini karşılama adına siyasi, hukuki, sosyal ve kültürel alanda yapılan yasal ve reformların Türkiye'nin ulusal güvenliğini dolaylı veya doğ- rudan etkilediği görülmüştür. Zira önceleri 'savunmacı reel politik' kapsamında bir güvenlik perspektifi benimseyen ve bu perspektif gereği her ulusal güvenlik 'sorununun' güvenlik konusu veya meselesi olarak görüp 'güvenlikleştiren' Türkiye, Kopenhag siyasi kriteleri kapsamında gerçekleştirilen yasal ve anayasal reformlar ile birlikte bu güvenlik perspektifini yavaş yavaş terketmeye başlamış yerine ise güvenliğin sadece askeri boyutunun olmadığı, siyasal, iktisadi, toplumsal ve kültürel boyutlarının da olduğu, ulusal güvenlik meselelerinde olağandışı yöntem ve araçlardan ziyade olağan yöntem ve araçların kullanıldığı bir güvenlik perspektifi - güvenlik dışı bırakma - benimseye başlamıştır. Bu yeni güvenlik perspektifin ne derece başarılı olup olmadığı konusunda bir sonuca varmanın şu an için erken olduğu düşünülmektedir. İleriki yıllarda yapılacak araştırmalar bu konuda daha somut bulgular ortaya koyacaktır. ; With the end of the bipolar system after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the national security concept has undergone significant change in many countries across the world. As an important player of the Cold War, Turkey was also not immune from this change. For many states including Turkey - both before and during the Cold War - the national security was defined mostly within the framework of a traditional and military security perspective. With the end of the Cold War, not only the definition of but also the sphere of security has been extended. With the extension of the security sphere, new issues such as immigration, environment, democracy, human rights, and economy have become important parts of the security studies' agenda. In other words, security has become multi-dimensional encompassing not only military but also social, political, economic and environmental aspects. Turkey's national security has also started to undergo a transformation to some extent after the end of the Cold War. However, the genuine transformation of Turkey's national security began after the decision taken at the EU Cardiff Summit in 1998. The purpose of this article is to evaluate and analyze the role of the Copenhagen political criteria, which have to be fulfilled in order to be a member of the EU, in the transformation of Turkey's national security. At the end of the analysis it has been found that the large-scale legal and constitutional reforms realized in political, judicial, social and cultural spheres to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria have a direct or indirect impact on the transformation of the Turkey's national security. Turkey which embraced a 'defensive real-politik' security perspective with a 'securitization' approach in the past has started to let off itself from this perspective and replace it with a multi-dimensional security perspective with a 'de-securitization' approach after the legal and constitutional reforms aimed at meeting Copenhagen political criteria. It is concluded that 'de-securitization' approach, which attaches great importance to using ordinary (normal) political means, methods and rules to deal with the security issues, has become the linchpin of Turkey's national security instead of 'securitization' approach, which emphasis on using extraordinary means and methods in dealing with security threats. It is also concluded that it is quite early to come to a conclusion whether this new security perspective is successful or not in solving the Turkey's national security matters. The researches that will be done on this question in the coming years will come up with betters answers and more tangible results.
Objective: To present a theoretical review about the collective action regarding the construction process of the state of the art "Mobilization of political action of Youth in Colombia from peace and nonviolence" project which was developed by the committee "Children and young people peacemakers: Democracy, Reconciliation and Peace". This review seeks to provide a theoretical support of the collective action as a possibility of social transformation.Methodology: The union movement's official teachings were used as the conceptual foundations of the collective action in order to interpret its specific process in Colombia. This served to avoid distancing the desired critical thought regarding knowledge construction from reality and from the legacy of popular movements in Latin America at the moment to validate such constructions.Results: It was found that this movement does not hold all the elements that characterize the new social movements, since it pursues individual and material interests rather than the empowerment of actors as part of civil society. This has maintained schemes of bureaucratic leadership that ignore the heterogeneity of the collective.Conclusions: It is necessary to overcome the strategic -instrumental rationality and transcend towards an identity of collective action, one based on organizational logics of direct participation in which communicative action stems from the multiple voices of the actors in order to make an impact beyond union expectations and societal requests. ; Objetivo: presentar una revisión teórica sobre la acción colectiva en el marco del proceso de construcción del estado del arte del proyecto "Movilizaciones de acción política de jóvenes en Colombia desde la paz y la noviolencia", desarrollado por el Consorcio "Niños, niñas y jóvenes constructores de paz: Democracia, Reconciliación y Paz". Dicha revisión busca fundamentar teóricamente la acción colectiva como posibilidad de transformación social.Metodología: se partió de los fundamentos conceptuales de la acción colectiva para interpretar un proceso específico de acción colectiva en Colombia: el movimiento sindical del magisterio oficial. Esto, para evitar el alejamiento de las pretensiones del pensamiento crítico latinoamericano en relación con la construcción de conocimiento desde la propia realidad y desde el legado de las movilizaciones populares en América Latina en la validación de dichas construcciones.Resultados: se encontró que dicho movimiento no ostenta todos los elementos que caracterizan a los nuevos movimientos sociales, puesto que se orienta a la búsqueda de intereses individuales, de orden material, más que al empoderamiento de los actores como parte de la sociedad civil y ha mantenido esquemas de liderazgo burocrático, que invisibilizan la heterogeneidad del colectivo. Conclusiones: es necesario superar la racionalidad estratégica-instrumental y trascender hacia una acción colectiva identitaria, desde lógicas organizativas de participación directa, en las que la acción comunicativa se configure desde la multiplicidad de voces de los actores, con miras a impactar, más allá de unos intereses gremiales, las expectativas y demandas de la sociedad. ; Objetivo: apresentar uma revisão teórica sobre a ação coletiva no marco do proceso de construção do estado da arte do projeto "Mobilizações de ação política de jovens na Colômbia desde a paz e a não violência", desenvolvido pelo Consorcio "Meninos, meninas e jovens construtores de paz: Democracia, Reconciliação e Paz". Dita revisão procura fundamentar teoricamente a ação coletiva como possibilidade de transformação social.Metodologia: Partiu se dos fundamentos dos fundamentos conceituais da ação coletiva para interpretar um processo especifico de ação coletiva na Colômbia: O movimento o movimento sindical do magistério oficial. Isto para evitar o afastamento das pretensões do pensamento critica latino americano em relação com a construção de conhecimento desde a própria realidade e desde o legado das mobilizações populares em America Latina na validação de ditas construções.Resultado: Encontrou se que dito movimento não ostenta os elementos que caracterizam aos movimentos sociais, posto que orientam se à busca de interesses individuais, de ordem material, mas que à apropriação dos atores como parte da sociedade civil e tem mantido esquemas de liderança burocrática, que invisivilizam a heterogeneidade do coletivo.Conclusões: É preciso superar a racionalidade estratégico-instrumental e transcender para uma ação coletiva identitária, desde lógicas organizativas de participação direita, nas que a ação comunicativa se configure desde a multiplicidade de vozes dos atores, com miras a impactar, mais lá de uns interesses gremiais, as expectativas e demandas da sociedade.
Mit Hilfe welcher Frames kommunizieren deutsche und italienische Abgeordnete die Europäische Union? Inwiefern unterscheiden sich die nationalen Vorstellungen und wie verändern sich diese im Zeitverlauf? Dies sind die zentralen Fragen der vorliegenden Arbeit. Sie betrachtet damit die Kommunikation politischer Eliten vor dem Hintergrund der Identitätssuche der EU. Anhand einer Frameanalyse wurden jeweils 20 parlamentarische Debatten aus dem Deutschen Bundestag und der italienischen Camera dei Deputati analysiert. Der Untersuchungszeitraum umfasst die Jahre 2000 bis 2007 und damit die Jahre der Ausarbeitung der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union bis zur Ratifizierung des Vertrages von Lissabon in beiden Ländern. Die Operationalisierung des Textmaterials erfolgte über ein zwei-stufiges Kategoriensystem, dessen erste Ebene der Codierung sich auf den Redebeitrag eines Abgeordneten, die zweite auf eine einzelne Aussage innerhalb einer Rede bezieht. Die inhaltliche Kategorisierung der Aussagen ist drei-stufig und in Frames, Unterframes und Idee-Elemente unterteilt. Der Schwerpunkt der Analyse ist qualitativ. Die induktive Erhebung ließ die Entwicklung und Veränderung von Kategorien absichtlich zu, um keine Informationen zu verlieren. Es wurden zehn Frames identifiziert: Die EU als Friedensmacht, Kulturelle Wurzeln, die Wertegemeinschaft, das soziale Europa, Demokratie, Kompetenzen und Interessen, Integration und Identität, die Herausforderungen der Globalisierung und Erweiterung, Europamodelle und die Grenzen der EU. Die Ergebnisse werden zunächst für jeden Frame einzeln sehr detailliert dargestellt, danach erfolgt ein Überblick zu den Frames und ihrer Gewichtung in beiden Ländern. Veränderungen und Entwicklungen des Diskurses werden dargestellt, Deutungshoheiten und Parteipositionen verglichen. Des Weiteren wird auf die Bedeutung nationaler Hintergründe eingegangen und die Art und Weise parlamentarischer Kommunikation bewertet. Es zeigt sich, dass die Europäische Union in beiden Ländern mit Hilfe derselben Frames kommuniziert wird, diese aber unterschiedlich stark ausgeprägt sind. Der jeweilige nationale Hintergrund beeinflusst die Darstellung der Argumente. Die aktuellen Probleme, der die EU gegenüber steht, werden in beiden Ländern am häufigsten diskutiert. So stehen die Fragen zur Erweiterung und zur Globalisierung an oberster Stelle. Als bedeutendste Entwicklung des Diskurses ist die Abwendung von der historischen Begründung der Union hin zur Deutung als starke Einheit in Zeiten der Globalisierung zu nennen. In Fragen der politischen Reform und der Identitätssuche dauert die Suche nach Antworten an. Die Parteien beanspruchen die Deutungshoheit für die Inhalte, die sie auch auf nationaler Ebene vertreten. Starke Kritik an der EU wird nur von Parteien des linken oder rechten Randes des Parteienspektrums geäußert. Die Analyse zeigte auf, dass die Vorstellungen von der EU, die Ziele und Erwartungen national unterschiedlich sind und eine Antwort, wie die Vielfalt der Union zu einen sein wird noch aussteht. ; Which frames do German and Italian members of Parliament use to discuss the matter of the European Union? How do national ideas about the EU differ? How did these ideas change between 2000 and 2007? This study examines the communication of political elites against the background of the European Union's search for a common identity. Using frame-analysis the author has examined 20 parliamentary debates of the German Bundestag and 20 of the Italian Camera dei Deputati. Those have been singled out of the debates on European issues hold during the years 2000 to 2007. This period covers the time from the elaboration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in both countries. The category system employed to operationalize the text corpus consists of two levels: Level 1 codes the speech of the Member of Parliament as a whole. Level 2 refers to the single statement within the MP's speech that was entered in the code book. Statements are categorized into frames, sub-frames and idea-elements. The method focuses on a qualitative analysis. To reduce information loss, an inductive approach was used, which allowed to develop and modify the categories. The study identifies ten frames: 1) The EU as a power advocating peace, 2) cultural roots, 3) community of values, 4) social Europe, 5) democracy, 6) competences and interests, 7) integration and identity, 8) the challenges of globalization and enlargement, 9) models of the European Union and 10) its borders. In a first step the findings are presented in detail, in the second step an overview is given and the weighting of the single frames in both countries is shown. Shifts and developments of the discourse will be illustrated; prerogatives of interpretation and the positions of the different parties are compared. Furthermore the impact of the national background can be shown and the parliamentary way of communication evaluated. It can be illustrated that both the Italian and the German parliament use the same frames to communicate the European Union in both countries. However, the frames´ significance is varies depending on national backgrounds and how they influence arguments. The current problems that the EU faces are the most frequently discussed in both countries. Enlargement and globalization assume highest priority. The most significant development in the discourse is a shift from the union's historical justification of its interpretation as a strong entity in times of globalization. There is still a lack of answers concerning political reforms and identity construction. The parties claim the prerogatives of interpreting contents that they also cover in their national discourse. Only the extreme left and right-wing parties direct severe critique towards the EU. The analysis shows that the ideas about the EU, goals and expectations vary in Germany and Italy. A solution to the problem of unifying diversity in the union is still missing.
Failure of the state-led development projects and the growing concerns for participation, in the 1980s and 1990s gave rise to community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). This in turn led to a paradigm shift in natural resource management from centralised state control towards CBNRM, in which the local communities now play actively and have direct control over resource use and management. These community-based approaches are a departure from the statecentered government polices of natural resource management. But the mixed successes and failures of these approaches have led to a question in the Indian development policy context, namely why CBNRM projects fail to achieve their expected level of results and equity. Academics and activists have criticised participatory interventions, for their inherent vulnerability due to power imbalances, which in turn affect various actors' capacity to participate in a development project. Using the case study of the Mathnaa watershed development project in the Sabarkantha district of Gujarat, this study aims to understand how socio-cultural factors influence participatory institutions and community formation created in CBNRM interventions in rural communities. In addition, it examines how the formal participatory arena is able to give space to the vulnerable and less powerful groups in the village. Due to the widespread notion that CBNRM project would be successful and egalitarian in nature which would lead to a true representation and the participation of all sections of society, functioning on the principle of democracy and equity. This thesis takes up the analysis of socio-cultural aspects affecting actors' participation and strategies in various water-related community groups in the formal and informal participatory arenas of managing water. Caste, class and gender dynamics are focused upon, and their influence on various water-related community group. In pursuit of these aspects, the thesis examines the role of power relations in the linkages between the formal and informal institutions operating in Mathnaa society, as well as shaping the participation of the key actors in the formal participatory arenas. The thesis demonstrates that the formal participatory arenas and institutions created by the process of decentralisation do provide the opportunities for marginalised community members to participate, although the power imbalances in a given community are less likely to guarantee 'equitable participation' as an intervention outcome. On the contrary, for actors participating in these formal invited arenas, such as a watershed committee or user group, their social life does not simply consist of formal relations, interactions and negotiations alone; hence, there is a need to understand what the 'informal' holds in the functioning of 'formal participatory arenas'. Therefore, a need to acknowledge the central role played by any kind of community water-related intervention involves building on and feeding into existing social and power relations and any inequity in the benefits of the CBNRM project through formal participation. ; In den 1980ern und 1990er Jahren führten Naturschutz- und Konservierungkomponenten in Entwicklungsprojekten zum community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) . Dies leitete einen Paradigmenwechsel im vom System zentralisierter staatlicher Kontrolle hin zu CBNRM ein, wobei lokale Gemeinschaften eine aktive Rolle spielen und direkte Kontrolle über die Resourcennutzung besitzen. Diese kommunal-basierten Ansätze bedeuten eine Abkehr von der zentralstaatlichen Politik des Mangements natürlicher Ressourcens. Da dies sowohl zu Erfolgen als auch zu Fehlschlägen führte, wurde in der indischen Entwicklungspolitik die Frage aufgeworfen, warum CBNRM-Projekte daran scheiterten die angestrebten Ziele zu erreichen. Akademiker und Aktivisten kritisierten die partizipatorischen Interventionen für ihre, durch ein fehlendes Machtgleichgewicht entstandene, inhärente Vulnerabilität, die die Fähigkeit verschiedener Akteure beeinflusst, an den Entwicklungsprojekten zu partizipieren. Das Ziel dieser Studie ist es, unter Verwendung einer Fallstudie im Mathnaa Watershed Development Project im Sabarkantha-Distrikt Gujarats in Indien, zu verstehen wie sozio-kulturelle Faktoren die partizipatorischen Institutionen und Gemeindebildungen beeinflussen, die durch CBNRM-Interventionen in ländlichen Gemeinden geschaffen wurden. Diese Dissertation versucht zu verstehen, ob die formale Arena der Partizipation, die geschaffen wurde, um die Teilhabe der Menschen zu fördern, in der Lage ist eine gerechte Teilhabe in den ländlichen Gemeinden zu ermöglichen. Die Doktorarbeit greift die die Analyse sozio-kultureller Aspekte auf, die die Teilhabe und Strategien der Akteure in verschiedenen Nutzergruppen und anderen Gruppen in formellen und informellen Arenen des Wassermanagements beeinflusst. Kaste, Klasse und Genderdynamiken sowie ihr Einfluss auf verschiedene Gruppen werden besonders betrachtet. In der Folge wird die Thematik der Rolle von Machtverhältnissen in der Verbindung von formellen und informellen Institutionen untersucht, die in Mathnaas agieren und die Teilhabe der Schlüsselakteure in den Arenen der formellen Teilhabe gestalten. Die Doktorarbeit zeigt auf, wie die Arenen der formellen Teilhabe und Institutionen, die durch die Prozesses der Dezentralisierung geschaffen wurden, den Mitgliedern marginalisierter Gemeinden die Möglichkeit bieten zu partizipieren. Die Machtungleichheiten in einer bestimmten Gemeinde garantieren jedoch mit geringerer Wahrscheinlichkeit 'gerechte Teilhabe' als Ergebnis einer Intervention. Andererseits partizipieren die Akteure an diesen formal geschaffenene Arenen wie dem watershed committee oder Nutzergruppen; ihr soziales Leben besteht nicht ausschließlich aus formelle Beziehungen, Interaktionen und Verhandlungen. Daher besteht die Notwendigkeit zu verstehen welche Rolle das 'Informelle' beim Funktionieren der 'formellen Arenen der Teilhabe' spielt. Diese Dissertation umfasst sieben Kapitel inklusive eine Schlußfolgerung . Im Folgenden findet sich die Zusammenfassung jeden Kapitels.
