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Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Pol.g. 238 h

Abstract
Creating the competitiveness of voivodeships is a difficult and complicated process; the effect is a specific competitive position against the background of compared regions. This study complements the literature on the subject and presents a new perspective that presents a fuller and more comprehensive range of determinants influencing the level of competitiveness of territorial units, thanks to the use of the components of the European Regional Competitiveness Index (RCI) and the European Social Progress Index (EU SPI). The study carried out a comparative analysis of the RCI and the EU SPI of territorial units of Central and Eastern Europe in 2016–2020, and as a supplement to the cluster analysis, used the Ward method. The research results prove that territorial units in Central and Eastern Europe were characterized by a lower level of competitiveness and social progress compared to regions in Northwestern Europe. Between the regions of countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there was also a visible spatial differentiation of competitiveness between individual units. Cluster analysis facilitated the selection of regions and the identification of units that were internally and homogeneously consistent. This made it possible to select leaders among the regions of the above-mentioned regions. countries with a relatively high competitive position compared to the others, including the regions of the Czech Republic and Poland.

This paper is an attempt to identify those structural conditions which are conducive to the rise and maintenance of industrial paternalist capitalism within Britain. Following Newby's discussion of the nature of deference industrial paternalism is defined as the specific form taken in Britain by economic and political structures in which the unequal distribution of resources is legitimated by tradition. A key factor in the maintenance of such systems of traditional authority is the nature of the owners of local productive capacity. Two features are emphasized; the extent to which local assets constitute the bulk of all capital owned by the local bourgeoisie and the existence of historical links between such owners of local capital and the area. Empirical measures of the nature of local labour markets are used to identify those areas of the country which contain the structural features most likely to support industrial paternalism. It is suggested that such areas can be characterized as relatively isolated local labour markets which are dominated by single companies.

Drawing on the author's unrivalled experience and expertise in both research and policy-making, this important new book provides a systematic assessment of the changing nature of local governance in Britain and a conceptual framework for understanding the new governance of localities. The author analyzes in detail what New Labour has been trying to do to local governance and management and assesses how and why it has achieved only a mixed record of change. The book concludes by providing a vision of good local governance and an assessment of future challenges for research and reform

AbstractResearch Question/IssueDespite the benefits of privatization (i.e., divestiture of government‐owned enterprises), governments still own substantial stakes in economically important firms. Given public concern about excessive compensation and frequent government responses, this paper compares the level and structure of CEO compensation in privatized firms, including those still partially owned by governments, to firms never owned by the government.Research Findings/InsightsUsing a multinational sample of firms, we find that privatized firms have lower total CEO compensation than private firms never owned by governments. CEO equity‐linked wealth in privatized firms is less sensitive to stock performance, and equity compensation is negatively related to government ownership stakes. Privatized companies engage in less risk‐taking than nonprivatized companies, suggesting that government risk aversion could explain differences in CEO compensation.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study finds that the role government ownership plays in the level and structure of executive compensation is broadly consistent with pay regulations governments periodically impose. It provides empirical support for the argument that government owners are risk‐averse and associated with lower equity‐linked executive pay, which discourages CEO risk‐taking.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study encourages corporate boards to consider the degree of government involvement in their firms when setting CEO compensation packages and policies. Government concerns about excessive compensation may require boards to find other ways to incentivize CEOs, particularly given the weaker governance linked to state‐influenced firms. Additionally, governments should analyze their influences on CEO compensation, and how these can affect performance, when considering their ownership stakes in public companies.

Le film Les Illusions tranquilles relate l'histoire d'une élection municipale dans un village du Québec. L'élection oppose un notable traditionnel à un technocrate, maire sortant, futur perdant. Au-delà de cet événement, c'est toute une représentation de l'évolution sociale nationale qui est mise en scène : la « fin du règne des technocrates », le retour des forces de conservation. À partir du film, un débat s'amorce entre le réalisateur du film, un fonctionnaire, un politicologue, une sociologue et un urbaniste. Il permet la confrontation d'interprétations différentes non seulement de la conjoncture actuelle du pouvoir local mais aussi du sens de l'évolution des forces sociales et politiques depuis la Révolution tranquille. L'échec du maire technocrate n'est-elle que l'expression du rejet dont finit toujours par être victime tout groupe « étranger » qui s'installe dans une communauté locale ? Ou faut-il la rattacher à la crise économique qui aurait contribué à précipiter l'échec d'un projet de modernisation misant sur les politiques centralisatrices de l'État ? Mais cette opposition entre notables traditionnels symbolisant les forces de conservation et technocrates « étatistes » représentant les forces de changement, n'est-elle pas chose du passé ? Les planificateurs ont appris à composer davantage avec les forces du milieu et les élites traditionnelles sont sorties de leur immobilisme. Le milieu local et la société dans son ensemble ne sont donc pas dans cette impasse que présente le film. Par contre il faudra peut-être se faire à l'idée que le changement ne soit plus guidé par de grands projets de société.