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The article examines the problem of restriction of political rights and freedoms. It is emphasized that the protection against unlawful restrictions on political rights and freedoms is particularly important for the functioning of direct and mediatory democracy. The meaning of the concept of «restriction of rights and freedoms» is analyzed. The article addresses the basic principles which should not be violated when the restriction of rights and freedoms is applied. To achieve this goal, the author analyzes the rules of domestic law, the practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the rules of international law governing these issues. The author differentiates political rights and freedoms into those that may be restricted in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law of Ukraine and those that are not subject to any restrictions; features of realization of political rights and freedoms in comparison with other groups of rights, such as social and economic, cultural are defined. Some of the political rights and freedoms that may be restricted are analyzed and ways to restrict them are identified, in particular: the right to join political parties, suffrage, the right to peaceful assembly, rallies, marches and demonstrations, the right to equal access to public service, freedom words, thoughts, views and beliefs. It is noted that from the standpoint of the ECHR it is important to check whether the possibility of restricting the exercise of the right was provided by law; whether the purpose of such a restriction is legitimate; whether such a restriction is necessary in a democratic society. The legitimate grounds for restricting human rights enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine have been identified: public health; social necessity; rights, freedoms and dignity of citizens; public order; economic well-being; national security; territorial integrity; morality of the population. It is emphasized that in accordance with the practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the restriction of the content and scope of rights and freedoms should be considered as a restriction. It is important that all restrictions were established exclusively by the constitution; were not arbitrary and unjust; the law restricting human rights must be of a general nature; restrictions must be proportionate and justified; they must optimally achieve a legitimate goal with minimal interference in the exercise of rights or freedoms, not to violate the essential content of the relevant right. It is determined that special qualification requirements for holding public positions, as well as participation in the electoral process (implementation of active and passive suffrage) cannot be considered restrictions. It is emphasized that the state, represented by its organs, should refrain from unjustified interference with political rights (for example, from discriminatory restrictions on the suspension of political rights of prisoners, violation of electoral secrecy of the ballot); take measures against possible violations of political rights by third parties (individuals, companies, etc.). It is concluded that restrictions on the exercise of political rights of individuals can be introduced either in favor of guaranteeing the rights of other individuals, or in favor of ensuring the functioning of the state. The legitimate exercise of political rights can be restricted only if the general conditions for interfering with fundamental human rights are met.

In theoretical considerations on democracy freedom is sometimes understood in unconditional and conditional terms. This general distinction underlies I. Berlin's concept of negative and positive freedom, and E. Fromm's concept of 'freedom from' and 'freedom to'. The authors of this paper introduce the concept of extrinsic and intrinsic sense of freedom which is meant to be psychological representation of the philosophical distinction on unconditional and conditional freedom, respectively. An extrinsic freedom results from a lack of external restrictions/barriers, whereas intrinsic freedom is based on the belief that being free means compatibility between one's own actions and preferred values, life goals or worldview. Based on nationwide survey data, the authors show that both forms of freedom are embedded in entirely different basic human values and moral intuitions. Further, it is shown that intrinsic freedom negatively predicts liberal orientation and clearly favors communitarian orientation, whereas extrinsic freedom clearly favors liberal orientation. The authors argue that both forms of experiencing freedom have different effects on support for the principles of liberal democracy. The positive effect of extrinsic freedom is indirect, i.e., entirely mediated by liberal orientation. On the other hand, the effect of intrinsic freedom can be decomposed into three components: a) as a positive direct effect, b) as a positive indirect effect (by strengthening the communitarian orientation), and c) as a negative indirect effect (by weakening the liberal orientation). In conclusion, the consequences of intrinsic and extrinsic freedom are discussed in the light of their relationships with support for democratic principles. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

AbstractThe article makes three contributions to our knowledge of the Canadian political science literature. First, it offers a historical survey of the methodologies and techniques used in the discipline. Second, the findings of this paper constitute a reference for future work interested in commenting the methods and techniques used inCJPSand provide scholars with data they can use to better situate their work within the broader literature. Finally, the paper answers three questions that permeate discussions of the Canadian political science literature. It investigates whether the proportion of qualitative works has declined over time, whether Canadian scholarship is more qualitative than quantitative today and whether there are important differences in the methodologies and techniques used in Canada and in the United States. The article concludes with a discussion of the future of political science methodology based on the findings.

On June 1, 2020, a little more than two months after the World Health Organization's COVID-19 pandemic declaration, our editorial team assumed the leadership of the American Political Science Review (APSR). Although this confluence of events makes it difficult to isolate the pandemic's effect on new submissions and review processes, this article describes submission and review patterns in the two and a half years before and after the onset of the pandemic and the editorial transition. It describes our preliminary observations regarding what the patterns suggest about the pandemic's impact on the APSR.1

The United Nations Organization has completed more than sixty-three years of existence. In these six decades, the world has moved far ahead, and power calculations have changed. The days of bi-polarity ended with the demise of the Cold War. International politics, though unipolar in nature at present, is showing tendencies of multi polarity. Globalization has introduced a new economy of free trade in the world. In this altered international political and economic milieu, demands for restructuring the United Nations, which is guided by an old, mostly outdated charter, have been gaining ground, particularly after the end of the Cold War. But reforming the United Nations would not be very easy, because amending the Charter is extremely difficult, and requires political consensus among members, which is not easily achievable. However, minor reforms that do not require the amendment of the Charter may be introduced to make the United Nations more adept to face today's challenges. The present paper analyzes the problems and prospects of the reform proposals, and shows that there is a gap between the hope and the reality.

ABSTRACT
Academic conferences are important institutions for promoting new research and facilitating conversations about the field. As a venue for knowledge exchange, professional development, and networking, conferences ideally promote positive environments that make scholars from underrepresented groups feel welcome. Yet, negative experiences at conferences are well documented. Codes of conduct have been promoted as tools to reduce harassment and discrimination. This article examines the prevalence and content of codes at US-based political science conferences and workshops. More specifically, we analyze whether and how codes address issues of sexual misconduct and identity-based discrimination. We find that 19% of 177 surveyed conferences have a code of conduct. Conferences that are older and larger are more likely to have codes, as are conferences that are run by organizations with permanent staff and relevant committees. We argue that effective conference codes must contain definitions, reporting channels, and enforcement procedures. Many of the analyzed codes did not explicitly define prohibited behaviors, specify mechanisms to report code violations, or describe consequences for misconduct.

Matter and Form explores the relationship between natural science and political philosophy from the classical to contemporary eras, taking an interdisciplinary approach to the philosophic understanding of the structure and process of the natural world and its impact on the history of political philosophy. It illuminates the importance of philosophic reflection on material nature to moral and political theorizing, mediating between the sciences and humanities and making a contribution to ending the isolation between them.

Although it is well-recognized that Max Weber was of central importance to many of the emigre social scientists who fled Hitler, commentators have overlooked both Weber's attempt to found a new dynamic political science that would test partisan commitments and the endeavors of emigre political scientists to develop this project. This article lays out this new Weberian political science and assesses the fate of the various attempts on the part of the emigres to translate it into their new setting. It shows that Weber forged a notion of political science that combined an existential notion of politics as inexorable power struggle with a sociology of the business of politics that provided the setting in which that struggle was to take place. It also shows that the central purpose of this political science was to aid political partisans in clarifying the meaning of their political commitments by forcing them to view these commitments as they are shaped in the socio-political context that determines the struggle for power. I then show that Mannheim sought to radicalize this approach to political science by seeking to construct the political backdrop for the testing of political ideas out of a political field not out of parties, politicians, and state institutions but out of competing ideologies, each of which could be shown to have some insight into the dynamics of political conflict. For Mannheim we could now test political ideas against political reality by playing them off against each other. I call this project of testing political ideas against existential and sociological notions of the political field the Weber–Mannheim project. I then show how three emigre political scientists – Arnold Brecht, Hans Morgenthau, and Franz Neumann – sought to carry on the Weber–Mannheim project in their new setting. I argue that, of the three, Franz Neumann in his great work Behemoth, was most successful in staying true to that project. For he was able to find in his analysis of the Weimar Republic and the fascist regime a way of demonstrating the dynamics under which democracy and dictatorship fail or succeed while still maintaining openings for political will. Both Brecht and Morgenthau seem to have flattened the dynamic aspect of the Weberian and Mannheimian notions of a prudential political science – though it was Morgenthau who had the most successful reception in political science.