Suchergebnisse

In the last two years, the Syrian uprising has turned from a civil protest movement against an authoritarian regime into an outright civil war in which the antagonists affiliations' and identities are increasingly framed in sectarian speech. In summer 2012, various politicians and analysts suggested a power-sharing agreement between regime and opposition representatives as a solution to break the vicious circle of escalating violence. They called it a "Syrian Taifh" after the 1989 peace accord that ended Lebanon's long-lasting civil war (1975-1990) by dividing power among religious communities. Others rejected the idea of a consociational power-sharing deal outright because they hold it responsible for the continued sectarian pillarization of Lebanese society. Moreover, Syria's experience is said to differ significantly from Lebanon's, making the effective transmittal of the Lebanese model impossible. This paper takes these differing arguments into consideration and investigates whether power sharing could help to deescalate the Syrian conflict and what lessons should be taken from Lebanon's experience. Lebanon shows that consociationalism tends to stabilize - even deepen - social cleavages. Therefore, a Syrian Taif should gradually substitute fixed guarantees of shares of power with centripetal and unitary state institutions. Furthermore, in addition to internal actors, external powers have to be convinced that power sharing may be the only viable option for ending the devastating civil war in Syria and for preventing the further spread of violence into neighboring countries. -- power sharing ; civil war ; sectarianism ; Syria ; Lebanon ; Taif ; Stephan Rosiny

This work reviews the rationale and processes for raising revenue and allocating funds to perform information intensive activities that are pertinent to the work of democratic government. 'Government of the people, by the people, for the people' expresses an idea that democratic government has no higher authority than the people who agree to be bound by its rules. Democracy depends on continually learning how to develop understandings and agreements that can sustain voting majorities on which democratic law making and collective action depends. The objective expressed in constitutional terms is to deliver 'peace, order and good government'. Meeting this objective requires a collective intellectual authority that can understand what is possible; and a collective moral authority to understand what ought to happen in practice. Facts of life determine that a society needs to retain its collective competence despite a continual turnover of its membership as people die but life goes on. Retaining this 'collective competence' in matters of self-government depends on each new generation: • acquiring a collective knowledge of how to produce goods and services needed to sustain a society and its capacity for self-government; • Learning how to defend society diplomatically and militarily in relation to external forces to prevent overthrow of its self-governing capacity; and • Learning how to defend society against divisive internal forces to preserve the authority of representative legislatures, allow peaceful dispute resolution and maintain social cohesion.

This article attempts a comprehensive account of the various actors—including both regional and global powers—their motivations and the intricacies of the interactions between them in Afghanistan. Given that the democratic governments have put particular emphasis on human rights and political freedoms, there would be some implications for the dictatorships or tyrant-regimes in Central Asia. The desire of the US to push the Russians out and minimise the Chinese presence in the region could not be entirely ruled out as a factor in the increasing importance of India in the US strategy, their agreement on nuclear cooperation pointed to some changes in the US' South Asia strategy. The stand taken by the governments in the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan and also Uzbekistan (which had recently withdrawn from the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) was especially significant. The author pointed out that the US deployment in Afghanistan was very extensive, with the largest number of troops in the south and east; the US was also the largest aid giver. Pakistan is far from stable and India–Pakistan ties are problematic, as also Pakistan–Afghanistan relations. The Pak–Taliban linkages have been corroborated from various sources but there are some disagreements between the US and the UK on the ways and methods of dealing with the situation, the latter favouring negotiations. All these factors will have to be thoroughly analysed in reconciling the different forces and promoting peace in Afghanistan.

In his wide-ranging and thought-provoking analysis of war and political violence in twentieth-century Europe, Ian Kershaw contrasts the immense violence wrought in Europe in the first half of the century with its relatively pacific history in the second half. Resisting the temptation to think of the violence of the first half of the century as a dysfunctional interruption to an underlying tale of economic, social and political progress, the author poses three astute questions concerning: (i) the causes of state-sponsored violence; (ii) the reasons why some states presided over low levels of violence while others presided over levels that 'soared into the stratosphere'; and (iii) whether there was something qualitatively new – or 'modern' – about that violence. Kershaw describes his piece as 'thinking aloud' and I read it in that spirit. I find myself in broad agreement with what he has to say, although we probably disagree over matters of emphasis – for example in respect of the significance of violence perpetrated by European states in their colonies, or the propensity for violence of liberal democratic states. I suspect that there is more principled disagreement about the salience of 'ideology' in fomenting the mass violence of the twentieth century. I have organised my responses according to the three stages of his argument; I end by considering the nature of 'peace' in Europe in the second half of the century and by offering a few reflections on the conceptualisation of political violence.

AbstractIn 1996, George Mitchell became the co-chairman of the All-Party Talks in a polarized Northern Ireland where the extremes had the dominant voice while the center was relatively mute politically. In analyzing Mitchell's actions, we seek to break new ground in the study of mediation. First, we explicitly assess the context to identify key barriers and opportunities. Second, we move beyond general categories of mediator approach – such as communication, formulation, and manipulation – to match classes of mediator action to barriers. Finally,we place these discrete actions in service of a larger purpose by exploring the "mediator as coalition-builder."Whether explicit or implicit, Mitchell's overarching approach in the All-Party Peace Talks can be interpreted as a drive toward creating an outward rippling "coalition of the center against the extremes."Mitchell's effort to forge a coalition of the center led him to follow coordinated and multi-pronged process, issue and timing strategies, which are the main focus of this article. In principle, Mitchell might have sought to forge agreement via very different potential coalitional approaches: for example, seeking to bridge the extremes, seeking consensus among all parties, seeking to forge a dominant coalition on one side or the other that could have prevailed over its opponents, or seeking a sequential divideand-conquer approach to isolate and overwhelm the opposition, etc. Yet for this particular context, the centrist coalitional approach led to significant progress.

On 5 February 2002 the Commission of the European Union formally resumed its direct co‐operation with the DRC after a ten year suspension ‐a consequence of the economic and political progress made in Congo over the past year. The co‐operation envisaged is also meant to encourage democratisation, good governance and respect for the rule of law. Indeed, the Congolese state has been an 'absentee landlord' for many years: anarchy and the lost expertise that have stemmed from it are both cause and consequence. Therefore, if there is to be a prospect of greater efficiency and long‐term sustainability of all efforts, the conditions enabling the state to take on its traditional role again need to be recreated. The EC hopes to use the current window of opportunity employing an incremental approach in combination with other donors. It has already committed approximately 250 million euros for the next 2–3 years. For external aid to maximise its impact, preliminary conditions are needed. The EC seeks to encourage long‐term development through peace‐building and political stabilisation. Concomitantly, the EC supports targeted poverty alleviation strategies to help the DRC re‐establish a minimal critical mass of internal development conditions, notably through institutional and administrative support. In the medium‐term, the Cotonou Agreement should bring additional funds and will promote a new and stronger relationship between the EU and the DRC combining political dialogue, trade and regional integration.

Mexico's interest in the Asia-Pacific region was promoted during Luis Echeverria's administration, when diplomatic relations were established with the People's Republic of China & much of Southeast Asia & Oceania. However, after the 1982 economic crisis, Mexican diplomacy in the region declined, & when the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) was formed, the Salinas administration did not consider participating. Because Mexico negotiated a free trade agreement with the US & Canada -- both founders of APEC -- the following year it was invited to join the forum, even before Chile, the only other Latin American country that had showed any interest in joining & which had stronger commercial ties with the Asia-Pacific region than Mexico. The Zedillo administration considered APEC just another forum the president would have to attend once a year, without really considering the need to structure a specific policy for the forum, since Mexico had little contact with most countries on the other side of the Pacific. Thus, the forum was simply considered one more place to speak out in favor of economic liberalism, but not as an option to build, in the mid- or long term, a relationship based on multiple interests with nations that have an increasingly important role in the world economy & in determining world stability & peace. In sum, even though Mexico's policy toward APEC might have been improvised, its participation, including the commitment to organize the central conferences in 2002, is a fact in the mid- & long terms. Adapted from the source document.

Understanding Central Europe as a particular European region is based on historical & cultural heritage of the Mitteleuropa & on the revival of the Central European identity in the 1980s. Central European regional cooperation has been promoted in the late 1980s & early 1990s, particularly through the following cooperation schemes: Pentagonale/Central European Initiative (now dissolved), the Vishegrad Group, & the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). These schemes have been supported by the European Union & they fit its strategy of widening that is now based on the differentiated integration, which implies strengthening of economic & monetary union & defense union. The European Union tends to link the Central European region to the Baltic countries, rather than connect it with Southeastern Europe, which is regarded as a special case, covered by the peace restoration strategy. Central Europe is a region of uneven development & very diversified cultures & peoples. It is therefore difficult to treat it as a structured European region. EU focuses on a number of states that form "the intersection of different areas of integration," & in this respect Central Europe may be best understood as a development & transformation project that might create a new type of differentiated relationships among states & cultures within Central Europe & between Central Europe & the European Union. Focusing on Central Europe may turn the region into the central project of European development. Adapted from the source document.

The major problems plaguing R(econstruction)&D(evelopment) activities in Croatia derive for the most part from the earlier pseudo-selfmanagement system in communist Yugoslavia, while the new legal and organizational framework for R&D is still under preparation. On the other hand, Croatian scientists were actively involved in communist Yugoslavia's international collaboration (e.g., ICSU, CERN, EPS, ESF, Academia Europaea), and they realized about 50% of its international scientific collaboration. In spite of this, Croatia is still waiting for membership in international scientific projects/institutions, as well as for new ST agreements with the EC, United States and other countries.There is an urgent need for a more appropriate organizational and legal framework for R&D activities in Croatia, as well as for the adequate R&D infrastructure, where the Croatian Government should also be more actively involved. Furthermore, a science-technology oriented "Marshall-type" plan, which could ensure peace and prosperity in the Adriatic-Baltic diagonal area, seems like a clear, feasible and - with reasonable effort and within reasonable time - achievable objective. Such revitalization of science and technology would presumably not cost more than 100-200 MECU for Croatia, and its likely total cost for all of the Central and Eastern European countries could be kept within 1-2 GECU, but would assure their economic and political integration into a greater Europe. (SOI : R-D: S. 357)

This thesis attempts to describe the impact of the Mennonite community in Manitoba, vis-a-vis the machinations of the chairman of the Manitoba Mobillization Board. The war divided the Mennonites into several groups. There were those conscientious objectors willing to cooperate with the government 1n alternative service programs, versus those holding to the 1873 agreement with the Canadian government exempting them from all forms of government service. Complicating the situation was the fact that a large percentage of Mennonite men joined the armed forces, in spite of the church's 425-year tradition of non-resistance (pacifism). For those Mennonites pleading postponement as conscientious objectors, appearance was required before the Mobilization Board Chairman, Judge John E. Adamson, a man of stern Christian temperament, with strong pro-military and pro-British sentiments. Not only was he the government's arbiter of men's conscience, but he also assumed the role of self-appointed mllitary recruiter. In the thesis the Manitoba Mennonite experience is examined through use of the minutes of the various Mennonite peace committees, personal records, as well as from available federal government records. It is concluded that the war was the most divisive event Mennonites in Canada ever experienced. While popular interpretation has pointed to Judge Adamson as the major problem Mennonites faced during the war, it is concluded that the real problem was Mennonite disunity in interpretation of their traditional doctrine of non-resistance.

Since independence, India has played an important role in strengthening the United Nations capability in the maintenance of international peace and security. Faced with the problem of Kashmir where Pakistan supported raiders, in violation of the Six Month Stand Still Agreement to work out future status of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, had entered the state, the ruler of the state called for assistance from India. Within hours Indian troops started to move by air and surface transportation and on entering the state faced Pakistani raiders. Some hard fighting ensued. In spite of the critical times, India pledged its support for the United Nations security system by calling on the Security Council to play a role in ending the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir and readily agreed to deploy United Nations military observers to supervise a cease fire which was negotiated by the United Nations between India and Pakistan. The decision by the Prime Minister, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru to stop fighting, instead of allowing the Indian Army to continue with its successful campaign, in favour of UN sponsored ceasefire and negotiations was significant. Nehru wished to avoid direct fighting between Indian and Pakistani forces by stepping in the general area of Uri which was at some distance from the Pakistani frontier. Regardless of the merits or demerits of this decision, the Indian Prime Minister had chosen United Nations direct military action.

The appointment of Mr. Christian Schmidt as the new high representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina met with great opposition from the Serbian political elite in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is supported by Russia and China. The key problem lies in the process of appointing Mr. Schmidt. According to Article I paragraph 2 of Annex 10 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH, the high representative should be appointed in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council. Of the eight high representatives, in the period from 1995 to 2023, six were appointed with the consent given by the appropriate resolution of the UN Security Council after the appointment was made by the Steering Committee of the Peace Implementation Council, and the seventh should have received this consent, but the resolution was not was adopted. Only one high representative was not appointed with the consent of the Security Council, and there was no draft resolution to give that consent. Considering that Mr. Christian Schmidt was not appointed with the consent of the Security Council given by the corresponding resolution, his challenge is justified. Despite this, there is disagreement about this position, because the US, the UK and France believe that the high representative was appointed legally without a resolution, while China and Russia dispute this position. High representatives intervened in the legal system of BiH and the entities, often through the adoption of laws and their amendments at the level of BiH and the entities, and the adoption of amendments to the constitutions of the entities. Of course, such behavior is controversial and the question has been raised as to whether the high representative has normative competences. By analyzing Article II and Article V of Annex 10, which the high representative used as a legal basis, we can conclude that his competences are not of a normative character, and by interpreting this annex it is not possible to arrive at such competences. Analyzing point XI/2 of the Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Council held in Bonn on December 9 and 10, 1997 (the so-called Bonn Powers), which the high representatives also refer to as a legal basis, it is evident that there is no authorization to enact laws either amendments to entity constitutions. Normative powers of the high representative would be contrary to the First Protocol of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, because the democratic principle of the sovereignty of the people requires that laws should be adopted by a body elected by the people. In addition, it would be contrary to Annex 4 - the Constitution of BiH and the constitutions of the entities, according to which the parliament is the body that enacts laws and amends the constitutions.