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"This collection of essays, written by authors of different nationalities, explores the experiences of the countries that were not numbered among the Second World War's major belligerents, including colonies, "lesser" powers, and neutral nation states. National Perspectives on the Global Second World War is an essential contribution to the study of the Second World War and will be of particular interest to scholars of imperial and colonial history, military history, and global history"--

If there's one theme in Washington this week, it's this: Ukraine needs more weapons, and it needs them now. Two top Biden administration officials told Congress Wednesday that, if new Ukraine funding isn't passed soon, Russia could win the war within months or even weeks."A sovereign and secure Ukraine is critical to global security," Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said during a meeting with European defense leaders earlier this week. "And we must not waver in our support for Ukraine." While European leaders are attempting to fill some gaps in Ukraine's stockpiles on a bilateral basis, there is little that can be done to bolster Kyiv's defenses and keep its economy afloat without U.S. help. Congressional talks have so far failed to produce a deal that would trade border security measures for increased aid, and it's looking increasingly likely that any future funding, if it is forthcoming, will narrowly focus on military aid at the expense of economic support.A failure to pass new economic aid would badly damage Ukraine's government, which currently relies on American and European cash to pay state employees and provide many essential services in the country.Making matters worse is the fact that the European Union — which has been far more generous with budgetary support than military aid — is facing its own internal struggle over future funding. As the EU considers a new, $54 billion aid package, all eyes are on Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has long been skeptical of support for Ukraine."It's difficult. I know Viktor Orban well," said Luxembourgeois Foreign Minister Xavier Bettel. "It won't be easy to convince him."There is, however, some hope that Orban will change his mind. The Hungarian leader has long opposed Ukraine's accession to the EU but was willing to sit out a vote on the question last month after the bloc freed roughly $11 billion in Hungarian funds that had been frozen due to alleged democratic backsliding. In other words, Orban may throw his support behind more aid for the right price.Ukraine also marked a consequential victory Wednesday when Slovakia's controversial prime minister announced that he would back new aid during a visit to Kyiv.But all of this uncertainty has left Ukraine in a difficult position. The blame game has already begun in anticipation of challenges on the battlefield, according to Politico. "If Russia wins the war against Ukraine, some officials in Kyiv are ready to pin the blame on the West," an anonymous Ukrainian military official told the outlet.If the tide starts to turn against Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky "will desperately look for options of whom to blame," the official continued. The shifting dynamics suggest that the potential for a negotiated peace — a reasonably probable possibility just a month or two ago — is quickly fading as Russian leaders see an opportunity to pursue their likely advantage on the battlefield.In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Russia President Vladimir Putin "may be willing to consider dropping an insistence on neutral status for Ukraine and even ultimately abandon opposition to eventual NATO membership" in exchange for keeping the Ukrainian territory Russia currently occupies, according to anonymous people close to the Kremlin who spoke with Bloomberg. The report says the proposal is part of Moscow's quiet signaling to Washington that it is open to talks to end the war, though U.S. officials deny any backchannel communications.— Russia's ambassador to Switzerland slammed the country's decision to host a pro-Ukraine peace conference without Russian participation, saying that Swiss actions have caused it to lose "its role as an impartial international mediator," according to Reuters. The Swiss talks will only include Kyiv's supporters and will be based on a 10-point Ukrainian plan that the Kremlin has rejected out of hand. The ambassador also reiterated Moscow's public demands for talks, which include an independent status for Ukraine and the protection of Russians and Russian speakers in the country.— Talks aimed at restarting the Black Sea grain deal have quietly begun, according to Ukraine's ambassador in Turkey, the country that held several previous rounds of negotiations on the issue, Reuters reports. Details on the new discussions are scarce, but the renewed interest in talks suggests that Ukraine's alternative shipping route, which hugs the coast of Romania, has not been as effective at boosting trade as was previously hoped. The news also points to Russia's increasing desperation to resume exports of fertilizers and fertilizer components, a key part of the original deal that Moscow abandoned due to alleged shortcomings in implementation.— Turkey's parliament formally approved Sweden's accession to NATO, marking a major step in Stockholm's so far arduous path to joining the bloc, according to the BBC. The Biden administration urged Congress to approve a sale of F-16s to Turkey shortly after the announcement, shedding light on what inducements helped Ankara come around.The final country that must sign off is now Hungary. While Budapest has yet to give a specific reason for slow-rolling the decision, some members of the ruling Fidesz party have said they oppose Sweden's accession due to its criticisms of alleged democratic backsliding in Hungary. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Orban said Wednesday that he "supports the NATO membership of Sweden" and will push parliament to move forward with ratification as soon as possible.— Russian officials threatened to seize as much as $280 billion in Western assets if the U.S. and Europe follow through on their proposal to give $300 billion in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine, according to Reuters. Cyprus and the Netherlands have the most to lose, according to Russian state media, while countries like France, Germany, Britain, Japan, and the U.S. would also have significant assets seized. Meanwhile, a bill that would allow the U.S. to seize Russian funds overwhelmingly passed a U.S. Senate committee Wednesday. Backers of the proposal expect that it will pass both chambers of Congress with significant bipartisan support.U.S. State Department news:In a Wednesday press conference, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel praised Turkey's approval of Sweden's accession to NATO and called on Hungary to follow suit. "We look forward to Hungary concluding their ratification process and the Alliance welcoming Sweden into NATO without further delay," Patel said.

For over 20 years, the partnership between the European Union and the Council of Europe in the field of youth (hereinafter EU–Council of Europe youth partnership) has been gathering, analysing and disseminating knowledge for better youth policy and practice. It functions as a "think tank" and a laboratory, gathering and producing knowledge, translating it for its effective use in youth policy and practice, developing and testing new approaches and considering traditional themes and innovative trends. The EU–Council of Europe youth partnership has supported knowledge-based youth policy development in a variety of ways, including by organising thematic events and training on youth policy, publishing the Youth policy manual, a youth knowledge book on cross-sectoral youth policy, and "Youth policy essentials", as well as by organising the massive open online course (MOOC) on youth policy and other activities focused on the same theme. The EU–Council of Europe youth partnership collects, analyses and publishes information on the conditions of young people and on youth policy and practice in the European Knowledge Centre for Youth Policy (EKCYP), supported by a network of EKCYP correspondents and the Pool of European Youth Researchers (PEYR). Yet little is known in Europe about the national realities of youth policy monitoring and evaluation. Based on the principle of promoting knowledge-based youth policy and taking into account the benefits of youth policy evaluation, this review aims at supporting those involved at diverse levels in evaluating youth policy design and implementation, in order to enhance youth policy's relevance, effectiveness and impact. The 2018 Annual Meeting of EKCYP correspondents undertook a first reflection on approaches to youth policy evaluation based on case studies at country level. The conclusions of that reflection were that youth policy evaluation is very complex – it involves a variety of stakeholders, each with their own perspectives on the purpose of such exercises – and there is little knowledge of how it takes place at country level. DefinitionsPage 6 ► Youth policy evaluation review In 2019, EKCYP correspondents pursued this objective of gathering knowledge on how youth policy evaluation takes place and analysing how it can better support youth policy and practice. This review is the first result of that process. This study provides an overview of youth policy evaluation at national level, including a selection of nine national and two European level case studies to help the readers better understand different approaches, methods and aspects of youth policy evaluation. The mid-term evaluation of the current EU Youth Strategy and the series of international reviews of national youth policies undertaken by the Council of Europe are integrated into Chapter 4, which presents case studies for several countries, highlighting the added value of international initiatives in the field. It concludes with a section explaining concepts, theoretical approaches and methods of policy evaluation, as well as with a practical checklist. Monitoring and evaluation of public policies, including youth policy, contribute to ensuring accountability as they offer the information needed to understand how each policy is planned and implemented and allow the sharing of different perspectives on the same policies, thus helping to understanding the resulting benefits, shortcomings and even losses. Monitoring and evaluation of polices also support the dialogue held during policy formulation and implementation and contribute to legitimating policies by allowing public participation, including youth participation. Therefore, monitoring and evaluation support the development of knowledge-based youth policy and interinstitutional and public communication. They support the dissemination of the learning outcomes, results and impact of youth policy. All these benefits of monitoring and evaluation of youth policies are important reasons for learning more about how youth policy evaluation is conducted in Europe. The needs of young people are evolving even faster than the context of public policies. The learning outcomes of monitoring and evaluation of youth policy are extremely valuable to support decision makers in amending and adapting youth and all policy targeting young people to better answer those changing needs. This review pays special attention to impact evaluation because it contributes to the accountability, learning and communication of youth policy, offering policy makers, stakeholders and young people information on the meaningful and lasting (short- or long-term) change generated by youth policy. Impact evaluation informs about the results achieved by the policy, which is relevant when planning new policies, so as to ensure their future impact, and provides data to decision makers when planning budgets. The horizontal, trans-sectoral nature of the youth policy and the numerous correlations needed with other sectoral policies, such as education, social inclusion, employment, health, sport and housing, should also be kept in mind. In this context, monitoring and evaluation are needed to increase the accountability of each institution and stakeholder involved and they allow the promotion of specific results in the field of youth to all relevant policy makers. Participation of young people in the policy process is an important principle in the youth field and the review also takes into consideration participation in evaluation. The participation of policy beneficiaries in the policy process, including its monitoring Introduction ► Page 7 and evaluation, is very important for each sectoral policy in a democratic society. By participating in youth policy evaluation, young people learn to exercise active citizenship. This is an investment that they take with them as they make the transition to informed, active and involved adults. The review includes the result of a survey conducted among the EKCYP and PEYR on the evaluation of national youth policy across Europe, followed by expert discussions in June 2019 and November 2019. The publication presents several good practices of concrete ways youth policy or elements of youth policy are evaluated throughout Europe. Definitions are presented at the beginning to clarify the meaning of the most important concepts used. A final section of the review presents the conceptual framework underlining the idea of knowledge-based policy and provides short presentations of the main theoretical and conceptual approaches in policy evaluation, when they can be used and for what purpose, as well as what advantages and challenges each of those perspectives entail. This review concludes with a practical checklist on youth policy evaluation. The checklist and the whole content of this review should be seen as a complementary resource and not as prescriptive methodology for youth policy evaluation initiatives.

A key objective in the field of translational psychiatry over the past few decades has been to identify the brain correlates of major depressive disorder (MDD). Identifying measurable indicators of brain processes associated with MDD could facilitate the detection of individuals at risk, and the development of novel treatments, the monitoring of treatment effects, and predicting who might benefit most from treatments that target specific brain mechanisms. However, despite intensive neuroimaging research towards this effort, underpowered studies and a lack of reproducible findings have hindered progress. Here, we discuss the work of the ENIGMA Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) Consortium, which was established to address issues of poor replication, unreliable results, and overestimation of effect sizes in previous studies. The ENIGMA MDD Consortium currently includes data from 45 MDD study cohorts from 14 countries across six continents. The primary aim of ENIGMA MDD is to identify structural and functional brain alterations associated with MDD that can be reliably detected and replicated across cohorts worldwide. A secondary goal is to investigate how demographic, genetic, clinical, psychological, and environmental factors affect these associations. In this review, we summarize findings of the ENIGMA MDD disease working group to date and discuss future directions. We also highlight the challenges and benefits of large-scale data sharing for mental health research. ; ENIGMA MDD work is supported by NIH grants U54 EB020403 (Thompson), R01 MH116147 (Thompson), and R01 MH117601 (Jahanshad & Schmaal). LS was supported by an NHMRC Career Development Fellowship (1140764). AFFDIS cohort: this study was funded by the University Medical Center Goettingen (UMG Startfoerderung) and the research team is supported by German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium fuer Bildung und Forschung, BMBF: 01 ZX 1507, "PreNeSt - e:Med"). Barcelona cohort: MJP is funded by the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación of the Spanish Government and by the Instituto de Salud Carlos III through a 'Miguel Servet' research contract (CP16–0020); National Research Plan (Plan Estatal de I + D + I 2016–2019); and co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). BRC DeCC cohort: CHYF is supported by NIHR BRC. Calgary cohort: supported by Canadian Institutes for Health Research, Branch Out Neurological Foundation. Cardiff cohort: supported by the Medical Research Council (grant G 1100629) and the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), funded by Health Research Wales (HS/14/20). CLING cohort: this study was partially supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) via grants to OG (GR1950/5–1 and GR1950/10–1). CODE cohort: Henrik Walter is supported by a grant of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (WA 1539/4–1). The CODE cohort was collected from studies funded by Lundbeck and the German Research Foundation (WA 1539/4–1, SCHN 1205/3–1, SCHR443/11–1). DIP-Groningen cohort: this study was supported by the Gratama Foundation, the Netherlands (2012/35 to NG). Edinburgh cohort: The research leading to these results was supported by IMAGEMEND, which received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under grant agreement no. 602450. This paper reflects only the author's views and the European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. This work was also supported by a Wellcome Trust Strategic Award 104036/Z/14/Z. FOR2107-Marburg cohort: funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG, grant FOR2107 KR 3822/7–2 to AK; FOR2107 KI 588/14–2 to TK and FOR2107 JA 1890/7–2 to AJ). Houston cohorts: supported in part by NIMH grant R01 085667 and the Dunn Research Foundation. JCS is supported by the Pat Rutherford, Jr. Endowed Chair in Psychiatry. IMH Study cohort: supported by funding from NHG (SIG/15012) and NMRC CISSP (2018). Melbourne cohort: funded by National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia (NHMRC) Project Grants 1064643 (Principal Investigator BJH) and 1024570 (Principal Investigator CGD). Minnesota cohort: the study was funded by the National Institute of Mental Health (K23MH090421; Dr. Cullen) and Biotechnology Research Center (P41 RR008079; Center for Magnetic Resonance Research), the National Alliance for Research on Schizophrenia and Depression, the University of Minnesota Graduate School, and the Minnesota Medical Foundation. This work was carried out in part using computing resources at the University of Minnesota Supercomputing Institute. Münster cohort: funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG, grant FOR2107 DA1151/5–1 and DA1151/5–2 to UD; SFB-TRR58, Projects C09 and Z02 to UD) and the Interdisciplinary Center for Clinical Research (IZKF) of the medical faculty of Münster (grant Dan3/012/17 to UD). NESDA cohort: The infrastructure for the NESDA study (www.nesda.nl) is funded through the Geestkracht program of the Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development (Zon-Mw, grant number 10–000–1002) and is supported by participating universities (VU University Medical Center, GGZ inGeest, Arkin, Leiden University Medical Center, GGZ Rivierduinen, University Medical Center Groningen) and mental health care organizations, see www.nesda.nl. Pharmo cohort: supported by ERA-NET PRIOMEDCHILD FP 6 (EU) grant 11.32050.26. PSYABM-NORMENT: supported by the Research Council of Norway (project number 229135). The South East Norway Health Authority Research Funding (project number 2015052). The Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, Norway. San Francisco cohort: supported by NIH/NCCIH 1R61AT009864–01A1. NIMH R01MH085734. SHIP and SHIP-trend cohorts: SHIP is part of the Community Medicine Research net of the University of Greifswald, Germany, which is funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (grants no. 01ZZ9603, 01ZZ0103, and 01ZZ0403), the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and the Social Ministry of the Federal State of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. MRI scans in SHIP and SHIP-TREND have been supported by a joint grant from Siemens Healthineers, Erlangen, Germany and the Federal State of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. Stanford cohorts: this work was supported by NIH grant R37 MH101495. The BiDirect Study was supported by grants from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF; grants FKZ-01ER0816 and FKZ-01ER1506). MDS is partially supported by an award funded by the Phyllis and Jerome Lyle Rappaport Foundation. TCH is supported by NIMH grant 5K01MH117442. EJWVS, JL, and TFB are supported by European Research Council grant no. ERC-ADG-2014–671084 INSOMNIA. TFB is supported by a VU University Amsterdam University Research Fellowship 2016–2017. JL is supported by a VU University Amsterdam University Research Fellowship 2017–2018. ; publishedVersion

For over 20 years, the partnership between the European Union and the Council of Europe in the field of youth (hereinafter EU–Council of Europe youth partnership) has been gathering, analysing and disseminating knowledge for better youth policy and practice. It functions as a "think tank" and a laboratory, gathering and producing knowledge, translating it for its effective use in youth policy and practice, developing and testing new approaches and considering traditional themes and innovative trends. The EU–Council of Europe youth partnership has supported knowledge-based youth policy development in a variety of ways, including by organising thematic events and training on youth policy, publishing the Youth policy manual, a youth knowledge book on cross-sectoral youth policy, and "Youth policy essentials", as well as by organising the massive open online course (MOOC) on youth policy and other activities focused on the same theme. The EU–Council of Europe youth partnership collects, analyses and publishes information on the conditions of young people and on youth policy and practice in the European Knowledge Centre for Youth Policy (EKCYP), supported by a network of EKCYP correspondents and the Pool of European Youth Researchers (PEYR). Yet little is known in Europe about the national realities of youth policy monitoring and evaluation. Based on the principle of promoting knowledge-based youth policy and taking into account the benefits of youth policy evaluation, this review aims at supporting those involved at diverse levels in evaluating youth policy design and implementation, in order to enhance youth policy's relevance, effectiveness and impact. The 2018 Annual Meeting of EKCYP correspondents undertook a first reflection on approaches to youth policy evaluation based on case studies at country level. The conclusions of that reflection were that youth policy evaluation is very complex – it involves a variety of stakeholders, each with their own perspectives on the purpose of such exercises – and there is little knowledge of how it takes place at country level. DefinitionsPage 6 ► Youth policy evaluation review In 2019, EKCYP correspondents pursued this objective of gathering knowledge on how youth policy evaluation takes place and analysing how it can better support youth policy and practice. This review is the first result of that process. This study provides an overview of youth policy evaluation at national level, including a selection of nine national and two European level case studies to help the readers better understand different approaches, methods and aspects of youth policy evaluation. The mid-term evaluation of the current EU Youth Strategy and the series of international reviews of national youth policies undertaken by the Council of Europe are integrated into Chapter 4, which presents case studies for several countries, highlighting the added value of international initiatives in the field. It concludes with a section explaining concepts, theoretical approaches and methods of policy evaluation, as well as with a practical checklist. Monitoring and evaluation of public policies, including youth policy, contribute to ensuring accountability as they offer the information needed to understand how each policy is planned and implemented and allow the sharing of different perspectives on the same policies, thus helping to understanding the resulting benefits, shortcomings and even losses. Monitoring and evaluation of polices also support the dialogue held during policy formulation and implementation and contribute to legitimating policies by allowing public participation, including youth participation. Therefore, monitoring and evaluation support the development of knowledge-based youth policy and interinstitutional and public communication. They support the dissemination of the learning outcomes, results and impact of youth policy. All these benefits of monitoring and evaluation of youth policies are important reasons for learning more about how youth policy evaluation is conducted in Europe. The needs of young people are evolving even faster than the context of public policies. The learning outcomes of monitoring and evaluation of youth policy are extremely valuable to support decision makers in amending and adapting youth and all policy targeting young people to better answer those changing needs. This review pays special attention to impact evaluation because it contributes to the accountability, learning and communication of youth policy, offering policy makers, stakeholders and young people information on the meaningful and lasting (short- or long-term) change generated by youth policy. Impact evaluation informs about the results achieved by the policy, which is relevant when planning new policies, so as to ensure their future impact, and provides data to decision makers when planning budgets. The horizontal, trans-sectoral nature of the youth policy and the numerous correlations needed with other sectoral policies, such as education, social inclusion, employment, health, sport and housing, should also be kept in mind. In this context, monitoring and evaluation are needed to increase the accountability of each institution and stakeholder involved and they allow the promotion of specific results in the field of youth to all relevant policy makers. Participation of young people in the policy process is an important principle in the youth field and the review also takes into consideration participation in evaluation. The participation of policy beneficiaries in the policy process, including its monitoring Introduction ► Page 7 and evaluation, is very important for each sectoral policy in a democratic society. By participating in youth policy evaluation, young people learn to exercise active citizenship. This is an investment that they take with them as they make the transition to informed, active and involved adults. The review includes the result of a survey conducted among the EKCYP and PEYR on the evaluation of national youth policy across Europe, followed by expert discussions in June 2019 and November 2019. The publication presents several good practices of concrete ways youth policy or elements of youth policy are evaluated throughout Europe. Definitions are presented at the beginning to clarify the meaning of the most important concepts used. A final section of the review presents the conceptual framework underlining the idea of knowledge-based policy and provides short presentations of the main theoretical and conceptual approaches in policy evaluation, when they can be used and for what purpose, as well as what advantages and challenges each of those perspectives entail. This review concludes with a practical checklist on youth policy evaluation. The checklist and the whole content of this review should be seen as a complementary resource and not as prescriptive methodology for youth policy evaluation initiatives.

Machine generated contents note: Introduction -- I Kaliningrad: A Historical Overview -- 2 Kaliningrad under Soviet and Russian Rule -- 3 Kaliningrad as a Flash Point of Conflict -- 4 A More Positive Assessment -- 5 From a "Gateway" to a "Black Hole" in Europe -- 6 The EU and Kaliningrad -- 7 Moscow and Kaliningrad -- 8 The United States and Kaliningrad -- Epilogue: Kaliningrad and the Future -- Index -- About the Author

DURING THE PAST DECADE, MANY COUNTRIES ACROSS THE GLOBE HAVE WORKED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIZATION. SOUTH AFRICA IS A UNIQUE EXAMPLE OF THIS. IN THIS ARTICLE, AMBASSADOR JAMES JOSEPH PROVIDES AN ON-THE-GROUND REPORT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE ECONOMIC LEGACY OF APARTHEID IS OUTLINED. THE ARTICLE CONSIDERS THE CHALLENGES SOUTH AFRICA HAS FACED SINCE APARTHEID AND THE STEPS IT HAS TAKEN TOWARD DEMOCRACY. HE IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE SITUATION THERE.

THIS ARTICLE CHALLENGES THE COMPACENCY OF THE "MARKET DEMOCRACY" PARADIGM ON THREE FRONTS. FIRST IT QUESTIONS THE MODEL OF DEMOCRACY WHICH IS BEING PROPAGATED BY RUSSIA'S WESTERN ADVISERS AND WELL-WISHERS. SECOND, IT CONSIDERS DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF STATE-AND NATIONAL-BUILDING IN RUSSIA, CHALLENGES WHICH MOST OTHER COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL TRANSITION DO NOT HAVE TO FACE. THIRD, IT PROBES THE LINKAGES BETWEEN FLAWED DEMOCRATIZATION AND MARKET REFORM.

Als Mao Zedong am 1. Oktober 1949 die Volksrepublik ausrief, mochten sich die KPCh-Führer, allem Siegestaumel zum Trotz, wie in einem Labyrinth gefühlt haben: 21 Jahre lang hatten sie im bäuerlichen Hinterland gekämpft und sollten nun auf einen Schlag ein neu entstandenes Gesamtreich von damals immerhin rund 500 Millionen Menschen lenken. Kein Wunder, daß die Politik, vor allem aber die Außenpolitik, einen Verlauf nahm, der sich eher am Mäander als an einem Lineal zu orientieren schien, und daß es fast drei Jahrzehnte dauerte, ehe mit den Reformbeschlüssen vom 1978 Berechenbarkeit und Ordnung einkehrten.