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Because of a blatant partisan gerrymander, not much
drama will come from Caddo Parish Commission elections this fall, with just a
few internecine conflicts to stir up things.

Despite having a black/white population of about
49/45 percent as a result of the 2020 census, earlier this year the Commission reapportioned
itself into seven strongly majority-black districts out of 12. In terms of
registered voters (through
August), no district's majority race was less than 62 percent, District 10
being the lowest, which also underwent the most dramatic change from its previous
incarnation where prior to February's
reapportionment its plurality was 49 percent white.

Commission Democrats managed this with an extreme
power play. Disregarding its own rules that reapportionment should have occurred
in 2022, they delayed the process until one commissioner, Republican Jim Taliaferro,
resigned at the end of the year to take a seat on the Shreveport City Council and
then appointed Democrat Ron Cothran to
serve in the heavily-Republican district. That gave them seven
sure votes by which to muscle through the current plan, disregarding an alternative
that would have created six each black or white majority districts, leaving
District 10 with a small white plurality.

They segregated races to such an extent because they
didn't
want what happened with the similar School Board District 10 last year. It
was drawn in
that reapportionment to have a small black majority (leading to a slight
white plurality in registrations) that led
to a white Republican winning despite that typically whites in Caddo
typically cross over more than twice the rate to vote for black candidates than
blacks do for white candidates. The plan adopted largely hinged on the fact
that with a board divided Democrats and Republicans with six each, so an
egregious gerrymander could not have passed.

As a result, there won't be any competitive inter-party
races which in any event feature eight incumbents of which only District 12
Democrat Ken Epperson drew a challenger in the form of former District 10 GOP
Commissioner David Cox. But district demographics make Epperson a solid
favorite to win an eighth (not all consecutive) term.

A newcomer also got a free ride. Democrat Gregory Young,
a retiree who once tried for this office and also Shreveport City Council, will
replace the only term-limited commissioner, Democrat Lyndon Johnson.

Technically, another incumbent also is trying his
luck. Cothran, reapportioned out of District 8, will go for a lateral move to
District 10. He faces off against Democrat Quinton Aught, who lost narrowly to
then-Republican Mario
Chavez, who won't seek reelection in a district now much less favorable demographically
to his chances, and Democrat Kenny Gordon. Given his previous effort, Aught is
the favorite to flip the district to Democrats.

While that might get heated, so might the contest
to replace Cothran. That comes down to Republicans Grace Anne Blake, a small
business owner who applied for the appointment Cothran nabbed, and education
administrator Tim Euler. Both tout
conservative credentials in likely the most conservative district of the 12,
but until recently Blake was not registered as a Republican, back then choosing a
no party label.

But the most heated battle could transpire between
District 4 GOP incumbent John-Paul Young and
Republican Frank Thaxton. Both sons
of judges, Thaxton may have a score to settle, as he also applied for the post
Cothran received, who Young voted for. Over his term, Young frequently has
sided with Democrats and on some big issues, like voting for Cothran and the reapportionment
plan highly favorable to Democrats. But in doing so, whether knowing it he drew
Thaxton into his district, and is the incumbent most in peril of losing.

The last incumbent having to break at least a
little sweat to get back into office, District 1 Republican Todd Hopkins, received a challenge from
the right in the form of welding supply employee and political activist Republican
Chris Kracman,
Hopkins' long political service in a couple of different roles and conservative
record should be enough to reelect him.

Republicans John Atkins and Ed Lazarus, plus
Democrats Roy
Burrell, Steffon
Jones, and Stormy
Gage-Watts will return unchallenged and likely will be joined by Democrat university
administrator Victor Thomas in District 3. He faces no party Joshua Hanson, but district demographics
favor him to replace Democrat Steven Jackson,
whose tendency to grandstand has become tiresome and whose recent
legal troubles apparently convinced him to seek another office.

Democrats almost certainly will continue to control
the Commission, although this time affirmed through the ballot box, and of the three
incumbents facing a challenge in their current districts only Young has any
real threat to be sent packing.

Peder Beck-Friis and Richard Clarida at Pimco have a nice blog post on the recent inflation, including the above graph.  I have wondered, and been asked, if the differences across countries in inflation lines up with the size of the covid fiscal expansion. Apparently yes. It's a simple fact, and it's dangerous to crow too loudly when things go your way. Fiscal theory says that inflation comes when debt or deficits exceed expectations of a country's ability or will to repay. The latter can differ a lot. So, it does not predict a simple relationship between debt or deficits and inflation. Still, it's nice when things come out that way, and more fun to write qualifications than to come up with excuses for a contrary result! I have seen other evidence that doesn't look so nice (will post when it's public). One example is across eurozone countries. But that's a good reminder where to expect success and where not to expect success. Inflation as described by most macro models, including fiscal theory, monetarism, etc., is the component common to all prices and wages. It is in essence the fall in the value of currency. In any historical experience we see lots of relative price changes on top of that, in particular prices over wages. Indeed inflation is only measured with prices, and a central idea is to measure the "cost of living," not the value of the currency. Across the eurozone there is only one currency and thus only one underlying inflation. The large variation in measured inflations are relative prices, real exchange rates between countries, and can't go on forever. That we cannot hope to explain inflation variation across countries in the eurozone with a simple theory that describes the value of currency gives you some sense of the error bars in this exercise as well. Beck-Friis and  Clarida also look at money growth, above. There was a big expansion in M2 before the US inflation. Monetarists took a victory lap. M2 has since fallen a lot. There is not much correlation between monetary expansion and inflation across countries however. The slope of the regression also clearly depends on one or two points. Money or debt, which is it? When governments print money to finance deficits (or interest-bearing reserves), fiscal theory and monetary theory agree, there is inflation. Printing money (helicopters) is perhaps particularly powerful, as debt carries a reputation and tradition of repayment, which money may not carry. A core issue separating monetary and fiscal theory is whether a big monetary expansion without deficits or other fiscal news would have any effects. Would a $5 trillion QE (buy bonds, issue money) with no deficit have had the same inflationary impact? Monetarists, yes; fiscalists, no. Beck-Friis and  Clarida opine that fiscal stimulus is over and central banks now have all the levers they need to control inflation. I'm not so sure. The US is still running a trillion or so deficit despite a 3.6% unemployment rate, and here come entitlements. And, as blog readers will know, I am less confident of the Fed's lever. We shall see. Update:Mark Dijkstra makes the following graph (see comments for link), based on IMF data for all countries. Hmm, doesn't look so good. However, when you look at lots of small countries, weird things happen. The far right data point is Estonia, with 100% increase in debt and 14% cumulative inflation. Estonia started with 8.2% debt/GDP, however, so its rise to 18.4% is a 100% rise in debt to GDP ratio. So, Estonia spent 10% of GDP on covid and now military, compared to 30% of GDP for the US. Again, fiscal theory is not debt or deficit = inflation, but debt vs. ability and will to repay. One can argue that this increase in debt is more repayable. Argentina has -8% growth in debt/GDP and 100% inflation. Inflation is inflating away debt/GDP faster than the government can print the debt. The high inflation countries in this graph are Uzbekistan, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Turkmenistan, Nigeria, Zambia, and Haiti. They are all plausibly fiscal inflation, from preexisting fiscal problems, not stable countries that suddenly borrowed/printed 30% of GDP with no plans to pay it back, the rather special case of the US, EU, UK. OK, I'm making excuses and I'm glad I started with the cautionary paragraph. Fiscal theory is not so easy as debt = inflation! But we do have to confront the numbers, and I hope this spurs some more serious analysis.  

All
the fretting about a $100 million last-minute reduction that only increases Louisiana
Department of Health spending by $146 million for next fiscal year, as
Republican state Sen. Sharon
Hewitt suggests, is unwarranted and no corrective should be in the offing.

This week, a couple of Senate panels met unanticipatedly
in the aftermath of the regular session's close to sort out the line item in
the general appropriations bill HB 1
triggering this, an insertion which caught by surprise legislators and Democrat
Gov. John Bel Edwards.
The latter warbled about how he would do everything he could, including casting
a line item veto on it, to prevent the roughly half-percent decrease it pared,
while a number of state senators listened with furrowed brows as allegedly how,
when considering leveraged federal funds involved, this really meant an over
$700 million loss in budget authority.

Of course, that figure was scare
tactics reminiscent of what Edwards threatened would happen in 2016 when trying
to muscle through a sales tax increase still haunting the state, that without taking
more from the citizenry people with disabilities would be left to beg on street
corners, grandparents would be kicked out of nursing homes, and, by the way,
college football would cease. Unfortunately, many, including Republicans who
should have known better, bought it hook, line, and sinker, then and now.

Not Hewitt this time, who noted, "I don't believe
we are accurate enough in our ability to forecast to be wringing our hands over
$100 million." She's right, given the wide variance expected in Medicaid
disenrollment costs and the impact of disenrollment that could have the
former that could be adjusted to go lower and the latter almost certainly underestimated
in money saved from getting ineligible people off the books, as well as the considering
the consistent overshooting in the last couple years of forecasts of nursing
dollars paid out on waiver services because of a nursing shortage caused by overreaction
to the Wuhan coronavirus pandemic that jacked
market rates sky high, leaving fewer nurses wanting to work for waiver
clients – an imbalance the department can't correct because by
law it continuously must shovel more money to overutilized nursing homes.

Naturally, Edwards takes any chance to grab dollars
from the people where he can in trying to redistribute these to suit his ideological
and power-building needs, so his first instinct will be to cast a line item
veto of the curbed $100 million – but then he'll have to find other items to
strike to match. That may not be so easy.

He could veto bills that have tax breaks or additional
costs or paying off judgments, but he already has signed a number of these into
law or many don't add or subtract much or don't take effect until after this
budget year. In fact, the two biggest items out there still needing disposition
ironically are authored by GOP state Rep. Tanner Magee,
who helped lead the charge to bust the state's spending cap, totaling $41.5
million. Adding in all others, including of his political allies, gets barely over
half the needed sum.

That means he has to cut $50-100 million in line items
in HB 1, but that also isn't easy because those zero out entire programs. For
example, it has only $31 million or so total in local expenditures. Transfers
are allowed, but only within the same department, so that wouldn't help in this
instance. And a preamble statement already forces a $95 million cut
government-wide.

But the easiest, and in policy terms wisest, course
would be to make the cuts within the department. The most salutary and obvious
would be to lop off Medicaid expansion. The last
published figures – which with disenrollment wouldn't be much more than
what will come next year – showed it cost Louisianans $451 million, servicing
a population where a third to half of recipients already had insurance and
others had access to plenty of other government benefits leaving them with an
ability to pay for health insurance, if only they would choose to do so. But
being that fiscal albatross is Edwards' pride and joy, don't look for this solution
not only to the problem but also to enable the increasing of waiver nursing
rates and leaving some change for future budgetary downdrafts estimated to
slice revenues by nearly $1.5 billion over the next three years.

Instead, expect a combination of all of the above –
excising the $100 million deduction line item, kayoing a few bills, issuing a
few HB 1 line item vetoes, and expecting some efficiencies in health care
spending. That combination will conclude as another lost opportunity to bring
more sanity to state spending and empowerment to its people.

So, Louisiana
has nearly three-quarters of a billion more bucks believed to flow into state
coffers through fiscal year 2025, above and beyond required diversions. This
should change nothing regarding the budget the House sent to the Senate earlier
this month.

The latest
meeting of the state's Revenue Estimating Conference approved a forecast
for this fiscal year of $323 million more and just over $400 million more for
the next. After mandatory distributions to the Budget Stabilization Fund,
the Revenue
Stabilization Trust Fund, to pay down unfunded accrued liabilities, and to
meet coastal restoration, this adds on to a previously recognized half-million
dollars or so above the state's expenditure limit, a restriction which may be
breached only by two-thirds supermajorities in each legislative chamber that
hasn't come close to fruition.

As a result, the BSF will hit its maximum of just
over $900 million, which can be spent by as much as a third when actual
revenues undershoot forecasts provided it wasn't tapped the previous year. The
RSTF, which accrues corporate income and franchise tax collections above $600 million
annually, at nearing $1.7 billion remains well below its $5 billion trigger
point, where when hitting that up to a tenth a year may be used for capital
projects by legislative majorities, although at any time any amount may be sucked
out by supermajorities.

These numbers prompted both Republican Sen. Pres. Page Cortez and Commissioner of
Administration Jay
Dardenne to suggest busting the expenditure cap. They spoke in measured
terms about using the additional spending for one-time expenses, but Dardenne's
boss Democrat Gov. John
Bel Edwards has been more vocal about using it for continuing commitments
in the hundreds of millions of dollars.

This is unwise, considering future forecasts of
revenues show dropping
from a peak of this current year of 9.3 percent, or at total fall or about $1.5
billion, over the next three years with a slight rebound four years from now.
In part, this is due to a slowing national economy looking to form a double-dip
recession, but also from the roll-off of 0.45 percent temporary state sales tax
in mid-2025 and a gradual transfer of vehicle registration fees from going to use
for operating expenses to only for capital projects over the next few years.

Breaching the cap also negates
two tax cut possibilities. By filling up the BSF that would make its balance
well above 2.5 percent of total state revenue receipts, the franchise tax – a
rarity among states and often suggested for elimination, which a bill which
passed the Senate aims to do – would be cut dramatically. It also would cause a
smaller drop in individual
income tax rates, with both of these dropping near-term revenue gains additionally.
And that scenario could repeat year after year, eliminating the franchise tax
and continuing to inch income tax rates lower.

In other words, by simply holding on to the extra
dollars, tax cuts directly or indirectly and increasingly over the years would
leave more money in people's wallets, and the banked money can address paying
down long-term liabilities, such as looming pension shortfalls or debt, embarking
on capital projects, or keeping for emergencies such as inclement weather.
Early payoffs also allow for having cake and eating it as well, as money saved
from that would be recurring and could be subsumed into funding new commitments
or (as did the budget when it left the House in shoring up retirement systems,)
allowing local governments to save money where they can provide, for example,
pay raises from their existing resources instead of hitting up taxpayers statewide.
Meanwhile, an operating spending baseline appropriate to the coming sharp
revenue decline will remain in place, rather than one that becomes
unaffordable.

Edwards and others of the grasshopper persuasion
will nominate a number of unconvincing scenarios to spend hundreds of millions more
recurringly. They'll
say local governments with their bounties may not provide enough pay raises
and too disparately, but local voters and elected officials surely can come to
consensus on that. Universities
may complain that the House budget has scaled back salary hikes, but
jettisoning needless functions such as diversity, inclusion, and equity efforts
and attached officers can free up funds to supplement. Others may bemoan
expiration of $52 million in early childhood education federal grant money that
the House budget doesn't backfill, but with nearly that amount in pork
line items included these can be swapped out to restore that spending.

There's no good reason to blow a bounty that
provides a bridge to improving Louisiana's fiscal posture and shoring up its
long-term capital and financial picture. Legislators must keep the expenditure
limit as it and a right-sized budget shaped by it.

USA NewsJosep M. Colomer: "I see in the US a certain nostalgia for the Cold War"Oliver Thansan 18 April 2023 Tuesday I do not understand that now the correspondents rotate every three or four years. It takes much longer to understand a country", says Josep M. Colomer, who has lived and studied US politics for almost half his life, where he is a professor of political science at Georgetown University. The Catalan professor, author of numerous books on political institutions and electoral processes, publishes Political polarization in the United States (Ed. Debate), where he maintains that original sin lies in his institutions.What impact can the impeachment of Donald Trump have on the polarization of the US?Trump has at least four pending cases and this one that has started is the weakest. He could be charged with trying to rig the elections and even with an attempted coup. In his first reaction in New York he said there would be "death and destruction" if he was charged, and then nothing happened, four clowns in the street. If he continues like this, I think he may end up very touched, although he could even show up from jail.At the moment it seems that the Republicans support him.There are many people in the party who think that Trump is no longer a good candidate, but the elections are a year and a half away and anything can happen. I do not rule out that there is another conservative candidate that divides the vote. And if he is not chosen, surely he will present himself under the initials of MAGA (make America great again), which he already uses in his acts. I see the problem more in the Democrats. Joe Biden will almost certainly run, but he is very old. They will need a good vice-presidential candidate; Kamala Harris has not lived up to it. But there are many unknowns.He claims that the main factor polarizing the US is its own institutions.The creation of the US is an unprecedented initiative, and I think they paid for the hazing. They made a couple of mistakes that have had consequences until today. The first was to miscopy the British Constitution. An executive president elected separately from the legislative Congress makes it difficult for them to agree. The other mistake was that they thought there would be no parties, but after the first five presidents the party elections began, which were the origin of a conflict that has lasted until now. In the 19th century, the level of conflict was brutal, civil war included. But from World War II and up to the cold war there was internal peace and collaboration. Especially since there was an outside enemy. When this was over, all the internal problems that had not been resolved began to emerge, because the institutional system does not allow for effective legislation. Now there is an overflowing agenda: the health system, the role of families in education, immigration control, racial tensions, gender, gun control... Polarization is back to the way it was in the 19th century.This system also favors the election of radical presidents.In the primaries a small proportion of the people vote, the most motivated, and therefore the most extremist. This means that in the primaries the candidates have to be more radical. But right now Biden would have an advantage, because he doesn't need primaries. If Trump is a candidate, I don't imagine that whoever didn't vote for him in 2020 can vote for him now. The result will depend on whether the Democrats manage to mobilize their voters. Trump will get fewer votes than last time.Obama was the last president to have members of the other party in his cabinet. Why hasn't it happened again?It was a legacy of the cold war. The Secretary of Defense and some others used to be from the other party. Trump breaks with it. But Biden hasn't either; the collaboration between the two parties no longer exists. Trump was the first president in a long time not to start a new war, which didn't help him much; he caused the internal agenda to explode and he was blown away. Now I see a certain nostalgia for the cold war.Has the foreign policy sideline strategy backfired for you?Completely. The public agenda is broader and more difficult to manage than ever. The government is overwhelmed.The Pentagon leaks suggest a culture war point. It does not seem that Biden's return abroad with Ukraine has united the citizens.There was already a Wikileaks and a Snowden, and they weren't a big international conspiracy. I don't think what happened is going to have a direct political impact against Biden.

As I have previously written here, I began playing in the Hardy House fantasy baseball league in 1989. It was named for the building on the Northwestern campus where we conducted our first few auctions. I didn't have to travel far as I was teaching in the Political Science department there at the time. We started out as a standard 4x4 roto league, but switched from using batting average to on- base percentage as a hitting category in 2011 and also added strikeouts and runs as categories in that same season. We changed from saves to saves plus .5*Holds in 2019, but had no regular season in 2020 so this is still a fairly new category. The 2022 version of my team finished in the middle of the pack (6th) of 12 teams. It started slowly, had a strong run in the middle of the season, but ultimately had insufficient pitching to contend for the title. If I had purchased Kevin Gausman at the auction from the Toronto rotation instead of Jose Berrios my entire position and strategy might have changed. Their auction prices spring 2022 were nearly identical. As a result of my predicament, very late in the season I traded virtually all of my hitting stars (who would be free agents) for some players I could potentially retain in 2023.Here's my roster from the auction, which was held in person for the first time since 2019, though two owners again participated over Zoom. Because of various time conflicts, the auction actually occurred on March 11, which is incredibly early by the standards of Hardy House. Retained players are in blue. C Kirk TOR $7C Jansen TOR $111B Pasquantino KC $292B Semien TEX $263B Rendon LAA $5SS Crawford SEA $8MI Paredes TB $5CI Turner BOS $14OF Ward LAA $5OF Hays BAL $10OF Kepler MIN $10OF Stanton NYY $21DH Moore SEA $3$154 hitting (or 59% of the $260 allotment)P McClanahan TB $20P Eovaldi TEX $8P German NYY $3P Rodon NYY $23P Kirby SEA $20P Hall BAL $2P Kluber BOS $1P Bautista BAL $3P Pressly HOU $25P Beeks TB $1$106 for pitching (or 41% of the budget)Reserves (I selected 6th in the snake draft):OF Eaton KC $3P Paul Blackburn OAK $2P Bryan Baker BAL $1The league did a much better job of spending its auction money this year as there was not much left over. This was the first time in awhile that I spent every dime of my cash. The pace was also quicker and we finished nearly an hour earlier than we typically do when meeting in person. This was largely because we did not break for lunch -- owners were asked to bring lunch or arrange delivery. I probably spent more than anyone on pitching, partly because I expected Rodon's salary to go higher despite the injury reports. I was price enforcing and the bidding stopped on me. At the listed price, he could be a big steal and a potential retained player for 2024 even after his required raise to $27. I apparently also valued Kirby more than others did, but a couple of other starting pitchers were bigger bargains -- Jon Gray went for $10, Tyler Mahle for $8, Pablo Lopez for $14, Luis Castillo $24, and Logan Gilbert $20. If I could reconfigure my pitching costs to swap out some other players, I would. As it often turns out, I ended up with some guys who moved over from the NL in the off-season (Rodon and Turner). Blackburn and Moore are hurt to start the season and Hall was sent to the minors by the Orioles. Crawford also has a minor injury apparently. I need to have a good outcome in the initial free agent run Monday.Pasquantino was likely retained at too high of a price, but my pre-auction calculations showed that 1B was not going to be a great position and it was probably ok to overspend a few dollars on a guy with very good OBP skills. By my calculations several of the veteran players I bought were a bit under their auction values. But no pick screams BARGAIN. Right after I bought Kepler some other outfielders of comparable talent went off the board for lower prices. During auctions, I often jump bids to $10 from the opening $1 to move the process along. That backfired this year when my brain momentarily confused Austin Hays and Anthony Santander. No one bid $11 on Hays and I ended up with an outfielder that I likely would not otherwise have pursued. That was dumb. Santander went later for $19. Sigh.  
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There is a recurrent discussion about the small size of the
U.S. House of Representatives in comparison with most democratic assemblies. A
few days ago, Danielle Allen from Harvard made a good case for increasing the
size of the House within a framework of democracy renovation (The Washington Post,
March 1). She argues that, as the U.S. House has the highest ratio of population per seat
of any OECD country, the representatives are much removed from their
constituents. My point is that the federal structure of the very large United
States and its multiple channels for people's participation may allow for a
functional explanation of a relatively small House that may not work for more
centralized nations.

From a worldwide perspective, it
has been found that the best approximation for the size of the democratic national
assembly in number of seats is to take the cube root of the population, as
initially formulated by Rein Taagepera. For most countries, the number of
inhabitants amounts to millions, so the cube root must be in the hundreds (that
is, some figures with six zeros can be transformed into figures with two
zeros). For example, as Mexico has about 122mn inhabitants, the cube root of
this number closely approaches the 500 seats of its Chamber of Deputies. In
Italy, with 59mn people, the Chamber of Deputies was oversized but it was
recently reduced via referendum from 630 to 400 seats, which fits the cube root
law.

According to this standard, the
U.S. House of Representatives is undersized. During the nineteenth century, the
size of the House regularly increased every ten years to account for population
growth according to the decennial census. But despite the further increase in
the country's population, the House has remained frozen since it was fixed at
435 seats in 1911. At that moment this was an almost exact fit with the cube
root of the population. A 1929 Act capped the size of the House until now.

Some studies suggest that the
discussion in the House at that time reflected the fear of third-party growth,
namely the Progressive Party and its left-wing cousins. Much less compellingly,
it was also argued that the room for plenary meetings on Capitol Hill would be
too small for much larger gatherings.

A larger assembly would certainly
create more competitive districts and would facilitate the election of more
representatives from minority parties and groups. However, in the complex
political structure of the federal United States, other institutional devices,
especially broad decentralization into a high number of states, have
compensated for the federal House's small size and its restrictive political
consequences.

The trade-off between federalism and
multipartyism comes from a long history. If in a large country, multiple
territorial governments are established, as it was from the very beginning in
the United States, much political action tends to focus on those local
institutions; it is then less likely that multiple political parties are formed
at the federal level, and as a consequence, there is less pressure to adopt a
large assembly and an electoral system favoring national representation of multiple
political parties.

The effect is extreme in this
country, which, with 50 states, is the most decentralized in the world. The
very high number of states somehow compensates for small federal representation.
A logical inference is that an increase in the size of the House would make it more
inclusive, with more diverse partisan affiliations, which would push for a
stronger federal government. Some issues that are now mainly debated and
decided by the state legislatures would be channeled to Congress as territorial
demands by the additional state representatives in Washington.

The trade-off can also be observed
from the inverse extreme case. In the oldest British democracy, the assembly
size has also been frozen for a long period, but on the other direction: the
House of Commons, with 650 seats, is largely oversized regarding the country's
population and the cube root law. Not by chance, the United Kingdom is the most
centralized large democracy, where most territorial tensions are channeled
toward London. Right now, there are ten parties in the House of Commons, six of
them based in Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland. Not surprisingly, the House
room is too small and many MPs have to stand up during its plenary sessions.

The main point is that in a
long-durable democracy, the trade-off between the size of the national assembly
and territorial decentralization must keep a consistently bounded relationship.
It is not possible to alter significantly an institution without affecting the
balance of the other.

---

See also my article:

"Equilibrium Institutions: The Federal-Proportional Trade-Off"
- click

From the Wall Street Journal Feb 2. After 30 days I can post full text. A Consumption Tax Is the Shock Our Broken System NeedsSomething remarkable happened last month. On Jan. 9, Georgia Rep. Buddy Carter introduced the "Fair Tax" bill to the House of Representatives, and secured a promise of a floor vote. The bill eliminates the personal and corporate income tax, estate and gift tax, payroll (Social Security and Medicare) tax and the Internal Revenue Service. It replaces them with a single national sales tax. Business investment is exempt, so it is effectively a consumption tax. Each household would get a check each month, so that purchases up to the poverty line are effectively not taxed.Mainstream media and Democrats instantly deplored the measure. Mother Jones said it would "turbocharge inequality." Rep. Pramila Jayapal called it a "tax cut for the rich, period." The New Republic asserted that consumption taxes are "always a dumb idea"—but presumably not in Europe, where 20% value-added taxes finance welfare states—and called it a "Republican dream to build a wealth aristocracy."Even the Journal's editorial board disapproved, though mostly on politics rather than substance, admitting a consumption tax "might make sense" if Congress were "writing the tax code from scratch." The board worried that we might end up with income and sales taxes, like Europe. And the tax change won't pass, making it is a "masochistic vote" that it will "give Democrats a potent campaign issue."But our income and estate tax system is broken. It has high statutory rates with a Swiss cheese of exemptions, immense cost, unfairness and distortion. Former President Trump's taxes are Exhibit A, no longer making headlines because we learned that he simply aggressively exploits the complex rules and deductions that Congress offers to wealthy politically connected real-estate investors.A consumption tax, with none of the absurd complexity of our current taxes, is the answer. It funds the government with the least economic distortion. A consumption tax need not be regressive. It's easy enough to exempt the first few thousand dollars of consumption, or add to the rebate.More important, the progressivity of a whole tax and transfer system matters, not of a particular tax in isolation. If a flat consumption tax finances greater benefits to people of lesser means, the overall system could be more progressive than what we have now. A consumption tax would still finance food stamps, housing, Medicaid, and so forth. And it would be particularly efficient at raising revenue, meaning there would potentially be more to distribute—a point that has led some conservatives to object to a consumption tax.Others complain that the rate will be high. An effective 30% consumption tax, added to state sales taxes as high as 10%, could add up to a 40% or greater rate. But taxes overall must finance what the government spends. Collecting it in one tax rather than lots of smaller taxes doesn't change the overall rate. It's better for voters to see how much the government takes.A range of implicit subsidies will disappear. Good. Subsidies should be transparent. Money for electric cars, health insurance, housing, and so forth should be appropriated and sent as checks, not hidden as tax deductions or credits. They can still be as large as Congress and voters wish. However, it is vital to keep the tax at a flat rate and not try to redistribute income or subsidize industries by different tax rates.Will there be some problems of compliance and evasion? Probably, but sales taxes or value-added taxes are hardly new, untested ideas. The Fair Tax bill addresses many objections and real-world concerns, and more refinements can follow. A value-added tax or personal-consumption tax can achieve similar goals.This is a big moment. For a long time, consumption taxes have been debated in academic articles, books, think-tank reports, administration white papers and so forth. When the U.S. eventually decides to reform the tax code, consumption taxes will be the obvious answer. It is great news that real elected politicians like Rep. Carter get it, and are willing to stick their necks out to try to get it passed.No, it's not likely to pass this year, or next. All great reforms take time. The 8-hour workday and Social Security started as wild-eyed dreams of the socialist party. Civil rights took bill after bill being voted down. The income tax took a long time. But if we never talk about the promised land and only squabble over the next fork in the road, surely we will never get there.

It is actually pretty basic: if you pass a law that addresses a non-problem but harms a vulnerable minority, then you have no grounds to complain when other criticize you.  So, passing Bill 21 in Quebec, an Islamophobic and anti-semitic law, that didn't address an issue where there was a real problem makes those parties supporting it Islamophobic.  What was true when the proposed law was being discussed is even more true today as we see the seeds of hate producing the predicted fruit--violence and harassment of the vulnerable minorities.  When political parties and ultimately the government target groups, they are sending signals to the public to, yes, treat such groups worse.  Quebec's parties, by supporting this law, incited violence against its Muslim and Jewish communities (and probably Sikhs as well).  Intolerant laws don't breed tolerance.This all, of course, is a product of ethnic outbidding where the various parties tried to compete with each other to rid the public square of religious symbols ... of minority groups.  These parties have agency as do those who vote for them.  Bill 21 basically said that religious minorities could not wear signifiers of their religion while working in provincial jobs--not just law enforcement officers and judges, but doctors, nurses, bus drivers, etc.  The public sector in Quebec is quite large, in part because most health care is delivered by the province.  So, this law affected a great number of people.  Was there a study done to show how these folks wearing religious stuff was actually harmful?  Was the law designed to cover Catholics?  Not really.  Did it single out Muslims, Jews, and Sikhs?  Of course.  "We saw severe social stigmatization of Muslim women, marginalization of
Muslim women and very disturbing declines in their sense of well-being,
their ability to fulfil their aspirations, sense of safety, but also
hope for the future."  Some folks claiming to be feminists said that the aim was to free Muslim women from having to wear hijabs.... how do they feel now that women have faced abuse and have their security threatened?  To be fair, men supported this legislation more than women, because, hey, why not another tool to dominate women, but many women supported this as well.To be clear, it is not just that the folks who worked in the public sector were affected by this, which is bad enough.  It is also that the province sent a signal to the public that it was ok to discriminate against these groups, and the public heard this message.  So, all Muslims, Sikhs, and Jews are worse off now than a few years ago, whether they worked in the public sector or not. From the Association for Canadian Studies studyAnd, now, of course, Quebeckers are outraged.  Their parties and their politicians hate being called out for their racism, their xenophobia, their Islamophobia, and their anti-semitism.  The ire right now is aimed at Amira Elghawaby who was named Canada's first special representative on combating Islamophobia.  Why?  Because in 2019, she co-wrote a piece criticizing this awful law.  How dare a person appointed to combat hate against Muslims previously take a stand against a hateful law?While the law is the most awful part about this, the grandstanding by Quebec politicians who claims to be victims is also pretty terrible.  It again goes to something very basic and now ritualized: those who engage in hateful behavior (Islamophobia, racism, anti-semitism, misogyny) find it more problematic to be called hateful than to be hateful.  It is worse to be called a racist than to do racism, for example.  While this law was passed by a populist xenophobic party, other parties were part of the outbidding process, and now they are piling on Elghawaby to prove their nationalist credentials.I left Quebec for a variety of reasons, but the awful discourse of the place was one of them.  That a people who suffered much discrimination and harm at the ends of an often insensitive majority have turned around and used their domination of provincial power centres to treat their minorities this badly again and again because it plays well in elections.  That again speaks not just to parties of Quebec, but to Quebec media who blow these stories up, and to the public that both these parties and the media pander.  To be clear, these dynamics exist elsewhere--Bill 21 was attractive to significant hunks of the Canadian public outside of Quebec--and the provincial leadership of many provinces suck mightily.  But the nationalist outbidding aimed at proving one's worth by targeting minorities is far more severe in Quebec.  And no one should call them out for it, of course.

 I spent part of this afternoon being interviewed by television outlets about the missiles that hit Poland today and NATO might do.  This is one time where TV is going to get it much more right than the newspaper.  Why?  Because the major paper of record in Canada got it spectacularly wrong:  This is looking like a grave and possibly deliberate provocation by Russia, but it does not mean that NATO countries must, or will, become militarily involved, even if Poland invokes Articles 4 or 5. It's worth actually reading the North Atlantic Treaty https://t.co/Y9TNNoUmFK pic.twitter.com/kztaPvF3Lb— Doug Saunders (@DougSaunders) November 15, 2022

FFS!  NATO is a collective organization--one country cannot wave a magic wand and shout "Accio alliance!  Tada, Article V is invoked!!!"  Nope.  What any country in NATO can do is call a meeting so that the alliance could consider invoking these famed article.  A5 is the "an attack upon one is equal to an attack upon all."  The Dave and Steve book on NATO explored how obligatory that is (it's not) and what explains how countries behave when asked by the alliance to do something.  But getting back to that attacked thing: it only counts as an attack that deserves a collective response if a consensus among the members.  Everything at NATO operates by consensus--no one is ordered to do anything by any specific country or any sub-group of countries.  This means there is a lot of lowest common denominator kind of decisions with opt out clauses (did you read the Dave and Steve book yet?).  So, one of the first things Poland (or anyone else seeking to invoke A5) has to consider is: can they get consensus?  If not, don't ask because it is more than a bit embarrassing to ask and then be denied.  Ask Turkey about that.  It is kind of like going up for Full Professor when you don't know what the result will be--it only ends in pain and sadness (and moving which then leads to joy).  Can Poland get damn near all of the alliance (Greece or Hungary or Turkey can agree not to be too disagreeable but not support the decision and then not deploy troops)?  Um, no.  France, Germany, and Italy, to name a few obvious, more powerful members, have been just a wee bit ambivalent all the way along, and they certainly don't want to be involved in a shooting war with Russia.One of the other things Poland has to consider is: would A5 be good for Poland?  Um, no.  Because if NATO would go to war with Russia, which is what invoking A5 means, that would mean that Russia is no longer restrained from attacking the supply lines leading from the West to Ukraine through ... Poland.  The existence of A5 in the treaty is working--for both the alliance and for Russia.  Until today, after nine months or so of war, Russia had refrained from hitting any NATO country and specifically Poland.  And today was probably an accident.  An accident that may have been made more likely by a loosening of Russia's rules as they hadn't attacked border cities all that often.  But Kherson and other developments may have changed the risk calculus for Russia.  Anyhow, A5 has been good for NATO's eastern members as it has restrained Russia.  It has also been good for Russia since it has restrained NATO from engaging in direct violence.  So, no, Article 5 is not going to be invoked.  Article 4, which is a way to indicate the need for serious discussions against a threat, will be.  Poland will get reinforcements as will other NATO allies, Ukraine will get more anti-aircraft equipment, but Ukraine will not get what it wants for an early Christmas present--a NATO intervention.  This would be great in the very short term, but might also lead to nuclear war, which would be bad for a very long time.  As I said at the start of this, rule #1 of avoiding nuclear war is for nuclear powers not to fight each other directly.  India and Pakistan have made us all very nervous.  US and Russia have stuck by rule number one, and that is not going to change now.So, as I told CBC Kids last month, no, Virginia, there will not be a nuclear war.  But then again, some elements of the media want to scare folks for sales and market share and ratings, I suppose.  For shame, Globe and Mail, for shame.  

Over the last thirty years, the Italians have tried almost everything, nothing has resulted as expected, the country is stagnated, and this is the only dish on the menu that had not been tasted yet. Economic growth was flat since 2000, and after the Great Recession and the pandemic, the per capita GDP is 5% lower than fifteen years ago. Public debt amounts to about 150% of GDP (the second in Europe, only after Greece, which is a much smaller economy).This permanent turmoil is in sharp contrast with the more than forty years of political stability and economic growth since the establishment of the Italian Republic at the end of World War II. In the first edition of my textbook Political Institutions in Europe, the author of the chapter on Italy, Gianfranco Pasquino, summarized that period as one with unstable governments (one-year average duration), lasting coalitions (always around the Christian-democrats), repeated presidents of the Council (up to De Gasperi eight times, Andreotti seven, Fanfani six…), and stagnated policies. After the Cold War and the dissolution of both the Christian-democracy and the Communist Party, there have been sustained attempts to force alternations in government via political polarization. Five electoral reforms replaced the previous proportional representation system with mixed systems including single-member districts by plurality rule and a "majority bonus" to the largest party. The results have been, paraphrasing Pasquino: slightly less unstable governments (lasting on average 18 months, but remember that Germany had only three chancellors in forty years); changing coalitions with many alternations (about eight, plus two national unity cabinets); repeated presidents of the Council (Berlusconi four times, Prodi two…); and extremely stagnated policies, despite government alternations, because they now largely depend on the European Union. Against some expectations, new parties proliferated. The most significant electoral reform has been the most recent one, used for the first time in this election: an unprecedented cut of the number of seats in both chambers of Parliament (by 37 percent), which has reduced the number of parties and attenuated fragmentation.In this context, the emphasis on the fascist precedents of the current largest party, Brothers of Italy, is largely biased. In the early 1990s, in parallel to the dissolution of the Communist party, the Social Movement with fascist roots also experienced a "perestroika." It first formed the National Alliance, which won the popular vote in the South, merged with Berlusconi's party, and after being in government for a while with Giorgia Meloni as a minister, a group split to form the minor Brothers of Italy, which became the only opposition to Mario Draghi's government. Accusing Meloni of fascist origins is as distracting as it would be accusing the former president of the Council Massimo D'Alema, at the time leader of the Party of the Italian Communists, of being the heir of Stalinism. While D'Alema furtherly evolved and became Vice-president of the Socialist International, the Brothers of Italy became a member of the European Conservative Group (which was founded by the British Tories), a more pro-EU alignment than the Identity Group that includes the Italian League, the French Le Pen, and the Alternative for Germany.Meanwhile, the European Union is reinforcing its fiscal and financial resources. Italy is prepared to receive the largest amount of loans and donations from the EU's programs for recovery and investments. The intended amount is a programs' percentage double the size of the Italian population and economy's share in the EU (as similarly happens with Spain, but the latter is a smaller economy). At some moment, Meloni hinted at renegotiating the conditional reforms on the judiciary, the tax code, or the anti-trust and competition rules. The size and interdependence of the Italian economy in Europe may give her some leverage, as the country is too big for the EU to let it fail. On this basis, the new Italian government could threaten the EU. But the EU is right now also menacing by being stern on that kind of attitude with its firmness on Hungary.This unbalanced game of mutual threats reflects the general political situation in Europe: the Union is already sufficiently strong to nullify many sovereign powers of the states, but not yet enough to establish the EU as the prevailing institutional level in all respects. Perhaps things must go still worse to go better. Worse with the useless politicking in the states to go better with a European more effective union.President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella was aware of this risk when he prevented the League's Matteo Salvini from becoming president of the Council after the last election and appointed the European leader Draghi. He could still try something of the sort.

The material scope of the analysis undertaken in the text covers the issues concerned with the relationship between two goods. Between the good constituted by community security on the one hand, and the good vested in the power to apply special measures falling within necessary defence and the state of higher necessity. The problem of the relationship between two goods, e.g. a conflict between two goods, can be observed in the competition between the common good and the good of the individual. A similar relation can be noted in the process of derogation from the obligations upon the contemporary political community as regards protection of life and other individual rights and freedoms. Special cases of the conflict between goods include the admissibility of the use of force, violence or restriction of individual freedom. Undoubtedly, situations in which individuals or groups are subjected to torture or have their life taken serve as the most extreme examples of violence use by the political community. All kinds of surveillance measures used by state institutions should be reckoned among the examples concerned with interference in individuals' private lives. The main purpose of the analysis contained in the text is to present all manner of argumentation concerned with the possibility of applying special measures within or outside the bounds of necessary defence and the state of higher necessity by the political community. In order to elaborate the objective scope of the analysis, the following research questions have been formulated in the text: (1) To what extent is it possible, within the limits of the law and per analogiam to the individual's adequate actions, for the political community to apply special measures (necessary defence or the state of higher necessity) with the aim of providing security (and in particular counter terrorism security) for itself?, (2) To what extent is it possible, outside the limits of the law and per analogiam to the individual's adequate actions, for the political community to apply special measures (necessary defence or the state of higher necessity) with the aim of providing security (and in particular counter terrorism security) for itself? The presented analysis is chiefly an overview of a conceptual character with regard to the presentation of the issues concerned with the relationship between such goods as security and special powers of a political community. For the presentation of the legal aspects of this issue textual, functional and systemic interpretations have been applied. Next to the individual kinds of legal interpretation, in the course of argumentation a theoretical reflection on the law is used. The conceptual approach to the title problem makes use of argumentation per analogiam to appropriate actions by an individual when faced with a direct threat, and specified in the provisions of the Polish criminal law – necessary defence and the state of higher necessity. ; Zakres przedmiotowy analizy podjętej w tekście obejmuje problematykę relacji między dwoma dobrami. Z jednej strony między dobrem, którym jest bezpieczeństwo wspólnoty, i z drugiej strony – dobrem wyrażającym się w uprawnieniu do stosowania szczególnych środków wpisujących się w ramy obrony koniecznej i stanu wyższej konieczności. Problem relacji między dwoma dobrami, np. konfliktem między dwoma dobrami, zauważyć można w rywalizacji dobra wspólnego i dobra jednostki. Podobną relację zauważyć można w procesie derogacji zobowiązań współczesnej wspólnoty politycznej w zakresie ochrony życia oraz innych praw i wolności jednostki. Za szczególne przypadki kolizji dóbr należy uznać dopuszczalność użycia siły, przemocy i ograniczenia prywatności jednostki. Do najbardziej skrajnych przykładów użycia siły i przemocy przez wspólnotę polityczną należy zaliczyć pozbawienie jednostek lub grup życia i stosowanie wobec nich tortur. Natomiast do przykładów związanych z ingerencją w sferę życia prywatnego jednostki należy zaliczyć wszelkiego rodzaju środki inwigilacji stosowane przez instytucje państwowe. Głównym celem analizy zawartej w tekście jest przedstawienie różnego typu argumentów dotyczących możliwości stosowania szczególnych środków w granicach lub poza granicami obrony koniecznej i stanu wyższej konieczności przez wspólnotę polityczną. W celu uszczegółowienia zakresu przedmiotowego analizy w tekście wskazano następujące pytania badawcze: (1) W jakim zakresie możliwe jest w granicach prawa, per analogiam do adekwatnych działań jednostki, stosowanie szczególnych środków (obrony koniecznej lub stanu wyższej konieczności) przez wspólnotę polityczną w celu zapewnienia jej bezpieczeństwa (w szczególności bezpieczeństwa antyterrorystycznego)?; (2) W jakim zakresie możliwe jest w poza granicami prawa, per analogiam do adekwatnych działań jednostki, stosowanie szczególnych środków (obrony koniecznej lub stanu wyższej konieczności) przez wspólnotę polityczną w celu zapewnienia jej bezpieczeństwa (w szczególności bezpieczeństwa antyterrorystycznego)? Analiza zawarta w tekście ma głównie charakter poglądowy i koncepcyjny w zakresie prezentacji problematyki relacji dóbr, jakimi są bezpieczeństwo i szczególne uprawnienia wspólnoty politycznej. Do prezentacji prawnych aspektów tego zagadnienia wykorzystano interpretację tekstualną, funkcjonalną i systemową. Obok poszczególnych rodzajów interpretacji prawnych w toku argumentacji wykorzystano teoretyczną refleksję nad prawem. W ujęciu koncepcyjnym tytułowego problemu wykorzystano argumentację per analogiam do adekwatnych działań jednostki w chwili bezpośrednio grożącego jej niebezpieczeństwa a określonych w przepisach polskiego prawa karnego – czyli obrony koniecznej i stanu wyższej konieczności.

The material scope of the analysis undertaken in the text covers the issues concerned with the relationship between two goods. Between the good constituted by community security on the one hand, and the good vested in the power to apply special measures falling within necessary defence and the state of higher necessity. The problem of the relationship between two goods, e.g. a conflict between two goods, can be observed in the competition between the common good and the good of the individual. A similar relation can be noted in the process of derogation from the obligations upon the contemporary political community as regards protection of life and other individual rights and freedoms. Special cases of the conflict between goods include the admissibility of the use of force, violence or restriction of individual freedom. Undoubtedly, situations in which individuals or groups are subjected to torture or have their life taken serve as the most extreme examples of violence use by the political community. All kinds of surveillance measures used by state institutions should be reckoned among the examples concerned with interference in individuals' private lives. The main purpose of the analysis contained in the text is to present all manner of argumentation concerned with the possibility of applying special measures within or outside the bounds of necessary defence and the state of higher necessity by the political community. In order to elaborate the objective scope of the analysis, the following research questions have been formulated in the text: (1) To what extent is it possible, within the limits of the law and per analogiam to the individual's adequate actions, for the political community to apply special measures (necessary defence or the state of higher necessity) with the aim of providing security (and in particular counter terrorism security) for itself?, (2) To what extent is it possible, outside the limits of the law and per analogiam to the individual's adequate actions, for the political community to apply special measures (necessary defence or the state of higher necessity) with the aim of providing security (and in particular counter terrorism security) for itself? The presented analysis is chiefly an overview of a conceptual character with regard to the presentation of the issues concerned with the relationship between such goods as security and special powers of a political community. For the presentation of the legal aspects of this issue textual, functional and systemic interpretations have been applied. Next to the individual kinds of legal interpretation, in the course of argumentation a theoretical reflection on the law is used. The conceptual approach to the title problem makes use of argumentation per analogiam to appropriate actions by an individual when faced with a direct threat, and specified in the provisions of the Polish criminal law – necessary defence and the state of higher necessity. ; Zakres przedmiotowy analizy podjętej w tekście obejmuje problematykę relacji między dwoma dobrami. Z jednej strony między dobrem, którym jest bezpieczeństwo wspólnoty, i z drugiej strony – dobrem wyrażającym się w uprawnieniu do stosowania szczególnych środków wpisujących się w ramy obrony koniecznej i stanu wyższej konieczności. Problem relacji między dwoma dobrami, np. konfliktem między dwoma dobrami, zauważyć można w rywalizacji dobra wspólnego i dobra jednostki. Podobną relację zauważyć można w procesie derogacji zobowiązań współczesnej wspólnoty politycznej w zakresie ochrony życia oraz innych praw i wolności jednostki. Za szczególne przypadki kolizji dóbr należy uznać dopuszczalność użycia siły, przemocy i ograniczenia prywatności jednostki. Do najbardziej skrajnych przykładów użycia siły i przemocy przez wspólnotę polityczną należy zaliczyć pozbawienie jednostek lub grup życia i stosowanie wobec nich tortur. Natomiast do przykładów związanych z ingerencją w sferę życia prywatnego jednostki należy zaliczyć wszelkiego rodzaju środki inwigilacji stosowane przez instytucje państwowe. Głównym celem analizy zawartej w tekście jest przedstawienie różnego typu argumentów dotyczących możliwości stosowania szczególnych środków w granicach lub poza granicami obrony koniecznej i stanu wyższej konieczności przez wspólnotę polityczną. W celu uszczegółowienia zakresu przedmiotowego analizy w tekście wskazano następujące pytania badawcze: (1) W jakim zakresie możliwe jest w granicach prawa, per analogiam do adekwatnych działań jednostki, stosowanie szczególnych środków (obrony koniecznej lub stanu wyższej konieczności) przez wspólnotę polityczną w celu zapewnienia jej bezpieczeństwa (w szczególności bezpieczeństwa antyterrorystycznego)?; (2) W jakim zakresie możliwe jest w poza granicami prawa, per analogiam do adekwatnych działań jednostki, stosowanie szczególnych środków (obrony koniecznej lub stanu wyższej konieczności) przez wspólnotę polityczną w celu zapewnienia jej bezpieczeństwa (w szczególności bezpieczeństwa antyterrorystycznego)? Analiza zawarta w tekście ma głównie charakter poglądowy i koncepcyjny w zakresie prezentacji problematyki relacji dóbr, jakimi są bezpieczeństwo i szczególne uprawnienia wspólnoty politycznej. Do prezentacji prawnych aspektów tego zagadnienia wykorzystano interpretację tekstualną, funkcjonalną i systemową. Obok poszczególnych rodzajów interpretacji prawnych w toku argumentacji wykorzystano teoretyczną refleksję nad prawem. W ujęciu koncepcyjnym tytułowego problemu wykorzystano argumentację per analogiam do adekwatnych działań jednostki w chwili bezpośrednio grożącego jej niebezpieczeństwa a określonych w przepisach polskiego prawa karnego – czyli obrony koniecznej i stanu wyższej konieczności.

AbstrakPemerintah Desa sebagai penyelenggara pemerintahan di desa melaksanakan funginya diberikan kewangan untuk mengatur pemerintahan sendiri yang termuat dalam Undang-Undung Nomer 34 Tahun 2004 Tentang pemerintahan daerah. Namun dalam pelaksanaan terdapat kesenjangan yang berarti diantaranya adalah berobahnya sekretaris desa yang menjadi Pegawai Negeri Sipil yang telah mengakibatkan posisi otonomi desa tidak independent lagi. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui kewenangan yang menjadi tanggung jawab pemerintah desa dalam kenangka otonomi desa, untuk mengotalui pelaksanaan tugas pemerintah desa yang dijalankan di kabupaten Kudus, dan untuk mengetahui bagaimana pertanggungjawaban atas kewenangan pemerintah desa kepada bupati dalam kerangka otonomi desa di kabupaten Kudus. Metode pendekatan yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah pendekatan yuridis empiris. Spesifikasi penelitian bersifat deskriptif analisis. Jenis data berbentuk data primer dan data sekunder Sedangkan teknik analisis delam penelitian ini terdiri dari tehnik analisis deskriptif dan analisis interaksi. Hasil penelitian menunjukan bahwa kewenangan pemerintah desa dalam hal ini adalah hak untuk mengatur dan mengurus kepentingan maayarakat setempat sesual dengan asal usul, adat istiadat yang berlaku dan tidak bertentangan dengan peraturan perundang-undangan. Dalam pelaksanan otonomi desa di Kabupaten Kudus, belum ada upaya maksimal di setiap desa dalam menjalankan tugas dan fungsi pokok secara baik. Diantara permasalahan belum maksimal adalah karena terjadinya status sekretaris desa menjadi PNS yang membuat kesenjangan yang berarti. Pertanggung jawaban kewenangan desa kepada bupati dipahami sebagai pertanggung jawaban keuangan sebagaimana diatur dalam pasal 15 ayat (1) huruf I PP No. 72 Tahun 2003 tentang Desa. Kesimpulan yang diperoleh bahwa konsep otonomi desa memberikan kewenangan kepada pemerintah desa untuk mengatur serta mengelola pemerintahannya sendiri sedikit dikebiri dengan keberadaan Undang-Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah dimana pemerintah hanya ditempatkan sebagai bawahan dari pemerintah kabupaten/kota, pemerintah desa yang tordiri dari Kepala Desa dan Perangkat Desa muncul permasalahan yaitu Sekretaris Desa yang harus di isi oleh PNS sehingga memunculkan perangkat desa yang lan. Berangkat dari hasil penelitian teraebut maka pemerintah diharapkan dapat melakukan beberapa penguatan terhadap pelaksanaan otonomi di desa dengan jalan melakukan perubahan Undang-Undang Nomor 32 Tabun 2004. Bahwa perkembangan sosial kemasyarakatan yang sangat pesat menuntut pemerintah desa turut berkembang dan semakin terbuka guna terciptanya pelayanan terhadap publik yang maksimal.AbstractThe Village Government as the administrator of the village administration in carrying out its functions is given the authority to regulate self-government as contained in Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning regional government. However, in the implementation there are significant gaps, including the change of the village secretary who became a Civil Servant which has resulted in the position of village autonomy being no longer independent. The purpose of this study was to determine the authority that is the responsibility of the village government in regard to village autonomy, to coordinate the implementation of village government tasks carried out in Kudus district, and to find out how to account for the village government's authority to the regent within the framework of village autonomy in Kudus district. The approach method used in this study is an empirical juridical approach. The research specification is descriptive analysis. The type of data is in the form of primary data and secondary data. Meanwhile, the analytical techniques in this study consist of descriptive analysis techniques and interaction analysis. The results of the study indicate that the authority of the village government in this case is the right to regulate and manage the interests of the local community in accordance with their origins, prevailing customs and not contrary to statutory regulations. In implementing village autonomy in Kudus Regency, there has not been a maximum effort in each village in carrying out its main duties and functions properly. Among the problems that have not been maximized is the occurrence of the status of the village secretary to become a civil servant which creates a significant gap. The accountability of village authority to the regent is understood as financial responsibility as regulated in Article 15 paragraph (1) letter I PP No. 72 of 2003 concerning Villages. The conclusion is that the concept of village autonomy gives the village government the authority to regulate and manage its own government, which is slightly neutered by the existence of Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government where the government is only placed as a subordinate of the district/city government, the village government which is independent from the Head Village and Village Apparatus problems arise, namely the Village Secretary which must be filled in by PNS so that other village officials appear. Departing from the results of this research, the government is expected to be able to carry out some strengthening of the implementation of autonomy in the village by making changes to Law Number 32 Tabun 2004. That very rapid social development requires the village government to develop and be more open in order to create services to the public that are maximum.

En Colombia, a través de la ley 1861 de 2017, se reglamenta el servicio de reclutamiento, control de reservas y la movilización, el cual establece en su artículo 4, la definición de servicio militar obligatorio, como aquel deber constitucional dirigido a todos los colombianos de servir a la patria, fundamental en la mayoría de los países, como pilar para la defensa y soberanía de la nación, lo que implica destinar y mantener recursos económicos que satisfagan las principales necesidades incluyendo aquellas necesarias para garantizar los derechos fundamentales, de aquellos hombres que deciden definir su situación militar, prestando el servicio militar obligatorio, y quienes emplean entre doce y dieciocho meses para cumplir con el requisito establecido en mencionada ley. La Fuerza Aérea Colombiana (FAC), como fuerza militar emplea para el cumplimiento de su misión una cantidad de recursos en donde se encuentra inmersos el personal de soldados, jóvenes que transitoriamente hacen parte de la fuerza efectiva de personal y quienes principalmente se desempeñan como soldados regulares o bachilleres en cada una de las distintas Unidades Militares Aéreas (UMA) empleados para realizar diferentes actividades de seguridad y defensa de bases aéreas. En los últimos seis años, esto ha implicado la destinación de aproximadamente doscientos cincuenta mil millones de pesos ($250.000.000.000), para garantizar el sostenimiento de cerca de veinte dos mil seiscientos cuarenta y dos soldados (22642), quienes han cumplido con su servicio militar obligatorio en la Fuerza Aérea Colombiana (FAC), recursos económicos que en la actualidad representan un gasto fundamental sin un retorno de inversión tangible, los cuales mediante la aplicación de un modelo de administración podrían destinarse a optimizar los medios para la seguridad actuales, es decir, medidas activas, medidas pasivas, armamento, comunicaciones, movilidad entre otros, realizando una reducción de la actual planta de soldados existentes en la FAC, con el propósito de potencializar proyectos, en los cuales se transforme el actual esquema de seguridad y defensa de bases, basado en la triada Hombre – Tecnología – Procedimientos, junto a la aplicación de las cinco D definidas en el libro de protección de activos, Disuadir, Denegar, Detectar, Demorar y Destruir. Adicionalmente, teniendo como referente que el conflicto militar en la actualidad, no es soportado en el principio de la masa, y la aparición de tecnologías para la seguridad y el surgimiento de nuevas amenazas, invita a que hoy por hoy, se planteen nuevas estrategias que permitan mantener la sensación de seguridad en las Unidades Militares Aéreas, mediante una optimización de los actuales recursos, logrando con ello, afianzar a la Fuerza Aérea Colombiana en un ambiente acorde a los desarrollos tecnológicos y a las nuevas modalidades o situaciones de riesgo que quieran atentar contra el componente físico del poder aéreo y espacial de la FAC. ; In Colombia, through Law 1861 of 2017, the service of recruitment, reserve control and mobilization is regulated, through which it establishes in its article 4, the definition of compulsory military service, as that constitutional duty directed to all Colombians of Serving the homeland, fundamental in most countries, as a pillar for the defense and sovereignty of the nation, which implies allocating and maintaining economic resources that satisfy the main needs, including those necessary to guarantee the fundamental rights of those men who decide to define their military situation, rendering compulsory military service, and those who employ between 12 and 18 months to comply with the requirement established in the aforementioned law. In the last six years, this has implied the allocation of approximately two hundred and fifty billion pesos ($ 250,000,000,000), to guarantee the support of approximately twenty two thousand six hundred and forty-two soldiers (22642), who have completed their military service mandatory in the Colombian Air Force (FAC), economic resources that currently represent a fundamental expense without a tangible return on investment, which through the application of a management model could be used to optimize the current means for security, that is, , active measures, passive measures, weapons, communications, mobility, among others, by reducing a percentage of the current staff of existing soldiers in the FAC, with the purpose of enhancing projects, in which the current security and safety scheme is transformed. defense of bases, based on the triad Man - Technology - Procedures, together with the application of the five D defined in the asset protection book, Deter, Deny, Detect, Delay and Destroy. Additionally, taking as a reference that the current military conflict is not supported on the principle of the mass, and the appearance of technologies for security and their professionalization, invites that today, new strategies are proposed that allow maintaining the sensation of security in the Military Air Units, through an optimization of current resources, thereby achieving the consolidation of the Colombian Air Force in an environment in accordance with technological developments and new modalities or risk situations that want to attack the physical component of the air and space power of the FAC.