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It speaks volumes that the death of Henry Kissinger, announced on Wednesday, drew major news obituaries that rivaled those of late American presidents' in length and depth. The news was met with equal parts of vitriol and paeans across social media, the former reflected in words like "war criminal" and "monster," the latter, "genius" and "master."His intellectually-driven, hard-nosed statecraft and strategy has long been embraced by realists who appreciate Kissinger's rejection of ideological doctrine in favor of interest-driven realpolitik. They credit him with détente and managing the Soviet threat in the Cold War. His critics say his approach was responsible for government-led massacres in developing nations and Washington's scorched earth policies in Indochina. Humanity suffered while the "great game" was played, no matter how well, from the Nixon White House and in later presidencies (12 total) for which Kissinger advised.But was his impact on U.S. foreign policy ultimately positive or negative? We asked a wide range of historians, former diplomats, journalists and scholars to pick one and defend it.Andrew Bacevich, George Beebe, Tom Blanton, Michael Desch, Anton Fedyashin, Chas Freeman, John Allen Gay, David Hendrickson, Robert Hunter, Anatol Lieven, Stephen Miles, Tim Shorrock, Monica Duffy Toft, Stephen WaltAndrew Bacevich, historian and co-founder of the Quincy InstituteI met Kissinger just once, at a small gathering in New York back in the 1990s. When the event adjourned, he walked over to where I was sitting and spoke to me. "Did you serve in the military?" "Yes," I said. "In Vietnam?" "Yes." His tone filled with sadness, he said: "We really wanted to win that one."I did not reply but as he walked away, I thought: What an accomplished liar.George Beebe, Director of Grand Strategy, Quincy InstituteHenry Kissinger's impact on American foreign policy, although controversial, was on balance overwhelmingly positive. As he entered office in 1968, America was overextended abroad and beset by domestic political conflict. An increasingly powerful Soviet Union threatened to achieve superiority over America's nuclear and conventional arsenals. The United States needed to extract itself from Vietnam and focus on domestic healing, yet any retreat into isolationism would allow Moscow a free hand to intimidate Western Europe and spread communism through the post-colonial world. Kissinger's answer to this problem, conceived in partnership with President Nixon, was a masterwork of diplomatic realism. Seeing an opportunity to exploit tensions between Moscow and Beijing, he orchestrated a surprise opening to Maoist China that reshaped the international order, counterbalancing Soviet power and complicating the Kremlin's strategic challenge. In parallel, the United States pursued détente with Moscow, producing a landmark set of trade, arms control, human rights, and confidence-building arrangements that helped to constrain the arms race and make the Cold War more manageable and predictable.By comparison to 1968, the scale of the problems we face today seems more daunting. The Cold War architecture of arms control and security arrangements is in tatters. Our middle class is more distrustful and disaffected, our international reputation more damaged, and our ability to manage the challenges of a peer Chinese rival more limited. A statesman with Kissinger's strategic acumen and diplomatic skill is very much needed. Tom Blanton, Director, National Security Archive, George Washington UniversityThe declassified legacy of Henry Kissinger undermines the triumphant narrative he labored so hard to build, even for his successes. The opening to China, for example, turns out to be Mao's idea with Nixon's receptiveness, initially dissed by Kissinger. His shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East did reduce violence but it took Anwar Sadat and then Jimmy Carter to make the peace that Kissinger failed to accomplish. The 1973 Vietnam settlement was actually available in 1969, but Kissinger mistakenly believed he could do better by going through Moscow or Beijing. Meanwhile, Kissinger's callousness about the human cost runs through all the documents. Millions of Bangladeshis murdered by Pakistan's genocide while Kissinger stifled dissent in the State Department. A million Vietnamese and 20,000 Americans who died for Kissinger's "decent interval." Some 30,000 Argentines disappeared by the junta with Kissinger's green light. Thousands of Chileans killed by Pinochet while Kissinger joked about human rights. Untold numbers of Cambodians dead under Kissinger's secret bombing.Adding insult to all these injuries, Kissinger cashed in over the past 45 years through sustained influence peddling and self-promotion, paying no price for repeated bad judgments like opposing the Reagan-Gorbachev arms cuts, and supporting the 2003 Iraq invasion. A dark legacy indeed.Michael Desch, Professor of International Relations at the University of Notre Dame Almost all of the obituaries for Henry Kissinger characterize him as the quintessential realist, harkening back to a bygone era of European great power politics in which statesmen played the 19th century version of the board game Risk otherwise known as the balance of power. Kissinger seemed straight out of central casting for this role with his deep, sonorous voice and perpetual Mittel-Europa accent. All that was missing was a monocle and a Pickelhaube. But in reality, Kissinger was at best an occasional realist. His best scholarly book — "A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22" — came out in 1957 and was more of a work of history than an articulation of a larger realpolitik theory of global politics in which power is used, and more importantly not used, to advance a country's national interest.And while his (and Richard Nixon's) opening to the People's Republic of China in 1972 remains a masterstroke of balance of power politics in action, at the drop of an egg-roll dividing the heretofore seemingly monolithic Communist Bloc, he was more often an inconstant realist.At times Kissinger embraced a crude might-makes-right approach (think of the Athenians bullying of the Melians in Book V of Thucydides) epitomized by the escalation to deescalate the war in Vietnam by invading Cambodia and the meddling in the fractious politics of Third World countries like Chile, seemingly to no other end than that's what great powers do. More recently, he's worked to remain the indispensable statesman through an embarrassingly obsequious pattern of making himself indispensable to nearly every subsequent president, whether or not they were really interested in sitting at the knee of the master realpolitiker. His hedged endorsement of George W. Bush's disastrous Iraq war is exhibit A on this score.Kissinger kept himself in the limelight for much of his career but not as a consistent voice of realism in foreign policy.Anton Fedyashin, associate professor of history, American UniversityIn his long and distinguished career, Henry Kissinger made many decisions that history may judge harshly, but oversimplifying and exaggerating complex geopolitical issues was not one of them. With their instinctive aversion to the trap of conceptual binarism, Kissinger and Nixon applied their flexible realism to China and the USSR in 1972. Abandoning the assumption that all communists were evil forced Beijing and Moscow to outbid each other for U.S. favors. Treating the USSR as a post-revolutionary state that put national interests above ideology, Nixon and Kissinger decided to bring the Soviets into the American-managed world order while letting them keep their hegemony in Eastern Europe.In Kissinger's realist version of containment, statesmanship was judged by the management of ambiguities, not absolutes. As Kissinger put it in an interview with The Economist earlier this year, "The genius of the Westphalian system and the reason it spread across the world was that its provisions were procedural, not substantive." Kissinger's realist wisdom would serve American leaders well as they navigate the rough waters of transitioning to a multipolar world order. The era of great power balancing is back, and non-binarist realism can help Washington manage hegemonic decline rather than catalyzing it.Ambassador Chas Freeman, visiting scholar at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public AffairsKissinger embodied a global and strategic view and because it was global, it often offended specialists in regional affairs. Because it was strategic, he often made tactical sacrifices for strategic gain. And the tactical sacrifices that he made were often rather ugly at the regional or local level. The classic example of that is the refusal to intervene in the war in Bangladesh. Obviously, he had nothing but contempt for ideological foreign policy. This has led ideologues, of which we have an abundance, to see him as an enemy, and you're seeing this now with some of the coverage after his passing.Kissinger's achievement of detente at a crucial point in the Cold War will be remembered for its brilliance, as will his significant scholarship. His statecraft and scholarship were inseparable. He was a very good negotiator and probably had more experience negotiating great power relations than any secretary of state since early in the Republic. He was moderately successful in the short term. He was not successful in the long term because his interlocutors correctly perceived that he was manipulative. If one wishes to keep relationships open to future transactions, one must not cheat on current transactions. But this problem is not uncommon. It's very typical in American politics. For example, Jim Baker was famously uninterested in nurturing relationships. He was interested in immediate results in his dealings with foreign governments. He left a lot of anger and dissatisfaction in his wake. Kissinger less so, but the same for different reasons, reflecting his personality, his character, and the character of the president he served.John Allen Gay, Executive Director, John Quincy Adams SocietyKissinger's legacy in the Third World commands the most attention and criticism. He has been made the face of the tremendous toll the Cold War took on the wretched of the earth. Yet his work on great power relations deserves more regard. The opening to China he engineered with President Richard Nixon was a masterstroke to exploit division in the Communist world. Granted, the Sino-Soviet split had happened long before, and the opening was more a Nixon idea, but Kissinger set the table. And Kissinger was also a central figure in détente with the Soviet Union.Both policies were deeply unpopular with the forerunners to the neoconservative movement, but reflected the Continental realist mindset that Kissinger, along with thinkers like Hans J. Morgenthau, brought into the American foreign policy discourse. The opening to China and détente were, in fact, linked. As Kissinger pointed out, the opening to China challenged the Soviet Union to prevent the opening from growing; contrary to the advice of Sovietologists, this did not prompt new Soviet aggression, but made the Soviets more pliable. As Kissinger wrote in his 1994 book "Diplomacy" — "To the extent both China and the Soviet Union calculated that they either needed American goodwill or feared an American move toward its adversary, both had an incentive to improve their relations with Washington. […] America's bargaining position would be strongest when America was closer to bot communist giants than either was to the other." And so it was. Today's practitioners of great-power politics would do well to borrow more from this happier part of Kissinger's legacy. They have instead helped drive China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea together, and have no answer to this emerging alignment beyond lectures and sanctions. The19th century European statesmen Kissinger admired would have seen the failure of such a policy. David Hendrickson, author, "Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition"The great oddity of Nixon and Kissinger's record in foreign policy is that they gave up as unprofitable and dangerous the pursuit of ideological antagonism with the Great Powers (the Soviet Union and China), but then pursued the Cold War crusade with a vengeance against small powers. Kissinger's diplomatic career reminds me of the charge that Hauterive (a favorite of Napoleon's) brought against the confusions of the ancien regime, that it applied "the terms sound policy, system of equilibrium, maintenance or restoration of the balance of power . . . to what, in fact was only an abuse of power, or the exercise of arbitrary will."Parts of Kissinger's record, like the bombing of Cambodia, are indefensible, but there are good parts too: had Henry the K been in charge of our Russia policy over the last decade, we could have avoided the conflagration in Ukraine. He was sounder on China and Taiwan than 90 percent of the howling commentariat. He was, in addition, a serious scholar who wrote some good books about the construction of world order (A World Restored, Diplomacy). Young people should take his thought seriously, not consign him to the ninth circle.Robert Hunter, former U.S. Ambassador to NATOLike all outstanding teachers, Henry Kissinger was also a showman — and he could be fun. He used his accent and self-deprecating humor as weapons for his policies and getting them taken seriously. Journalists might at times scorn what he was doing and how he did it, but they were still charmed and tended so often to give him the benefit of the doubt — as well as the credit, even when not deserved. Everyone recalls his roles in promoting détente with the Soviet Union and, even more, the opening to China, with Richard Nixon following in his wake. In fact, both policies sprang from Nixon's mind. But when the dust settled, Kissinger was the Last Man Standing."Henry," we could call him who never worked for him (!), made intelligent and literate speeches on foreign policy that everyone could understand, bringing it into the limelight. A man of great ego, he still recruited and inspired talented acolytes at the State Department and White House — matched only by Brent Scowcroft and Zbig Brzezinski. He had other policy positives in the Middle East ("shuttle diplomacy") but major negatives in Chile, in prolonging the Vietnam War, and bombing Cambodia.Take him altogether, a true Man of History.Anatol Lieven, Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy InstituteThe problem about any just assessment of Henry Kissinger is that the good and bad parts of his record are organically linked. His Realism led him to an awareness of the vital interests of other countries, a willingness to compromise, and a prudence in the exercise of U.S. power that all too many American policymakers have altogether lacked and that the United States today desperately needs. This Realist acceptance of the world as it is however also contributed to a cynical disregard for basic moral norms — notably in Cambodia and Bangladesh — that have forever tarnished his and America's name.When in office, reconciliation with China and the pursuit of Middle East peace took real moral courage on Kissinger's part, given the forces arrayed against these policies in the United States. But in his last decades, though he initially criticized NATO expansion and called for the preservation of relations with Russia and China, he never did so with the intellectual and moral force of a George Kennan.Perhaps in the end the best comment on Kissinger comes from an epithet by his fellow German Jewish thinker on international affairs Hans Morgenthau: "It is a dangerous thing to be a Machiavelli. It is a disastrous thing to be a Machiavelli without Virtu" — an Italian term embracing courage, moral steadfastness and basic principle.Stephen Miles, President, Win Without WarNearly as many words have been spilled marking the end of Henry Kissinger's life as the lives he's responsible for ending, but let me add a few more. It would be easy to simply say that the devastating impact of Kissinger on U.S. foreign policy was clearly and wholly negative. As Spencer Ackerman noted in his essential obituary, few Americans, if any, have ever been as responsible for the death of so many of their fellow human beings. But Kissinger's true impact was not just in being a war criminal but in setting a new standard for doing so with impunity. Earlier this year, he was feted with a party for his 100th birthday attended not just by crusty old Cold Warriors remembering 'the good ole days,' but also by a veritable who's who of today's elite from billionaire CEOs and cabinet members to fashion megastars and NFL team owners. Sure, he may have been responsible for a coup here or a genocide there, but shouldn't we all just look past that and recognize his influence, power, and intellect? Does it really matter what he used those talents for?And in the end, that's the benefit of Kissinger's horrific life and decidedly not-untimely death. By never making amends for the harm he did and never being held accountable for the horrors he caused, he made clear just how truly broken and flawed U.S. foreign policy is. Perhaps now that he has finally left the stage, we can begin to change that. Tim Shorrock, Washington-based journalistKissinger nearly destroyed three Asian countries by causing the deaths of thousands in U.S. bombing raids, covertly intervened to subvert democracy in Chile, and encouraged an Indonesian dictator to invade newly independent East Timor and inflict a genocide upon its people. These were criminal acts that should have made him a pariah. Instead, he is lauded as a visionary by our ruling elite. And it was mostly accomplished through lies and deceit, in the name of corporate profit.I'll never forget in 1972 watching Kissinger declare "peace is at hand" in Vietnam. After years of protesting this immoral war, I truly thought that Vietnam's suffering, and my own countrymen's, was finally over; they had won and we had lost. But my hope was shattered that Christmas, when Kissinger and Nixon ordered B-52s to carpet-bomb Hanoi in an arrogant act of defiance and malice. Afterwards, a shaky peace agreement was signed that could have sparked an honorable U.S. withdrawal. But it took 3 more years of bloodshed before the United States was forced out.Kissinger broke my trust in America as a just nation and overseas sparked a deep hatred of U.S. foreign policy. Few statesmen have caused such harm.Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics and Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityI have a pair of midcentury teak chairs once belonging to the late eminent scholar Samuel P. Huntington in my office. Sam was a colleague and friend of Henry Kissinger's, and a mentor to me. Sam and I sat in these chairs discussing world politics and the everyday challenges of running a scholarly institute. When a new set of chairs arrived, Sam insisted I take the old ones, but not before emphasizing their significance — reminders of the hours he and Kissinger spent in deep debate and casual banter. These chairs have history.Henry Kissinger was, and shall remain, a controversial figure. His gifts were two. First, across decades of U.S. foreign policy challenges, he remained consistent in his conception of power, and how U.S. power should be used to enhance the security of the United States. Second, he was gifted at assembling, mentoring, and deploying cross-cutting networks of influential people. Like many of my colleagues who study international politics, there are policies — his support of Salvador Allende's ouster in Chile, for example — I find odious. I am also uncomfortable with Kissinger's elitism: his preferred policies favored those with wealth and political power at the expense of those without.But what I admire about Kissinger's U.S. foreign policy legacy and, by extension, international politics, was his profound grasp of the importance of historical context: a thing as important to sound U.S foreign policy today as it is rare; and of which I am pleasantly reminded every time I sit in one of Sam's chairs.Stephen Walt, Quincy Institute board member, professor of international affairs at the Harvard Kennedy SchoolHenry Kissinger was the most prominent U.S. statesman of his era, and that era lasted a very long time. His main achievements were not trivial: a long-overdue opening to China, some high-wire "shuttle diplomacy" after the 1973 October War, and several useful arms control treaties during the period of détente. But he was also guilty of some monumental misjudgments, including prolonging the Vietnam War to no good purpose and expanding it into Cambodia at a frightful human cost. His diplomatic acrobatics in the Middle East were impressive, but they were only necessary because he had missed the signs that Egypt was readying for war in 1973 in order to break a diplomatic deadlock that he had helped orchestrate. His indifference to human rights and civilian suffering sacrificed thousands of lives and made a mockery of U.S. pretensions to moral superiority.Kissinger owed his enduring influence not to a superior track record as a pundit or sage but to his own energy, unquenchable ambition, unparalleled networking skills, and the elite's reluctance to hold its members accountable. After all, this is a man who downplayed the risks of China's rise (while earning fat consulting fees there), backed the disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003, opposed the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, and dismissed warnings that open-ended NATO enlargement would make Europe less rather than more secure. Kissinger also perfected the art of transmuting government service into a lucrative consulting career, setting a troubling precedent for others. Debates about his legacy will no doubt continue, but one suspects that the reverence that his acolytes exhibit today will gradually fade now that he is no longer here to sustain it.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!

SUMMARY: Étienne François explores the way in which the French project of creating "symbolic history" through studies of memory initiated by Pierre Nora's work can be continued in a different national context. For François, it is the question of whether history of memory can be pursued in the German case. François notes that despite Nora's insistence on the exclusivity of the French case, Germans have not less a "neurotic" attitude to their past.

At the same time, François admits that in Germany attitude to the national past memorial projects is profoundly different from the French case. Among such points of difference François notes that if in France national history is usually perceived as a long-term development rooted in the Middle Ages, in Germany looking at the past usually implies focusing on such topics as Nazism or "the second German dictatorship" in GDR. History of memory is problematic in Germany partly because most well known "places of memory" are concentration camps. It is also that in Germany perceptions of national identity are questioned to a greater extent than in France, which is a result of German history divided for the most part of the second half of the 20 th century.

Despite these profound differences, François insists that France and Germany entered the "memorial period" simultaneously about 20 years ago. The Franco-German rapprochement and the development of mass cultural tourism greatly contributed to that process. This "memorial boom" is reflected in three major developments: the growth of and greater attention to memorial events, such as the celebration of "Luther's year" in 1983; the public fascination with historical exhibitions; and the rise in popularity of historical museums. A development parallel to the growth of "memory" in Germany can be noticed in professional historical studies: in Germany, at the roots of the study of memory were Thomas Nipperdey and Reinhart Koselleck, while today the leading scholars in the field are Jan and Alaida Assman. The unification of Germany and the disappearance of the "German question" combined with dramatic improvements in the relationships between Germany and its neighbors created most favorable conditions for German memorial projects.

François touches upon the work of the conferences on "Nation and Emotion" held in Berlin in October 1993 and May 1995. At these events researchers agreed that the paradigm of "places of memory" that allows to create a symbolic history of a nation can be successfully implemented not only in France but elsewhere. The second conclusion of researchers was that it was impossible to replicate the French case in other national traditions. François notes four major principles that emerged out of the French-German cooperation in the studies of memory: the first is the preservation of a critical attitude to one's own work and resistance to temptations to legitimate the existing political situation; second, the specifics of German history required more attention to conflicts, ruptures, and breaks in the past; third, such research should be open and pluralistic with respect to chronology and geography, without limiting one's project to XIX and XX centuries or to the national level; finally, the pan-European context should be always taken into account, for varieties of national memory are often shaped by or in contact with "foreigners".

In the last paragraphs of his contribution François informs the reader about the seminar on cultural memory that he and Hagen Schulze conducted in Berlin, as well as touches upon the structure and methodology of the project of German "places of memory" study. François explains the decision to structure the project around the list of key memorial terms, such as "Reich", "Leistung", "Schuld", etc. François ends his article by pointing out the importance of German cultural memory in European context and in German national history.
Tony Judt explores the emergence of Pierre Nora's project of describing the French places of memory by locating it in the context of transformations that France was undergoing in the post-World War II period. As Judt argues, in 1956 France still reminded one the France of 1856 in terms of the social composition of its population, the structure of its economy defined by late industrialization and the importance of agriculture, and the authoritarian political regime. In the 1960s, fundamental changes in the economy led to the growth of urbanization. Rising prosperity undermined the position of the French Communist party and the departure of Charles de Gaulle combined with Mitterand's reluctance to pursue radically socialist policies left behind most divisive political distinctions between the conservative France and the left France. At the same time, the decline in importance of the French language combined with the revival of interest in regional identities and the loss of the French dominant position in world and European affairs contributed to the French perception that by 1980s their country was simultaneously undergoing several transformations: France was shrinking, breaking apart, and loosing its traditional identity. Pierre Nora's project was initiated during this period of flux and uncertainty. Thus, Nora's project was a response to the sense of loss of traditional France in public consciousness and an attempt to fixate in historical categories elements of public memory.

Judt notes the contradiction of Nora's project: designed as an attempt to fixate, explore, and repudiate various historical myths, the project itself finally turned into the celebration of the past. Judt sees several reasons for this transformation. First, Pierre Nora is an important figure on the French intellectual landscape, and he attracted best specialists to write articles in the collection. Second, there is no more consensus on the canon of the past and people disagree profoundly on what can or should be included in such a project. Taking possession of past events and places brought together accidentally underscores the break of the historical tradition. Third, despite many genius insights in the articles of the collection, it turned into a text that displays emotional attraction of researchers to the object of their study. The fact that the collection curiously omitted any references to the legacy of Napoleon Bonaparte or his nephew Louis Napoleon underscores how the project reflects French ambiguities about France's past. Judt also critically surveys Nora's claims of the specificity and exclusivity of the French historical experiences, which, allegedly, make France into a "nation of memory" like no any other nation.

Judt also analyses particular contributions to the volume, focusing on such topics as Catholicism and other religions in French memory. He notes that in the collection those studies that are dedicated to Protestants and Jews are characterized by more methodological innovation then the more traditional explorations of the role of Catholicism in French history and serve as a reminder to the editor of the collection, which avoided the memory of St. Bartholomew's Night. Judt also explores the ambiguity of perceptions of the countryside always characterized positively and of the province and the provincial always characterized negatively in the French history. Judt explores the role played in French history by memory of wars.

From Judt's point of view, Nora's project is informed by the fact that today (unlike earlier in French history) French public memory shaped by official representation differs from history as told by historians. As Judt argues, public memory without a foundation in narrative history looses coherence and turns into "places of forgetting".

According to Judt, Nora's project of describing "places of memory" was a response to the loss of the sense of eternal identity experienced by the French society at the juncture when two leading historical schools – the Annales and the (neo)Marxist historiography of the French revolution – lost their predominant position. Nora's story is about that meaning that the French ascribe to France and its identity, and those aspects of French history, such as Bonaparte's legacy of national minorities, were either omitted or pushed to the periphery of the narrative. In that sense, Nora's collection represents an example of a modern mythology and cannot be called a historical study properly, despite high quality contributions by professional historians.

Concerning the applicability of the French project to the Soviet context, Judt argues that it has little to offer to an understanding of a multinational state. In France, history is an established and respected discipline and Nora can offer an alternative approach to the past, while in post-Soviet societies the task is to return to scholarly writing of history. Finally, Nora's project is the product of the Parisian intelligentsia, self-assured and well versed in all details of French history. It has not been repeated elsewhere in Europe. It is a jeu d'esprit that can hardly be replicated elsewhere.
Marina Loskutova points out that "memory" is an imported methodology in Russia. At the same time, as most researchers of memory explain, the studies of memory are related to profound changes in Western societies in the post-war period. Correspondingly, the importation of memory studies will depend on similarity of experiences. In particular, the sense of the local landscape permeated by memorials of the past, the omnipresence of places of memory in Russia is not a given fact. Despite agricultural and peasant roots of most post-Soviet citizens, very few people will seek to uncover their village roots, and if they do, not industry of memorabilia exists for them. The study of memory in Western societies is also related to the communications revolution and to the new generation of mass-media, which brings forth the problem of the visual image as a sign of the past. It is the prevalence of visual culture, according to the author, that informs the upsurge in memory studies.

Loskutova then focuses on the contents of the concept of "memory". According to the author, it implies 1) social cadres that allow an autobio graphical memory to take shape; 2) oral memories circulating in society; 3) collective commemorations; 4) information devices, from newspaper to CD, delivering information about the past to an audience larger than professional historians' community; 5) habits of the body. As the author argues, these aspects are hardly related, and their combination within one research framework obscures rather then helps to solve the problem. At the same time, none of them is specifically related to the nation-state (with the exception of commemorations). It is traditional narrative history that provides the basis for national identity, even if we consider the explosive "memory" of ethnic minorities, which is often based on semi-professional historical accounts popularized by mass media.

Loskutova agrees with Judt's argument concerning the importance of a historical narrative taught at school; at the same time, she takes issue with him concerning the presence of such a narrative in Eastern Europe. She notes that in post-Soviet Russia there is little doubt about historians' right to talk about the past authoritatively and there is little criticism of traditional narrative historical modes.

For Loskutova, the experience of importing oral history methods into the Russian context is telling. On the one hand, the community of professional historians is skeptical about the use of oral histories interviews, pointing to the need to verify data using traditional methods anyway. Historians are also reluctant to accept the possibility that contemporary perceptions of the past should be in their sphere of competence. With respect to the Soviet past seen through oral history two drastically different positions are prevalent: "Soviet history is only possible on the basis of oral data for historians have always lied to us" and "People don't remember much and they do they won't tell". Loskutova notes that many memories of the Siege of Leningrad in World War II are told according to one scenario, which implies likely following prescribed expectations of such a memory. At the same time, research into what was told in families demonstrated significant variations in memories, thus undermining the interview method. Finally, Loskutova argues that it is possible to study "imperial memory" as informal knowledge of imperial social and political mechanisms. Nevertheless, such studies of memory cannot be an alternative to a meta-narrative of imperial history.
Igor Narskii points out that historiography knows works on functions of collective memory in imperial and Soviet Russia (Lotman, Wortman, Plaggenborg). Narskii criticizes approaches to memory in the editorial introduction as too narrow. For Narskii, memory is cultural context and includes not only images of the past but also mechanisms of their formation, circulation, manipulation, etc. Imperial memory is heterogeneous as much as the national memory. Narskii also focuses on varieties of imperial memory that support/maintain supranational unit without being totalitarian. The author refers to particular junctures in history when addressing the past becomes an important societal aspect. He also argues that the Russian scholarly community focuses on such issues as memory belatedly, when the problem has already been discussed in the West and triggers idiosyncratic reactions from Western colleagues.

For Narskii, historical memory is the field for research in the framework of new social and cultural history and it can become a key in interpreting the subjective world of people in the past. Narskii reminds that it is not just the concept itself but the hard work of adapting it to the needs of historical scholarship that matters.

По мнению Матта Мацуды , память империи следует скорее рассматривать не как коллективную (Хольбвакс), но как память "собранную" ( collected ), состоящую из отдельных фрагментов, артефактов, частей мозаики, порождающих "невольное", а не преднамеренно сконструированное значение. Мнемонические качества таких фрагментов гарантируются их разделенностью, фактом невозможности единого нарратива. Соответственно, противопоставление памяти и истории неправомерно: скорее, речь должна идти о памяти как об одном из видов истории, в котором главную роль играют не хроники развития, а моменты значения. По мнению Мацуды, проекты, подобные "Местам памяти" Пьера Нора, не являются оппозицией истории, они даже не являются "антинациональными": скорее, это – варианты национальных историй, в которых собраны различные субъекты. Такие истории выглядят странными только по сравнению с телеологическими историческими нарративами. Специфика исследований памяти состоит в том, что они делают процесс дистанцирования от прошлого предметом рефлексии. Если в 1950-60-е и затем в 1980-е гг. речь шла о распаде грандиозных территориальных империй, в начале ХХI века вопрос стоит о хроно-политической деколонизации субьектов, колонизированных телеологическими нарративами социализма или империализма.

Традиционное понимание империи состоит в представлении о территориальной замкнутости, множественности подданных и наличии центра власти. Можно, тем не менее, последовать примеру "мест памяти" и представить себе империю не как закрытую территорию власти, но как множество локальностей, каждая из которых является пространством соревнования меняющихся императивов. Исследования национализма говорят о нациях как практиках, а не как о реальных сущностях. Такой же подход должен быть применен к империи. Соответственно, в той же мере, в какой империи не суть закрытые историографические доминантные миры, память не является оппозицией истории. В терминах памяти можно говорить об империи как о наррации правил; при этом имперское пространство характеризуется неровным распространением этих правил. Подход к империи как ко множеству локальностей, определяемых и доминируемых политической, экономической или культурной властью, позволяет уйти от противопоставления "модерного" концепта памяти и "архаичного" концепта империи. Именно "архаичность" памяти об империи (Британской или Российской) позволяет глобальным империям XXI века (США) не замечать имперского характера собственного доминирования в мире.

Касаясь вопроса об "имперской памяти", Мацуда замечает, что она, скорее, является ширмой, за которой осуществляется непростое сосуществование разных народов, взаимоисключающих претензий на культурное наследие или различных культур. Освобождение от имперских уз часто ведет к реконституированию национального, причем агенты такого реконституирования предпочитают не помнить о том, что нации сыграли свою роль в создании империй. Касаясь вопроса о моделях памяти, воплощенных в обществах типа "Памяти" и "Мемориала", Мацуда отмечает, что и ностальгия как исторический принцип, и моральное банкротство попыток использования нарративов прогрессивных перемен для исправления исторических несправедливостей одинаково опасны.

В заключении Мацуда обращается к известной теме восстановления исторической справедливости, к требованиям платежей и репараций, выдвигаемым на основе памяти. По сути, вопрос стоит так: может ли память требовать репараций у истории? Вопросы исторической вины и компенсации в огромной степени зависят от факта признания, т.е. от допущения памяти. Это само по себе – вызов имперскому наследию, ведь главной задачей империи является забывание (поскольку сама империя расколота и неоднородна). Обращаясь к проблематике памяти, исследователи невольно напоминают нам об этой характеристике империи.

Old postcards and posters were used as illustrations to the roundtable.

В оформлении круглого стола использовались старые почтовые открытки и плакаты.

학위논문 (박사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 공과대학 협동과정 도시설계학전공, 2020. 8. 김세훈. ; This dissertation investigated the spatial characteristics and social impact of 'urban shrinkage' and 'housing abandonment' in four separate but related papers focusing on the following sub-themes: (1) major paths of abandonment in the East Asian context, (2) distribution pattern and characteristics in terms of socio-spatial inequalities, (3) residents' perceptions of vacant houses, and (4) neighborhood-specific clusters of vacant houses. Studies have been conducted in Incheon, one of the cities experiencing both city-wide growth and the decline of the inner city. Paper 1_ Housing abandonment in shrinking cities of East Asia: Case study in Incheon, South Korea Despite growing signs of urban shrinkage in countries such as Korea, Japan and China, few studies have examined the generalizable pattern of urban shrinkage and its relationship to the characteristics of housing abandonment in the East Asian context. This study explores five major paths that may explain the emergence of vacant houses in declining inner-city areas, based on empirical observations in the city of Incheon, South Korea. The paths are: (1) strong government-led new built-up area development plans (pull factor for population movement); (2) delay and cancellation of indiscriminate redevelopment projects (push factor for population movement); (3) initial poor development and concentration of substandard houses; (4) aging of the elderly population; and (5) the outflow of infrastructure and services. These paths, also found in Japan or China, are expected to be combined in a local context, leading to more serious housing abandonment. This study suggests that it is important to take appropriate countermeasures based on the identification of the paths causing vacant houses. Paper 2_ Planned inequality of the locational pattern of housing abandonment in shrinking inner-city areas of Incheon, South Korea Housing abandonment is one of the most distinctive features of urban shrinkage associated with depopulation and a loss of neighborhood attractiveness. Previous studies investigated the scale and the process of housing abandonment in the former industrialized cities in the United States and Europe. Yet very little was known about the characteristics of housing abandonment in cities that have experienced rapid urbanization in terms of spatial unevenness. In the study, based on a unique parcel-level dataset of vacant houses in Incheon, South Korea, the firth's logistic regression analysis revealed that the building and parcel, urban neighborhood, economic, and socio-demographic determinants might explain the spatially selective occurrence of housing abandonment at intra-urban level. The results indicated that older, smaller, and inaccessible residential buildings developed with lower quality during the rapid urbanization period were more vulnerable to abandonment. The failure of indiscriminately planned redevelopment projects under the growth-oriented policies contributed to housing abandonment in concentrated areas. With the devastation of manufacturing and commercial areas due to the out-migration of households to the new suburbs, socially unsustainable environments, such as the concentration of elderly and less-educated people in the inner city, were significantly associated with the emergence of abandoned houses. Paper 3_ Perceptions of abandonment: Analyzing subjective perception on vacant houses using the photo-elicitation method Vacant houses have been regarded, in terms of the broken windows theory, as one of the signs of neighborhood disorder inducing prevalent violent crimes. Previous studies, mostly in the fields of public health and criminology, have indicated that vacant houses not only pose a threat to the physical health of residents but also deteriorate their mental health. However, little is known about the residents' experiences and interpretations of vacant houses in declining neighborhoods. In this study, the perceptions of vacant houses in shrinking inner-city neighborhoods of Incheon, South Korea, were analyzed utilizing the semi-structured questionnaire and photo-elicitation methods. The surveyed residents expressed that they had been suffering from persistent daily life problems, not from the issues caused by the simple presence of vacant houses. The survey revealed that the residents' degree of understanding and responsibility for neighborhoods and the level of experiences of and information on vacant houses affected subjective perceptions of vacant houses. Additionally, the photo-elicitation method involving both resident and non-resident groups revealed that the fear of vacant houses arose not only from the visible presence of abandonment but also from invisible wrongdoers or outsiders. The perception of how abandonment is managed also determined their feelings and responses toward vacant houses. The results suggest that suitable vacant house management and usage measures in shrinking cities should be provided for the remaining residents with pieces of broken windows. Paper 4_ The causes and characteristics of housing abandonment in an inner-city neighborhood: Focused on the Sungui-dong area, Nam-gu, Incheon The study aims to analyze the causes and characteristics of housing abandonment at a micro level and to draw the implications for urban design in the declining inner-city neighborhoods of Sungui-dong, Nam-gu, Incheon. This study created a theoretical frame explaining the mechanism between urban shrinkage and housing abandonment, and identified the spatial distribution pattern, characteristics, and causality of housing abandonment, applying qualitative methods. 80 vacant houses in Sungui-dong were distributed intensively in the four clusters. The results indicated that the different physical conditions of each cluster acted as driving forces influencing the pattern of housing abandonment. The clusters with poor physical environments, such as narrow streets and small parcels, attracted redevelopment's cancellation and spatial concentration of socially-vulnerable populations, leading to the proliferation of vacant houses. The maintenance of public areas surrounding vacant houses played a decisive role in the occurrence of additional decline and the formation of stigmatized neighborhood images. Additionally, residents perceived the seriousness of housing abandonment differently depending on their residence locations and social characteristics. Further studies could aim to conduct an in-depth analysis of the urban spatial characteristics of housing abandonment, prepare public domain management plans, and identify residents' awareness and behavior. ; 도시쇠퇴는 전 세계 수많은 도시들이 경험하고 있는 가장 두드러지는 도시현상들 중 하나이다. 도시쇠퇴는 공통적이면서도 차별화된 세계적 현상으로, 경제적·사회적·물리적 측면에서 특정 개발 논리를 따르는 한편, 국가 및 도시에 따라 다양한 동기, 유형, 접근방식을 가진다. 서구 도시들에서는 탈산업화, 교외화, 인구감소가 쇠퇴의 주요 패턴으로 이해되어 왔다. 도시쇠퇴의 가장 심각하고 명백한 공간적 발현으로는 주택 포기, 즉 빈집을 꼽을 수 있다. 빈집은 도시쇠퇴와의 하향적 악순환의 관계 안에서, 물리적 환경의 악화, 지역 활력도의 저하, 부동산 가치의 감소, 관리비용의 증가 등을 통해 추가적인 쇠퇴를 유도한다. 빈집은 건물 자체로는 쇠퇴도시의 황폐화된 건조환경을 나타내지만, 넓게는 분포패턴을 통해 구시가지와 신시가지 사이의 공간사회적 불균형을 드러낸다. 더불어 장기간 방치된 빈집은 쇠퇴근린에 자의적 또는 타의적으로 남겨진 주민들의 일상생활에 서서히 침투하여, 신체적 및 정신적 건강을 포함한 삶의 질에 악영향을 미친다. 한국의 경우, 통계청에 따르면 2017년 기준으로 총 주택 수의 7.4%에 해당하는 약 130만 채의 빈집이 집계되었으며, 이는 2010년의 약 80만 채 대비 59.3%가 증가한 수치였다. 한국 정부는 빈집 발생을 심각한 사회현상으로 인지함에 따라, 2017년에 「빈집 및 소규모주택 정비에 관한 특례법」을 제정하였다. 그런데 한국 쇠퇴도시 내 빈집현상에 대한 포괄적 논의의 필요성과 체계적 대책마련의 시급성에도 불구하고, 지금까지 대부분의 관련 연구들은 미국 또는 유럽의 사례들 그리고 그들의 시각에 초점을 맞춰왔다. 또한 지금까지 추진된 빈집 관련 정책 및 사업들은 단기적이고 일시적인 대책들을 제시하는 것을 우선시 해왔다. 이에 본 논문은 도시쇠퇴의 시기, 속도, 양상에 있어 서구와는 구별되는 징후들을 드러내는 동아시아 국가들, 그 중에서도 특히 한국 인천에서의 실증적 관찰을 기반으로 경로, 원인, 특성, 영향력, 주민인식을 포함한 빈집의 역학에 대해 분석하고자 했다. 결과적으로, 다음의 네 개의 연구를 통해 쇠퇴도시 내 악순환의 고리를 끊고, 빈집을 바람직하게 관리·활용하며, 남아있는 주민들의 삶의 질을 개선하기 위한 토대를 마련하고자 했다. 첫 번째 연구는 아직까지 동아시아 맥락에서 도시쇠퇴의 일반화 가능한 패턴과 이것의 빈집 발생의 특성과의 관계에 대해 조사한 연구는 거의 없다는 점에 착안하여, 한국 인천에서의 경험적 관찰을 기반으로 쇠퇴하는 구시가지에서 빈집 발생의 원인 및 양상을 설명하는 다섯 가지 주요 경로들을 분석하고자 했다. 먼저는 도시쇠퇴의 구조적 문제에 부정적으로 영향을 준 두 개의 정치경제적 측면의 경로들로, 각각 강력한 정부 주도의 신시가지 개발 및 공공기관의 이전 그리고 구시가지에서 무차별적으로 시행된 정비사업의 지연 및 취소에 해당되었다. 빈집 발생과 관련된 신시가지와 구시가지 사이의 인구이동에 있어 전자는 유인요인, 후자는 배출요인으로 작용하였으며, 특히 후자는 빈집 클러스터를 야기하는 역할을 하였다. 세 번째 경로는 압축 성장 하의 급격한 도시화의 기간 동안 불충분한 기반시설을 바탕으로 개발된 열악한 건물들과 이들의 가속화된 노후화와 관련되었다. 네 번째 경로는 급격한 사회구조의 변화 및 심각한 고령화 현상에서 비롯되었으며, 유지관리의 부족으로 황폐화된 건조환경에 취약계층이 집중됨에 따라 공간적 불균형이 고착화되고 새로운 인구의 유입을 저해하였다. 마지막 경로는 낙인 찍힌 지역에서 기반시설, 서비스, 젊은 인구층의 유출로 인해 남아있는 주민들의 삶의 질이 저하되고 빈집 발생의 악순환이 지속됨을 드러내었다. 각각의 경로들은 지역적 맥락에서 서로 밀접하게 관계를 맺고 동시에 그 영향력 행사함으로써, 보다 극심한 빈집 문제를 초래할 것으로 예상되었다. 더불어 동아시아적 관점에서, 이와 같은 경로들은 국가주도의 도시개발을 통한 고도경제성장을 경험한 일본과 중국에서도 유사하게 발견됨과 동시에, 도시계획 관련 법 및 정책, 도시개발의 시기 및 방식에 따라 그 양상의 차이를 보임을 확인할 수 있었다. 본 연구의 다섯 가지 경로들에 대한 탐색은 빈집의 주요 원인에 따라 발생 특성이 상이하기에, 적절한 빈집 관리 방안의 마련과 추후 급증에 대한 예방을 위해서는 빈집 발생의 주요 경로들과 그들의 상호관계를 이해하는 것이 중요함을 시사하였다. 두 번째 연구는 필지 수준의 데이터를 기반으로 퍼스(firth)의 로지스틱 회귀분석을 활용하여 짧은 시간 내에 도시화 및 경제성장을 경험한 지역에서 빈집 발생이 공간적 불균형의 측면에서 어떤 특성을 지니는지에 대해 분석하고자 했다. 2017년 기준으로, 연구 대상지인 인천 구시가지에는 인천 전체 빈집의 3/4에 해당하는 약 1,600여 채의 빈집이 위치했으며, 건물 및 필지, 도시근린, 경제적, 인구사회적 측면의 결정요인들이 빈집의 공간선택적인 발생 패턴을 설명할 수 있을 것이라 예상되었다. 분석결과에 따르면, 급속한 도시화의 시기에 저품질로 개발된 보다 오래되고, 규모가 작고, 접근성이 떨어지는 주거용 건물들이 빈집으로의 전환에 더 취약했다. 성장 지향적 정책 하에서 무차별적으로 계획된 정비사업의 실패는 빈집 밀집지역을 초래했으며, 실제 구시가지 빈집의 약 64%가 정비구역에 위치했다. 제조업의 영세화와 상업지역의 황폐화는 지역 경제활동과 커뮤니티의 활력을 약화시킴으로써, 인구유출에 기반한 빈집 발생을 촉진시켰다. 더불어, 구시가지로의 노인 및 저학력 인구의 집중과 같은 사회적으로 지속 불가능한 환경의 조성은 근린의 낙인 찍힌 이미지를 형성함과 동시에, 고학력의 젊은 인구층의 이탈을 통한 빈집 출현에 기여했다. 본 연구는 앞선 분석결과를 기반으로 도시설계 및 계획의 관점에서 더욱 심도 있게 논의되어야 할 세 가지 이슈를 제시하였다. 첫째, 뚜렷한 공간적 불균형이 도시 내, 구시가지 내, 근린 내, 심지어 도시블록 규모와 같이 점점 더 작은 공간단위에서 발현되고 있다는 것이다. 둘째, 구시가지 내에서 지연되거나 취소된 정비사업 구역이 빈집 밀집지역의 온상이 되고 있다는 것이다. 셋째, 이미 잘 알려진 경제적 불평등 및 이와 관련된 주거지 분리에 더해, 왜곡된 인구구조가 사회적 지속가능성을 위협하는 공간적 양극화를 심화시키고 있다는 것이다. 세 번째 연구는 지속적·점진적인 쇠퇴를 경험하는 도시에서 도시설계 및 계획의 렌즈를 통해 빈집에 대한 주민들의 경험 및 해석에 대해 탐색한 연구는 거의 없다는 점에 착안하여, 설문조사 및 사진유도기법(photo-elicitation)을 활용하여 인천 남구의 쇠퇴하는 구시가지 근린에서 빈집에 대한 인식을 분석하고자 했다. 지금까지 빈집은 주로 공중보건 및 범죄학의 분야에서 깨진 유리창 이론의 관점을 통해, 폭력범죄의 만연을 유도하는 근린 무질서의 징후들 중 하나로 간주되어 왔다. 하지만 본 연구는 무질서에서 범죄로의 전환 가능성, 무질서가 발생하는 지역의 주요 인구사회학적 및 건조환경의 특성을 검토함으로써, 이 이론을 한국의 쇠퇴도시에서 재맥락화 하고자 했다. 연구의 첫 번째 단계에서는 인천 남구의 93명의 주민들을 대상으로 빈집 인식과 관련된 설문조사를 진행하였다. 빈집에 대한 인식은 신체적 및 정신적 건강, 행동적 대응, 공동체 활동에의 참여의 세 가지 측면을 통해 확인되었으며, 인구사회학적 특성, 개인적인 경험, 공동체 상호작용과 관련된 요인들이 인식의 이질성을 형성하는 데 관여했다. 두 번째 단계에서는 인천 남구 숭의동의 주민 10명과 비주민 10명을 대상으로 사진유도조사를 실시함으로써, 총 13장의 빈집 사진에 대해 두 집단이 두려움을 느끼는 정도와 이유에 대해 비교하였다. 연구결과는 쇠퇴도시 내 빈집들을 효율적으로 관리하고 남아있는 주민들의 삶의 질을 개선하기 위해 다음의 네 가지 이슈들을 제시하였다. 첫째, 주민들은 지속적인 쇠퇴를 경험하는 구시가지 근린에서 강력범죄보다는 고착화된 빈집들에서 기인한 쓰레기, 먼지, 악취 등의 일상생활의 문제들로부터 끈질기게 영향을 받아왔다. 둘째, 근린에 대한 이해 및 책임의 정도, 빈집에 대한 경험 및 정보의 수준이 빈집에 대한 주민인식에 있어 차이를 형성했다. 셋째, 단순히 빈집의 존재가 아닌, 건조환경 측면에서 관리의 유무를 암시하는 물리적 요소들이 빈집에 대한 감정 및 대응을 결정지었다. 넷째, 빈집에 대한 두려움의 감정은 가시적인 건조환경뿐만 아니라 비가시적인 사회적 환경에서도 기인했다. 네 번째 연구는 빈집의 체계적인 관리 및 활용을 위해서는 도시근린과 같은 미시적 공간 차원에서의 빈집 발생 메커니즘에 대한 파악이 필수적이라는 점을 바탕으로, 쇠퇴현상을 겪고 있는 인천 남구 숭의동 내 근린, 특히 빈집 클러스터를 중심으로 빈집 발생의 원인 및 특성을 분석하고자 했다. 정성적인 연구 방법론을 활용하여 도시쇠퇴와 빈집 사이의 반복 및 누적되는 악순환의 고리를 드러내는 메커니즘을 이론적 틀로 정리한 후, 빈집의 분포 현황 및 특성, 그리고 인과관계를 탐색하였다. 남구의 공가현황 자료 및 현장답사를 기반으로, 숭의동에는 약 80여 채의 빈집이 4개의 클러스터에 집중 분포되어 있는 것을 확인하였다. 각 클러스터의 서로 다른 건축적·도시공간적 특성들이 빈집 발생 양상의 차이를 만들어내는 요인으로 작용하고 있었다. 클러스터 1은 열악한 물리적 환경으로 인해 재개발 취소의 영향력이 심화된 구역이었으며, 클러스터 2는 양호한 물리적 환경을 보유했지만 재개발에 대한 기대 심리를 기반으로 빈집이 발생하게 된 구역이었다. 클러스터 1과 2의 경우 동일하게 재정비촉진지구로 지정된 후 해제되었지만, 기존의 도시·건축적 특성의 차이로 인해 빈집의 밀도, 건물 및 가로의 상태에 있어 서로 다른 양상과 영향력을 드러냈다. 더불어 클러스터 3은 사회취약계층의 공간적 집중과 가로변 건물들의 개보수로 인해 상대적 쇠퇴가 심화된 구역이었으며, 클러스터 4는 열악한 기반시설 및 대규모 기피시설이 빈집 발생을 유도한 구역이었다. 연구결과에 따르면, 폐쇄적 블록, 협소한 가로, 소규모 필지 등의 열악한 물리적 환경이 재정비촉진지구의 해제, 사회취약계층의 공간적 집중 등과 결합됨에 따라 빈집현상의 심화 및 확산으로 연결되었다. 또한 빈집 인근 공적영역의 유지관리 여부가 추가적인 쇠퇴의 진행 및 쇠퇴 이미지 형성에 중요한 역학을 하고 있었다. 한편 연구결과를 통해 거주위치 및 거주특성에 따라 주민들이 빈집문제의 심각성을 인식하고 대응하는데 있어 차이가 존재함을 확인할 수 있었다. ; Introduction 1 Chapter 1. Housing abandonment in shrinking cities of East Asia: Case study in Incheon, South Korea 5 1. Introduction 5 2. Theoretical Framework and Research Site 10 3. Results 14 4. Discussion 26 5. Conclusion 35 Chapter 2. Planned inequality of the locational pattern of housing abandonment in shrinking inner-city areas of Incheon, South Korea 37 1. Introduction 37 2. Literature Review 41 3. Data and Methods 47 4. Results 58 5. Discussion 70 6. Conclusion 76 Chapter 3. Perceptions of abandonment: Analyzing subjective perception on vacant houses using the photo-elicitation method 78 1. Introduction 78 2. Literature Review 83 3. Methods 90 4. Results 96 5. Discussion 119 Chapter 4. The causes and characteristics of housing abandonment in an inner-city neighborhood: Focused on the Sungui-dong area, Nam-gu, Incheon 125 1. Introduction 125 2. Theoretical Consideration 136 3. Results 143 4. Discussion 162 5. Conclusion 164 Conclusion 167 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 174 REFERENCES 175 ABSTRACT IN KOREAN 184 ; Doctor

학위논문 (박사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 공과대학 협동과정 도시설계학전공, 2020. 8. 김세훈. ; This dissertation investigated the spatial characteristics and social impact of 'urban shrinkage' and 'housing abandonment' in four separate but related papers focusing on the following sub-themes: (1) major paths of abandonment in the East Asian context, (2) distribution pattern and characteristics in terms of socio-spatial inequalities, (3) residents' perceptions of vacant houses, and (4) neighborhood-specific clusters of vacant houses. Studies have been conducted in Incheon, one of the cities experiencing both city-wide growth and the decline of the inner city. Paper 1_ Housing abandonment in shrinking cities of East Asia: Case study in Incheon, South Korea Despite growing signs of urban shrinkage in countries such as Korea, Japan and China, few studies have examined the generalizable pattern of urban shrinkage and its relationship to the characteristics of housing abandonment in the East Asian context. This study explores five major paths that may explain the emergence of vacant houses in declining inner-city areas, based on empirical observations in the city of Incheon, South Korea. The paths are: (1) strong government-led new built-up area development plans (pull factor for population movement); (2) delay and cancellation of indiscriminate redevelopment projects (push factor for population movement); (3) initial poor development and concentration of substandard houses; (4) aging of the elderly population; and (5) the outflow of infrastructure and services. These paths, also found in Japan or China, are expected to be combined in a local context, leading to more serious housing abandonment. This study suggests that it is important to take appropriate countermeasures based on the identification of the paths causing vacant houses. Paper 2_ Planned inequality of the locational pattern of housing abandonment in shrinking inner-city areas of Incheon, South Korea Housing abandonment is one of the most distinctive features of urban shrinkage associated with depopulation and a loss of neighborhood attractiveness. Previous studies investigated the scale and the process of housing abandonment in the former industrialized cities in the United States and Europe. Yet very little was known about the characteristics of housing abandonment in cities that have experienced rapid urbanization in terms of spatial unevenness. In the study, based on a unique parcel-level dataset of vacant houses in Incheon, South Korea, the firth's logistic regression analysis revealed that the building and parcel, urban neighborhood, economic, and socio-demographic determinants might explain the spatially selective occurrence of housing abandonment at intra-urban level. The results indicated that older, smaller, and inaccessible residential buildings developed with lower quality during the rapid urbanization period were more vulnerable to abandonment. The failure of indiscriminately planned redevelopment projects under the growth-oriented policies contributed to housing abandonment in concentrated areas. With the devastation of manufacturing and commercial areas due to the out-migration of households to the new suburbs, socially unsustainable environments, such as the concentration of elderly and less-educated people in the inner city, were significantly associated with the emergence of abandoned houses. Paper 3_ Perceptions of abandonment: Analyzing subjective perception on vacant houses using the photo-elicitation method Vacant houses have been regarded, in terms of the broken windows theory, as one of the signs of neighborhood disorder inducing prevalent violent crimes. Previous studies, mostly in the fields of public health and criminology, have indicated that vacant houses not only pose a threat to the physical health of residents but also deteriorate their mental health. However, little is known about the residents' experiences and interpretations of vacant houses in declining neighborhoods. In this study, the perceptions of vacant houses in shrinking inner-city neighborhoods of Incheon, South Korea, were analyzed utilizing the semi-structured questionnaire and photo-elicitation methods. The surveyed residents expressed that they had been suffering from persistent daily life problems, not from the issues caused by the simple presence of vacant houses. The survey revealed that the residents' degree of understanding and responsibility for neighborhoods and the level of experiences of and information on vacant houses affected subjective perceptions of vacant houses. Additionally, the photo-elicitation method involving both resident and non-resident groups revealed that the fear of vacant houses arose not only from the visible presence of abandonment but also from invisible wrongdoers or outsiders. The perception of how abandonment is managed also determined their feelings and responses toward vacant houses. The results suggest that suitable vacant house management and usage measures in shrinking cities should be provided for the remaining residents with pieces of broken windows. Paper 4_ The causes and characteristics of housing abandonment in an inner-city neighborhood: Focused on the Sungui-dong area, Nam-gu, Incheon The study aims to analyze the causes and characteristics of housing abandonment at a micro level and to draw the implications for urban design in the declining inner-city neighborhoods of Sungui-dong, Nam-gu, Incheon. This study created a theoretical frame explaining the mechanism between urban shrinkage and housing abandonment, and identified the spatial distribution pattern, characteristics, and causality of housing abandonment, applying qualitative methods. 80 vacant houses in Sungui-dong were distributed intensively in the four clusters. The results indicated that the different physical conditions of each cluster acted as driving forces influencing the pattern of housing abandonment. The clusters with poor physical environments, such as narrow streets and small parcels, attracted redevelopment's cancellation and spatial concentration of socially-vulnerable populations, leading to the proliferation of vacant houses. The maintenance of public areas surrounding vacant houses played a decisive role in the occurrence of additional decline and the formation of stigmatized neighborhood images. Additionally, residents perceived the seriousness of housing abandonment differently depending on their residence locations and social characteristics. Further studies could aim to conduct an in-depth analysis of the urban spatial characteristics of housing abandonment, prepare public domain management plans, and identify residents' awareness and behavior. ; 도시쇠퇴는 전 세계 수많은 도시들이 경험하고 있는 가장 두드러지는 도시현상들 중 하나이다. 도시쇠퇴는 공통적이면서도 차별화된 세계적 현상으로, 경제적·사회적·물리적 측면에서 특정 개발 논리를 따르는 한편, 국가 및 도시에 따라 다양한 동기, 유형, 접근방식을 가진다. 서구 도시들에서는 탈산업화, 교외화, 인구감소가 쇠퇴의 주요 패턴으로 이해되어 왔다. 도시쇠퇴의 가장 심각하고 명백한 공간적 발현으로는 주택 포기, 즉 빈집을 꼽을 수 있다. 빈집은 도시쇠퇴와의 하향적 악순환의 관계 안에서, 물리적 환경의 악화, 지역 활력도의 저하, 부동산 가치의 감소, 관리비용의 증가 등을 통해 추가적인 쇠퇴를 유도한다. 빈집은 건물 자체로는 쇠퇴도시의 황폐화된 건조환경을 나타내지만, 넓게는 분포패턴을 통해 구시가지와 신시가지 사이의 공간사회적 불균형을 드러낸다. 더불어 장기간 방치된 빈집은 쇠퇴근린에 자의적 또는 타의적으로 남겨진 주민들의 일상생활에 서서히 침투하여, 신체적 및 정신적 건강을 포함한 삶의 질에 악영향을 미친다. 한국의 경우, 통계청에 따르면 2017년 기준으로 총 주택 수의 7.4%에 해당하는 약 130만 채의 빈집이 집계되었으며, 이는 2010년의 약 80만 채 대비 59.3%가 증가한 수치였다. 한국 정부는 빈집 발생을 심각한 사회현상으로 인지함에 따라, 2017년에 「빈집 및 소규모주택 정비에 관한 특례법」을 제정하였다. 그런데 한국 쇠퇴도시 내 빈집현상에 대한 포괄적 논의의 필요성과 체계적 대책마련의 시급성에도 불구하고, 지금까지 대부분의 관련 연구들은 미국 또는 유럽의 사례들 그리고 그들의 시각에 초점을 맞춰왔다. 또한 지금까지 추진된 빈집 관련 정책 및 사업들은 단기적이고 일시적인 대책들을 제시하는 것을 우선시 해왔다. 이에 본 논문은 도시쇠퇴의 시기, 속도, 양상에 있어 서구와는 구별되는 징후들을 드러내는 동아시아 국가들, 그 중에서도 특히 한국 인천에서의 실증적 관찰을 기반으로 경로, 원인, 특성, 영향력, 주민인식을 포함한 빈집의 역학에 대해 분석하고자 했다. 결과적으로, 다음의 네 개의 연구를 통해 쇠퇴도시 내 악순환의 고리를 끊고, 빈집을 바람직하게 관리·활용하며, 남아있는 주민들의 삶의 질을 개선하기 위한 토대를 마련하고자 했다. 첫 번째 연구는 아직까지 동아시아 맥락에서 도시쇠퇴의 일반화 가능한 패턴과 이것의 빈집 발생의 특성과의 관계에 대해 조사한 연구는 거의 없다는 점에 착안하여, 한국 인천에서의 경험적 관찰을 기반으로 쇠퇴하는 구시가지에서 빈집 발생의 원인 및 양상을 설명하는 다섯 가지 주요 경로들을 분석하고자 했다. 먼저는 도시쇠퇴의 구조적 문제에 부정적으로 영향을 준 두 개의 정치경제적 측면의 경로들로, 각각 강력한 정부 주도의 신시가지 개발 및 공공기관의 이전 그리고 구시가지에서 무차별적으로 시행된 정비사업의 지연 및 취소에 해당되었다. 빈집 발생과 관련된 신시가지와 구시가지 사이의 인구이동에 있어 전자는 유인요인, 후자는 배출요인으로 작용하였으며, 특히 후자는 빈집 클러스터를 야기하는 역할을 하였다. 세 번째 경로는 압축 성장 하의 급격한 도시화의 기간 동안 불충분한 기반시설을 바탕으로 개발된 열악한 건물들과 이들의 가속화된 노후화와 관련되었다. 네 번째 경로는 급격한 사회구조의 변화 및 심각한 고령화 현상에서 비롯되었으며, 유지관리의 부족으로 황폐화된 건조환경에 취약계층이 집중됨에 따라 공간적 불균형이 고착화되고 새로운 인구의 유입을 저해하였다. 마지막 경로는 낙인 찍힌 지역에서 기반시설, 서비스, 젊은 인구층의 유출로 인해 남아있는 주민들의 삶의 질이 저하되고 빈집 발생의 악순환이 지속됨을 드러내었다. 각각의 경로들은 지역적 맥락에서 서로 밀접하게 관계를 맺고 동시에 그 영향력 행사함으로써, 보다 극심한 빈집 문제를 초래할 것으로 예상되었다. 더불어 동아시아적 관점에서, 이와 같은 경로들은 국가주도의 도시개발을 통한 고도경제성장을 경험한 일본과 중국에서도 유사하게 발견됨과 동시에, 도시계획 관련 법 및 정책, 도시개발의 시기 및 방식에 따라 그 양상의 차이를 보임을 확인할 수 있었다. 본 연구의 다섯 가지 경로들에 대한 탐색은 빈집의 주요 원인에 따라 발생 특성이 상이하기에, 적절한 빈집 관리 방안의 마련과 추후 급증에 대한 예방을 위해서는 빈집 발생의 주요 경로들과 그들의 상호관계를 이해하는 것이 중요함을 시사하였다. 두 번째 연구는 필지 수준의 데이터를 기반으로 퍼스(firth)의 로지스틱 회귀분석을 활용하여 짧은 시간 내에 도시화 및 경제성장을 경험한 지역에서 빈집 발생이 공간적 불균형의 측면에서 어떤 특성을 지니는지에 대해 분석하고자 했다. 2017년 기준으로, 연구 대상지인 인천 구시가지에는 인천 전체 빈집의 3/4에 해당하는 약 1,600여 채의 빈집이 위치했으며, 건물 및 필지, 도시근린, 경제적, 인구사회적 측면의 결정요인들이 빈집의 공간선택적인 발생 패턴을 설명할 수 있을 것이라 예상되었다. 분석결과에 따르면, 급속한 도시화의 시기에 저품질로 개발된 보다 오래되고, 규모가 작고, 접근성이 떨어지는 주거용 건물들이 빈집으로의 전환에 더 취약했다. 성장 지향적 정책 하에서 무차별적으로 계획된 정비사업의 실패는 빈집 밀집지역을 초래했으며, 실제 구시가지 빈집의 약 64%가 정비구역에 위치했다. 제조업의 영세화와 상업지역의 황폐화는 지역 경제활동과 커뮤니티의 활력을 약화시킴으로써, 인구유출에 기반한 빈집 발생을 촉진시켰다. 더불어, 구시가지로의 노인 및 저학력 인구의 집중과 같은 사회적으로 지속 불가능한 환경의 조성은 근린의 낙인 찍힌 이미지를 형성함과 동시에, 고학력의 젊은 인구층의 이탈을 통한 빈집 출현에 기여했다. 본 연구는 앞선 분석결과를 기반으로 도시설계 및 계획의 관점에서 더욱 심도 있게 논의되어야 할 세 가지 이슈를 제시하였다. 첫째, 뚜렷한 공간적 불균형이 도시 내, 구시가지 내, 근린 내, 심지어 도시블록 규모와 같이 점점 더 작은 공간단위에서 발현되고 있다는 것이다. 둘째, 구시가지 내에서 지연되거나 취소된 정비사업 구역이 빈집 밀집지역의 온상이 되고 있다는 것이다. 셋째, 이미 잘 알려진 경제적 불평등 및 이와 관련된 주거지 분리에 더해, 왜곡된 인구구조가 사회적 지속가능성을 위협하는 공간적 양극화를 심화시키고 있다는 것이다. 세 번째 연구는 지속적·점진적인 쇠퇴를 경험하는 도시에서 도시설계 및 계획의 렌즈를 통해 빈집에 대한 주민들의 경험 및 해석에 대해 탐색한 연구는 거의 없다는 점에 착안하여, 설문조사 및 사진유도기법(photo-elicitation)을 활용하여 인천 남구의 쇠퇴하는 구시가지 근린에서 빈집에 대한 인식을 분석하고자 했다. 지금까지 빈집은 주로 공중보건 및 범죄학의 분야에서 깨진 유리창 이론의 관점을 통해, 폭력범죄의 만연을 유도하는 근린 무질서의 징후들 중 하나로 간주되어 왔다. 하지만 본 연구는 무질서에서 범죄로의 전환 가능성, 무질서가 발생하는 지역의 주요 인구사회학적 및 건조환경의 특성을 검토함으로써, 이 이론을 한국의 쇠퇴도시에서 재맥락화 하고자 했다. 연구의 첫 번째 단계에서는 인천 남구의 93명의 주민들을 대상으로 빈집 인식과 관련된 설문조사를 진행하였다. 빈집에 대한 인식은 신체적 및 정신적 건강, 행동적 대응, 공동체 활동에의 참여의 세 가지 측면을 통해 확인되었으며, 인구사회학적 특성, 개인적인 경험, 공동체 상호작용과 관련된 요인들이 인식의 이질성을 형성하는 데 관여했다. 두 번째 단계에서는 인천 남구 숭의동의 주민 10명과 비주민 10명을 대상으로 사진유도조사를 실시함으로써, 총 13장의 빈집 사진에 대해 두 집단이 두려움을 느끼는 정도와 이유에 대해 비교하였다. 연구결과는 쇠퇴도시 내 빈집들을 효율적으로 관리하고 남아있는 주민들의 삶의 질을 개선하기 위해 다음의 네 가지 이슈들을 제시하였다. 첫째, 주민들은 지속적인 쇠퇴를 경험하는 구시가지 근린에서 강력범죄보다는 고착화된 빈집들에서 기인한 쓰레기, 먼지, 악취 등의 일상생활의 문제들로부터 끈질기게 영향을 받아왔다. 둘째, 근린에 대한 이해 및 책임의 정도, 빈집에 대한 경험 및 정보의 수준이 빈집에 대한 주민인식에 있어 차이를 형성했다. 셋째, 단순히 빈집의 존재가 아닌, 건조환경 측면에서 관리의 유무를 암시하는 물리적 요소들이 빈집에 대한 감정 및 대응을 결정지었다. 넷째, 빈집에 대한 두려움의 감정은 가시적인 건조환경뿐만 아니라 비가시적인 사회적 환경에서도 기인했다. 네 번째 연구는 빈집의 체계적인 관리 및 활용을 위해서는 도시근린과 같은 미시적 공간 차원에서의 빈집 발생 메커니즘에 대한 파악이 필수적이라는 점을 바탕으로, 쇠퇴현상을 겪고 있는 인천 남구 숭의동 내 근린, 특히 빈집 클러스터를 중심으로 빈집 발생의 원인 및 특성을 분석하고자 했다. 정성적인 연구 방법론을 활용하여 도시쇠퇴와 빈집 사이의 반복 및 누적되는 악순환의 고리를 드러내는 메커니즘을 이론적 틀로 정리한 후, 빈집의 분포 현황 및 특성, 그리고 인과관계를 탐색하였다. 남구의 공가현황 자료 및 현장답사를 기반으로, 숭의동에는 약 80여 채의 빈집이 4개의 클러스터에 집중 분포되어 있는 것을 확인하였다. 각 클러스터의 서로 다른 건축적·도시공간적 특성들이 빈집 발생 양상의 차이를 만들어내는 요인으로 작용하고 있었다. 클러스터 1은 열악한 물리적 환경으로 인해 재개발 취소의 영향력이 심화된 구역이었으며, 클러스터 2는 양호한 물리적 환경을 보유했지만 재개발에 대한 기대 심리를 기반으로 빈집이 발생하게 된 구역이었다. 클러스터 1과 2의 경우 동일하게 재정비촉진지구로 지정된 후 해제되었지만, 기존의 도시·건축적 특성의 차이로 인해 빈집의 밀도, 건물 및 가로의 상태에 있어 서로 다른 양상과 영향력을 드러냈다. 더불어 클러스터 3은 사회취약계층의 공간적 집중과 가로변 건물들의 개보수로 인해 상대적 쇠퇴가 심화된 구역이었으며, 클러스터 4는 열악한 기반시설 및 대규모 기피시설이 빈집 발생을 유도한 구역이었다. 연구결과에 따르면, 폐쇄적 블록, 협소한 가로, 소규모 필지 등의 열악한 물리적 환경이 재정비촉진지구의 해제, 사회취약계층의 공간적 집중 등과 결합됨에 따라 빈집현상의 심화 및 확산으로 연결되었다. 또한 빈집 인근 공적영역의 유지관리 여부가 추가적인 쇠퇴의 진행 및 쇠퇴 이미지 형성에 중요한 역학을 하고 있었다. 한편 연구결과를 통해 거주위치 및 거주특성에 따라 주민들이 빈집문제의 심각성을 인식하고 대응하는데 있어 차이가 존재함을 확인할 수 있었다. ; Introduction 1 Chapter 1. Housing abandonment in shrinking cities of East Asia: Case study in Incheon, South Korea 5 1. Introduction 5 2. Theoretical Framework and Research Site 10 3. Results 14 4. Discussion 26 5. Conclusion 35 Chapter 2. Planned inequality of the locational pattern of housing abandonment in shrinking inner-city areas of Incheon, South Korea 37 1. Introduction 37 2. Literature Review 41 3. Data and Methods 47 4. Results 58 5. Discussion 70 6. Conclusion 76 Chapter 3. Perceptions of abandonment: Analyzing subjective perception on vacant houses using the photo-elicitation method 78 1. Introduction 78 2. Literature Review 83 3. Methods 90 4. Results 96 5. Discussion 119 Chapter 4. The causes and characteristics of housing abandonment in an inner-city neighborhood: Focused on the Sungui-dong area, Nam-gu, Incheon 125 1. Introduction 125 2. Theoretical Consideration 136 3. Results 143 4. Discussion 162 5. Conclusion 164 Conclusion 167 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 174 REFERENCES 175 ABSTRACT IN KOREAN 184 ; Doctor

Niall Ferguson ha completado una rigurosa saga sobre las virtudes, limitaciones, ascenso y declinación de Occidente. Su último trabajo, "Civilization, the West and the Rest" (Penguin, 2011), es por sí solo un notable análisis histórico del inédito "liberal Project" que se desarrolló en un extremo de Eurasia desde el siglo XVI en adelante. Sin embargo, es posible e incluso necesario tomarlo como la secuela de "Empire, The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power" (Allen Lane, 2003) y "Colossus, The Price of America´s Empire" (Penguin, 2004). Como parte de una trilogía, este libro posee un notable valor histórico y analítico. El libro comienza detallando la considerable supremacía y el alto nivel de desarrollo que hace 500 años Oriente mostraba sobre aquello que hoy conocemos como Occidente. Por ejemplo, la comparación que Ferguson lleva a cabo entre el nivel de desarrollo tecnológico de la armada china y la armada española es reveladora. Paso seguido, el autor señala las 6 características que explican el exitoso desempeño primero de Europa continental y, luego, de esa otra parte de Europa que esAmérica: la competencia, la ciencia, la propiedad o estado de derecho, la medicina, la sociedad de consumo y la ética del trabajo.Una revolución geopolítica y económica representa el ascenso de uno(s) y la declinación de otro(s). Ferguson sostiene que asistimos a un cambio de paradigma después de 500 años de dominación Occidental y desarrolla una rigurosa explicación sobre las razones que llevaron a Occidente a comenzar a superar a Oriente (mas particularmente, a China) a partir del año 1500. El autor remarca que"…the principal question addressed in this book increasingly seems to be the most interesting question a historian can ask. Just why, beginning around 1500, did a few small polities of the Western end of the Eurasian landmass come to dominate the rest of the world, including the most populous and in many ways more sophisticated of Eastern Eurasia? My subsidiary question is this: if we can come up with a good explanation for the West past ascendancy, can then we offer a prognocis for its future? Is this really the end of the West´s world and the advent of a new Eastern epoch?" (1).En "Colossus", Ferguson había marcado el benigno papel del imperio informal americano en el largo siglo XX. La democracia mas antigua del mundo no solo se había convertido en imperio sino que ello suponía una condición necesaria para la prosperidad global, particularmente para aquellos actores secundarios y terciarios que no teníanlos mecanismos ni la capacidad para incorporarse por si solos a la nueva economía. Sin embargo, en "Colossus" Ferguson también exponía como el imperio informal americano ha carecido de determinadas herramientas burocráticas presentes, por ejemplo, en la notable vocación imperial británica. En parte, "Colossus" refleja que la necesaria presencia imperial americana pudo incluso tener secuelas mas promisorias si ese imperio informal, que ahora llega a su fin, hubiera asumido genuina y profundamente su rol en la historia contemporánea. "Civilization, The West and theRest" viene a fundamentar que ese noble rol ya no puede ser jugado ni por EE.UU. ni por Occidente.En un tema tan trillado es difícil ser original y el autor lo logra. Para ello, recurre a un sofisticado análisis histórico y analítico basado, al menos en parte, en una hipótesis: Oriente, particularmente China, ha incorporado eficientemente 5 de las 6 características que han generado el inédito bienestar contemporáneo de las sociedades Occidentales. Para Ferguson, solo faltaría la propiedad o el estado de derecho. Sin embargo, podemos pensar que el estado de derecho o Rule of Law es, junto a la competencia y la ética del trabajo, los principales pilares de la exitosa experiencia que, a lo largo de 500 años, ha sido Occidente. En una medida, no es posible argumentar a favor (o en contra) de la economía de mercado y el libre comercio sin hacerlo primero sobre el marco institucional que le da vida. Un párrafo aparte merece la relevancia que alcanza para el autor el papel de la ética del trabajo. Basándose en el clásico libro de Max Weber, Ferguson rescata el papel que la ética protestante ha tenido en el desarrollo de los EE.UU. Por otro lado, el autor menciona que esta ética no es propiedad exclusiva de esa expresión religiosa. Es que hay una ética del trabajo en el catolicismo, budismo o confusionismo. Es posible que una de ellas sea mas eficiente que las otras, pero es claro que no existe solo una ética del trabajo para alcanzar el desarrollo. El libro realiza una selección de fotos reveladoras y una de ellas es la de un maduro Max Weber.El papel civilizador que ha tenido el imperio informal moderno que simboliza Occidente ha dejado secuelas positivas que trascenderán su incipiente declinación. El liberalismo como proyecto universal ha fracasado. Sin embargo, permanece vigente un conjunto de normas formales e informales que se han consolidado espontáneamente a lo largo de 500 años inéditos en la historia de la humanidad.Si bien en sus sucesivos libros es posible ver un intento premeditado de ser políticamente incorrecto, en "Civilization"Fergusonbusca y logra sopesar los grandes aciertos junto a las grandes miserias de Occidente. Solo después llega a la sólida conclusión que los aciertos han contribuido a un escenario donde el bienestar se ha democratizado. Este proceso de democratización del bienestar acontecido contemporáneamente en Occidente es inédito en la historia universal. En este punto, Ferguson hace bien en ser todo lo políticamente incorrecto que se pueda, ya que esta descripción posee una dimensión ética innegable: la academia, bien representada en la sofisticada costa este de los EE.UU., ha pasado gran parte de las últimas décadas cuestionando y exponiendo sólo las miserias de Occidente. Si bien ello ha sido para estos exponentes políticamente correcto y profesionalmente sofisticado, Ferguson expone las falencias de esta particular forma que ha tomado la hipocresía (Occidental).En cierto sentido, podemos marcar que para Ferguson es secundario cuánto le debe o deberá la nueva prosperidad de Oriente a las ideas, políticas e instituciones aprendidas de Occidente. No es este el punto principal. La nobleza de la civilización Occidental trasciende a la mayor o menor permanenciade sus ideas e instituciones en el "Eastern Project". En cambio, el valor de estos 500 años de preeminencia Occidental hay que encontrarlos en la aparición de una vocación universal que supuso incorporar la igualdad y la libertad como valores y aspiraciones mutuamente necesarias. Si es que Occidente y el "Liberal Project" descansaron en esta aspiración, su declinación relativa será relevante como situación geopolítica pero secundaria como símbolo. Mas aún, el siglo o la época de Oriente que comienza estará de alguna forma influido por estos 500 años donde la igualdad y la libertad han aparecido como valores universales, mas allá de su fracaso o incapacidad de devenir o permanecer (universalmente)en la nueva geopolítica global.Todo trabajo ambicioso tiene necesariamente puntos débiles y criticables. "Civilization" no es la excepción. Ferguson abusa del papel que, supuestamente, tienen los malos libros de historia en la formación parcial de las nuevas generaciones. Menciona demasiadas veces (en el libro, en sus clases o en sus reiteradas apariciones televisivas) que sus profesores de Historia tenían una visión global sobre el papel de Occidente mucho mas sofisticada que los profesores de sus hijos. Tal vez sea cierto. Sin embargo, tal vez sea solo una buena anécdota.Por otro lado, en el apartado sobre la propiedad (capítulo 3), el autor ocupa demasiado tiempo en la repetida y consabida comparación entre la conquista británica de América del Norte y la conquista ibérica, particularmente española, de América del Sur. El punto es importante y, ciertamente, relevante para el enfoque del libro. Sin embargo, mas allá de anécdotas puntuales, Ferguson no innova en la cuestión y se repite en innecesarias citas que reflejan la vocación autoritaria de personajes (como Bolívar) relevantes para América Latina pero poco relevantes para el objetivo del libro.Ferguson no es un historiador económico sino un original historiador que incorpora en sus análisis la rigurosidad de la economía. Es capaz de pasar de una mención sobre los agentes económicos relevantes en la revolución de 1848a describir el comportamiento probable del bono a 10 años del tesoro de los EE.UU. y mencionar como una agencia crediticia china (Dagong) ha rebajado en noviembre de 2010 la nota de la deuda de EE.UU. (de AA a A+, con perspectiva negativa) o a enumerar en la pagina 317 la estrategia de la inserción china en África.Paso seguido, en la página 319 el autor se pregunta: "What could go wrong for the ascending chinese dragon?". En principio, hay 4 diferentes hipótesis elaboradas por quienes pronostican un traspié. La primera es débil y se basa en la comparación con la experiencia japonesa de finales de los 80´. Es claro que si muchos analistas pronosticaron que Japón superaría a EE.UU. y fallaron, eso poco informa sobre la nueva confrontación por la supremacía. La segunda es mas sólida: China podría sucumbir ante incipientes demandas e incluso explosiones sociales, como efectivamente ha sucedido en el pasado en distintos procesos de modernización. Un tercer escenario es también razonable como problema: una creciente clase media articulándose para demandar una mayor participación política. La cuarta y última sostiene que el creciente poderío chino podría generar alarma en sus vecinos, haciendo que éstos buscaran un balance de poder, coaligándose con EE.UU.Como mencionamos, la notable secuela de Ferguson comienza en 2003 con la historia del auge y caída del imperio británico. El enfoque allí estaba dirigido a cuestionarse cuánto y qué puede aprender el imperio americano de su antecesor y mentor, el imperio británico. En 2004 Ferguson publica el original "Colossus". Entre 2003 y 2011, fecha de la publicación de "Civilization", el autor escribe una historia de la moneda ("TheAscent of Money, A Financial History of theWorld" (Penguin, 2008)). En alguna medida, podemos pensar que es una pieza que enriquece esta notable trilogía de la declinación de Occidente.Es posible ver tres presentaciones sobre "Civilization" (dos relativamente breves (una de las cuales es en BBC radio 4 y la otra en TED) y otra mas larga) en:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LxpO5SKlmPA http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xpnFeyMGUs8 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AORm8Nvoud4Niall Ferguson tiene una página web con información académica y de actualidad:http://www.niallferguson.com(1).-Fergusson, Niall (2011): "The west and the rest". Preface to the UK Edition.Página XV. En la mismalógica, el autor continua: "Put differently, are we witnessing the waning of an age when the greater part of the humanity was more or less subordinated to the civilization that arose in western Europe in the wake of the Renaissance and Reformation-the civilization that, propelled by the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, spread across the Atlantic and as far as the Antipodes, finally reaching its apogee during the Ages of revolution, Industry and Empire?"Página XV.*Licenciada en Relaciones Internacionales (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella-Argentina), maestrando en Arquitectura Urbana (Universidad Di Tella-Argentina)Ha sido Profesora Adjunta en Historia Economica (Universidad Di Tella-Argentina) *New York: Penguin, 2011. 402 páginas

Headlines out of Ukraine in recent weeks have been grim. Military officers on the front lines say that the situation in the country's east is approaching "critical." The country is facing a serious manpower and weapons shortage. The Russian offensive is reportedly accelerating. Privately, Biden administration officials are wondering whether — even with the latest tranche of U.S. aid secured — Ukraine will be able to win this war. Listening to Secretary of State Antony Blinken's speech this week in Kyiv, however, none of this reality was apparent. The tone of Blinken's speech was optimistic — he referred to the war as a "strategic failure" for Moscow and a "strategic success" for Kyiv. He maintained that Ukraine would win the war and eventually join NATO as a thriving democracy with an economy rebuilt from seized Russian assets. "All of these measures – Ukraine's increased integration with, and support from, NATO; a growing network of security agreements with individual countries; a booming defense industrial base – all of these will ensure that the moment conditions are met and Allies agree, Ukraine's invitation and accession to the Alliance will be swift and smooth," Blinken said. "These measures will also ensure that if Russia is ever serious about negotiating a truly just and lasting peace with Ukraine, your military prowess will be formidable, your hand strong, your path to Europe and NATO secure."As the journalist Leonid Ragozin noted on X, "None of that is on the cards at the moment as the devastated and depopulated country is struggling to prevent a collapse on the frontline."The rhetoric is indicative of an administration that has been unwilling to adapt its approach or messaging on the war regardless of changing dynamics. The administration has said that continuing to support Ukraine to improve its battlefield situation will provide Kyiv with a stronger hand at any future negotiations, but has made no indication that such talks are forthcoming and has avoided answering crucial questions about the war's endgame. Notably, the speech contained no specific reference to Ukraine's territorial ambitions. Independent journalist Ken Klippenstein reported on leaked talking points from the secretary's trip, which included as a trip objective "highlight[ing] U.S. support for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace" that includes respect for Ukraine's territorial integrity "within its internationally recognized borders," which would include Crimea and the Donbas. Blinken's speech did not mention either of those regions or include "internationally recognized borders." In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— During his visit, Blinken also indicated that Washington was open to Ukraine using U.S. weapons to hit targets inside Russia. "We've not enabled or encouraged strikes outside of Ukraine, but ultimately, Ukraine has to make decisions for itself about how it's going to conduct this war," he said. Until now, the Biden administration has reportedly told Ukraine not to strike inside Russia, which has been a point of tension between Washington and Kyiv.— Russian President Vladimir Putin is traveling to China this week. In advance of his trip, Putin expressed support for China's peace plan. "We are positive in our assessment of China's approach to solving the Ukrainian crisis," Putin said, according to a translation of a Russian transcript on the Kremlin website. "In Beijing, they truly understand its root causes and its global geopolitical meaning." China has tried to portray itself as a peacemaker in the conflict, and has reportedly been urging Western countries to invite Moscow to upcoming peace summits. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was set to go to Spain and Portugal this week, but he canceled his plans on Wednesday. No official reason was provided, but media reports suggest that he decided to stay in Ukraine amid the Russian attacks in the country.— British foreign secretary David Cameron pitched Donald Trump on pursuing a peace deal if he returns to White House in 2025, as part of an effort to convince the former pressident to support aid for Ukraine, according to The Sunday Times. "Cameron's message was simple: 'What are the best conditions in which you as president can make a deal in January? It's both sides holding their lines and paying a price for that.' Trump is understood to have responded: 'No one has set that out for me in these terms. And I'm glad we had the conversation,'" according to the Sunday Times. The suggestion of such a peace proposal would mark a significant shift in the UK's approach to the war. Since the report was published, officials have tried to squash speculation that the West was planning to force Kyiv to the negotiating table. "There is just no sense at all in which Britain would try to persuade, strong-arm or otherwise, Ukraine into accepting giving up some of their territory. That's a decision entirely for Ukraine," defense secretary Grant Shapps told Times Radio on Tuesday. U.S. State Department news:In a Tuesday press briefing, State Department spokesman Vedant Patel reiterated the key talking points from Blinken's speech."The Secretary is in Kyiv to reaffirm what President Biden has said, which is that we want Ukraine to win, and we're committing – committed to helping Ukraine to do just that," Patel said. "And with the support of the United States, our partners and allies, the Ukrainian people can and will achieve their vision for the future: a free, prosperous, and secure democracy, fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community and fully in control of its own destiny."

The Biden administration is breathing a sigh of relief that it has so far avoided a wider regional war between Israel and Iran. But that self-congratulation should be tempered with realization that it was a close call and that the incentives for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his hawkish governing coalition to provoke one are still present. The Biden administration's rhetorical outrage at Iran's forewarned and well-choreographed symbolic missile and drone attacks on Israeli territory conflicts was absurd, as was its crowing that Israel, with U.S. and allied help, had already "won" by knocking down almost all the sequenced projectiles. American policy has long been so "in the bag" for its Israeli ally, no matter what its behavior, that such silly kabuki has been normalized. Despite the U.S. declaration of victory, designed to dissuade Israel from a strong escalatory response to the Iranian strike, the Israeli leader came close to ordering a much larger "retaliatory" strike than the limited one the Israelis executed, according to the New York Times.Although Hamas started the Gaza conflict with its heinous terrorist attack on Israel, Israel's purposefully reckless attack on Iran's embassy compound in Syria on April 1, 2024 — which killed seven Iranian military personnel, including three top Iranian generals — threatened to widen and escalate the conflict into a direct Israel-Iran war that easily could have dragged in the United States. Internationally, overseas embassies are regarded as being the soil of the home country; thus, Israel's attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria was the same as an attack on Iran itself. As a result, Iran retaliated with the symbolic missile and drone attack against Israeli territory. Netanyahu and his hawkish governing coalition have blatantly rejected a two-state solution that would go a long way toward diminishing conflict in the region and enhancing Israel's long-term security. Even before this pugnacious government took office, Israel has long desired to push the United States into a war with its Iranian rival to ensure Israeli regional dominance by severely diminishing Iran's military capabilities. This hidden agenda was clearly demonstrated by the Israeli government's virulent opposition to the U.S.-led nuclear deal with Iran, which would have blocked pathways for Iran to build a nuclear weapon. One would have thought that Israel would have been wildly excited about an agreement that would have severely restrained Iran's program. Yet, Israel knew that a reduction of tensions between Iran and the United States that the agreement, if it had been fully carried out, would have put any severely debilitating U.S. military attack on Iran's conventional military capabilities and nuclear program in the deep freeze. Fortunately, for the hawks in Israel, when President Donald Trump became president, he unilaterally terminated the nuclear deal, again raising the possibility that the United States might do the dirty work of militarily taking on Israel's archrival. Given that Netanyahu has foolishly worn a partisan preference for Trump and the Republicans on his sleeve, dragging President Biden, despite appearances, into war with Iran has been difficult.Yet now may be Netanyahu's golden opportunity. An even wider war, which includes direct U.S. military conflict with Iran, would help an unpopular, indicted prime minister who may need to stay in power to keep himself out of jail and divert attention from his wildly disproportionate military response and potential bog in Gaza. America's alliances and partnerships with other countries are only of value if they advance what should be the end goal — enhancing U.S. security. One issue — in addition to the free rider problem in which the dominant power (always the United States) bears the greater cost burden — is that smaller countries like Israel can have an incentive to be more aggressive with their neighbors when under the protective umbrella of the larger power. Although intense U.S. and allied pressure on Israel to limit its "retaliatory" strike on Iran has, for the moment, prevented a wider regional war, Netanyahu's political survival may depend on such escalation, especially if he needs to take the Israeli public's attention away from the likely quagmire that poorly planned Gaza aftermath will likely bring forth — similar to the continuing counterinsurgency slog after an initial "win" by the United States in Iraq. Netanyahu has already seen his low poll numbers go up during his dust-up with Iran after his reckless attack on the Iranian embassy. So why not a massive first strike on the Iranian-supported Hezbollah on Israel's northern border to get the escalation ball rolling? New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof reported that one of his "scarier discussions with an Israeli official recently was his advocacy of a first strike on Hezbollah, and a poll found that 53 percent of Israeli Jews favor such an attack on Hezbollah." A lesson of history learned by the American founding generation that was forgotten by U.S. policymakers in their rush to acquire a Pax Americana after World War II: permanent and entangling alliances can commit a country to needless and costly faraway wars — especially a country like the United States that has the intrinsic security advantage of being far away from the world's centers of conflict. The great powers of Europe also forgot the downside of alliances when those pacts dragged them into a cataclysmic war that none of them wanted: World War I.To avoid being enmeshed in a wider war in the Middle East, Biden should threaten to cut off or reduce the billions of dollars in annual U.S. military aid to Israel if it does not stop its overheated actions in Gaza and its blatant attempts to widen the war to include Iran. Instead, the United States is in the process of vastly increasing the amount of that aid, further rewarding Israel for its irresponsible behavior.

It's as if the Ukraine War has all but ended — at least for American politics. If the Republican debates had occurred last year, they would have been consumed with talk over whether Vladimir Putin was readying to roll across Europe and how weak President Biden was for not giving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky our best tanks, our most powerful fighter aircraft, the longest range missiles we had — maybe even access to nukes.But Zelensky wasn't anywhere near the debate stage in Alabama last night, his name not even invoked. Fitting, we guess, since the Senate failed to pass an aid package yesterday that would have sent another $60 billion to Ukraine. This, despite administration claims that the war effort is literally running out of money. Biden even took to the airwaves Wednesday to warn of a NATO war if the funding wasn't approved.Republicans have been souring on the aid for months now, which might account for Ukraine's diminished importance in the conversation. It was outweighed last night by the conflict in Israel, which in itself only drew three questions: Do we send in special forces to get the eight remaining American hostages back from Hamas? What kind of punishment could be slapped on university presidents who allow "pro Hamas" protests on campus? And how do we "get" Iran for purportedly being behind it all?Ukraine was wielded, albeit briefly, as a blunt instrument. At the very least it gave us the tiniest of glimpses into the competing world views of the hawks on the dais (Chris Christie and Nikki Haley) and their chief agitant, Vivek Ramaswamy.Haley raised the issue (without being asked about it) by fitting it into her usual stream of Domino Theory conciousness:"The problem is, you have to see that all of these are related. If you look at the fact Russia was losing that war with Ukraine, Putin had hit rock bottom, they had raised the draft age to 65. He was getting drones and missiles — drones from Iran, missiles from North Korea. And so what happened when he hit rock bottom, all of a sudden his other friend, Iran, Hamas goes and invades Israel and butchers those people on Putin's birthday. There is no one happier right now than Putin because all of the attention America had on Ukraine suddenly went to Israel. And that's what they were hoping is going to happen. We need to make sure that we have full clarity, that there is a reason again that Taiwanese want to help Ukrainians because they know if Ukraine wins China won't invade Taiwan. There's a reason the Ukrainians want to help Israelis because they know that if Iran wins, Russia wins. These are all connected. But what wins all of that is a strong America, not a weak America. And that's what Joe Biden has given us."Vivek Ramaswamy responds:"I want to say one thing about that tie to Ukraine. Foreign policy experience is not the same as foreign policy wisdom. I was the first person to say we need a reasonable peace deal in Ukraine. Now a lot of the neocons are quietly coming along to that position with the exceptions of Nikki Haley and Joe Biden, who still support this, what I believe, is pointless war in Ukraine. …One thing that Joe Biden and Nikki Haley have in common is that neither of them could even state for you three provinces in eastern Ukraine that they want to send our troops to actually fight for. … So reject this myth that they've been selling you that somebody had a cup of coffee stint at the UN and then makes eight million bucks after has real foreign policy experience. It takes an outsider to see this through."To which Chris Christie retorted:"Let me just say something here, you know, his (Ramaswamy's) reasonable peace deal in Ukraine. He made it clear. Give them all the land they've already stolen. Promise Putin you'll never put Ukraine in Russia, and then trust Putin not to have a relationship with China." (Christie then essentially calls Ramaswamy a liar for suggesting he never said that.)Ramaswamy responds:"These people are lying. These are the same people who told you about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to justify that invasion didn't know the first thing about it if they send thousands of our sons and daughters to go die. The same people who told you the same in Afghanistan, where the Taliban is still in charge. Twenty years later, seven trillion of our national debt due to these toxic neocons. You can put lipstick on a Dick Cheney, it is still a fascist neocon today."That was basically it. After $130 billion in U.S. taxpayer money since 2022, most of which we are being told has been spent in Ukraine. After hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and Russians dead and maimed, Ukraine's economy in such a state that the West has to prop it up, and NATO pledging more troops and weapons it doesn't even seem to have, the issue was afforded a scant few minutes, and used only in the broadest of ways to pound each other. Gone was even the ghost of the old argument that the free world was at stake or that our obligation to Ukrainians was a moral imperative. It's been reduced to a political cudgel, which is the first step to being memory holed in Washington. It happened to Iraq and Afghanistan in prior president debates 2012 and 2016.The gist seems to be, maybe if we ignore it, it will just go away?