Giorgio Agamben has used the notion of the state of exception to describe the United States' detention camps in Cuba. Agamben argues that the use of the state of exception in the U.S. can be traced back to President Lincoln's suspension of the right of habeas corpus during the Civil War. This paper suggests that this argument obscures more relevant legal and political precedents that can be found in U.S. territorial legal history. Moreover, while Agamben's argument obscures conceptual distinctions between a state of emergency and a state of exception, his argument also provides resources that can expose the limits of liberal interpretations of the relationship between the State, the citizen, and the law. [Copyright 2006 Elsevier Ltd.]
Federal action addressing climate change is likely to emerge either through new legislation or via the U.S. EPA's authority under the Clean Air Act. The prospect of federal action raises important questions regarding the interconnections between federal efforts and state-level climate policy developments. In the presence of federal policies, to what extent will state efforts be cost-effective? How does the co-existence of state- and federal-level policies affect the ability of state efforts to achieve emissions reductions? This paper addresses these questions. We find that state-level policy in the presence of a federal policy can be beneficial or problematic, depending on the nature of the overlap between the two systems, the relative stringency of the efforts, and the types of policy instruments engaged. When the federal policy sets limits on aggregate emissions quantities, or allows manufacturers or facilities to average performance across states, the emission reductions accomplished by a subset of U.S. states may reduce pressure on the constraints posed by the federal policy, thereby freeing facilities or manufacturers to increase emissions in other states. This leads to serious 'emissions leakage' and a loss of cost-effectiveness at the national level. In contrast, when the federal policy sets prices for emissions or does not allow manufactures to average performance across states, these difficulties are usually avoided. Even in circumstances involving problematic interactions, there may be other attractions of state-level climate policy. We evaluate a number of arguments that have been made to support state-level climate policy in the presence of federal policies, even when problematic interactions arise.
This paper reviews Finland's growth strategy in the postwar decades. Finland was able to initiate an impressive mobilization of resources during this period, reflected mostly in a high rate of capital accumulation for manufacturing industries. This was achieved by an unorthodox combination of dirigiste means and a basic commitment to upholding the market economy. The state acted as a net saver, and credit was rationed to productive investment outlays. This policy package may have been boosted by the country's precarious international position during the cold war, so that an economic failure would have been very risky indeed. We argue also that incomes policies and welfare reforms were important in sustaining the necessary political compromise that underpinned the Finnish development state.
The role of the state in collective bargaining in the three Scandinavian countries is strongly rooted in compromises and traditions shaped long ago. While the state has always played a significant role in Denmark and Norway, a doctrine of freedom of the labour market from state intervention has dominated in Sweden. With different changes both in the bargaining structures and among the main labour market parties since the 1970s, the ability to solve coordination problems embedded in centralised collective bargaining now varies considerably. Procedural rules and routines, together with compulsory mediation and different forms of state intervention, have helped to maintain or restore a stable situation in Norway and Denmark. The Swedish development represents the deviant case, where a weak mediation institution, inter-union rivalry, and the withdrawal of the employer's association from bargaining, have led to a fragmented situation. Le rôle de l'Etat dans les négociations collectives menées dans les trois pays scandinaves est profondément ancré dans des compromis et des traditions façonnées depuis longtemps. Alors que l'Etat a toujours joué un rôle significatif au Danemark et en Norvège, la doctrine de la liberté du marché du travail par rapport à l'intervention de l'Etat a prédominé en Suède. Après des changements différents tant au niveau des structures de négociation qu'entre les principaux acteurs du marché du travail depuis les années soixante-dix, la capacité de résoudre des problèmes de coordination incrustés dans les négociations collectives varie actuellement de manière considérable. Les règles et les routines en matière de procédures, de même que la médiation obligatoire et les différentes formes d'intervention de l'Etat, ont contribué à maintenir ou rétablir une situation stable en Norvège et au Danemark. L'évolution suédoise représente le cas déviant où une institution de médiation faible, une rivalité intersyndicale et le retrait de la confédération patronale de la négociation ont conduit à une situation fragmentée. Die Rolle des Staates in den Tarifverhandlungen der drei skandinawischen Länder ist tief verwurzelt in Kompromisshaltungen und Traditionen, die sich schon vor langer Zeit herausbildeten. Während in Dänemark und Norwegen der Staat schon immer eine wichtige Rolle spielte, wurde die Situation in Schweden von einem Ansatz geprägt, der mehr auf Freiheit im Zusammenhang mit den industriellen Beziehungen setzte. Nach 1970 änderte sich allerdings hier die Situation sowohl, was die Tarifverhandlungsstrukturen als auch die Tarifpartner betraf. Dies hatte Auswirkungen auf die Fähigkeit, Koordinierungsprobleme im Rahmen von Tarifverhandlungen zu lösen. Verfahrensregeln und eine entsprechende Routine haben zusammen mit der Pflicht zu einem Vermittlungsverfahren und verschiedenen Formen der Staatsintervention dazu geführt, dass in Norwegen und Dänemark die Situation stabil blieb. In Schweden zeigt sich indessen der umgekehrte Fall, wo schwache Schiedsstrukturen, die Rivalität zwischen den Gewerkschaften und der Rückzug der Arbeitgeber aus den Tarifverhandlungen zu einer fragmentierten Situation geführt haben.
AbstractFriedmann and McMichael's work, through their concept of the 'food regime', has been foundational to our thinking about the relation between capitalism, the state, and agriculture. Given the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of their seminal 1989 paper in this journal (Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present) it seems very appropriate to commemorate this event by undertaking a reassessment of that paper. This article undertakes such a reassessment by examining and critiquing: the theoretical assumptions underlying the paper, particularly in relation to capitalism, class, and the state. This directs attention particularly to: the authors' (implicit) definition of capitalism; the relation between capitalism and the modern state; their treatment of 'class' and 'class struggle'; and their periodisation of food regimes and the dynamics underlying them, these being premised on their theoretical assumptions. The second, third, and, fourth sections occupy the bulk of the paper. The second section develops a significantly revised theoretical foundation for thinking about the dynamics underlying food regimes, while the third section deploys this as the basis for a new periodisation of food regimes. This periodisation includes a proposed Fifth, or 'Post‐Neoliberal' Food Regime, and the final section examines this in detail.
Argues that the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), which incorporated the concept of the illegal enemy combatant into the law, resulted in the legalization of a new legal & political order in the US. Further, the idea of the illegal enemy combatant concerns the relation between the US state & its residents & the US & other countries, with the concept of the illegal enemy combatant situated at the intersections of military & criminal law & US & international law. It is contended that looking at the concept sheds light on various incarnations of US sovereignty & of the US state's international & domestic relations, allowing for a definition of the new for of the US state. The conceptual history of enemy combatant or illegal combatant is traced to the Bush administration's 13 November 2001 executive order; it first applied to foreigners, but was quickly applied to US citizens as well. It is asserted that while the (2004) Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision seemed a victory for civil liberties, it offered the government the opportunity to ask Congress to custom build a new legal order & that such authority is reflected in the MCA, which provides a political character to the crime(s) of an illegal enemy combatant & legalizes special military tribunals established by the 2001 executive order. These tribunals are supposed to be reserved only for foreign enemy combatants, but the MCA is explicit in applying them to the whole population. Thus, the MCA is seen to transform the state organization via the ending of the formal separation of powers & creating a subjective law placed in the executive's hands, one that no longer respects international law while war becomes an ordinary police operation; US criminal law establishes a new definition of hostility that is globally applied, placing all populations at the mercy of US executive power. D. Edelman
In this article, we propose a new approach to an old question: How does development affect religion-state relations? We argue that because development increases states' ability to effectively formulate and implement policy, it will be associated with greater state regulation of religion. This stands in contrast to predominant theories that examine development's negative impact on individual religiosity while largely overlooking the impact that development may have on state institutions. We test our theory using data drawn from over 160 countries, and demonstrate that the effect of economic development on state regulation of religion is consistently positive, substantively significant, and robust to alternative measurements and the inclusion of a broad range of controls. Statistical analysis also demonstrates that the correlation between development and state regulation of religion is primarily a result of economic development's impact on state capacity, rather than social dislocation or improved coordination by religious communities. Incorporating state capacity recasts the study of religious regulation—and suggests that economic growth is unlikely to take religion off the political agenda.
In this article, we propose a new approach to an old question: How does development affect religion-state relations? We argue that because development increases states' ability to effectively formulate and implement policy, it will be associated with greater state regulation of religion. This stands in contrast to predominant theories that examine development's negative impact on individual religiosity while largely overlooking the impact that development may have on state institutions. We test our theory using data drawn from over 160 countries, and demonstrate that the effect of economic development on state regulation of religion is consistently positive, substantively significant, and robust to alternative measurements and the inclusion of a broad range of controls. Statistical analysis also demonstrates that the correlation between development and state regulation of religion is primarily a result of economic development's impact on state capacity, rather than social dislocation or improved coordination by religious communities. Incorporating state capacity recasts the study of religious regulation—and suggests that economic growth is unlikely to take religion off the political agenda.
In this article, we propose a new approach to an old question: How does development affect religion-state relations? We argue that because development increases states' ability to effectively formulate and implement policy, it will be associated with greater state regulation of religion. This stands in contrast to predominant theories that examine development's negative impact on individual religiosity while largely overlooking the impact that development may have on state institutions. We test our theory using data drawn from over 160 countries, and demonstrate that the effect of economic development on state regulation of religion is consistently positive, substantively significant, and robust to alternative measurements and the inclusion of a broad range of controls. Statistical analysis also demonstrates that the correlation between development and state regulation of religion is primarily a result of economic development's impact on state capacity, rather than social dislocation or improved coordination by religious communities. Incorporating state capacity recasts the study of religious regulation—and suggests that economic growth is unlikely to take religion off the political agenda.
Books reviewed in this article:Glenn Beamer, Creative Politics: Taxes and Public Goods in a Federal SystemDavid Brunori, State Tax Policy: A Political PerspectiveKurt M. Thurmaier and Katherine G. Willoughby, Policy and Politics in State Budgeting
