Suchergebnisse

Steven Rosefielde's article has two objectives: first, to display the major features and the "revolutionary implications" for Soviet economic history of evidence provided in Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago; second, to devise "a coherent and consistent countertheory to the prevailing interpretation of Soviet industrialization." In pursuit of these objectives, he initiates "a complete reconsideration of the causes and consequences of the First Five-Year Plan."

The basic line of reasoning in the excellent and thought-provoking article by Professor Rosefielde is: The Soviets claim and some Western scholars agree that from 1928 to 1932 the economy of the USSR grew dramatically, that, at the expense of an agricultural surplus, industry made a big leap forward "which virtually assured the success of future Soviet economic development." A common belief of specialists (Professor Rosefielde included) is that although some value indicators, especially prices (price changes), could be distorted, in general, Soviet statistics are "not freely invented," and "it is unlikely that the Soviets kept two sets of books." Thus, some scholars have corrected the price basis of the calculation of the rate of economic growth during 1928-32 (instead of 1928 prices, the prices of 1937/50 were used) and obtained much less spectacular, but still very impressive, figures demonstrating growth of the economy, particularly in industry and construction.