Suchergebnisse

Die Autoren untersuchen den Zusammenhang zwischen dem Wechselkurssystem eines Landes und Grundelementen des politischen Systems, wie dem Wahlsystem und dem Gesetzgebungsprozeß. In Ländern, in denen die Kosten für einen Wahlsieg hoch und der Wahlzeitpunkt exogen vorgegeben sind, zeigen Politiker wenig Neigung, ihren Einfluß auf die Geldpolitik wegen eines festen Wechselkurses aufzugeben. Umgekehrt verhält es sich in Ländern, in denen die Kosten für einen Wahlsieg niedrig sind und der Wahlzeitpunkt beeinflußbar ist. Unterschiede im politischen System können also helfen, die Auswahl eines bestimmten Wechselkurssystems zu erklären. (SWP-Clv)

Recent claims that regional government structures are crucial to regional economic competitiveness are controversial. This article summarises the economic arguments for regional government and assesses how far British policy-making on economic development has become regionalised. It examines links between regional institutional capacity and regional economic performance in Britain, commenting in detail upon the experiences of four British regions. The penultimate section suggests the common allegation that Britain is out of step with its European Union partners in terms of regional structures and support for regional economic development is overdrawn. The final section argues that regional government is by no means a proven economic necessity.

THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER MODELS OF SELF-SELECTION IN CONGRESS - WHETHER CONGRESSMEN BY-AND-LARGE FIND THEMSELVES ON COMMITTEES WHICH MOST CLOSELY CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS' INTERESTS - HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZATION. BUILDING ON RECENT FINDINGS WHICH QUESTION A CATEGORICAL SELF-SELECTION PROCESS, IN THIS PAPER THE AUTHORS PRESENT A THEORY OF COMMITTEE FUNCTION BASED ON LOYALTY TO PARTY LEADERS. AS A RATIONALE FOR LEADERSHIP PRIVILEGE, AND TO PROVIDE CONTEXT FOR OUR ARGUMENT, THEY FIRST PRESENT A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK BASED ON A MODIFIED MODEL OF COOPERATION. THEY THEN FOCUS ON CERTAIN SPECIFIES OF OUR LEADERSHIP THEORY; THAT RANK-AND-FILE MEMBERS VOTE LEADERSHIP INTERESTS IN EXCHANGE FOR LEADER SUPPORT IN GAINING CHOICE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS AND AID IN PASSING LEGISLATION. THIS LEADS TO PREDICTIONS ABOUT VOTING PATTERNS ACROSS COMMITTEES. STATIC TESTS OF THESE RELATIONS ARE PERFORMED, AS WELL AS THOSE INCORPORATING CHANGES IN VOTING PATTERNS WITH SENIORITY.