Suchergebnisse

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. The making of criminal law as an element of ius puniendi -- Chapter 3. Substantive criminal law in the normative approach -- Chapter 4. Non-state actors as law-makers -- Chapter 5. Regulation issued by the non-state actors. Chapter 6. Conflict of regulation-elements of norms -- Chapter 7. The regulation of non-state actors as elements of the domestic penal norms -- Chapter 8. Conclusions.

The article is devoted to the identification of characteristic features of legislative defects caused by regulatory legal acts (or within legislative acts) of terminological interpretations that are ambiguous. Polysemy quite often has a negative impact on the universal conceptual-categorical apparatus. Attention is drawn to the fact that the homogeneity of the subject matter of the legal regulation requires the maximum terminological clarity, since the context of the individual legal relations is not in itself sufficiently pronounced to provide a clear delineation of the meaning of the ambiguous term. The manifestations of normative polysemy only reduce the clarity of the law and create difficulties in law enforcement, including in the field of criminal justice. The manifestation of polysemy in criminal procedural law is considered on the example of the ambiguous legal term «reconciliation», the definition of legal meaning of which is determined only by the context of its use. In addition, the study draws attention to the fact that in the criminal procedural legislation there are cases where the problem of polysemy is not solved by taking into account the contextual meaning, and the use of means of interpreting the text of the law does not provide a clear answer. This situation is illustrated by an example of the use by the legislator of the identical terminological designation «trial» both for the name of the stage of proceedings in the court of first instance, and for the name of its separate (second) stage, which involves the examination of evidence. Suggestions are made to eliminate and overcome the described legislative defects.

The application of criminal law to consensual sex is an arena of conflict and contest between conservative and liberal forces in the United States, with occasional feminist interventions. The same arguments tend to recur on each side of the debate. Conservatives assert the appropriateness and necessity of enforcing a particular Judeo-Christian sexual morality through law. Liberals argue for tolerance of private consensual sexual conduct. When the debate shifts from the private to the public arena, conservatives may argue privacy principles, asserting the right of bystanders to be let alone, whereas liberals may shift to freedom of expression arguments. In this paper, I am seeking to find a new way of understanding the criminal regulation of consensual sex that transcends this conservative-liberal debate. In tracking the debate through courts, legislatures, and academic literature, I noted frequent references to disgust or revulsion. These were not incidental, throwaway references. An examination of the theory behind the opposing arguments reveals that disgust plays a central role in determining for each camp which consensual sexual practices should or should not be regulated through criminal law. Disgust is deployed by conservatives to argue for prohibition of various consensual sexual practices. On the other side, one might expect liberals to keep their disgust under wraps in the interest of pluralistic tolerance. This proves not to be the case. Liberals do argue that the generation of disgust by any given practice is not a sufficient basis for criminalizing consensual conduct, but nevertheless frequently invoke disgust to justify confining such conduct to the private realm. Drawing upon literary and psychoanalytic theory, the above references can be characterized as abjection responses and linked to anxiety about the maintenance of boundaries between a variety of cherished classifications, such as human/animal, male/female, adult/child, and citizen/foreigner, the existence of which impose a semblance of order and hierarchy in society. Making this link helps to explain why many are so strongly invested in regulating the private and consensual conduct of others.

"This book traces the history of the EU competence, EU policy discourse and EU legislation in the field of criminalisation from Maastricht until the present day. It asks 'Why EU Criminal Law?' looking at what rationales the Treaty, policy document and legislation put forth when deciding whether a certain behaviour should be a criminal offence. To interpret the EU approach to criminalisation, it relies on both modern and post-modern theoretical frameworks on the legitimacy of criminal law, read jointly with the theories on the functions of EU harmonisation of national law. The book demonstrates that while EU constitutional law leans towards an effectiveness-based, enforcement-driven, understanding of criminal law, the EU has in fact in more than one instance adopted symbolic EU criminal law, ie criminal law aimed at highlighting what values are important to the EU, but which is not fit to actually deter individuals from harming such values. The book then questions whether this approach is consistent or in contradiction with the values-based constitutional identity the EU has set for itself"--

Chapter 1: History of International Investigations and Prosecutions (International Criminal Accountability; International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective); Chapter 2: International Criminal Tribunals and Mixed Model Tribunals (The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; The Making of the International Criminal Court; Mixed Models of International Criminal Justice; Special Court for Sierra Leone; Special Tribunal for Cambodia; East Timor); Chapter 3: National Prosecutions for International Crimes (National Prosecutions for International Crimes; National Prosecutions of International Crimes: A Historical Overview; The French Experience; The Belgian Experience; The Dutch Experience; Indonesia; The U.S. War Crimes Act of 1996; Enforcing ICL Violations with Civil Remedies: The Case of the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act); Chapter 4: Contemporary Issues in International Criminal Law Doctrine and Practice (Command Responsibility; Joint Criminal Enterprise; The Responsibility of Peacekeepers; The General Part: Judicial Developments; Ne bis in idem; Plea Bargains; Issues Pertaining to the Evidentiary Part of International Criminal Law; Penalties and Sentencing; Penalties: From Leipzig to Arusha; Victims' Rights in International Law).

Introduction: The Rule of Law does not exist in Bangladesh, S. 3. - Md. Ashrafuzzaman: Rule of Law in Bangladesh - Normative standards and reality's mirror, S. 9. - Saira Rahman Khan: Vested Interest: The 'Human Rights' practices of political parties, S. 27. - Maimul Ahsan Khan: Constitutional disaster & 'legal' impunity: Constitutional amendments in perspective, S. 45. - CASE STUDIES. - Wild West in the East: Four stories of State persecution, S. 68. - Forty seven cases of unresolved killing, torture and disappearance in five years, S. 74. - INTERVIWES. - Nurul Kabir: 'The rulers do not believe in human dignity', S. 127. - Anu Muhammad: 'Weak electoral process perpetuates conflict', S. 134. - Saiful Huq: 'The government survives as hostages in the hands of law enforcement agencies', S. 146. - Shahed Kayes: 'The criminal justice system is useless', S. 154. - Nur Khan: 'Independence of the judiciary was never ensured', S. 164. - Akmal Hussain: 'Disappearance becomes a means to settle political differences', S. 168. - M. Shahiduzzaman: 'On torture… no comment', S. 172. - Appendix: Parallel Event at the UN HRC on the Rule of Law in Bangladesh, S. 175